Dealing with Democrats. Decision making and policy formation within the British Foreign Office's Central Department with regard to the Czechoslovak political exiles in Britain and the Czechoslovak question, 1939 to 1945. by Brown, Martin D.
H  O  o  ' 2.1 a X
7383498
UNIVERSITY OF SURREY LIBRARY
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if materia! had to be removed,
a note  will indicate the deletion.
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Dealing with Democrats.
Decision Making and Policy Formation within the British Foreign 
Office’s Central Department with regard to the Czechoslovak political 
exiles in Britain and the Czechoslovak Question, 1939 to 1945.
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at
St Mary’s College, Strawberry Hill, 
part of the University of Surrey.
By
Martin D. Brown 
December 2002
Abstract
This study seeks to analyse decision making and policy formation within the 
British Foreign Office’s Central Department in regard to the Czechoslovak political 
exiles based in Britain and the wider Czechoslovak question between 1939 and 1945. 
This thesis will examine the general interaction between the British and Czechoslovak 
authorities during this period and will study the development of British policy on a 
number of crucial issues that defined this relationship. These are the recognition 
question, the influence of military considerations, tripartite relations with both the 
Soviet Union and the Polish government in exile, relations with the Sudeten German 
exiles in Britain and the evolution of British policy on population transfers from 
Czechoslovakia, and finally the role played by the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE). Particular emphasis will be placed on the manner in which British policy 
evolved, the external influences on this process and the extent to which the exiles 
themselves were able to shape the prevailing course of British policy.
This study is based on a detailed and systematic examination of primary 
materials held by the Public Records Office and in other archives. This research 
incorporates materials from a number of departments and from other governmental 
and non-governmental institutions that played a role in the creation of British policy 
during this period. Much use has also been made of official sources, published 
documents, diaries, private papers, memoirs, and the canon of secondary works on 
this subject in both English and in Czech. The secondary works on this subject, 
written during the Cold War, are of particular interest and this study seeks to 
undertake a critical examination of the conclusions they contain and to compare them 
against the current state of archival research and new developments and approaches in 
historical studies. This is not least as these works, predominately written by
2
Czechoslovak emigres based in the west after 1948, continue to have a 
disproportionate influence on our understanding of Anglo-Czechoslovak relations 
during this period.
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Introduction
The polarised effects of Cold War politics have seriously distorted the history 
of Anglo-Czechoslovak relations between 1939 and 1945.1 After the Communist coup 
d'etat in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 both the Communist authorities and their 
opponents created their own accounts of this period. As a result, the history of the 
Czechoslovak government in exile, an organisation of democratic emigres led by Dr 
Edvard Benes, and its relations with the British authorities were made subservient to 
the prevailing ideological and political currents that then existed and many of the texts 
that emerged during this period were highly mythologised.2 While the Communist 
version of this history has been thoroughly discredited since the fall of the Iron 
Curtain in 1989, the opposing anti-Communist version produced in the west remains 
largely unchallenged, and it is this version of history that has come to dominate the 
subject, especially as so few western historians have researched this topic. This is not 
to suggest that this interpretation is wholly inaccurate, but rather that given the 
politicised climate in which it was produced and the absence of accessible primary 
materials significant errors of analysis can be identified. Moreover, these errors 
continue to be uncritically replicated by Czech, Slovak and western historians.3 The 
Czechoslovak writer, Erazim Kohak, addressed these issues in his essay ‘Making and 
Writing History (Edvard Benes 1943-1948)’ where he accused emigre historians of 
politically influenced anachronism, in other words, of consistently portraying myth as
7
1 The term Anglo-Czechoslovak relations is one that is often found in the Foreign Office files and for 
clarity this thesis will confine itself to the use of this term to refer to relations between the British and 
Czechoslovak authorities.
1 As defined by C. Buffet & B. Heuser (eds), Haunted by History. Myths in International Relations, 
London, 1998, p ix.
’ See M. Burleigh, The Third Reich. A New History, London, 2000, pp798-799, R.J. Crampton, Eastern
Europe in the Twentieth Century, London, 1995, pp 190-195 & P. Latawski, ‘Czechoslovakia’ and 
‘Slovakia,’ both entries in I.C.D. Dear & M.R.D Foot (eds), The Oxford Companion to World War II, 
Oxford, 2001, pp216-217 & 787-788.
history.4 It is necessary; therefore, to undertake a critical examination of this subject 
and to compare these received interpretations against the current state of archival 
research and new developments and approaches in historical studies.2'
In order to develop a more balanced and accurate, post-Cold War, history of 
the British position on the Czechoslovak question during this period this thesis will 
examine policy formation within the British Foreign Office and its Central 
Department, which was the primary nexus for relations between the British authorities 
and the Czechoslovak government in exile. While several British historians have 
examined this subject in recent years, no comprehensive examination of Anglo- 
Czechoslovak relations from the British perspective has been undertaken in English. 
As a result, there remains a gap in the literature 011 this subject. A systematic and 
detailed examination of the Foreign Office’s archives at the Public Records Office, as 
well as those of related departments, and a comparison of these documents with 
related primary and secondary sources in English and Czech reveals that many of the 
commonly accepted interpretations of this relationship can be shown to be 
inaccurate.6 These discrepancies are not so much of a chronological or factual nature, 
as the key events and personalities that defined this period of exile have long been
4 E. Kohak, ‘Making and Writing History (Edvard BeneS, 1943-1948)’, in N. Stone (ed), 
Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and Crises 1918-1988, London, 1989, pp 183-201.
3 O. A. Westad, ‘The New International History of the Cold War: Three (possible) Paradigms,’ 
Diplomatic History, Vol 24, No 4, (Fall 2000) pp551-565 8c Westad Reviewing the Cold War: 
Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, London, 2000, F. S. Saunders, Who Paid the Piper, The CIA and 
(he Cultural Cold War, London, 1999, C. Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin’s Cold War, Manchester, 1995 & V. 
Zubolc & C. Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, Harvard, 1996.
6 The files of the Foreign Office, War Cabinet, Prime Minister’s Office, Home Office, Treasury, 
Ministry of Supply, Special Operations Executive (SOE) and other ministries involved in the political, 
economic and military relations between the two governments during the war. Other materials include 
private diaries and papers, newspapers, extracts from Hansard and memoirs. For the some of the key 
texts by Czechoslovak emigres written after 1948 see W. Jaksch, Europe's Road to Potsdam, London,
1963, J. Korbel, Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia: The meaning of its History, New York, 1977, pp 
174-178 & 208, J. Lettrich, History o f Modern Slovakia, New York, 1955, pp 110-243, V. Mastny, 
Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of Communism 1941-1945. New 
York, p p l34-144, J. Mlynarik, ‘The Nationality Question in Czechoslovakia and the 1938 Munich 
Agreement,’ in Stone (ed), Czechoslovakia, pp89-100 & I. Svitak, The Unbearable Burden of History. 
The Sovietization of Czechoslovakia. Vol. 1, Prague, 1990.
known, but are rather issues of interpretation, nuance and context.7 Consequently, 
certain key conclusions about relations between the British authorities and the 
Czechoslovak government in exile need to be revised.
It is necessary, therefore, to outline the literature that has been generated 011 
this topic, and to examine the various interpretations they contain, paying particular 
attention to those works produced by Czechoslovak emigres in the west during the 
Cold War, as it is this material that continues to dominate the subject. The reason for 
this is simple; writers and historians of Central European origin have produced the 
vast majority of work on this topic. No scholarly monographs, collections of 
documents 01* secondary works were produced by British or western historians on 
Anglo-Czechoslovak wartime relations before 1989, in contrast to the wealth of 
material 011 the Munich Agreement of 1938. Although references to the Czechoslovak 
exiles in London appear in a number of British works on the war itself, and in a
• onumber of diaries and memoirs, no comprehensive accounts were produced. Even 
the memoirs of the two Britons who experienced the closest contacts with the 
Czechoslovak exiles, Robert Bruce Lockhart and Frank Roberts, only contain a 
limited amount of relevant information.9 In many respects the dearth of material 
parallels the amount of time the British authorities actually spent considering 
Czechoslovak issues during the war.
The literature on this subject can be divided up into five phases. First, those 
primary materials created during the war itself and up to the end of 1947. These
7 See E. Taborsky, The Czechoslovak Cause in International Law. An Account o f the Problems of 
International Law in Relation to Czechoslovakia, London, 1944.
s See W. Churchill, Finest Hour, London, 1949, p569 & 573 fn., D. Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir 
Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945, London, 1971,p i57, 226,273, 540 & 600, 734-735, B. Pimlott (ed), 
The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940-45, London, 1986, pi 15, 147, 226, 228 & 334 & 
A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, Oxford, 1992, p494.
9 R. Bruce Lockhart, Conies the Reckoning, London, 1947, pp69-121 & F. Roberts, Dealing with 
Dictators. The Destruction and Revival of Europe 1930-70, London , 1991, pp60-63.
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include the documents and propaganda materials produced by the exiles themselves, 
their allies and their enemies.10 In particular there are books and articles written by 
Benes, Hubert Riplca, Milan Hodza and Josef Polisensky.11 Second, those materials 
produced after the Communist coup d'etat and throughout the 1950s, both the official 
Communist version of history and the opposing emigre / dissident accounts produced 
in the west. Particularly works by John Brown (a pseudonym), Josef Korbel, Vaclav 
Krai, Jozef Lettrich, Ripka, Eduard Taborslcy, Jan Stransky, and Pavel Tigrid, who 
founded the highly influential emigre journal Svedectvi [Testament].12 Another 
commentator on this subject was Wenzel Jaksch, a Sudeten German Social Democrat 
who had also been in London during the war, and whose work focused on the forcible
« • I Ttransfer of the Sudeten German population from Czechoslovakia after the war.
Third, the work produced in Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere, during the brief 
liberalisation of the Communist regime in the 1960s, prior to the Warsaw Pact 
invasion of 1968. Notable are those works by Jan Kfen, Radomir Luza and Rudolf 
Strobinger, and the collections of published primary documents that began to appear 
at this time, particularly those volumes by Libuse Otahalova and Milada Cervinlcova
10 Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, On the Reign Of Terror in Bohemia and Moravia under 
the Regime of Reinhard Heydrich, London, 1942, J. Masaryk, Speaking to my Country, London, 1944, 
K. Svedivy, Why We Want to Transfer the Sudeten Germans, London, 1946 & V.Zizka (ed), Bojujlcl 
Ceskoslovensko, 1938-1945, Prague, 1945.
11 E. Benes, Pameti. Od Mnichova k nove voice a k novemu vltezstvl, Prague, 1947, —, ‘The New Order 
in Europe,’ The Nineteenth Century and After, CXXX (September 1941), ppl 50-155, M. Hodza, 
Federation in Central Europe, London, 1942, J. PoliSensky, History of Czechoslovakia in Outline, 
Prague, 1947 & H. Ripka, The Future o f the Czechoslovak Germans, London, 1944.
12 J. Brown, Who's Next? The lesson of Czechoslovakia, London, 1951, J. Korbel, The Communist 
Subversion of Czechoslovakia. 1938-1948. The Failure o f Coexistence, Princeton, 1959, Lettrich, 
History o f Modern Slovakia, H. Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The Story of the Communist Coup 
d'Etat, London, 1950, E. Taborslcy, ‘Benes and Stalin-Moscow, 1943 & 1945,’ Journal of Central 
European Affairs, XIII, (July 1953), p p l54-168, J. Stransky, East Wind Over Prague, New York, 1951 
& Svedectvi, 1957-1990 see also M. Churaft et al., Kdo byl kdo v nasich dejinach ve 20. sto/etl, Vol. 2, 
Prague, 1998, pp221-222. For an example of the rival Communist interpretation see V. Krai, Otazlcy 
hospoddrskeho a socdlniho vyoje v ceskych zemich v letech 1938-1945, Three Volumes., Prague, 1957- 
1959.
|J W. Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, London, 1963, first published in German in 1958.
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and by Vilem Precan.14 This phase was especially important as it represented the first 
academic reassessment of this period based upon primary documentation. Fourth, 
those works produced in the west after 1968 up until the revolution of 1989. These 
included works by Luza, Vojtech Mastny, Colonel Frantisek Moravec and Victor 
Mamatey.15 Equally important was the work of the German historian, Detlef Braudes, 
one of the first people to examine the Foreign Office files released in the early 1970s, 
although his work is clearly sympathetic to the Sudeten German interpretation of 
events.16 Finally, those materials produced after 1989, a period marked by a growth of 
interest in this subject by western historians and the publication of further volumes of 
documents; particularly works by Callum MacDonald, Mark Cornwall, Michael 
Dockrill, Jan Kuiklik and Zbynelc Zeman.17 More important still are the volumes of 
published documents now available on President Benes’s Decrees, the transfer of the 
Sudeten German population, plans for a post-war Czechoslovak-Polish federation and 
Czechoslovak-Soviet relations.18
14 J. Dolezal and J. Kfen (eds), Czechoslovakia's fight, 1938-1945. Documents on the Resistance 
movements of the Czechoslovak People, Prague, 1964, J. Kfen, Do emigrace, Prague, 1963 & V 
emigraci. Zapadnl zahranicni odboj 1939-1945, Prague, 1969, R. Luza, The Transfer o f the Sudeten 
Germans. A Study in Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962, London, 1964, L. Otahalova & M. 
Cervinkova (eds), Dokumeniy z historic ceskoslovens/ce politily, Prague, 1965, V. PreCan (ed), 
Slovenske narode povstanie. Dokumenty, Brats lava, 1965 & R. Sti obinger, Agent-54, Prague, 1964.
15 V. Mamatey & R. Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, New Jersey,
1973, F. Moravec, Master o f Spies, London, 1975, & V. Mastny, The Czechs under Nazi Rule. The 
Failure o f National Resistance, New York, 1971.
16 D. Brandes, Grofibritannien und seine osteuropdischen Alliierten 1939-1943. Die Regierungen 
Polens, der Tschechoslowakei und Jugoslawiens im Londoner Exil vom Kriegsausbruch bis zur 
Konferenz von Teheran, Munich, 1988 & —, Der Wegzur Vertreibung 1938-1945. Plane und 
Entscheidungen zum, ‘transfer’ der Deutschen aus der Tschecho-S/owakei undaus Polen, Munich, 
2 0 0 1 .
17 M. Cornwall, ‘The Rise and Fall of a ‘Special Relationship’?: Britain and Czechoslovakia, 1930-48,’ 
in B. Brivati & H. Jones (eds), Themes in Contemporary British History. * What difference did the War 
make. ‘ Leicester, 1993, pp 130-150, M. Dockrill, ‘The Foreign Office, Dr Eduard Benes and the 
Czechoslovak Government-in-exile 1939-1941,’ Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 6, No. 3, (November 
1995), pp701-718, J. Kuklllc, Londynsky exil a obnova ces/coslovenskeho statu, 1938-1945. Prague,
1998 & —, Myty a realita takzvanych Benesovych dekretu, Prague, 2002, C. MacDonald, The Killing of 
Obergruppenfiihrer Reinhard Heydrich, London, 1989 & Z. Zeman & A. Klimek, The Life of Edvard 
Benes 1884-1948. Czechoslovakia in Peace and War, Oxford, 1997.
18 K. Jech & K Kaplan, Dekrety prezidenta republiky 1940-1945, Two Volumes, Brno, 1995, K. 
Novotny, Edvard Benes, odsun nemcu z ceskoslovenska, Prague, 1996, Nemecek, H. Novackova, I. 
Sfovicelc & M. Tejchman (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy v diplomatickych jednanich, Vol. 1,
The most significant point to make about this canon of work is that between 
1948 and 1989 the subject was dominated by emigre writers, none of whom had 
complete access to all the relevant primary documentation. Indeed, most of the works 
produced in the west during the 1950s relied heavily on oral recollections from 
opponents of the Communist regime; the lack of reliable information amongst the 
emigre community in the west encouraged narratives that were based upon rumour, 
supposition and innuendo.19 Thus, as Kohak notes, no work on this subject can be 
considered to be definitive or complete even before the politicised effects of the Cold 
War are taken into account.20 Obviously, the Czechoslovak and Soviet archives were 
not generally accessible before 1989, but it should be recognised that access to the 
relevant documents in the west was also restricted. The British Foreign Office 
archives were only opened in the early 1970s and further materials, such as those 
dealing with the Special Operations Executive (SOE), were not released until the mid- 
1990s.21 This lack of access to primary materials is one that has slowly begun to be 
rectified over the last decade, but there remains much work to be done in this area. It 
is also clear that there was insufficient time between the end of the Second World 
War and the events of 1948 to establish a measured historical assessment of the 
government in exile’s work.
This is illustrated by an examination of the changing interpretations regarding 
the successes and failures of the ‘action abroad’ over the last 50 years. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the materials on the ‘six years in exile’ produced prior to 1947 stressed 
Benes’s international successes and paid less attention to internal political relations.
Prague, 1998 & I. St’ovi'cek & J. Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polskd jednani o konfederaci a 
spojenectvi 1939-1945. Ceskoslovenske diplomaticke dokumenty, Prague, 1995.
19 See K. Young (ed), The Diaries o f Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Vol. 2, 1939-1965, London, 1980, 
pp651-654, 661-662, 663-665, 671-672, 677-678, 680-681, 683-684 & 701-702.
20 Kohak, ‘Making and Writing History,’ in Stone (ed.), Czechoslovakia, pi 83.
21 FO 371 Series and the HS Series.
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The central focus of these works was the struggle against Nazi Germany, the difficult 
task of re-constructing a Czechoslovak state within her pre-Munich frontiers and 
justifying her role as a bridge between the eastern and western Allies, and not, as 
would subsequently become the case, conflict with the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party (KSC).22 The accounts of the exile written in the west after 1948, however, 
rejected these original, positive conclusions and substituted for them a new set of 
conclusions that took the Communist seizure of power -  not the Second World War - 
as their starting point and context. These narratives, often devoid of primary 
references, increasingly focused on a narrow series of key events; the failure of 
Czechoslovak- Polish talks on a post-war federation, the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty 
of December 1943, the surrender of Podkarpatska rus (Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia) to 
the Soviet Union, the uprisings in Slovakia and Prague and most of all the exiled 
government’s relations with Moscow.23 These accounts, Korbel’s work in the United 
States provides the clearest and most well known example, sought to link the 
activities of the exiles in London to the Communist takeover.24 They tended to focus 
on those political issues related to what many regarded as Benes’s naive, and overly 
enthusiastic, diplomatic relations with Stalin and the Soviet Union, views that were
-j c
prevalent in the British Foreign Office during the 1940s. It would be inaccurate to 
suggest that the accounts produced in the west after 1948 were totally homogeneous, 
however, and differences in interpretation and motivation can be identified, not least 
in Taborsky’s and Luza’s work. Yet, the prevailing interpretations of these emigre
22 See Benes, Pameti & H. Ripka, East and West, London, 1944.
2j See Brown, Who's Next? Lettrich, Histoiy o f Modern Slovakia, F. NSmec & V. Moudry, The Soviet 
Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, Tortonto, 1955 & E. Taborsky, ‘A Polish-Czechoslovak 
Czechoslovak Confederation; A Story of the First Soviet Veto,’ Journal of Central European Affairs, 
IX, no.4, (January 1950), pp379-395.
24 Korbel, Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia, pp 156-217.
23 Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, pp 353,370, 388-389, V. Mastny, ‘The Benes-Stalin-Molotov
Conversations in December 1943: New Documents,’ Jahrbiicher fiir Geschichte Osteuropas, Band
XX, 3 September, 1972, pp376-380 & Young (ed), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, p696.
writers, largely formed in the 1950s, continue to be viewed as a legitimate and 
accurate history of this period.
The effects of the Cold War are even more clearly observable in the literature 
(in Czech, German and English) that deals with the planning, execution and 
consequences of the post-war transfer of the Sudeten German population from 
Czechoslovakia, a policy initiated by the government in exile and developed in close 
cooperation with the British authorities and sanctioned by the Allies at the Potsdam 
Conference in 1945. The resulting diskuse o odsunu [discussion on the transfers] 
clearly demonstrates how the Cold War polarised and mythologised the debate on this 
question.26 For example, the Sudeten German expellee groups consistently inflated the 
number of Germans who died during the transfers, claiming 250,000 fatalities, and 
these figures were widely and uncritically accepted as fact in the west right up until
* 97the downward revision of these figures, to some 20-30,000, in the late 1990s. The
V
transfers were also inaccurately linked to the KSC and the coup of 1948. In fact, the 
way in which history was made subservient to the political imperatives of the Cold 
War was made explicit in 1951 when the National Committee for a Free Europe, 
created and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), encouraged 
Czechoslovak emigres in the west to accept the Sudeten German version of events, 
regardless of their veracity.29 As the historian Eva Hahn has commented, ‘anti- 
Communist Czech dissidents and emigrants, as well as the post-Communist elites that 
adhere to fundamentalist anti-Communism, still view the world through the eyes of
14
26 See T. Burcher, The Sudeten German Question and Czechoslovak relations since 1989, London,
1996 & E. Hahnova, Sudetonemeckyproblem: Obtiznes loucenis minulosti, Ustl nad Labern, 1999.
27 See W. Turnwald, Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, Munich, 1953 & A. De 
Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, London, 1979.
28 Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, p383.
29 F. S. Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War, London, 1999, pp 130-132.
the national-conservative right-wingers in Germany.’30 Quite simply the opinions and 
conclusions formed during the Cold War continue to exert an influence on how this 
history is comprehended today.
The events of 1948, therefore, can be shown to have had a profound effect on 
the history of the ‘action abroad,’ not least because they revised the exile’s own 
interpretation of their activities, but also because they established two opposing, yet 
intertwined, narratives in the absence of any original studies by British historians. The 
first was the Communist interpretation and the second the opposing emigre / dissident 
account. The former was dedicated to legitimising the Communist’s seizure of power 
and discrediting the non-Communist exiles in London, while the latter was devoted to 
proving the lack of legitimacy of the new regime and apportioning blame for the 
coup. Consequently, the opposing camps became locked in a cyclical dialogue with 
each other, each trying to disprove the other’s position, yet neither party was actually 
engaged in a constructive historical dialogue with the past. The history of the ‘six 
years in exile’ was effectively re-written by Communists and anti-Communists alike 
during the Cold War, a process that dislocated accounts of the ‘action abroad’ from 
their original context. If this analysis is correct, then clearly, this fact must be 
recognised, and a re-assessment of these mythical interpretations must now be 
undertaken.
This thesis will begin by examining the general interaction between the British 
and Czechoslovak authorities during the war and will detail the development of 
British policy on a number of crucial issues; the recognition question, military 
relations, relations with the Sudeten German exiles, the evolution of British policy on 
population transfers from Czechoslovakia, tripartite relations with both the Polish
‘,0 M.D. Brown & E. Hahn, ‘The Sudeten Dialogues,’ Central Europe Review, 7.5.01, Vol. 3, N o.16,
15
government in exile and the Soviet Union and finally relations with SOE. The same 
chapter will also detail how the course of the war, and the subsequent creation of the 
Grand Alliance, influenced the formation of British policy on the Czechoslovak 
question. The following chapters will then examine each of these issues in more detail 
and analyse the development of British policy in each case. It is important to 
recognise that the Czechoslovak question was never a high priority for the British 
authorities and at no time between 1939 and 1945 was there a coherent British 
strategy on how to deal with the exiled government’s long-term political objectives, 
such as the reconstruction of the Czechoslovak state within its pre-war frontiers. As a 
result British policy was consistently formed in reaction to the course of events and 
the political pressures applied by Benes and his colleagues.
16
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Chapter One
Outline of Anglo-Czechoslovak Relations, 1939 to 1945.
The German occupation of Czechoslovakia, on the 15 March 1939, proved to be a 
defining moment in Anglo-Czechoslovak relations and one that was possibly more 
significant, at least in the short term, than the conclusion of the Munich Agreement five 
months previously.1 Not only did this event herald a major shift in British foreign policy, 
it also marked the beginnings of an exiled Czechoslovak ‘action abroad’ dedicated to the 
liberation, and eventual re-establishment, of the democratic Czechoslovak Republic.2 Led 
by Dr Edvard Benes, the former Czechoslovak President, this movement used the final 
collapse of Czechoslovakia to begin a determined, and ultimately successful, campaign to 
restore that state within her pre-1938 frontiers.J Although this organisation originated in 
the United States, where Benes was then based, it moved to London in the summer of 
1939 and, staffed by numerous Czechoslovak exiles, soon established working links with 
the British government through the Central Department of the Foreign Office.4 This 
department and its officials became the primary nexus for diplomatic relations between 
these emigres and the British authorities and, as a result, it played a crucial role in the
1 The First Czechoslovak Republic was dissolved in November 1938 and the resulting Second Republic 
was referred to as Czecho-Slovalcia, hyphenated as to reflect the greater autonomy given to Slovakia. When 
Germany invaded on 15 March 1939 a German Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was declared, 
Slovakia had declared its independence the day before. Technically, therefore, Czechoslovakia had ceased 
to exist. This linguistic differentiation was to play a central role in British policy during the early period of 
relations. The Foreign Office referred to the exiles as Czecho-Slovaks in order to avoid recognising the pre- 
Munich borders of the former state, on the whole the Czechoslovak emigres ignored these linguistic 
niceties. The use of the hyphenated form ended after Britain recognised a Czechoslovak Government in 
Exile in July 1941. For clarity this thesis will confine itself to the use of the term Czechoslovak.
2 P. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy. Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865- 
1980, London, 1981, pp290-312 & Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czechoslovakia Fights Back, 
Washington, 1943, pp!17 & 179-180.
3 E. Benes, Pameti. Od Mnichova k nove voice a k novemu vitezstvi, Prague, 1947, pp. 92 — 122.
4 FO 371 22898 C9152/ 7/12 O. Sargent on meeting with K. Lisicky, 27 June 1939, & L. Otahalova & M. 
Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, Prague, 1966, pp53-54.
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formation of British policy on the Czechoslovak question during the Second World War. 
The German invasion of Czechoslovakia, therefore, provided the stimulus for six years of 
close, though often turbulent, Anglo-Czechoslovak co-operation up until the liberation of 
Prague in May 1945.
These relations were shaped and influenced by a number of interconnected 
factors, such as the long drawn out process of British recognition of Benes and his 
colleagues as an official government in exile, the course of the war itself and the 
Czechoslovak contribution to the Allied war effort. In addition, Anglo-Czechoslovak 
relations with the Polish government in exile, the anti-fascist Sudeten German exiles in 
London and with the Soviet Union also played a major role in shaping British policy. 
This was not least because these contacts led to plans for a Czechoslovak-Polish 
federation, the transfer of the Sudeten German population from Czechoslovakia and, 
controversially, Benes’s decision that his foreign policy had to be based ‘between east 
and west.’5 This last aspect was to prove especially important because after the Soviet 
Union’s entrance into the war the Czechoslovak exiles strove to regularise their relations 
with Moscow and the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC).6 This policy, although 
necessary from Benes’s perspective to guarantee Czechoslovakia’s frontiers and her 
future security, placed an increasing strain on his government’s relations with the British 
authorities.7 After spending the war in London, Benes was obliged to return to Prague via 
Moscow in early 1945.
1 See Benes, Pameti, pp424-430 & H. Ripka, East and West, London, 1944.
6 See J. Nemecek, H. Novackova, I. St’ovlcek & M. Tejchman (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy v 
diplomatickych jedndnich, Two Volumes, Prague, 1998 & J. Bloomfield, Passive Revolution. Politics and 
the Czechoslovak Working Class, 1945-1948, London, 1979, pp40-48.
7 FO 371 30828 C 10670/151/12 Bruce Lockhart to Sargent, 12 October 1942, FO 371 34339
Cl 0733/525/12 Eden minute,, 16 September 1943 & K. Young (ed), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce 
Lockhart, 1939-1965, London, 1980, p278.
Before focusing in detail on the various interconnected factors that influenced 
British policy 011 the Czechoslovak question it is necessary to provide an overview of the 
key events that defined this association. The purpose of this approach is three fold. First, 
to depict accurately the historical context in which British policy was created and 
pursued. Second, to provide a chronological outline of the development of these various 
issues. Finally, to examine the interaction between the formation of British foreign policy 
and the course of the war itself, principally because British decision making was 
inexorably linked to, and subservient to, the prior actions of other states and the success 
or failure of military action.
Anglo-Czechoslovak relations can be divided into three distinct periods. The first 
lasted from the beginning of 1939 up until the outbreak of war in September; and was 
marked by the continuing repercussions of the Munich Agreement, by British reactions to 
the events to March 1939 and the need to deal with the successor entities that emerged 
from the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. It is worth noting that the Munich Agreement 
cast a long shadow over Anglo-Czechoslovak relations during the war and was a 
consistence source of tension between the two parties, particularly as Benes was 
determined to annul its terms, while the British authorities were unwilling to reopen what 
they regarded as an embarrassing episode. This was significant because as Lord Annan 
later remarked, ‘To the Foreign Office embarrassment is almost worse than diplomatic 
defeat, because embarrassment is a continuing state of discomfort, like a running sore.’8 
The second period lasted between September 1939 and June 1941 and was largely taken
19
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up by relations between the emerging Czechoslovak ‘action abroad5 and the 
British authorities. These included the recognition of a Czechoslovak National 
Committee and, subsequently, a Provisional Government in exile, as well as relations 
with the other exiled governments in London.
The last period began immediately after the German invasion of the Soviet Union 
and lasted up until the end of the war. This final period saw British recognition of a fully 
accredited Czechoslovak government in exile and, after the assassination of Reinhard 
Heydrich in Prague in the summer of 1942, an official British denunciation of the terms 
of the Munich Agreement.9 In addition, the Czechoslovak government had to re-align its 
foreign policy in response to the Soviet Union’s growing influence in, and eventual 
occupation of, Central Europe. Consequently relations with the Polish government in 
exile deteriorated, plans for a joint federation were shelved and replaced by proposals for 
the wholesale transfer of the Sudeten German population from Czechoslovakia.10 This 
was a situation that resulted in the signing of a Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty in December 
1943 and a growing suspicion amongst many British officials that Benes’s was forming 
too close an attachment to Moscow. Anglo-Czechoslovak relations deteriorated further 
when Benes was forced to recognise the very real limitations of British influence in the 
region after the Special Operation Executive’s (SOE) failure adequately to support the 
uprisings in Slovakia.11
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9 FO 371 30835 C7210/326/12 A. Eden to J. Masaryk, 5 August 1942.
10 See I. St’ovi'cek & J. Valenta, (eds), Ceskoslovenslco-polskd jedndni o konfederaci a spojenectvi 1939-
1945, Prague, 1995 & R. Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans. A Study in Czech-German Relations, 
1933-1962, London, 1964.
11 See V. Precan (ed), Slovenske narodne povstanie, Dokumenty, Bratislava, 1966.
In addition, it is,important to consider how British decision makers perceived the 
Czechoslovak question immediately before the war, especially as these attitudes exerted 
an influence on their later bilateral relations in London. Attitudes amongst British 
officials towards the Paris Peace settlement of 1919 and consequently Czechoslovakia 
and the Sudeten Germans are well known and there is no need to recount them here.12 
While it would be unhelpful to make sweeping generalisations about British views on 
these issues, it would be largely accurate to state that these views were generally negative 
with regard to Czechoslovakia’s treatment of its German citizens and broadly favoured 
peaceful compromise with Germany over German minorities in Central Europe.13 This 
position was compounded by Britain’s military weakness on the Continent and her 
understandable disinclination to go to war over this question.14 It was these views that 
eventually evolved into the policies of appeasement and culminated in the Munich 
Agreement of September 1938. It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that such pro­
appeasement policies predominated or were held by all in government or the Foreign 
Office.15
These attitudes centred on two main contentions. First, that a significant 
proportion of the British foreign policy forming elite regarded many of the new states in 
Central Europe as artificial creations, with arbitrary borders that would have to be revised
12 See H. Nicolson, Why Britain is at War, London, 1939, pp 142-153 for a succinct outline of such views & 
W. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, London, 1948, pp8-9. Also R. Overy & A. Wheatcroft, The Road to 
War, London, 1999, pp 76-77 & 99-100 & R.A.C. Parker, Churchill and Appeasement, London, 2000,
pp 129-130 & 151-153, & A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, Oxford, 1992, ppl36-137.
13 F. Roberts, Dealing with Dictators. The Destruction and Revival of Europe 1930-70, London, 1991, 
pp25-28 & R.M. Smelser, The Sudeten Problem 1933-1938, Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi 
Foreign Policy, Folkestone, 1975, pp211-212.
14 J. Harvey (ed), The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937-1940, London, 1970, p 122-123 & Taylor, 
English History, pp415-418 & 424-432.
15 See R. R J antes (ed), Chips. The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, London, 1967, pp 163-216, A. Eden, The 
Reckoning, London, 1965, pp 18-27, Harvey (ed), The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, pp 102-103, 
Parker, Churchill, and Appeasement, pi 27 & Roberts, Dealing with Dictators, p27-30.
in order to guarantee security in Europe.16 Such attitudes had a significant effect on 
thinking during the crisis of 1939.17 John Troutbeck, a Counsellor at the British embassy 
in Prague, later referred to Czechoslovakia as a ‘distressful and indefensible mosaic’ 
adding that he hoped it would not be re-constructed after the war.18 Even the Permanent 
Under Secretary of States for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan, noted that, ‘We must 
cut our losses in central and eastern Europe -  let Germany, if she can, find her 
‘lebensraum,’ and establish herself, if she can, as a powerful economic unit.’19 Therefore, 
not only was Britain militarily incapable of defending Czechoslovakia, but some officials 
were not pre-disposed to defend such a problematic multi-national creation against what 
they saw as justified German grievances and the threat of war and several were not 
inclined to see the re-creation of these states after the war had been won.
Second, that many British officials believed that the Sudeten Germans’ claims of 
discrimination, which had led to the Munich Agreement, were not only entirely 
legitimate, but that the Czechoslovak government was ultimately responsible for failing 
to rectify this position.20 These attitudes had a long pedigree and had been fostered by a 
number of British diplomatic representatives in Prague, first by the British charge 
d’affaires, Cecil Gosling, then (to a lesser degree) by Sir George Clark, Sir Joseph
16 M. Cornwall, ‘The Rise and Fall of a ‘Special Relationship’?: Britain and Czechoslovakia, 1930-48,’ in 
B. Brivati & H. Jones (eds), Themes in Contemporary British History. ' What difference did the War make. ’ 
Leicester, 1993, pp 133 & 132-134, E. Goldstein, ‘Neville Chamberlain, the British Official Mind and the 
Munich Crisis,’ The Munich Crisis, 1938, Special Issue, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 10, Nos. 2&3, 
(July/November 1999), p282, J. Lukas, Five Days in London. May 1940, London, 1999, pp50-51 & 56-60. 
& B. Pimlott (ed), The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1940-45, London, 1986, p230, 254 &
334.
17 S. Newman, March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland. A Study in the Continuity o f British Foreign 
Policy, Oxford, 1976, p33.
18 FO 371 22898 C l2826/7/12 Troutbeck minute, 22 August 1939.
19 D. Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945, London, 1971, pi 19.
20 Cornwall, ‘The Rise and Fall of a ‘Special Relationship’?,’ in Brivati & Jones (eds), Themes in 
Contemporary British History, p 132, K. Robbins, Politicians, Diplomacy and War in Modern British
Addison, Sir Ronald Macleay and Sir Basil Newton. Although their collective reports 
from 1919 to 1938 were by no means entirely disparaging, over time, these attitudes 
fostered a negative view of Czechoslovakia within the Foreign Office and beyond, not 
least with Orme Sargent, the Assistant Under Secretary of State with responsibility for 
the Central Department.21 These perceptions exerted an important influence on British 
decision making towards the Czechoslovak exiles in London throughout the war and 
although they never resulted in demonstrations of open prejudice they did inform the 
general tone of British relations with their Czechoslovak allies and resulted in a 
disinclination to support many of Benes’s political objectives.
Although the German invasion of Czechoslovakia proved to be a decisive 
juncture in Anglo-Czechoslovak relations, most of the Foreign Office’s time immediately 
prior to this event was spent dealing with financial and industrial questions that had 
resulted from the truncation of Czechoslovakia the previous year. These issues clearly 
reveal the serious difficulties that the British authorities had in constructing a ‘coherent 
strategy’ towards Central Europe in early 193 9.22 These difficulties were compounded by 
Britain’s failure to guarantee the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia from renewed German 
aggression and subsequently allowed Benes to use the events of March 1939 to launch his 
campaign for the reconstruction of the Czechoslovak state. In addition, the British 
authorities soon realised that German interest in Czechoslovakia was now focused on 
controlling its vast armaments industry and although efforts were made to prevent these
History, London, 1994, pp273-297 & N. Rose, Vansittcirt, A Stuc/y of a Diplomat, London, 1978, pi 11 & 
224.
21 G. Protheroe, ‘Sir George Clerk and the Struggle for British Influence in Central Europe, 1919-26,’ in 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 12, No.3, 2001, pp48-49 & 60-61.
22 See R. Overy, & A, Wheatcroft, The Road to War, London, 1999, pp 105-6, R.A.C. Parker, Churchill 
and Appeasement, London, 2000, pp 208-209 & A. Roberts, ‘The Holy Fox’: A Biography of Lord Halifax, 
London, 1991, p i25.
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assets falling under German control, they failed with disastrous consequences. These 
were concerns that had, since the spring of 1938, seen the Foreign Office press for the use 
of ‘British money and economic strength to buttress the economies of those countries [in 
this region] against too great a dependence on Germany.’23 Although these efforts were 
mainly concentrated on Greece and Romania, British loans to Czechoslovakia and the 
interest in her armaments industry must be viewed in the light of these wider 
considerations,24
Neville Chamberlain had accepted the idea of a re-constructive loan to 
Czechoslovakia, but it was the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, who further promoted 
this idea in Cabinet.25 This was regarded as being necessary because the promised 
guarantee of Czechoslovak’s post-Munich frontiers had not been finalised in the face of 
German intransigence and Britain’s understandable reluctance to enter into a unilateral 
guarantee.26 Consequently, financial assistance proved to be the only way to demonstrate 
continued British interest in Czechoslovakia. Even so it was immediately apparent to the 
Foreign Office that such a loan was more of a benevolent, possibly guilty, gesture than a 
serious attempt to re-create a viable Czechoslovak economy freed from German 
influence.27 Negotiations were conducted by the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the French 
government and a Czechoslovak delegation headed by Dr Vilem Popisil.28 The final
23 D.C. Watt, How War Came, London, 1989, p83.
24 See M. Pearton, ‘British Policy Towards Romania, 1939-1941,’ in Extras din Anuaml Insititutului de 
Istorie §i' Arheologie "A.D. Xenopol, ” XXIII/2, la§i, 1986, pp527-552 & A. Teichova, An Economic 
Background to Munich, London, 1974.
2SCAB 23/95 48(38) 3 October 1938 & FO 371 22903 C l720/1720/12 Annual Report on Czechoslovakia 
1938, prepared by the British embassy in Prague 14 January 1939.
~6 D. Diiks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945, London, 1971, ppl26-127.
27 FO 371 22893 C95/3/12, F. Roberts minute, 2 January 1939, see also Treasury to W. Strang, 2 January 
1939 & Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pp 116-121.
25 FO 371 22893 C 702/3/12 Treasury minutes forwarded to Central Department, 14 January 1939.
figure, however, fell well short of the £30 million originally requested.29 These talks 
culminated on 27 January 1939 with the signing of the ‘Financial Assistance to Czecho­
slovakia Act,’ the funds were transferred to Prague on 1 March, and consisted of a loan 
of £10 million, and a cash gift of £3.4 million.30 But the time taken to finalise payment 
meant that the Czechoslovak government had little time to put these funds to any use.
There was another element that can be identified in British behaviour with regard 
to these monies and that was the growing unease with which many people in Britain now 
viewed the policies of appeasement.31 For however justifiable appeasement may have 
once seemed, such unease was now increasingly apparent in both political circles and in 
public opinion.32 These concerns were evident during the Commons debate on the Act on 
7 February, when several MPs highlighted Czechoslovakia’s uncertain position and the 
questionable effects such financial assistance would have in the absence of any guarantee 
of her territorial integrity.33 This polarisation of key British politicians and individuals 
into, what can be broadly defined, as pro and anti-Munich camps was to have significant 
political effects in the medium term and was later to be utilised by Benes and his 
colleagues to their advantage.34
During these talks Popisil raised the question of German interest in 
Czechoslovakia’s industrial assets, specifically the Skoda works in P l z e n .T h e s e
20 FO 371 22893 C 862/3/12,E. Phipps, Paris embassy to Foreign Office, 22 January 1939.
30 p o  371 22894 Cl 128/3/12 Final text of Anglo-French-Czechoslovak agreement, 23 January 1939, and 
Cl 408/ 3/12 details of meeting at Foreign Office on 27 January to sign agreement & FO 371 22894 C2508/ 
3/ 12, confirmation from the Czechoslovak Legation in London that the money had been received, 1 May 
1939.
31 Parker, Churchill and Appeasement, ppl92-195. See also Cato, Guilty Men, London, 1940 & Nicolson, 
Why Britain is at War.
32 Harvey (ed), The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey, pp202-203.
33 House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 343, Cols. 773-855, 7 February 1939.
34 Benes, Pameti, p i24-125.
35 FO 371 22893 C 543/3/12 minutes of Anglo-Czechoslovak discussions, 11 January 1939.
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concerns paralleled continuing British attempts to prevent Czechoslovak weaponry from 
being circulated in an unstable European environment. These activities had first begun in 
the immediate aftermath of Munich when Czechoslovak representatives had approached 
British military authorities to request that they help purchase surplus military stocks.36 As 
a result of these talks the British authorities considered a variety of plans to prevent this 
equipment falling into German hands. These included buying a wide range of military 
materials, acquiring a controlling interest in certain companies and increasing British 
orders with Czechoslovak firms.37 Particular consideration was given to the Vitkovice 
steel works in Ostrava, which owned the Koskullskulle iron ore mine in Sweden.38 But 
due to a variety of logistical and technical difficulties it was concluded that these plans 
were unrealistic.j9 The War Office did manage to smuggle a prototype anti-tank rifle out 
of Prague hidden in the departing Ambassador’s wardrobe in May 1939, but this 
achievement was of limited value.40 Far more successful was the work done by the 
London representative of the Zbrojovka arms factory in Brno, Frantisek Slaby, in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Supply (MOS). He prevented the royalties from the 
manufacture of the Czechoslovak designed BREN light machine gun in Britain falling 
into German hands and assisted several hundred Czechoslovak engineers to escape to 
France and Britain with the help of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). A
’6 CAB 104/111 Department of Overseas Trade to Major General H.L. Ismay, Committee of Imperial 
Defence, 1 October 1938. See O. Holub & V. Kaplan, Opevnem 1935-1938, Ndchodsko, Nachod, 1986.
37 CAB 104/ 111 Committee of Imperial Defence, 14 October 1938, F0 371 21588 Cl 3468/12665/12 
Telegram from Ambassador Basil Newton in Prague to Foreign Office, 20 October 1938, with lists of 
surplus arms on offer, FO 371 22901 C44/44/12 Talks between W. Strang and the French Ambassador, 30 
December 1938 & FO 371 22902 C 1984/1003/12 on plans to increase Admiralty orders at Vitkovice steel 
works, 9 February 1939.
3S CAB 104/112 From British embassy Stockholm to Halifax, 3 April 1939. See also T. Munch-Peterson, 
The Strategy of the Phoney War: Britain, Sweden and the Iron Ore Question, 1939-1940, Stockholm, 1981.
39 CAB 104/112 Committee of Imperial Defence, 19 July 1939.
40 See FO 371 22901 C2895/144/12 to C7261/144/12 various minutes and letters 8 March to 19 May 1939 
& P. Wilkinson, Foreign Fields: the Story of an SOE operative, London 1997, pp59-60.
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number of factories were later established in Britain, India and Afghanistan and 
production of this crucial weapon proved to be a major contribution to the British war 
effort, even after relations between Slaby and the MOS had deteriorated.41
Unsurprisingly, .Germany was also interested in these industrial resources and 
they played a significant role in Berlin’s decision to invade Czechoslovakia in March 
1939 42 As a result the Germany army acquired a ‘huge stock of war material’ that was 
estimated to have increased its armament supply by up to 25% and these factories 
continued to produce arms for the rest of the war.4'5 Benes and his colleagues were 
understandably concerned by this situation and later made frequent requests for the Royal 
Air Force (RAF) to bomb the Protectorate, although none of these attempts proved to be 
particularly successful 44 Weaponry made in the Protectorate was subsequently used in 
Poland and against British forces in France in May 1940 and the hugely popular anti­
appeasement polemic, Guilty Men, noted that the German tanks that had surrounded 
Dunkirk, ‘...had been made according to French design in the Skoda works...’45 The 
Munich Agreement’s impact on Europe was not, therefore, limited only to the political
41 FO 371 22900 Cl 8265/7/12 F. Slaby to Foreign Office, 7 November 1939, FO 371 24290 
C6320/I276/12 Roberts minutes, 24 April 1940, FO 371 26391 Cl 1666/550/12 Ministry of Supply to 
Central Department, 20 October 1940 & 371 47116 N3254/580/12 Slaby memorandum on Caswick Ltd., 
received 20 March 1945. See also the photographs of some of these engineers at work in C. Mackenzie, Dr 
Benes, London, 1946, pp272-273.
42 I. Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945, Nemesis, London, 2001, pp88-89 & 164-165.
43 CAB 21/589 Sir Neville Henderson, British embassy Berlin to Lord Halifax, 28 March 1939 & G. 
Ogilvie-Forbes to Halifax, 30 March 1939.
44 FO 371 30847 C2915/539/12 Bruce Lockhart to Strang, 15 March 1942, request from Benes that 
industrial targets in the Protectorate be bombed & Eden to Sir Archibald Sinclair, Air Ministry, 25 March 
1942. See also HS 4/35 for operational reports on attempts to bomb the Skoda factory in 1942, HS 4/35 
Benes letter to Lord Selborne, 23 November 1942, FO 371 47097 N 7907/233/12 Air Ministry 
memorandum on the RAF’s attempts to bomb industrial targets in the Protectorate during the war, 28 June 
1945 & Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskos/ovenske politiky, p722.
45 Cato, Guilty Men, p i22.
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implications of appeasement, its most damaging consequence was the fact that Germany 
had been allowed to acquire Czechoslovakia’s sizeable industrial assets.
British interests in the financial and industrial future of Czechoslovakia paralleled 
the continued work of the British embassy in Prague, headed by Sir Basil Newton.46 In 
addition, so as to reflect Slovakia’s more de-centralised position, an additional Consul, 
Peter Pares, had been despatched to Bratislava in February 1939.47 As a result the Foreign 
Office was well informed about the separatist tendencies being promoted there by 
Germany.48 These pressures led to the dismissal of Monsignor Jozef Tiso from the 
government, the introduction of martial law and ultimately Slovakia’s declaration of 
independence on 14 March.49 Information about German intentions also reached the 
Foreign Office from a variety of ‘unofficial’ sources.50 One of these was Czechoslovak 
military intelligence known as the dmhy odbor (Second Department or Deuxieme 
Bureau), headed by Colonel Frantisek Moravec, which passed on warnings of a possible 
invasion in early March and these allowed SIS to evacuate Moravec and a number of his 
officers to London on the morning of the invasion.21 Moravec’s organisation had long 
standing relations with the SIS and when combined with the high quality information he 
provided and the financial assistance he received from the SIS Moravec proved to be a 
vital asset for Benes’s ‘action abroad.’52 The British were, therefore, well informed about
46 See FO 371 22896.
47 FO 371 22896 Cl 872/7/12 First report from P. Pares in Bratislava, 9 February 1939.
48 FO 371 22896 C2927/7/12 From N. Henderson, British embassy in Berlin, to Foreign Office, 12 March 
1939 & C2873/7/12 From Sir H. Kennard, British embassy in Warsaw, 7 March 1939.
49 FO 371 22896 C 2774/7/12 Foreign Office memorandum on Slovak Crisis, 7 March 1939.
2,0 C. Andrew, Secret Service, London, 1985, p416, Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 
pi 55-156 & D. Dilks, ‘Flashes of Intelligence: The Foreign Office, The SIS and Security before the 
Second World War,’ in C. Andrew, & D. Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension, London, 1984, ppl 18-119.
51 F. Moravec, Master of Spies, London, 1975, pi 59 & The Daily Telegraph, 15 March 1939.
52 See F. H. Hinsley et al (ed), British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 1, London, 1979, pp 57- 
58, 83, 211, 462, Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, p85, 
Andrew, Secret Service, pp 392-393, Benes, Pamciti, pi 30 & Moravec, Master of Spies, pl45.
the deteriorating situation in the Republic, but as is often the case with ambiguous or 
voluminous intelligence materials these warnings were not acted upon.53 More 
importantly in the absence of a formal four-power guarantee of Czechoslovakia’s 
frontiers it was apparent that there was little Britain could do in the face of determined 
German actions in Central Europe.54
The reactions of the British authorities to the German invasion and the 
establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia were confused and proved to 
have lasting consequences. Sir Neville Henderson passed a protest note to the German 
government that explained that the British government now regarded the Munich 
Agreement as ‘repudiated’;55 but Slovakia’s newly declared independence prompted 
Chamberlain to announce in the Commons that this action had freed Britain from any 
obligations toward Czechoslovakia.56 After these initial responses Chamberlain’s speech 
in Birmingham on 17 March provided a clearer indication of the future course of British 
foreign policy. Chamberlain admitted that war was now a distinct possibility and that 
Britain, whether she wanted to or not, had to preserve the status quo in Eastern Europe.2)7 
This did not mean, however, that his pursuit of appeasement had ended, but rather that 
under pressure from Halifax and the Foreign Office, and in response to wider concerns, 
British resistance to further German expansion in Europe had been stiffened.58
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55 CAB 21/589 15 March 1939.
56 HC Deb., 5th Series., Vol. 345, Cols. 435-440, 15 March 1939.
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In the wake of the war scare over Romania, the Italian invasion of Albania and 
concerns over where Adolf Hitler would strike next, the most important consequence of 
the occupation of Prague were soon announced; consultations with France, Poland and 
the Soviet Union. Although these negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, they did 
result, on 31 March 1939, in an Anglo-French guarantee of Poland’s independence, 
which was belatedly signed in August.59 This agreement decisively tied Britain to 
obligations on the Continent just as the international situation was worsening, 
responsibilities that Britain had long sought to avoid, and ultimately led to the declaration 
of war on the 3 September.60 The final consequence of the events of March 1939 was the 
Foreign Office’s return to the forefront of British foreign policy formation; a position had 
been undermined during Chamberlain’s attempts to reach an accommodation with 
Hitler.61
The Foreign Office had now to deal with the successor entities that had emerged 
from the break up of Czechoslovakia. The decisions that resulted had lasting 
consequences, not least because they delayed the eventual recognition of a fully 
accredited Czechoslovak government in exile until July 1941, a frustrating delay for 
Benes and his colleagues. Here too, the immediate British reactions were somewhat 
confused and resulted in the recognition of the new Slovak state, the de facto recognition 
of the Protectorate (the embassy in Prague was shut in May) and the continued
30
59 See Newman, March 1939, p203.
60 See Nicolson, Why Britain is at War, pp 142-153 for a succinct outline of such views & W. Churchill,
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recognition of Czechoslovakia’s legation in London.62 The recognition of these three 
separate entities was partly due to the re-implementation of the Foreign Office’s standard 
operating procedure in response to unexpected external stimuli. Quite simply, British 
foreign policy decision-making returned to being reactive and incremental, not proactive 
as was the case with appeasement, and would remain so for the rest of the war. 
Unbeknown to the Foreign Office, however, these decisions would provide Benes with 
what he regarded as proof of the ‘juridical continuity’ of the Czechoslovak state and the 
opportunity to use these inconsistencies to promote his political objectives in exile.63 At 
the same time, British recognition of these successor entities meant that the Foreign 
Office was subsequently reluctant to recognise a fourth: Benes’s ‘action abroad.’64
The British authorities had also to return to financial matters in the aftermath of 
the invasion, not least to prevent the grants and loans that had just been paid to 
Czechoslovakia being acquired by Germany. In fact, swift action by the Treasury and the 
Foreign Office resulted in the enactment of the ‘Czecho-Slovakia (Restrictions on 
Banking Accounts, etc) Bill,’ 011 23 March 1939, which blocked access to all funds from 
the former Republic held in Britain.65 However, these preventative measures were soon 
overshadowed by the pace of events when the government found itself embroiled in 
allegations of having allowed a second, financial, Munich to be perpetrated on the
62 On Slovakia see FO 371 22898 C6535/7/12 R. L. Speaight Memorandum, 25 April 1939 & C7036/7/12 
Pares to Foreign Office, 9 May 1939. On the legation see Diiks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, pi 57. On the Protectorate see E. Taborsky, The Czechoslovak Cause. An Account of the 
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Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, p66, HC Deb., 5th Series., Vol. 345, cols, 
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63 Benes, Pameti, p98 & Taborsky, The Czechoslovak Cause, p47.
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hapless Czechoslovaks. The problem concerned an amount of Czechoslovak gold 
(approximately £6 million) held in the Bank of England on deposit from the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS) in Switzerland that had been originally placed there for 
safe keeping.66
On the day of the invasion German officers had forced the directors of the 
Czechoslovak National Bank to draft orders to transfer this gold to German accounts.67 
This request presented a particular problem for the British authorities; on the one hand 
there was an unwillingness to let Germany acquire these funds, as this would undermine 
British attempts to economically contain Germany. On the other, the founding charter of 
BIS (an institution created in 1930 to facilitate the depoliticised management of 
reparations) made it impossible for the British authorities to intervene in BIS decision 
making and the Treasury was unwilling to compromise London’s position as a major 
financial centre by blocking, what it saw, as a legitimate request from the BIS.68 As a 
result, there was little that the British authorities could have done to prevent the transfer 
from proceeding, as it did; yet the blame for the BIS gold fiasco was to fall squarely on 
the government’s shoulders. The acrimonious debates that followed in the Commons on 
18 and 24 May demonstrated that many MPs, Brendan Bracken and Winston Churchill in 
particular, were sympathetic to the Czechoslovak position, and this support was later 
skilfully manipulated by Benes to further his political objectives.69 Unsurprisingly many 
Czechoslovak exiles reacted negatively to these events, and regarded them as further
66 FO 371 22895 C4023/3/12 Newton to Foreign Office, 24 March 1939.
bl E. Kubu, ‘Czechoslovak Gold Reserves and their Surrender to Nazi Germany,’ in London Conference on 
Nazi Gold: December 1997, London, 1998, p246.
68 See FO 371 22895 C4543/3/12 & C4770/3/12.
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2760 & 2274-2278, 24 & 26 May 1939 & Taborsky, The Czechoslovak Cause, pp49-61.
33
evidence of the lengths that the ‘Men of Munich’ would go to satisfy German demands at 
their expense.70 Somewhat ironically, however, the monies that had been retained by 
British actions were later utilised to fund the allied war effort and to finance the 
Czechoslovak ‘action abroad.’71
Before moving on to examine Anglo-Czechoslovak relations during the war itself 
it is necessary to provide some detail about those Czechoslovak exiles who would lead 
the ‘action abroad’ and direct its policies. There are two reasons why this approach is 
necessary; first, that because of a lack of any coherent British policies towards the former 
Czechoslovakia in September 1939, it was the Czechoslovak exiles themselves who set 
the agenda and pace of British policy. The Foreign Office, with some exceptions, was 
continually forced to react to new policy initiatives instigated by these exiles. This was 
because the Foreign Office, and the Central Department within it, had to deal with a wide 
range of international issues on a daily basis, with limited resources and under intense 
pressure. Conversely, Benes’s far narrower focus allowed the ‘action abroad’ to 
concentrate solely on the Czechoslovak question. Second, that although nominally a 
representative, and democratic, government in exile the Czechoslovak ‘action abroad’ 
was in effect created and directed by Benes alone, though his policies were themselves 
influenced by the other factors such as the views of the resistance movements in the 
Protectorate, his own government and the KSC in Moscow.72 Clearly then, any analysis
70 E. Taborsky, President Edvard Benes; Between East and West, 1938-1948, Stanford, 1981, p35.
71 FO 371 24289 C8143/2/12 Treasury to R. Makins, 31 July 1940 & M. D. Brown, ‘The Great 
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of British relations with the Czechoslovak government in exile must contain some 
examination of Benes himself and how he came to lead this organisation.
In the immediate aftermath of Munich, and in response to his own failures, 
exhaustion and intense German pressure, Benes resigned as President on 5 October 1938 
and soon after he travelled to London to stay with is nephew, Bohus Benes, in Putney.73 
Ostensibly this marked the end of Benes’s political career, however, he was an astute, 
resourceful and experienced diplomat and politician and given his own very personal 
relationship to the Czechoslovak State and the intensity with which he felt the ‘betrayal 
of Munich,’ he had no intention of allowing her dissolution to remain uncontested.74 In 
the pursuit of this aim Benes could draw upon his previous experiences during the First 
World War, when, in the company of T.G. Masaryk and Milan Stefanik, he had been able 
to secure the establishment of a Czechoslovak state.721 In fact, these experiences provided 
a blueprint for Benes’s actions during the Second World War.
Benes was in the United States in March 1939, a Professor of Sociology at the 
University of Chicago. His reactions to the invasion were swift; first, he rejected 
Chamberlain’s contention that the Slovak declaration of independence had annulled the 
need for an Anglo-French guarantee. Second, he felt the failure to implement the 
guarantee had destroyed the Munich Agreement and thus released Czechoslovakia and 
himself from any implied constraints.76 The British authorities would never accept this
73 Benes, Pameti, p75-76.
74 See A. Klitnek, Boj o Hrad„ kdo po Masarykovi ?, Prague, 1998, Z. Zeman & A. Klimek, The Life of 
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75 E. Benes, My War Memoirs, London, 1928 & M. Macmillan, Peacemakers, The Paris Conference of 
1919 and its Attempts to End War, London, 2001, pp240-253.
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thesis, even though Benes and the exiled government would repeatedly press for 
recognition of the ‘juridical continuity’ of the Czechoslovak State. Nevertheless, Benes 
began organising an ‘action abroad’ dedicated to the liberation and re-establishment of 
Czechoslovakia. So while Benes had five months to prepare his ‘action abroad’ for a 
‘Free Czechoslovakia in a Free Europe’ no comparable consideration was given to this 
question in the Foreign Office.77
Although an ocean away from the troubles plaguing Europe, the United States 
was a far more fortuitous location in which to start a Czechoslovak exile organisation 
than might be immediately presumed, not least as one and a half million Czechs and 
Slovaks expatriates lived there and offered their political and financial support to 
Benes.78 At this stage Benes realised the weakness of his position and the possibly 
counter productive results of any pre-emptive declaration of his political objectives. 79 
But crucially Benes decided to make London his base of operations, a decision that was 
influenced by the links Moravec had already formed with the SIS and the British 
authorities.80 Although Benes had no way of knowing when the next war would actually 
start, he was well prepared for its outbreak.81 Upon his return to London in June 1939 
Benes was soon in contact with what friends and allies he had there and established 
communications with his supporters in Prague, although by his own admission there was 
little he could actually do at this stage. These was not least because he had assured his
77 FO 371 22898 C6789/7/12 Washington to Foreign Office, 28 April 1939 & C 7587/7/12, Washington to 
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hosts that he would live quietly in Britain and would not undertake any political actions 
or do anything that might embarrass the government.82
It was only on 22 August that the Central Department began to deliberate policy 
toward Benes and his colleagues after being informed by the Home Office that Benes 
intended to proclaim Czechoslovak independence and to form a Czechoslovak legion. 
The minutes and memoranda that followed this warning illustrated the deep divisions that 
existed in the Foreign Office over this issue and ranged from open support to outright 
hostility.83 They also revealed what were to become the central British considerations in 
the debate over the recognition of the exiles. In the first place that, whatever his 
limitations, Benes was the most competent leader for any exiled movement. Second, that 
any reference to the possible restoration of the Czechoslovak state should be couched in 
vague terms and would not include any approval of the thesis of the ‘juridical continuity5 
of the Republic or the restoration of her pre-Munich frontiers.84 Moreover that a careful 
balance should be maintained between the potential usefulness of the Czechoslovak’s 
military, intelligence and propaganda assets and the amount of political support they 
would be given in return.85 Lastly, that some sort of a liaison should be appointed to the 
Czechoslovaks, a post that Robert Bruce Lockhart, an old acquaintance of both Benes
o / r
and Jan Masaryk, would soon fill.
As was to be so often the case in Anglo-Czechoslovak relations during this period 
the course of events outpaced the speed of Foreign Office decision-making. The German
82 FO 371 21588 C l3246/13246/12 Aide-memoire by Masaryk, 29 October 1938.
83 FO 371 22898 C l2826/ 7/12 Home Office to Foreign Office, 22 August 1939, & minutes by F. Roberts, 
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85 FO 371 29899 C l2865/7/12 Troutbeck minute, 24 August 1939.
86 FO 371 22899 C15006/7/12 R. Leeper, Political Intelligence Department, to Cadogan, Foreign Office, 13 
September 1939. R. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, London, 1947, pp64-65.
37
invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, and the Anglo-French declaration of war two 
days later caused the whole apparatus of the Czechoslovak ‘action abroad’ to swing into 
operation. By comparison, although a lengthy memorandum on possible policy toward 
the Czechoslovaks had been circulated, no formal pronouncement of British intentions 
was made.87 Benes opened negotiations when he sent a telegram to the Prime Minister 
announcing that he was the spokesman of the Czechoslovak people and that they too 
considered themselves at war with Germany.88 Gingerly, and mindful of the number of 
complications that recognition of Benes would bring, the Foreign Office decided that it 
would only accept Benes as the de facto spokesman of those Czechoslovaks in exile and 
although British civilian and military authorities had agreed to assist in the formation of a 
Czechoslovak legion in France, it was made it clear that this assistance did not constitute 
any sort of political commitment. This exchange marked the beginning of the long 
drawn out process of British recognition of a Czechoslovak Government in exile.90 
During the ensuing discussions British political recognition was directly linked to the 
amount of military support the ‘action abroad’ could provide.91 As a result, and in the 
face of certain objections and earlier moves by the French authorities the British 
government recognised a Czechoslovak National Committee based in Paris on 20 
December 1939, though Benes himself remained in London.92
87 F 0  371 22899 C l3304/7/12 Troutbeck memorandum, 1 September 1939.
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The duration of the Phoney War between September 1939 and April 1940 saw 
few further developments in Anglo-Czechoslovak political relations. Nor did it see any 
dramatic alteration in the prevailing direction of British foreign policy, which continued 
to be cautious as a result of an inability to predict the likely outcome of events. 93 
Moravec and the SIS maintained their working relationship, the British authorities 
assisted Czechoslovak refugees in Europe to join the army in France or to travel to 
Britain and Bruce Lockhart’s regular meetings with Benes and Masaryk kept the Central 
Department informed of the Committee’s intentions.94 The only source of British concern 
was the increasingly conspicuous divisions within the Czechoslovak ‘action abroad,’ 
largely focused on the activities of Stefan Osusky and Milan Hodza, which festered with 
the portentous inactivity of the period. Although neither man ever posed a serious threat 
to Benes’s leadership and were never regarded by the Foreign Office as credible 
alternatives, their behaviour did consume a disproportionate amount of time.95
There were two new elements in relations, however, that emerged during this 
period. The first was Chamberlain’s decision to invite Churchill and Anthony Eden to 
join the government. As both men were more sympathetically disposed to the 
Czechoslovak cause than some they provided a new dimension in Anglo-Czechoslovak 
relations.96 Second, that Poland’s defeat by Germany and the Soviet Union saw a Polish 
government in exile join the Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris. The Poles did 
not suffer from the same political handicaps that had so far encumbered Benes’s ‘action
93 Roberts, The Holy Fox, pi 78.
94 FO 371 22900 Cl 8276/ 7/12 F. Slaby to Foreign Office, 7 November 1939, see also FO 371 24288 
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abroad’ and they were soon fully recognised by the allies.97 Although Czechoslovak- 
Polish relations never ran smoothly, especially as a result of divergent attitudes towards 
the Soviet Union, these'early contacts soon matured into discussions on a possible post­
war Czechoslovak-Polish federation, a policy that was supported and encouraged by the 
Foreign Office from the outset.98
The resumption of German military actions on the Continent in April 1940 once 
again forced the pace and direction of British policy. As German forces marched toward 
the Channel Britain lost her remaining allies in Continental Europe and only managed to 
recover her own forces from Dunkirk by the slimmest of margins. By July 1940 Britain 
stood alone and there was a pressing need to gain the greatest possible advantage from 
the various emigres now gathered in London, a fact that outweighed the purely political 
objections against proffering further recognition to the Czechoslovaks.99 These political 
imperatives, imposed by military defeat, combined with Benes’s unceasing pressure for 
further recognition (in order, so he argued, to regularise his position vis-a-vis the other 
exiled governments), a continued flow of intelligence from Moravec and the 
establishment of Czechoslovak army and air contingents on British soil made further 
recognition difficult to resist.100 This is not to say, however, that this next phase of the 
recognition process was conducted swiftly or without difficulties, in fact, the discussions
97 A. Prazmowska, Britain and Poland 1939-1943, The Betrayed Ally, Cambridge, 1995, pp40-43.
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and negotiations that led to the British recognition of a Provisional Czechoslovak 
government in exile, on 18 July 1940, took over four months.101
In the wake of this agreement the British and Czechoslovak authorities signed two 
further treaties, respectively on financial and military matters. Britain’s financial position 
by the late summer of 1940 was increasingly troubled; the costs of re-armament and the 
war itself had brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy.102 The Czechoslovak 
emigres were also experiencing financial difficulties, the monies secured by Benes in the 
United States had been almost exhausted by early May and they had to apply for a British 
loan.103 As part of the discussions there arose the question of what to do with some £ 7.5 
million in gold deposited by the National Bank of Czechoslovakia with the Bank of 
England, part of the assets frozen back in March 1939.104 As the further recognition of 
the Czechoslovaks was already under discussion the Treasury suggested that the gold 
could be signed over to them, in turn it was envisaged that the Czechoslovak authorities 
would then ‘donate’ the gold to the allied cause and Britain would cover the, ‘military 
and civil expenditure of the Czech government, within the limits of the value of the 
gold.’105 These negotiations progressed smoothly and Eduard Outrata, the Czechoslovak 
Minister of Finance, and Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer, signed the 
agreement on 25 October 1940.106 From this point on the financial future of the ‘action 
abroad’ was secured and further loans were granted as required. On the same day a
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British-Czechoslovak Armed Forces agreement was signed between Masaryk, the 
Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Halifax.107 Both agreements had the 
effect of further regularising Anglo-Czechoslovak relations and integrating the emigres 
into the British war effort.
There were a number of other developments during the second half of 1940 that 
need to be mentioned as well. The first was the formation of the Special Operations 
Executive (SOE), an organisation designed to bring the war to occupied Europe that soon 
established good working relations with the Czechoslovak military authorities.108 The 
second was the regularisation of the administration of the government in exile. As the 
recognition process had now legitimised Benes’s leadership he began issuing legislative 
decrees, the first of which established the Czechoslovak State Council that met for the 
first time on 11 December.109 Finally, Benes and his government began developing plans 
for a ‘solution’ to Czechoslovakia’s complex minority questions that included the 
possibility of population transfers. Crucially, when the Foreign Office was first informed 
of these plans they were not rejected and they continued to evolve over the next four 
years.110
Therefore, in just over a year, and against the Central Department’s prevailing 
advice, the Czechoslovak emigres had gone from being a stateless people to a recognised 
fighting ally. This was the largely the result of Benes’s judicious utilisation of political 
pressure, applied at opportune moments, and a good deal of luck. It certainly had little to
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do with British policy, which was at best unfocused and regarded the Czechoslovak 
question as a low priority. Nevertheless, the Czechoslovaks themselves still viewed the 
‘Question of Provisionally’ as a form of discrimination and another hurdle to be 
overcome in the drive towards full recognition that commenced in early 1941.111 This 
final phase of the recognition process was made all the more tortuous by the 
Czechoslovak’s insistence on the ‘juridical continuity’ of their state, the restoration of her 
pre-1938 frontiers and continued demands that British adherence to the terms of the 
Munich Agreement be officially revoked. But from the Central Department’s perspective 
the recognition of a Provisional Government in exile was the furthest that they were 
prepared to go at this time. In certain respects, therefore, this period indicated the high- 
water mark of Anglo-Czechoslovak relations because from June 1941 onwards they were 
increasingly complicated by the entry of the Soviet Union into the war and the gradual 
formation of the Grand Alliance. For all these positive developments, however, as 1940 
drew to a close the situation Britain and her allies found themselves in was unrelentingly 
bleak. Although the Battle of Britain had ended German plans for the invasion of Britain, 
the Blitz and the draining Battle of the Atlantic had both now commenced and British 
victories in North Africa were soon blunted by the Italian invasion of Greece on 28 
October 1940. The following year offered little respite and witnessed a fresh series of 
allied defeats in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, developments that necessitated far 
more consideration by the Foreign Office than the Czechoslovak question.
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The invasion of the Soviet Union, on 22 June 1941, proved to have lasting 
consequences for Anglo-Czechoslovak relations. Not only did the Soviet Union’s 
entrance into the war necessitate a fundamental reappraisal of British policy towards 
Moscow and Stalin’s regime, but also the addition of this new ally had an effect on the 
various exiled governments gathered in London.112 This was not least because the Soviet 
Union quickly agreed to recognise a Czechoslovak government in exile and to accept 
many of Benes’s political objectives in return for access to Moravec’s intelligence 
networks.113 This was a development that obliged the Foreign Office to follow suit, 
although it maintained its reservations over Czechoslovakia’s ‘juridical continuity,’ her 
frontiers and the government’s authority over the Sudeten Germans in Britain. Both 
countries recognised the Czechoslovak government through an exchange of diplomatic 
notes on 18 July 1941, marking the end of the recognition process.114 Similarly the 
entrance of the United States into the war in December 1941, and the formation of the 
Grand Alliance, further altered the prevailing dynamics in the relationship between the 
British authorities and the Czechoslovak government in exile.115
But the entrance of the Soviet Union and the United States into the war did not 
reverse the long list of military defeats experienced by the allies. Allied advances in
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North Africa were soon reversed by determined German actions. Yugoslavia, Greece and 
Crete had all been occupied during the first six months of 1941 and the activities of 
German surface raiders and submarines had a devastating effect on the much needed 
supplies being sent across the Atlantic.116 By the time of the German attack on the Soviet 
Union most of Europe was now either under direct German administration or controlled 
by sympathetic regimes, and apart from the bombing of targets in Germany by the RAF 
and the embryonic activities of SOE there was little that Britain could do to alter this 
situation. Even the invasion of the Soviet Union afforded little relief, as few British 
officials believed that the Red Army could withstand the German onslaught for long.117 
As a result, little thought was given to British post-war policy towards Central Europe as 
it was felt that any pronouncements would have been meaningless in the absence of the 
necessary military victories needed to implement them.118 Moreover, the British 
authorities were in no position unilaterally to implement any post-war agreements, as any 
arrangements would have to be agreed with the two other members of the Grand Alliance 
and these partners soon eclipsed Britain’s influence in world affairs and left her 
increasingly incapable of influencing developments in Central Europe.119
The tortuous development of a coherent series of Allied war aims within the 
Grand Alliance did, however, have an effect on the Czechoslovak government. The 
western allies’ failure to declare any definite war aims soon become an increasing source 
of suspicion for the Soviet Union and the smaller allies who had little official information
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on what the west’s post war European policies were likely to be.120 The simple answer 
was that Britain had few post-war policies apart from adherence to the terms of the 
Atlantic Charter, and the refusal to discuss post-war frontiers and this was a policy that 
had few implications for those states located to the west of the Rhine.121 Some attempts 
had been made by the Ministry of Information in late 1940 to draft a statement on British 
war aims, but Churchill had refused to sanction them, stating that, ‘precise aims would be 
compromising, whereas vague principles would disappoint.’122 Churchill’s attitude was 
quite straightforward; securing victory took priority over post war planning. This was in 
many ways a perfectly rational attitude to take, but it was not one that was shared by 
Benes, the Poles or by Stalin, as he made clear to Eden in Moscow in December 1941.123
Clearly, Churchill and other members of the War Cabinet did have some war aims 
in mind; the maintenance of Britain’s status as a world power and the integrity of her 
Empire, but such objectives meant little to the United States, the Soviet Union or to the 
Czechoslovak exiles.124 Indeed, American attitudes towards what they saw as British 
imperialism and protectionism and President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s desire to promote 
his own brand of American ideology were to result in an increasing divide between the 
Anglo-Saxon powers.125 While this lack of war aims actually suited the British style of
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policy formation, as it kept the widest number of future policy options open, it did little to 
mollify Benes’s concerns over the post-war settlement.
These issues became one more reason for Benes to try to secure his political 
objectives through bi-lateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, which had been far more 
forthcoming on these topics than the British had -  not least 011 frontiers.126 This fact was 
originally welcomed by the Foreign Office as a possible means of assisting Anglo-Soviet- 
Polish relations, though this appreciation quickly abated when it became clear that the 
Czechoslovaks intended to use these newly acquired advantages to further their own
197 * * » *agenda and not Whitehall’s. This also gave rise to suspicions amongst certain British 
officials about the closeness of Benes’s contacts with Moscow. This is not to say, 
however, that Anglo-Czechoslovak understandings were not maintained 011 other issues 
or that the Central Department was unaware of the Benes’s desire to maintain a balance 
between the eastern and western powers in his government’s foreign policy. Indeed, 
many efforts were made to preserve the understandings reached between both parties 
during the war, though comments were made about the Czechoslovak’s desire to ‘have
the best of both worlds’ (that is east and west) and the inherent dangers of such a
, . 128 position.
In addition to these developments the appointment of Reinhard Heydrich as Reich 
Protector of Bohemia and Moravia in late September 1941 set in motion a particularly 
important chain of events. These ultimately led to his assassination on 27 May 1942
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(abetted by SOE), British denunciation of the Munich Agreement on 5 August and the 
international community’s gradual acceptance of the principle of transfers as a solution to
_ i
Central Europe’s complex minority questions. Heydrich’s death and the retribution that 
followed, specifically the mass arrests and executions in the Protectorate and the 
destruction of the villages of Lidice and Lezaky, also influenced Anglo-Czechoslovak 
relations.130 This was because the reputation of Benes’s government had been greatly 
enhanced by this dramatic example of resistance in occupied Europe, and by the 
widespread sympathy generated after the brutal retribution exacted by Nazi Germany.131
The attack on Heydrich also occurred during months of protracted Anglo- 
Czechoslovak negotiations over a suitable formula to encapsulate a British denunciation 
of the Munich Agreement.b2 Progress had been hampered by the fact that Central 
Department regarded this issue as a troublesome and unnecessary expenditure of their 
time in what was already a crowded and hectic schedule. For the Czechoslovak 
government, however, this was a crucial issue to which they dedicated a far greater 
proportion of their time and effort than the Central Department was willing, or able, to 
do.ljJ Furthermore the Central Department were aggrieved because they felt that Benes 
was using the publicity surrounding Heydrich’s death to pressurise them to accede to his 
demands.134 Consequently the Department’s officials became increasingly exasperated by 
Benes’s negotiating techniques as P. F. Hancock noted,c We all know Dr Benes’s "step-
129 FO 371 30835 C7210/326/12 Eden to Masaryk, 5 August 1942 and C 7666/326/12 Masaryk’s reply on 
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130 Moravec, Master of Spies, p222
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132 These can be traced through the materials in FO 371 20834 & 20835.
133 Benes, Pameti, p297.
134 See minutes and comments in FO 371 30834 C5797/326/I2, 9 to 14 June 1942,
by-step" methods of negotiation, which are designed to achieve his objects one by 
one.’13:5 These sentiments were echoed by Frank Roberts; ‘Dr Benes is a very experienced 
negotiator, which 110 doubt explains why we are always asked at the last moment for 
further concessions additional to those which we understood to be more or less 
agreed,..’lj6 Nevertheless, and in part due to the attack on Heydrich, the War Cabinet 
agreed to a public denunciation of the Munich Agreement on 6 July, a tentative statement 
agreeing to the ‘principle’ of post-war population transfers and an exchange of diplomatic 
notes duly followed.lj7 For Benes and his government this marked a triumphant reversal 
of what they regarded as the ‘betrayal of Munich.’138 The international attention that the 
exiled government received in the summer of 1942, combined with its enhanced political 
status meant that Benes and his government became markedly less dependent upon 
British political support. This would be illustrated in the spring of 1943 by Benes’s 
decision to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union in the face of the Foreign Office’s 
strenuous objections.139
Heydrich’s death in June 1942 also happened to precede a gradual improvement 
in the Grand Alliance’s’ military fortunes. Whereas the period up to the summer of 1942 
had been characterised by a seemingly unending series of military setbacks the period
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from 1943 to 1945 was marked by a growing number of allied victories in the European 
theatre, not least at Stalingrad and Kursk. Thus, the timing of the assassination, more by 
coincidence than planning, happened to pre-empt this change in allied fortunes and Benes 
and the government in exile were able to reap the political rewards, even with the loss of 
most of the western-orientated resistance in the Protectorate and a corresponding decline 
in the warmth of relations with SOE.140
In the continued absence of any coherent allied war aims and in an attempt to 
generate support for his government’s international position and its long-term political 
goals Benes undertook a series of high-level international visits in 1943. First, he 
travelled to the United States and Canada in May to June and then to Moscow in 
December. 141 Although the Foreign Office had no direct involvement in Benes’s trip to 
Washington, they were kept informed of its outcome.142 Upon his return Benes told Eden 
of his intention to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union. Eden immediately objected and 
informed Benes that Britain and the Soviet Union had agreed in May 1942 to a ‘self- 
denying ordinance’ over treaties with lesser allies and that he felt that such an agreement 
would have a detrimental effect on the Polish exiles in London.14j Months of fierce 
wrangling then ensued over whether Benes should be allowed to proceed, although in the 
end, Benes won the argument and on 12 December 1943 a treaty of Friendship, Mutual
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Assistance and Post-war Co-operation was signed in Moscow, with Benes and Stalin in 
attendance.144 However, the months of arguments and disagreements over the treaty had 
taken a heavy toll on Anglo-Czechoslovak relations and some British officials began to 
view Benes’s behaviour as having placed the Czechoslovak exiles firmly within the 
Soviet camp.14:1
This treaty was signed at a crucial juncture in wartime planning and the continued 
development of relations within the Grand Alliance, not least because it came after the 
Italian armistice - from which the Soviet Union had been excluded - and the first allied 
conference at Tehran, in November 1943.146 Although the conference helped to resolve 
some of the issues that had troubled the alliance, it also made it clear that Stalin had no 
intention of limiting his political ambitions in Eastern and Central Europe and brought 
home the weakness of Britain’s position vis-a-vis the other Great Powers.147 The 
conference further reinforced the Foreign Office’s concerns about the Moscow’s post-war 
objectives in the region, concerns that were echoed by sections of the British media.148 
These suspicions were compounded by the breakdown in relations between the Polish 
government in exile and Moscow by the end of 1943 and there was little the British 
authorities could do but observe the subsequent creation of the Communist dominated
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Polish Committee for National Liberation in October 1944.149 These problems also 
undermined the Poles’ involvement in talks with the Czechoslovak government about a 
possible post-war federation and these came to an inconclusive end.150 Unbeknown to 
Benes and his government, however, the talks in Tehran had also placed Czechoslovakia 
within the Soviet sphere of military operational/occupational control. This fact only 
became apparent when the Czechoslovak government in exile requested SOE’s help in 
re-supplying the Slovak Uprising.151
Military developments on the eastern front and the political dynamics within the 
Grand Alliance were brought into sharp focus on 8 April 1944 when the vanguard of the 
Red Army reached the eastern frontiers of the former Czechoslovakia.152 In response the 
Czechoslovak government in exile concluded a civil affairs agreement with the Soviet 
Union, on the 24 April, designed to regulate the administration of liberated Czechoslovak 
territories and manage the transition from military to civilian rule.153 However, both 
Britain and the United States refused to sign similar agreements on the grounds that their 
armed forces were unlikely ever to reach Czechoslovak territory.154 This was a worrying 
development for the Czechoslovak exiles as it undermined their policy of maintaining 
equality between the eastern and west allies and meant that the Soviet Union would play 
a predominant role in Czechoslovakia’s liberation and political future. Indeed, these 
concerns were heightened by the serious political difficulties that soon developed in
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Podkarpatska Rus (Sub Carpathian Ruthenia) and Slovakia and that ultimately forced 
Benes to return home via Moscow. Nevertheless the reality was that the Red Army was 
already on Czechoslovak territory, domestic support for the KSC was increasing and 
Benes’s western allies had made it clear that they could do little to alter this situation.1:0 
Quite simply, the Czechoslovak government in exile now had little alternative but to rely 
on Soviet reassurances of continued co-operation and non-interference in her domestic 
affairs.
Consequently the Czechoslovak government spent most of 1944 preparing for its 
return to liberated territory and these were plans that neither required nor invited British 
participation, as much of this work now came under the auspices of the tripartite 
European Advisory Commission (EAC).156 This is not to say that the Central Department 
ceased to be interested in the Czechoslovaks in London, but rather that their involvement 
and influence had been greatly reduced. The Central Department, however, remained the 
primary nexus between the British authorities and the Czechoslovak emigres. 
Ambassador Nichols continued to meet regularly with Benes and other members of the 
government although there was only one meeting between Benes and Eden, on 27 
November, which contrasted sharply to the frequency of their contacts during the 
previous year.137
Benes celebrated his sixtieth birthday on 28 May 1944 and this occasion merited 
the dispatch of congratulatory messages from both Eden and Churchill and the
155 Bloomfield, Passive Revolution, pp43-44.
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publication of a collection of celebratory essays to which the Foreign Office, somewhat
I C O
hesitantly, contributed. Financial matters returned to the agenda once more, for the first 
time since 1940, when both British and Czechoslovak representatives attended the 
Bretton Woods conference in July 1944 and the government in exile requested another 
loan and post-war restructuring credits.159 By the end of 1944 the Czechoslovak exiles 
had borrowed a total of £17.5 million from the British authorities.160 Plans for the transfer 
of the Sudeten German populations from Czechoslovakia continued to develop as well, 
and their evolution was closely monitored by the Foreign Office who had already 
contributed to this debate with their own inter-departmental committee of enquiry which 
came out in favour of these plans.161 This process culminated with the submission of the 
first set of Czechoslovak proposals for the implementation of transfers to the EAC in 
November 1944, although international agreement for these plans would not be finalised 
until the Potsdam Conference in August 1945.162
The successful allied landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944 and the Soviet 
summer offensive, Operation Bagration, put Germany on the defensive and encouraged 
partisans and resistance movements across Europe to prepare for uprisings in support of 
the approaching allied armies, actions that were meant to be the culmination of SOE’s 
work in occupied Europe. SOE’s operations with the resistance in France that summer
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proved to be highly successful, as was its continued support for Tito’s forces in 
Yugoslavia.165 Yet, the west’s inability adequately to support the uprisings in Warsaw 
and Slovakia, both of which commenced in August 1944, once again underlined Britain’s 
powerlessness to influence events in Central Europe. Although the Czechoslovak 
government made repeated requests for western support for the insurgents the British 
military authorities denied all these requests, on the grounds that Slovakia was the Soviet 
Union’s responsibility, and the uprising petered out by the end of the year.164
The last few months of Benes’s stay in London during early 1945 continued to be 
dominated by preparations for the return home.163 It should also be noted that Benes and 
the KSC had agreed in Moscow in December 1943 that the government in exile would 
not form the basis of the future government of a liberated Czechoslovakia. A National 
Front government, with significant Communist representation, would be created in its 
place.166 At much the same time the Yalta Conference was convened in the Crimea from 
4 to 11 February 1945.167 Though this meeting of the Grand Alliance was considered a 
success, not least for its Declaration on Liberated Europe, its conclusions focused mainly 
on the Polish question and further reinforced the perception that Britain’s position within 
the alliance was becoming marginalised.168 Moreover, burgeoning British suspicions 
regarding Soviet motives in Central Europe were not shared by the United States, which
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was primarily concerned with securing Soviet assistance for the war in the Pacific.169 
More significantly the western allies now viewed the Soviets as the principle arbiter in 
Czechoslovak affairs, just as they had been during the Slovak Uprising, although Eden 
and the Foreign Office continued to pay lip service to Benes’s objective of securing 
Czechoslovakia’s position ‘between East and West.’
On one level this marked a rather unsatisfactory end to Benes’s stay in London as 
he now believed that the British authorities were content to leave Czechoslovakia to the, ‘ 
tender mercies of the Russians.’570 However, this situation was somewhat mitigated by 
Britain’s position on .the final formula for the exercise of authority in liberated 
Czechoslovakia on 20 March 1945.171 The wording of the formula had already gone 
through several drafts and included various revisions in the Czechoslovaks’ favour.172 
The final statement marked a minor success for Benes and his government. For the first 
time during the war they had managed to extract from the British authorities some small 
measure of agreement that Czechoslovakia might be re-constructed in her pre-Munich 
form, even though the British authorities continued to insist that Czechoslovakia’s 
frontiers would only be definitively settled at the anticipated Peace Conference. Yet, by 
the time it was announced Czechoslovakia’s political and territorial future would no 
longer be determined by Anglo-Czechoslovak relations or by British statements, but 
rather by the actions of the Soviet Union and the United States.
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As the day of Benes’s final departure for Moscow drew near ambassador Nichols 
suggested that the King and Queen might like to invite Benes and his wife for luncheon at 
Buckingham Palace.173 With Churchill and Eden’s away in the Crimea Orme Sargent, 
now Superintending Under Secretary of the Department, wrote to the deputy Prime 
Minister, Clement Attlee, two days later to suggest that, ‘HM Government should no 
doubt also show the President and Madame Benes and the Czechoslovak Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister some civility before they leave...’174 The next day he also wrote to 
Sir Alan Lascelles at the Palace and a luncheon invitation was subsequently sent to Benes 
and his wife for the 14 February 1945.175 This was followed by another lunch on Friday, 
16 February 1945, attended by leading members from the British and Czechoslovak 
governments.176 These meetings marked the last direct high-level contacts between the 
two governments during the war as Benes and many of his colleagues left for Moscow 
soon afterwards.
The Foreign Office continued to receive information about Benes’s political 
activities during his stay in Moscow through its representatives, but his dinner with the 
British Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr on 25 March was the last personal contact 
between a British diplomat and the President for over a month and a half.177 This was the 
result of the Soviet’s refusal to allow the despatch of the western Diplomatic Corps to 
join Benes and his government in eastern Slovakia.178 This development raised concerns
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that the Soviets might attempt to replace Benes with a Communist controlled government 
and the Northern Department (the Central Department had been renamed in late 1944) 
began to consider the political advantages to be gained by encouraging the United States 
to order its forces to occupy Prague in order to counteract this worrying development.179 
Significantly, this decision was made during an important transition in the leadership of 
the Grand Alliance; President Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945 and was succeeded by 
Harry S. Truman. This change had the effect of negating the influence of Churchilfs 
close personal relationship with the former President at a critical juncture and hindered 
his ability to convince the United States to march on Prague.180
Meanwhile, the Red Army had smashed its way into Berlin by late April 1945 and 
the city finally fell on 1 May. The war against Germany was all but won, but German 
resistance continued in the Protectorate and Prague was still an occupied city. On 16 
April Cadogan sent the first official British request that the United States give serious 
consideration to the liberation of Prague to Ambassador J. G. Winant.181 This exchange 
marked the beginning of a brief, intensive and ultimately unsuccessful British campaign 
to encourage the United States to order its forces to move on to Prague during the closing 
weeks of the war. In the event the new American administration and General Dwight 
D. Eisenhower refused to accept what they regarded as Churchill’s politicised rationales 
for advancing further east and refused to do so.183 It was only on 9 May, after nine days 
of street fighting by Czechoslovak insurgents and two days after the war in Europe had
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ended that the Red Army finally entered the Czechoslovak capital and brought the 
German occupation to an end.
British diplomatic contacts with the new Czechoslovak government, which had 
returned to Prague on 10 May, were finally restored when a SOE officer, Harold Perkins, 
managed to slip into the city and he was briefly appointed charge d’affaires. This 
situation lasted until Ambassador Nichols eventually arrived in Prague and took up his 
post in the British Embassy, which had been vacated by the previous ambassador six 
years previously.185 Back in London the head of the Northern Department had a visitor on 
the 8 May.
The Czechoslovak Ambassador called to-day, on instruction from his government, 
to convey their congratulations at the outcome of the war, and to express their 
gratitude for all that H.M. Government had done for them during the years of 
exile.'80
With the end of the war and Benes and his government’s return to Prague six years of 
close and often turbulent Anglo-Czechoslovak relations had finally come to an end.
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Chapter Two 
The Recognition Question
Of all the issues that surround the wartime relations between the British authorities 
and those Czechoslovak political exiles who had escaped to the west none has been so 
thoroughly investigated as the question of recognition. This has been the case for very 
good reasons, for the recognition issue was the central axis around which all Anglo- 
Czechoslovak relations revolved between 1939 and 1941 and this was a process that 
eventually culminated in Britain’s recognition of a fully functioning, and accredited, 
Czechoslovak government in exile in July 1941. The significance of the recognition 
question rested on two main considerations. First, that because the Czechoslovak State had 
been truncated as a result of the Munich Agreement in September 1938 and had then been 
obliterated after the German invasion on 15 March 1939 no such state existed by the 
outbreak of hostilities on 3 September 1939. This placed the Czechoslovak exiles in a very 
different position to the governments of those countries that had been invaded after this 
date, such as Poland, Belgium or Norway, which were officially recognised as victims of 
German belligerence and as functioning governments in exile upon their arrival in London. 
The creation of a representative political body in exile that could argue the case for the re­
establishment of Czechoslovakia (and the repudiation of the terms of the Munich 
Agreement) was, therefore, Edvard Benes’s primary objective from March 1939 onwards.1 
Second, that Benes and his colleagues could only achieve this objective if, and when, they 
were able to enter into an official diplomatic dialogue with Britain and her allies.2 These 
negotiations could not commence, however, until some form of representative political
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body had been recognised; thus British political recognition was a vital pre-condition for 
the fulfilment of Benes’s political objectives in exile. It should also be noted, however, that 
the British authorities retained a number of key reservations throughout the recognition 
process and at no point during the war did they agree to the re-establishment of 
Czechoslovakia within her pre-1938 frontiers, even though Britain’s adherence to the terms 
of the Munch Agreement was eventually rescinded.3
As a result of these two considerations the swift completion of the recognition 
process was more of a priority for Benes than it was for the British authorities, not least as 
the Central Department was reluctant to offer anything beyond the most rudimentary 
acknowledgement of Benes’s political position in exile. Consequently, the pace and agenda 
of the recognition question was one that was instigated by, and constantly driven forward 
by, Benes and his colleagues and not by the British authorities, who were not inclined to 
support his long-term political objectives.
The recognition process itself can be separated out into three distinct phases: The 
first lasted between September 1939 and December 1939 and led to the French and British 
governments agreeing to the formation of a Czechoslovak National Committee, ostensibly 
to help form and control the Independent Czechoslovak Division based in France. The 
second lasted between January 1940 to July 1940 and culminated in the establishment of 
the Provisional Czechoslovak Government in exile. This level of recognition was granted 
on the basis of Britain’s increased need for trained military personnel, provided by 
Czechoslovak soldiers and airmen, after Germany’s successful invasion of France. At this 
stage Benes and his government had succeeded in becoming ‘fully authorised 
representatives in the international sphere,’ although their ‘Provisional’ status continued to 
differentiate them from some of the other exiled government based in London.4 The final
3 See FO 371 30834 C6671/326/12 Eden memorandum on Anglo-Czechoslovak relations, 2 July 1941.
4 E. Taborsky, The Czechoslovak Cause. An Account o f the Problems of International Law in Relation to 
Czechoslovakia, London, 1944, p85.
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phase of the recognition process lasted between the late summer of 1940 up until July 1941 
and culminated in full de jure recognition of a Czechoslovak government in exile by the 
British authorities and their allies. The central reason behind Britain’s decision to grant this 
enhanced level of recognition was not a dramatic charge in British policy, but rather the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union. In fact, on 18 July 1941 Britain and the Soviet 
Union were in direct competition to see who would be first exchange letters of recognition 
with the Czechoslovaks, in the event the Soviets beat the British by a matter of hours. This 
was a development that had a profound effect on Anglo-Czechoslovak relations and one 
that meant that Benes was increasingly obliged to turn to Moscow, as opposed to London, 
for the fulfilment of his post-war political ambitions.
The chronology of these events have been long established and were first detailed 
by a close colleague of Benes’s, Eduard Taborslcy, in The Czechoslovak Cause published 
in 1944.3 It should be noted, however, that his work was produced for propaganda 
purposes and does not claim to take the British viewpoint into account. The aim of this 
chapter, therefore, is to examine the recognition issue from the British perspective and to 
examine why the Foreign Office was originally reluctant to grant the Czechoslovak exiles 
the recognition they requested, and how, in turn, they managed to reserve British policy on 
this question. In order .to achieve this objective it will be necessary to outline the key 
developments in the recognition process, especially those that occurred before the outbreak 
of war. This period is of particular interest as it clearly demonstrates that British policy on 
this question was pragmatic, based on reactions to external events and therefore had a 
tendency to be incremental and often somewhat confused. This was a situation that
3 Taborslty, The Czechoslovak Cause. See also M. Cornwall, ‘The Rise and Fall of a ‘Special Relationship’?: 
Britain and Czechoslovakia, 1930-48,’ in B. Brivati & H. Jones (eds), Themes in Contemporary British 
History. ' What difference did the War make. ’ Leicester, 1993, pp 130-150 and M. Dockrill, ‘The Foreign 
Office, Dr Eduard BeneS and the Czechoslovak Government-in-exile 1939-1941,’ Diplomacy and Statecraft, 
Vol. 6, No. 3, (November 1995), pp701-718.
unintentionally allowed Benes to utilise these inconsistencies to further his own agenda 
and undermine the Central Department’s various objections to full recognition.
More importantly this chapter will detail how British policy on this question was 
repeatedly reversed, or 'short-circuited,' by the actions of the Czechoslovak exiles 
themselves, who repeatedly sought to influence and direct British policy on this issue. A 
particularly vivid example of this can been seen in the Prime Minister’s, Winston 
Churchill’s, note to the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, of 20 April 1941, in which he 
stated ‘I see no reason why we should not give the Czechs the same recognition as we have 
given the Poles.’ Crucially, this was a statement that directly contradicted the Central 
Department's reservations on this question, and had been secured by Benes’s own 
intervention with Churchill during their visit to inspect Czechoslovak soldiers based in 
northern England.6 Thus Churchill’s involvement directly altered prevailing British policy 
and became a crucial factor in full recognition being granted to the Czechoslovaks later 
that year.
It is necessary to start, therefore, by focusing on the period before the outbreak of 
hostilities with Germany. The reason for this is simple; the Foreign Office had begun to 
formulate policy toward the Czechoslovak question before the outbreak of the war and 
these attitudes were to result in a profound reluctance to grant political recognition to 
Benes and his colleagues. This position was the result of a number of factors that can be 
divided into four separate categories. The first concerned the international status of the 
former Czechoslovak State after the German invasion and the establishment of the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and a separate Slovak State in March 1939. Second,
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there was the political status of the former officials and representative organs of that state, 
including Benes who had resigned as the Czechoslovak President in October 1938. Third, 
there were the political actions of those Czechoslovaks in exile before the war began that 
were designed to foster support for their long-term objectives, and those politicians and 
public figures in Britain, France and the United States who supported them. Lastly, there 
were the prevailing international attitudes toward the re-construction of Czechoslovakia 
with her pre-1938 borders complete with her constituent minorities and the Foreign 
Office’s attitudes toward these considerations over time.
Many of the issues that were to complicate and lengthen the recognition process 
were related to these earlier events, and the fact that Britain soon recognised the 
Protectorate and Slovakia was to have an important ancillary effect on later British policy.7 
Moreover, these policies were also entirely symptomatic of the realistic nature of British 
attitudes toward the Czechoslovak question at this time, and while perfectly 
understandable, were to place Britain in a rather disordered position once the war began.8 
In the case of Slovakia, Britain had quickly granted de facto recognition to the state in 
order that, ‘British business could be transacted and communications maintained with the 
government.’9 In the case of the Protectorate the case for British recognition was also 
based on pragmatic considerations, as the Foreign Office’s chief legal advisor, Sir Flerbert 
Malkin, noted
[it] would be in my view unwise if the natural indignation which we all feel 
led us to committing ourselves never to recognise a state of affairs which
7 FO 371 26394 C5090/1320/12 Foreign Office minute, 19 June 1939 and FO 371 22898 C6535/7/12 
Speaight minute, 25 April 1939.
8 Taborsky, The Czechoslovak Cause, pp62-63.
9 FO 371 22898 C7813/7/12 Draft Foreign Office answer to a Parliamentary question on Slovak recognition, 
26 May 1939.
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exists in fact. Experience shows (Ethiopia is a case in point, and so is 
Austria) that it is impossible to maintain such an attitude permanently.. . 10
Although British recognition of these successor entities was challenged and debated in the 
House of Commons in June 1939 these discussions had no effect on policy.11 Therefore, 
even before the outbreak of hostilities the British authorities had accepted the 
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia as fact, albeit a regrettable one and this position was 
influenced by purely realistic rationales, not least Britain’s inability to influence events in 
Central Europe. In addition, the British authorities had not gone any further than 
denouncing the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and no response beyond this
• * 1 9verbal reproach had been seriously considered. Crucially, the guarantee of 
Czechoslovakia’s post-Munich frontiers by the Great Powers was not invoked, a fact that 
Benes then used to promote his thesis that the terms of the Munich Agreement had been 
voided and that the ‘juridical continuity of the Czechoslovak state’ continued to operate.13 
These events meant that the political position of those Czechoslovak exiles in the west, 
Benes in particular, was complicated by the presence of two alternative governments in 
Prague and Bratislava that had already been recognised by Britain. This was not a 
situation, for example, that the Polish government in exile would later have to contend 
with.14
There were two further examples of how British policy helped to complicate the 
recognition question before the war. First, there was the somewhat curious position of the
10 FO 371 22897 C3548/7/12 W. Malkin minutes, 20 March 1939.
11 House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 348, Cols. 1786-1788, 19 June 1939.
12 CAB 21/589 text of Neville Henderson’s message of protest to the German Government, 15 March 1939 
& D. Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945, London, 1971, pp 155-157.
1 ’ D. C. Watt, How War Came, New York, 1989, pp 87 & 166-167. A complex legal argument on this issue 
is put forward in Taborsky, The Czechoslovak Cause, p47, see also Benes, Pameti, p98.
14 A. Prazmowska, Britain and Poland, 1939-1943. The Betrayed Ally, Cambridge, 1995,pp 4-24.
world-wide network of Czechoslovak legations; second there was Benes’s own position. 
After the German invasion the foreign legations of the former Czechoslovakia, in London, 
Paris and Washington, continued to be recognised by their host governments and to 
represent the interests of their citizens there, even though the state they represented had 
ceased to exist.'3 The Foreign Office preserved the status of the legation in London and the 
position of the Charge d’affairs, Karel Lisicky, as a sign of their disapproval of Germany’s 
actions and to prevent the buildings and any assets falling under German control, but this 
action was not meant to confer any greater political significance.'6 Yet again Benes seized 
upon this action as proof of his theory of Czechoslovakia’s juridical continuity, an issue 
that was further to complicate Anglo-Czechoslovak relations, especially as the Foreign 
Office consistently refused to accept this controversial concept.
Second, Benes's own position was complicated by the fact that he had resigned as 
President of Czechoslovakia in October 1938, something that Benes later claimed he had 
been forced to do under duress. Nevertheless, he had resigned before he had travelled to 
the United States, via Britain, to take up a position as a Professor of Sociology at Chicago 
University. The Foreign Office could not, therefore, legitimately regard him as an official 
Czechoslovak representative, unlike Lisicky. However, although he was a ostensibly a 
private individual, Benes had travelled to Britain on a diplomatic visa in late 1938, and 
upon his return to Britain in June the Washington Embassy had also issued diplomatic
| n
visas for him and his party. These actions raise the question of why this was done. On the 
outward journey the rationale was clearly one of safety, Benes had to travel across hostile 
airspace and he was a man with many enemies. The necessity for such a visa on the return 
journey is more difficult to answer, especially as Benes was specifically requested not to
13 FO 371 22897 C3842/7/12, Draft Foreign Office answer to Parliamentary question by A. Henderson, 22 
March 1939 & Benes, Pameti, p 104.
16 Dilks (ed) The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pi 57.
17 C. Mackenzie, Dr Benes, London, 1946, pp236-241.
18 FO 371 22898 C9737/7/ 12 British Embassy, Washington, to Central Department, 30 June 1939.
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involve himself in any political actions on his arrival back in London, warnings he swiftly 
ignored.19 Unfortunately, the answer is not to be found in the files, but this behaviour was 
indicative of the Foreign Office’s confusion over Benes’s political status at this time.
This confusion was to become more apparent when Benes and his entourage 
arrived back in London in July 1939. The Central Department was well aware that Benes 
wished to agitate on behalf of Czechoslovak liberation, not least because they had been 
informed about his successful fundraising and political activities amongst the large Czech
« ■ 71 •and Slovak communities in the United States." Moreover, while there, Benes had already 
accepted the role of leader of the world-wide movement for the restoration of 
Czechoslovak independence and had been generally accepted by the expatriate 
Czechoslovak community as the leader of this ‘action abroad.’22 The Central Department 
therefore made preparations to try and limit the scope of Benes’s political activities in 
Britain. After some internal discussions, and consultations with the Home Office, it was 
decided to
Inform Mr Lisicky verbally that no objection is seen to Dr Benes .settling in 
England but that we naturally assume that he will realise the importance of 
avoiding any activities which might give rise to criticism here or abroad.23
Yet, contrary to British expectations Benes swiftly began to form political links and, rather 
impertinently, asked the Central Department, which of his activities they might object to. 
These included a lunch in his honour in a private room at the Savoy Hotel, hosted by
19 FO 371 22898 C 9152/7/12 Roberts minute on reply to K. Lisicky, 25 July 1939.
20 FO 371 22898 C9152/7/12 Lisicky to Sargent, 27 June 1939.
21 See FO 371 22898 C6071/7/12 Sir R. Lindsey Washington to Foreign Office, 20 April 1939. See also FO
371 22898 C6789/7/12 Lindsay, Washington to Foreign Office, 28 April 1939, an extract from memorandum 
from British Consulate General, Chicago, 20 April 1939 & FO 371 22898 C7587/7/12 Chancery Washington 
to Central Department on activities of Dr Benes in United States, 15 May 1939.
22 Benes, Pameti, pp 104-105 & Interview with Benes in the Chicago Tribune, 19 April 1939.
23 FO 371 22898 C 9152/7/12 Roberts memorandum, 25 July 1939.
Winston Churchill, and a series of lectures at Cambridge.24 Nor had Benes had lost any 
time in acquiring the support of significant British personalities, including Anthony Eden 
and of course Churchill, who were to later prove to be important assets to the 
Czechoslovak exiles.25 As early as July 1939 John Troutbeck, formally a member of staff 
at the British Embassy in Prague and now a clerk in the Central Department, had to admit 
that, even if the Foreign Office had wanted to curb Benes's political activities, There 
would be an outcry... if we tried to stop him.’26 Benes also brazenly denied rumours in the 
French press that he had begun to organise a political liberation movement in London, 
even though this was exactly what he was preparing to do.27
As a result, even before the war began the Foreign Office was well aware of 
Benes’s stated political objectives. Nevertheless, it was only in the weeks preceding the 
declaration of war with Germany that the Central Department finally started to consider 
Benes’s stated objectives and his possible usefulness to Britain in time of war. On 22 
August information was received from the Home Office, to the effect that when war was 
declared Benes would proclaim the independence of Czechoslovakia and try to form a 
Czechoslovak Legion.28 In the ensuing discussion it became clear that the Foreign Office 
as a whole viewed the Czechoslovaks as a potentially useful ally, especially in terms of 
propaganda value, with Frank Roberts, Troutbeck, Alexander Cadogan and Rex Leeper all 
in agreement on this matter. A more detailed examination of these discussions, however, 
reveals a series of concerns that provide some very pertinent reasons for the British not to 
proffer any recognition to Benes and his colleagues.
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Of these, the most extreme example came from Gladwyn Jebb, Cadogan’s private 
secretary, who stated that,
To my mind the re-emergence of that distressful and indefensible 
mosaic [Czechoslovakia] would be something to be avoided rather 
than desired. Surely we had better go much further back and try the 
reconstruction of the Austrian Empire.29
Although this was not an opinion that was wholly representative of the Foreign Office’s 
attitude on this question, this quote does shed some light on the Central Department’s 
reluctance to accept the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia as a foregone conclusion. These 
were attitudes that also (briefly) influenced British desires to see the creation of large 
federated political structures in Central Europe as opposed to the re-construction of the 
former patchwork of nation states.30 Some of these attitudes can be traced back to the time 
of Munich, a feature that Robert Bruce Lockhart described as, ‘a tragic illustration of the 
dislike that men feel for those they have wronged.’31
The key consideration for the Foreign Office in this question, however, was not 
Benes’s ultimate political objectives, but rather what assistance the Czechoslovaks could 
provide to the British war effort. Discussion of this issue first emerged in a memorandum 
written by Troutbeck, entitled Our attitude towards the Czechs and Slovaks in Time o f  
War,22 which tried to define what British policy on this question should be. Importantly, 
Troutbeck echoed Jebb’s reservations about the usefulness of recreating Czechoslovakia
29 FO 371 22898 C12826/7/12 Jebb minutes, 22 August 1939.
30 See 1. Sfovfdek & J. Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polskdjedndnt o konfederaci a spojeneclvi 1939-1945, 
Prague, 1995.
Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p60.
’2 FO 371 22899 C13304/7/12 Troutbeck’s memorandum ‘Our attitude towards the Czechs and Slovaks in 
Time of War,’ 1 September 1939.
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and of having this objective as a stated British war aim. He then went on to list the many 
problems the British authorities would face if they accepted Benes’s political objectives. 
But the greatest stumbling block he identified was the fact that Britain had now advanced a 
guarantee of Poland’s independence, a guarantee that had repercussions regarding Poland’s 
borders as they stood in the summer of 1939.3j These borders now included the long 
disputed region of Tesln (Cieszyn in Polish, Teschen in German), which had formerly been 
part of Czechoslovakia. As Troutbeck noted, ‘With Poland as an ally we should be careful 
to avoid any phraseology in our war aims which could possibly imply that it was our object 
to make her return them [these industrial areas], whatever view may be taken of the justice 
of the case.’ As no officially recognised Czechoslovak ally then existed Poland’s claims to 
the region took precedence over Czechoslovakia’s. Troutbeck also suggested that no 
commitments, nor comments, should be made to ‘ Czechoslovakia’ or ‘independence.’ 
Although he then went 011 to acknowledge that Benes was the bound to be the focus for 
any organisation in exile, and, as a result the Foreign Office, ‘will have no option but to 
accept him as their de.facto spokesman,’ he also admitted that, ‘On moral grounds we 
cannot hold ourselves wholly blameless for their [the Czechoslovaks’] current plight...it is 
therefore clearly in our advantage to encourage them [to resist Germany]...’ In essence, 
Troutbeck admitted that while there were many reasons for the British authorities to avoid 
any firm commitments regarding Czechoslovakia, but that some level of recognition would 
have to be extended to Benes and his colleagues.34
The importance of this memorandum lies in the fact that it broadly encapsulated 
British policy toward the Czechoslovak exiles for the next eight months. Significantly the 
head of the Central Department, William Strang, noted that, ‘This is a very useful paper
3j See Watt, How War Came, pp 179-87.
’4 FO 371 22899 C13304/7/12 Troutbeck’s memorandum ‘Our attitude towards the Czechs and Slovaks in
Time of War,’ 1 September 1939.
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with the conclusions of which I agree.’35 The Foreign Office would now be wary about 
recognising Benes and his political objectives, not least because of the effects such a 
development might have on other countries such as Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.36 As a 
result, although it was understood that some form of political accommodation would have 
to be reached with Benes, it would have to be in a form that avoided any reference to the 
restoration of Czechoslovak independence. These then were the options, as the Foreign 
Office saw them, and they formed the foundations of British policy with regard to Benes 
and his fellow exiles. Clearly then, this was a policy that was diametrically opposed to 
Benes’s stated objectives, especially his belief in the juridical continuity of the 
Czechoslovak Republic.37 However, British reluctance to confer anything beyond the most 
limited recognition was to be repeatedly undermined by the actions of other states, by the 
actions of the Czechoslovak exiles and the progress of the war itself.
Once Britain declared war on Germany, and as the Central Department had 
expected, Benes immediately began to seek political recognition and support for his long­
term objectives from the British authorities. Benes wrote to the Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, the same day and explained that, ‘We Czechoslovak citizens consider 
ourselves as being also in war with German military forces,’ and that they sought ‘the
o
liberation of our fatherland.’ This correspondence immediately brought Troutbeck’s 
memorandum into sharp relief and Chamberlain’s supportive, but completely non­
committal reply closely replicated his advice. Chamberlain replied to Benes on 9 
September stating ‘The sufferings of the Czech Nation are not forgotten. And we look 
forward... to the release of the Czech Nation from Foreign Domination,’ but significantly
FO 371 22899 C13304/7/12, Strang minute, 4 September 1939.
36 FO 371 22899 C 14071/7/12, Sir O. O'Malley to Foreign Office, 17 September 1939 & C16878/7/12 
O ’Malley to Foreign Office, 9 October 1939.
’7 E. Benes, Sest let exilu. A druhe svetove vdlly, Prague, 1947, p50. See also FO 371 22899 C 15433/7/12 
Bruce Lockhart memorandum, 28 September 1939.
38 F0 371 22899 C j 3303/7/12 Benes to Chamberlain, 3 September 1939.
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he made 110 reference to Czechoslovakia.39 Benes also had two interviews in September 
with the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, in which he set out his objectives and asked the 
British authorities for a clear statement on their attitude toward the restoration of a 
Czechoslovak State, and toward recognising an exiled government led by himself.40 These 
questions were perceived as being important enough for consideration in the Cabinet, but 
the answers that emerged were vague. To the first Flalifax replied that no war aims had yet 
been decided upon apart from, ‘securing by every possible means, of the defeat of 
Germany.’ On the question of recognising Benes as the leader of the Czechoslovaks in 
exile Halifax wrote that, ‘it was under consideration: his [the Secretary of State’s] present 
feeling was that this request should be granted.’41 What was clear from this reply was that 
the War Cabinet had far more pressing issues to consider, and these answers were solely 
designed to placate Benes.42 The political status of the Czechoslovaks exiles in London 
was therefore not a primary consideration; thus Benes’s first request for political 
recognition by Britain had been met with a generally supportive, but firmly non-committal, 
response.
One of the central reasons that this policy was soon under review was the 
appointment of Robert Bruce Lockhart as a political liaison with Benes and the 
Czechoslovak exiles. Bruce Lockhart’s long friendship with Jan Masaryk and Benes, 
combined with his intimate knowledge of Czechoslovakia, the result of his posting to the 
British embassy in Prague in the early 1920s, made him an ideal nexus between the 
Czechoslovaks and the Foreign Office43 It was Rex Leeper, head of the Political 
Intelligence Department (PID), who had originally proposed Bruce Lockhart for this post
39 FO 371 22899 C l3303/7/12 Chamberlain to Benes, 9 September 1939.
40 FO 371 22899 C 14548/7/12 Halifax memorandum on his meeting with Benes, 19 September 1939.
41 FO 371 22899 C 14528/7/12 Extracts from War Cabinet Conclusions 21(39), 20 September 1939.
42 Prazmowska, Britain and Polandj p 33.
43 See K. Young (ed), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Vol I, 1915-1938, London, 1973, pp55-63 
& R. Bruce Lockhart, Retreat From Glory, London, 1934, pp56-l 18.
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in mid-September 1939.44 Soon after this development Leeper detailed the prevailing 
British attitude on the Czechoslovak question to Bruce Lockhart: ‘Progress was bound to 
be slow...because the Czechoslovaks were not in favour [with the British authorities] and 
were not regarded as very important.’45 The significance of Bruce Lockhart’s position lay 
in the fact that he helped to establish a clear channel of communication between the 
Czechoslovak exiles and the British authorities 46 Once Bruce Lockhart had accepted this 
position he soon began to produce memoranda for the Central Department, based on 
weekly meetings with Masaryk and Benes. In these he carefully outlined Benes’s 
objectives, the disunity amongst the exiles and the alleged support they had within the 
governments of the Protectorate and Slovakia.47 Lastly, and possibly most importantly 
Bruce Lockhart also stressed the Czechoslovak’s potential contribution to the war effort. 
Specifically, he emphasised the close links between the Czechoslovak druhy odbor (second 
department or Deuxieme Bureau) and British intelligence and Benes’s hopes of raising a 
25,000-man Czechoslovak legion to fight in France.48 He concluded that, ‘1 believe that of 
all the smaller nations of Europe they are the most capable of waging a determined and 
successful underground war against foreign oppression.’49 These military considerations 
soon proved to be another ingredient that undermined the Foreign Office’s original 
position on recognition.
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In the event the first phase of the recognition process was started by the French 
Government and not by the British authorities or Benes. This was because a significant 
number of Czechoslovak soldiers had escaped from Central Europe and had gathered in 
France, where the French had agreed to gather them into a ‘national legion,’ which meant 
that some sort political structure would have to be established to control them.50 In turn this 
raised the question of what form of political organisation would have to be created and 
who would lead it. The Foreign Office was first alerted to these Franco-Czechoslovak 
negotiations on 28 September when Benes informed Halifax that talks were underway 
between a ‘central organisation,’ about which Halifax knew nothing, and the French 
authorities.51 These events were then confirmed in a telegram from the British embassy in 
Paris 011 the same day.52 Although the Foreign Office was aware of these negotiations, the 
Czechoslovak troops in France were not their responsibility and they were content to leave 
the French authorities to deal with this issue.
Then on 30 September Benes sent the Foreign Office a memorandum regarding the 
constitution of what he described as a ‘Czechoslovak Provisional Government,* with 
himself as Prime Minister and Dr Stefan Osusky as Foreign Minister.53 (Osusky held the 
same position in Paris as Lisicky did in London and his authority was similarly derived 
from the Anglo-French decision to continue to recognise Czechoslovak legations after 
March 1939.) This was a sudden and wholly unexpected development that took the Foreign
30 FO 371 24287 C1205/2/12 Strang memorandum on War Office liaisons with Czechoslovaks, 22 January 
1940 & C3411/2/12 Makins memorandum on Colonel C. Gubbins’s request to extract Czechoslovaks from 
Hungary, 4 March 1940. See also E. Cejka, Ceskosl ovens l<y> odboj no Zcipade J939-1945, Prague, 1997, 
pp94-95, J. Josten, Oh my country, London, 1949, pp22-29, Taborsky, The Czechoslovak Cause, pp 67-69 
and the various articles in L.M. White (ed), On All Fronts. Czechoslovaks in World War 11, Three Volumes, 
New York, 1991, 1995 & 2000. This agreement was similar to the one the French authorities had already 
signed with the Polish government in exile on 9 and 21 of September 1939, see Prazmowska, Britain and 
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51 FO 371 22899 C15436/7/12 Halifax memorandum on talk with Benes, 28 September 1939 & C 15437/7/12 
Benes to Sargent, 30 September 1939.
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33 FO 371 22899 C 15437/7/12 Benes to Orme Sargent, 30 September 1939. See M. Churan et al, Kdo byI 
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Office by complete surprise. Messages were immediately despatched to the British 
Ambassador in Paris, Sir Eric Phipps, asking him to inquire why the Quai d'Orsay had 
taken such a drastic step without consulting London. Phipps’s reply came three days later; 
he explained that the French authorities had wanted to establish a Czechoslovak army and 
had allowed Osusky to sign it on behalf of a non-existent ‘Provisional Government’ in 
order to create a ‘national’ force. Furthermore, he explained that Benes’s announcement of 
a cabinet had come as an unwelcome shock to the French too. The French ministers Phipps 
had spoken to, M. Hoppenot and E. Daladier, both disliked Benes and had no desire to see 
him take up a leading position in this cabinet.34 They had hoped that this organ would be 
composed of non-political technocrats and were embarrassed by the whole episode. Both 
men were far more enthusiastic about working with Osusky and agreed that 110 further 
commitments would be entered into without further consultation with the Foreign Office.33
Two other factors threatened to undermine Benes’s attempts to secure his political 
position. The first concerned the objections of other Central European states to recognition 
and the second the serious levels of disunity among the Czechoslovak exiles. On 8 October 
it was announced on the BBC that a ‘Czechoslovak Government may shortly be formed in 
London with Dr Benes as President.’36 This elicited an immediate response from the 
British ambassador in Budapest, Sir Owen O’Malley, who expressed the unease the 
Hungarian government felt at this development and his own views on Benes’s 
‘untrustworthiness.07 Although O’Malley’s objections did not have a significant impact on 
the Central Department, they were indicative of a widespread dislike for Benes and the
34 For the Czechoslovak’s own estimation of the reasons behind the French government’s dislike of Benes 
see L. Otahalova & M. Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenskepolitiky, Vol. 1, Prague,
1966, pp38-40.
33 FO 371 22899 C l5880/7/12 From British embassy in Paris, Phipps, to Foreign Office, 6 October 1939.
36 FO 371 22899 C 16878/7/12 From British embassy in Budapest, O'Malley, to Foreign Office, 9 October 
1939.
37 FO 371 22899 C 16878/7/12 From British embassy in Budapest, O'Malley, to Foreign Office, 9 October 
1939.
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many complications that might arise, with both the Hungarians and the Poles, if he was 
recognised as representing Czechoslovak interests abroad.
These objections, however, were of less importance compared to the divisions 
within the Czech and Slovak exile community itself. Although Benes had been accepted as 
the de facto  leader of the ‘action abroad’ by Czechoslovak expatriates in the United States, 
his leadership was not universally accepted amongst the other Czechoslovak exiles in 
London. Benes’s most significant opponents were in fact former members of his 
government, Dr Milan Hodza, the former Prime Minister and later Osuslcy as well. Both 
were Slovaks and agitated against Benes’s position in exile throughout the war, although it 
should be stated that neither man was ever considered a serious rival by the Foreign 
Office.58 But this obvious lack of unity did concern the Central Department. The situation 
was sufficiently severe in the early months of the war for Bruce Lockhart to bring it to the 
Central Department’s attention,
my personal opinion [is] that the success of the Czecho-Slovak action 
depends on a united front and that His Majesty's Government, however 
sympathetic they may be to the Czechs and Slovaks, are bound to show a 
natural caution before recognising any Czech and Slovak organisation 
unless it fulfils all the conditions of national unity.59
This was an opinion with which Strang agreed.60 Understandably, there was little point in 
the Foreign Office recognising a political body that was not wholly representative of all the 
Czechoslovak exiles in Britain, or of the various nationalities that had been contained in 
the former state. Indeed, much time and effort was spent by the Central Department to
58 See Churan, Kdo byl kdo, Vol. 1, pp225-227.
39 FO 371 22899 C17089/G Bruce Lockhart memorandum, 21 October 1939.
60 FO 371 22899 C17089/G Strang minute on talk with Bruce Lockhart, 26 October 1939.
encourage Benes to incorporate those Sudeten Germans in Britain into his government in 
exile, events that will be examined in more detail in a later chapter. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that all the exiled governments in Britain during the war suffered from these 
internecine conflicts, as did the British War Cabinet.61 Nevertheless, such public disunity 
was repeatedly employed by the Foreign Office as a rational for withholding further 
recognition to the Czechoslovaks. In fact, Hodza’s inclusion in any Czechoslovak 
government in exile was made an explicit pre-condition of British recognition, something 
that Bruce Lockhart was only able to secure after months of tortuous negotiations.62
Notwithstanding these added complications, it became clear to the Foreign Office 
as time progressed that Benes’s pre-emptive attempt to establish a Provisional Government 
on the basis of the military agreement with the French authorities had failed.65 The French 
had realised their error in allowing such a term to be used and had began to talk instead of 
forming a National Committee to undertake the necessary functions regarding the 
formation of a Czechoslovak army in France.64 In the light of these events Roberts 
reiterated the Central Department’s position on the recognition question, ‘Our policy is that 
the Czechs should put their house in order, after which they may receive some sort of 
recognition from HMG...’65
However, the Central Department also realised that without some degree of 
political recognition it would be difficult to expect any sort of military or intelligence co­
operation from the Czechoslovaks.66 In short, the British authorities understood that they
76
61 See J. Lukacs, Five Days in London, May 1940, London, 1999, pp 20-25.
bl Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp72-73.
63 Otahalova & Cervinlcova (eds), Dokumenty z historie ceskoslovenskepolitilcy, Vol. 1, p42.
64 FO 371 22899 C17465/7/12 British embassy Paris to Foreign Office, 29 October 1939.
65 FO 371 22899 C17805/7/12 Roberts minute, 8 November 1939.
66 FO 371 22899 C l8016/7/12 Bruce Lockhart minutes, 7 November 1939.
had to make some political concessions to Benes in order to make sure they were in step 
with their French allies and so that the Czechoslovaks were sufficiently motivated to 
continue the fight against Germany (as Troutbeck had noted in his memorandum). Having 
said that, as talks with the French progressed Benes made it increasingly clear in his 
parallel talks with the Foreign Office that he was unhappy with the lack of political 
representation in the French proposal. Furthermore, he clearly stated that he would prefer 
to see some reference to the ‘committee being able to carry on the struggle for the 
liberation of the Czechoslovak Republic.’67 As this was beyond what the Foreign Office 
was willing to consider Cadogan persuaded Benes that any departure from the text of the 
French Agreement would best be avoided.
For a second time the pace of these negotiations was again forced by the French 
government when they exchanged letters with Osusky on the recognition of a 
Czechoslovak National.Committee on 13 and 14 November 1939.68 This led to renewed 
discussions within the Foreign Office on the British response to this development and the 
subsequent decision to proceed with limited recognition was based on two key points. 
First, that as the French authorities had already signed an agreement with the 
Czechoslovaks, the British were obliged to do the same ‘in order to avoid any criticism 
that His Majesty’s Government are being less generous that the French Government 
towards the Czechoslovak cause.’69 Second, that the National Committee would only be 
authorised to deal with the establishment of a Czechoslovak army in France and was not a 
government and recognition would not ‘imply any recognition of particular Czech political 
aspirations.’70
67 FO 371 22900 C 18441/7/12 Cadogan minute on discussion with Benes, 13 November 1939.
os FO 371 22900 Cl 8906/7/12 Confirmation of creation of Czechoslovak National Committee from British
Embassy, Paris, 20 November 1939.
69 FO 371 22900 C 19983/7/12 War Cabinet Office Confidential Print, 6 December 1939.
70 FO 3 7 1 22900 C 18519/7/12 Memorandum of conversation between Bene§ and Cadogan on National 
Committee and accompanying minutes, 14 November 1939.
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A delay then occurred while the Foreign Office inquired about the Home Office’s, 
War Office’s, Colonies’ and Dominions’ opinions on this question.71 A printed 
memorandum on this issue was then produced for the War Cabinet’s consideration on 6 
December. On 11 December the War Cabinet agreed to a similar exchange of letters with 
the Czechoslovaks, but only on the understanding that the National Committee was not a 
government. Letters were then duly exchanged between Halifax and Benes on 20 
December 1939.73 Significantly, in a minute of 30 December Roberts noted that the British 
government continued to recognise the Czechoslovak legation in London and Lisicky as 
an, ‘alternative political representative to Benes and a sign of non-recognition of invasion 
of Bohemia-Moravia.’74 Quite simply the Central Department wanted to keep the widest 
possible number of options open at this stage and its continued recognition of Lisicky was 
symptomatic of this desire. Thus, as 1939 drew to a close the British authorities had in fact 
recognised four bodies as being representative of the Czech and Slovak peoples. First, the 
Protectorate Government in Prague, second the government of the new Slovak State, third 
the Czechoslovak legation in London and lastly the Czechoslovak National Committee. 
Clearly this was a confused state of affairs that could not be expected to last.
Although the Foreign Office had now recognised a National Committee, headed by 
Benes, there was no desire to enhance this level of political recognition or to resolve the 
confusion that surrounded the growing number of bodies that seemingly represented 
Czechoslovak interests. Nor was the Czechoslovak question regarded as any more of a
78
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72 FO 371 22900 C20205/7/12 Foreign Office’s copy of War Cabinet Conclusions, 11 December 1939.
73 FO 371 22900 C202702/7/12 Halifax's letter to Benes, 20 December 1939. See also reproductions of both 
letters in Czech in Benes, Sest let, pp 436 & 437.
74 FO 371 22900 C20582/7/12 Roberts minute, 30 December 1939.
priority than it had been in 1939 and this situation was unlikely to change unless external 
events intervened. In the event, of course, this was exactly what occurred. By the 
beginning of 1940 the international situation had begun to change and Britain slowly found 
herself increasingly isolated as the ‘Phoney War’ gave way to a renewed German offensive 
in the west and the invasion, and occupation, of Norway, then the Low Countries and 
finally France. By late May, Britain was in an entirely different, and far more desperate, 
position than it had been nine months previously. Now the frontline had been brought up to 
the Channel coast and Britain needed the support of every fighting ally it could secure, 
including the Czechoslovaks. More importantly, after the disastrous Norwegian Campaign 
Chamberlain had been replaced by Churchill and this change in leadership had a 
significant effect on the continuation of the British war effort, and also on the attitudes 
toward renewed Czechoslovak requests for increased political recognition.75 Though it 
would be inaccurate to suggest that these events resulted in a fundamental reversal in 
British foreign policy on the Czechoslovak question they did result, when combined with 
the worsening military situation, in an atmosphere that was marginally more supportive of 
the Czechoslovaks’ long-term political objectives.
The ensuing discussions between the Foreign Office and the National Committee 
over the upgrading of their status to a Provisional Government in exile revolved around 
two key documents. Benes wrote the first after a meeting with Cadogan on 26 April 1940, 
a 20-page memorandum that set out his arguments as to why the British authorities should 
now increase the level of recognition they had granted to the National Committee.76 Bruce 
Lockhart produced the second on 20 May and this was a response to Benes’s argument and 
set out the advantages and disadvantages in granting further recognition to the
75 See Lukacs, May 1940.
76 FO 371 24288 C6494/2/12 Benes’s memorandum on provisional recognition, 3 May 1940, see also Dilks 
(ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p273.
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Czechoslovaks.77 The subsequent negotiations on this question repeatedly returned to 
several issues that the Foreign Office felt had to be resolved before further recognition 
could be granted. These were; the question of unity amongst the exiles, the potential 
Czechoslovak contribution to the war effort, the status of the successor entities of the 
former Czechoslovak state and their relations with the exiles in London, and the reaction of 
other states to the creation of a Provisional government.
In the period immediately before Benes’s meeting with Cadogan most of the 
Central Department’s attention was focused on the first of these issues, the continued 
disunity amongst the Czechoslovak exiles; especially as these relations had barely 
improved since the beginning of the New Year and Hodza, who had been offered a 
position in the National Committee, had even attempted to establish a rival emigre
78 ♦organisation in Paris. The seriousness with which the Central Department viewed these 
developments was amply illustrated by one comment in particular that noted, ‘all this 
wrangling and backbiting among emigres whose sole interest lies in collaboration is
70depressing reading.’
One possible solution, as Roberts noted, was that Benes could attempt to secure
political recognition solely on behalf of the Czechs, to which the Foreign Office would 
80have willing agreed. But this suggestion completely ignored the fact that Benes’s 
ultimate objective was the re-establishment of pre-war Czechoslovakia and there is no 
evidence to suggest that he ever considered compromising this goal. It was possible that 
the Central Department failed to comprehend the single-minded determination with which 
Benes pursued this objective, but nevertheless it seemed logical to them that Benes should
77 FO 371 24288 C6035/2/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum on the Provisional Czechoslovak Government- 
in-exile, 12 May 1940.
78 FO 371 24287 C2331/2/12 Bruce Lockhart minute, 11 February 1940.
79 FO 371 24287 C2331/2/12 Foreign Office minute, signature illegible, 11 February 1940.
80 FO 371 24288 C6035/2/12 Roberts minute, 20 May 1940.
80
reach some accommodation with Hodza before increased recognition was granted. Bruce 
Lockhart even was forced to admit that,
Emigres are peculiarly prone to political wrangling...It is therefore clear 
that a thoroughly unsatisfactory situation has been created for which Dr 
ITodza, Dr Benes, and the war of inactivity are in varying degrees 
responsible.’81
But, as the ‘Phoney War’ became real these intrigues abated slightly and it appeared that 
Hodza and Benes had been reconciled, however, the Foreign Office’s position on 
provisional status was still dependant on complete unity amongst the exiles.82
As a consequence of this pre-condition Hodza attempted to gain further political 
advantages for himself during this most sensitive period in negotiations. 83 Hodza’s 
machinations led Benes to complain to Bruce Lockhart that, ‘You admit...that I have a big 
majority [amongst the exiles]. Yet you are trying to force me to accept this insignificant 
minority of blackmailers.’84 In fact, Benes’s outburst was not entirely baseless. The 
amount of genuine support that Hodza and Osusky enjoyed amongst the exiles in the west 
was limited and the only reason that they had been able to contest his leadership was 
because they both had supporters within the French government, many of who were 
implacably opposed to Benes. Indeed, it could be argued that Benes had caused some of 
these problems by locating himself in London rather than in Paris, as the distance between 
the two capitals allowed his opponents to conspire against him. Benes, however, was often 
able to negate this effect by mobilising his supporters in the United States. For example,
81 FO 371 24287 C2985/2/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum on meeting with Hodza, 24 February 1940.
82 FO 371 24288 C6035/2/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum on possible reconciliation between Benes and 
Hodza, 22 April 1940.
8j BeneS, Pameti, pp 180-182.
84 Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p 92.
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Osusky’s attempts to outmanoeuvre Benes were seriously curtailed when the Slovak 
National Alliance of America instructed him in December 1939, in no uncertain terms, to 
back Benes.85 But, while Benes may have had a point, the Foreign Office retained the 
upper hand in these negotiations and could insist on any level of cohesiveness that it felt 
necessary.
Moreover, from the British perspective there were very good reasons for insisting 
on complete unity among the exiles, based on their experiences with some of the other 
exiles now gathered in London, especially the Poles. The problems General Wladyslaw 
Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minster in exile, had to contend with far exceeded those
q/-
experienced by Benes. But once France had been defeated Benes 110 longer had to 
contend with these opponents in Paris and in October 1940 Hodza eventually relented and 
joined the newly established Czechoslovak National Council as Vice-President.87 This was 
a representative and legislative body that had already been reorganised in order to include a 
larger number of Slovaks and to address British concerns over representation.88 Having 
said that, Hodza often feigned illness to avoid attending these meetings and continued to 
intrigue against Benes until he eventually left Britain for the United States.
Bearing these events in mind Benes’s meeting with Cadogan in late April 1940 
could not have come at a more inopportune time for either party, the Czechoslovak exiles 
were in disarray and the British War Cabinet had only just decided to evacuate Norway. It 
was clear that Cadogan’s mind was on other matters when Benes came to visit.89 Yet the 
importance of this encounter lay in the memorandum Benes subsequently produced, a copy
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87 FO 371 24289 Cl 1204/2/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum, 17 October 1940.
88 Dockrill, ‘The Foreign Office and the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile,’ Diplomacy and Statecraft, 
p705.
89 Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p 273.
of which the Central Department received on 3 May, in which he clearly detailed the 
Czechoslovaks’ immediate political objectives. Benes’s argument centred around four 
basic points; relations with the Poles, the juridical position of the former Czechoslovakia, 
the impact the recognition of a Provisional Government would have on post-war borders 
and his own position as leader.90 Czechoslovak-Polish relations was an issue of some 
consequence as Benes had just begun negotiations with the Poles on the creation of a joint 
federated state after the war, an idea that was supported by the Foreign Office.91 The 
memorandum also returned to his argument on the supposed ‘juridical continuity’ of 
Czechoslovakia, concluding that as the west still recognised her legations and an army in 
France then Czechoslovakia still de jure existed and Benes’s aspirations to establish a 
government in exile were legitimate. This was a somewhat dubious legal argument, and 
one the Foreign Office rejected, but serves as a good illustration of how Benes utilised the 
various ad hoc decisions Britain had made regarding Czechoslovakia’s successor entities 
to further his own political agenda.
But the memorandum’s stance was not entirely inflexible and it explicitly noted 
that any increased level of recognition would not commit the British to any future frontiers 
in Central Europe. This was a crucial point, as the Foreign Office had already made it clear 
that they could not commit themselves to any frontiers at this stage of the war, not least 
because of the complications this might cause with the Poles. This was another example of 
Benes sophisticated political tactics, he often tailored his objectives to fit in with the 
current British position, thus increasing the likelihood of acceptance of
90 FO 371 24288 C6494/2/12 Benes’s memorandum on provisional recognition, 3 May 1940.
91 St’ovicek & Valenta (eds), Ceskos/ovensko-polskd jednanf o kenfederaci, pp43-44 & Otahalova & 
Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politifty, Vol. 1, p90.
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any particular point. It went on to allege that, ‘the whole of the Czech people and a 
majority of the Slovak people stand without exception behind the Czecho-Slovak political 
emigres in Britain...behind Dr Benes, who is fully recognised in his own country as the 
leader of this national resistance.’ The memorandum concluded by arguing that although 
Czechoslovak nation could survive the German military occupation it could not accept an 
inferior legal position in comparison with those other Allies in London.
The British response to this approach took two forms; the first was a minute by an 
unknown author (the signature is completely illegible), three days after the Central 
Department had received the memorandum and the second was Bruce Lockhart’s own, 
longer, memorandum. This first response was not entirely dismissive of Benes’s 
arguments, but was not won over by them either. The author rejected the need for equality 
between the Czechoslovaks and Poles and although he agreed that there were no legal 
hindrances to further recognition he went 011 to point out that the complications that 
remained were of a purely political nature. Not the least was that, although the British and 
Benes might agree that recognition would not include any commitments to future frontiers,
it is equally true that the recognition of the Provisional Government 
would be taken by other powers- e.g. Hungary- as implying that we 
did mean to restore the previous Czecho-Slovak frontiers, and this 
impression might well have results which did not agree with our 
strategic and diplomatic objectives!94
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On the issue of the supposed unity of the ‘action abroad’ the author concluded, ‘A glance 
through the files recording Mr Lockhart's efforts to bring Dr Benes and Dr Hodza together 
is sufficient to refute this assertion.’95 Furthermore, the theory expressed in the 
memorandum that such disunity is common amongst emigre groups and that recognition 
would help solve it was also given short shrift, and the author stated that the Czechoslovaks 
would have to provide conclusive evidence of unity first.
As was to be expected Bruce Lockhart’s response was more sympathetic. His 
memorandum listed the arguments for and against enhanced recognition. In the ‘against’ 
category he noted: Britain’s reluctance to take up any commitments in Central Europe, the 
reaction of other states; the existence of a government in Prague, doubts over the support 
Benes enjoyed, and that morale in the Protectorate would be best served by allied victory 
and not by political gifts. In the ‘for’ category he noted: that the Slovaks were politically 
inexperienced, plans for a Habsburg restoration had little support, the Czechoslovaks 
formed a strategic bulwark in the region, the present government in Prague supported the 
exiles and that Benes, like him or not, was the best man on offer. Obviously, Bruce 
Lockhart’s formulations were designed to cast the balance in favour of recognition but he 
went on to make a more impassioned plea against Britain’s pragmatic, and cautious 
approach to date. He wrote, ‘In a war, which we have not even begun to win, excessive 
caution about the future of Europe is out of place. We should know who are our friends and 
back them...’96 Fie concluded by recommending that the British authorities should recognise 
the Czechoslovaks as Allies forthwith and invite them to attend meetings of the Supreme 
War Council.
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Three weeks of intense discussions followed these two memoranda and the Foreign 
Office’s preliminary conclusion was that no further recognition should be offered. Roger 
Makins, an official in the Central Department, explained,
Dr Benes has no assets and is a very large liability...I'm sure that in this 
tangle of blackmail and intrigue we ought not to be rushed into a fresh 
commitment, which we may never be able to implement, to an 
unsatisfactory individual, unless we are going to obtain some real 
advantages from doing so.
To which Roberts added, ‘We therefore maintain our present attitude that further 
consideration of Dr Benes’s request must be preceded by a clear and public demonstration 
of the unity of Czecho-Slovak action abroad.’97 Bruce Lockhart’s explanation for this 
refusal to grant further recognition was more vitriolic.
Even in my Czechs the F.O. take no interest, I feel that every time I raise 
some point by Benes I am only boring the Central Department. Strang who 
is in charge of all this work never has time to see me...he is a poor creature
no
- gutless and second rate...
Although the immediate outcome of these discussions was negative the Foreign Office’s 
decision did not stand for long, due to the worsening of the military situation 011 the 
Continent.
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As Makins had noted it appeared that the Czechoslovaks had little to offer Britain 
in return for an increased level of recognition, especially as the Czechoslovak Division and 
a number of fighter pilots were was still in France. But, as the military situation changed 
these forces were evacuated to Britain in late June 1940 and thereby became a British 
responsibility and were integrated into the British war effort." Not long after 
Czechoslovak pilots were fighting alongside the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the Battle of 
Britain.100 Parallel to this development, links between the Czechoslovak and British 
intelligence services had produced numerous results and the quality of intelligence these 
contacts produced was widely appreciated.101 At much the same time that Czechoslovak 
troops were being evacuated from France, Britain established the Special Operations 
Executive (SOE), designed to encourage resistance and armed uprisings in occupied 
Europe. It was soon realised by the Central Department that this was an area where the 
Czechoslovaks might be of some assistance and that this factor alone warranted a possible 
reversal of policy on the recognition question.102 After the defeat of France, therefore, the 
Czechoslovaks went from being a liability to a significant military asset, not only for the 
defence of Britain, but also in terms of propaganda value in the United States and with an 
eye to establishing resistance movements on the Continent.
The Central Department also found its decision under attack from what appeared to 
be an orchestrated propaganda campaign.103 This took a wide variety of forms; from letters 
to the Prime Minister to questions asked in the House, letters in The Times and inter­
99 A. Brown, The Czechoslovak Airforce in Britain. 1940-1945 Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Southampton, 1998, Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p 92 & Z. Kordina, ‘The 1940 Evacuation of the 
Czechoslovak Armed Forces from France,’ in White, On All Fronts, Vol. I,pp63-81,
100 Cejka, Ceskostovens!f> oclboj na Zdpade, pp241-257.
101 FO 37124287 C2330/2/12 Bruce Lockhart minute, 11 February 1939.
102 FO 371 24289 C7646/2/12 Troutbeck minute, 21 June 1940. Benes also soon realised the political benefits 
that these forces might bring, see Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenslce 
politiky, Vol. I, p212.
103 FO 371 24288 C6035/2/12 Makins minute, 7 June 1940.
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departmental enquires from other ministers.104 It should be recognised that the 
Czechoslovaks were particularly adept at mobilising support for their objectives and they 
produced an impressive range of propaganda materials during the war, but whether this 
meant that Benes had instigated this particular flurry of interest is open to speculation.105 
But while the Department politely noted these approaches it did not change its original 
decision. When Bruce Lockhart met with Strang on 13 June to inquire about progress on 
this issue, Strang replied in exasperation, ‘Fed up with Benes; doesn't he realise that the 
fate of the world-British Empire, [is] being settled in the next forty eight hours?’106
Benes himself visited Strang on the 21 June and, after thanking him for Britain’s 
help in evacuating Czechoslovak forces from France, he once more broached the question 
of recognition, reiterating of same arguments that had appeared in his earlier 
memorandum.107 He also went on, as Strang explained, to,
say that one of the objections to recognition had been the alleged lack of 
unity among the Czech and Slovak emigres. But it was fair to ask whether 
the Poles or the.' Belgians or the Norwegians or the Dutch, or even the 
French were united. It was unfair to judge the Czechs and Slovaks more 
severely than the others.108
On this occasion this time the Central Department’s reaction was markedly different. The 
military situation had become critical and no one had the slightest idea of how events were
104 FO 371 24288 C7332/2/12 Messages and letters passed on from the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary to 
the Central Department, July 1940 & FO 371 24288 C6035/2/12 Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for 
Air, to Halifax, 6 June 1940.
103 M. Dowling, Czechoslovakia, London, 2002, pp67-69.
106 Young (ed), The Diaries of Sir Robert Brace Lockhart, p62.
107 FO 371 24289 C7646/2/12 Strang memorandum on talk with Benes, 21 June 1940.
108 FO 371 24289 C7646/2/12 Strang memorandum on talk with Benes, 21 June 1940.
likely to develop. Three days later Makins penned a crucial minute, one that is worth 
quoting at length.
I have not hitherto been in favour of recognising Dr Benes’s 
provisional government for a number of reasons. Dr Benes is a 
somewhat tarnished figure; he has been unable to secure unity in 
Czecho-Slovak action abroad...But circumstances have now changed.
Hungary may be written off ..The Czechs have shown up well 
compared with some of our other allies, and the Czecho-Slovak 
National committee and army are moving to the United Kingdom. Our 
own position has changed for the worse and, having less to lose, we 
can perhaps afford to take on the Czechs...109
More than any other factor it was the potentially catastrophic military situation Britain now 
faced that was responsible for this change in policy. The Foreign Office retained its 
previous objections to recognising the Czechoslovak exiles, but a political decision was 
made that these issues were now secondary to the assistance they might be able to give the 
war-effort. Thus, on 3 July 1940 the War Cabinet considered, and approved, the 
recognition of a Czechoslovak Provisional Government in exile, a proposal that went 
through ‘without a murmur. ’110
Pre-empting the usual exchange of letters, Benes sent Halifax an outline of 
structure of the proposed Provisional Government and its related organs on 9 July. Benes 
was to be President and Mgr Jan Sramek Prime Minister and he listed all the cabinet 
members.111 Halifax’s reply, however, on 18 July contained several reservations that were
109 FO 371 24289 C7646/2/12 Makins minutes, 24 June 1940.
110 FO 371 24289 C7646/2/12 Foreign Office’s copy of the War Cabinet Conclusions, 3 July 1940 & Young 
(eel), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, p65.
111 V. Zizka (ed.), Bojujici Ceskoslovensko, 1938-1945, Prague, 1945, pp52-54.
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to guarantee the continuation of the recognition process. Halifax noted in this letter that the 
British government, ‘would not commit themselves to recognise...any particular frontiers 
in Central Europe,’ that they did not accept his position ‘as regards the continued juridical 
existence of the Czecho-Slovak Republic,’ and ‘...the question of jurisdiction over
• • 119Czecho-Slovak armed forces and civilians in this country... ’ Roberts also noted that no 
Minister would be appointed to the Czechoslovaks, nor would one be accepted from them, 
unlike the other exiled governments, furthermore the legation would continue to keep its 
present status.113 As a result, although the Foreign Office accepted the need for an 
increased level of recognition it maintained its position on many of the issues that had do 
far delayed this process. Finally, on 21 July Halifax wrote to Benes to inform him that the 
British government now recognised a Czechoslovak Provisional Government in exile, a 
development confirmed by Churchill in the House of Commons on the 23 July.114 The final 
nicety was the appointment of an official British Representative to the Provisional 
Czechoslovak Government. Bruce Lockhart agreed to fill this post and was duly appointed 
on 12 August 1940.115
Although Benes and his fellow emigres had now secured the enhanced political 
status they sought, the reservations contained in Halifax’s reply meant that there was still a 
gap between Benes’s stated objectives and what the British authorities had so far agreed to. 
As a result, instead of marking the end of the recognition process, as the Central 
Department had hoped, the granting of provisional status merely proved to be the end of 
the second phase of negotiations. The Provisional Czechoslovak Government would 
continue to press for further recognition until they were satisfied that they had extracted as
112 FO 371 24289 C7646/2/12 Halifax to Benes, 18 July 1940.
1.3 FO 371 24289 C8267/2/12 Roberts minute, 31 July 1940.
1.4 HC Deb., 5th Series, Vol. 363, Cols. 614-615, 23 July 1940.
113 FO 371 24289 C8267/2/12 Makins minute on Bruce Lockhart’s appointment, 12 August 1940.
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much political capital from the British government as possible, principally to ensure that 
their position was entirely analogous to the other exiled governments in London.116
It took just under twelve months for the British authorities to recognise a fully 
accredited Czechoslovak Government in exile on 16 July 1941; this was not, however, 
because it was felt that this was warranted. The British authorities still retained their 
previous reservations on full recognition, not least with regard to Benes’s ultimate 
objective of recreating Czechoslovakia after the war. Moreover, these reservations were 
shared by many officials in the upper echelons of the Foreign Office, in the Cabinet and by 
certain Dominion states, South Africa in particular. From the British perspective these 
reservations were entirely legitimate, especially as any acknowledgement of 
Czechoslovakia’s frontiers would have immediately embroiled the Foreign Office in a 
fierce debate with the Polish Government in exile and quite possibility with a number of 
other interested parties, not least the Sudeten German emigres in London, led by Wenzel 
Jaksch.117 These complexities made the Central Department understandably reluctant to re­
open the recognition question yet again and even less willing to grant full status, even after 
Churchill and Eden had given the idea their blessing. As a result, when Benes began to 
press for a revision of the ‘provisional’ status of his government the Foreign Office 
procrastinated. In order to compensate for these delaying tactics, which the Czechoslovak 
emigres found increasingly difficult to comprehend, Benes and his colleagues reverted to 
techniques designed to circumvent these obstructions and to present the Foreign Office 
with a fa it accompli.
Benes felt impelled to seek further recognition because there remained a number of 
issues that he wanted resolved. Although the spectre of the Munich Agreement had
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haunted Anglo-Czechoslovak relations ever since its enactment, Benes and his government
had so far avoided any reference to this episode and continued to do so until 1942 when
1 1 8they pressed for its revocation. In part this was because Benes wanted fully to secure his 
international position before he turned his attention to this issue.119 When the references to 
Munich did arise, Churchill referred to the Munich Agreement as having been ‘destroyed’ 
by Hitler on its second anniversary, Osusky attempted to stir up trouble, but Benes, 
presumably mindful of his ‘provisional’ status, refused to be drawn into a debate.120 
Nevertheless, the legacy of the Munich Agreement continued to hover in the background 
of the recognition process, especially as the Foreign Office was now intent on encouraging 
Benes to include the Sudeten German emigres in his government, which he later did. 
Interestingly, when Benes offered seats to Communist politicians, theoretically in line with 
the Central Department’s call for unity amongst the exiles, the Department objected.121 
Unity amongst the exiles was, therefore, only acceptable within the terms set by the 
Central Department.
Moreover, the Soviet Union’s recognition of a Czechoslovak government in exile, 
signed some four hours before Britain’s, marked the beginning of a growing rift between 
the Foreign Office and Benes’s government. This was because Soviet recognition came 
without the same reservations the British had insisted upon, which had been made easier 
by the fact that the Soviet Union was not a party to the Munich Agreement. Instead, 
Moscow had agreed to the re-construction of Czechoslovakia within her pre-1938 frontiers, 
accepted Benes’s conception of the juridical continuity of that state, Benes’s leadership in 
exile, and agreed to establish a Czechoslovak army on Soviet soil.122 Moscow’s willing
118 FO 371 24292 C l0410/10210/12 Bruce Lockhart minute, 24 September 1940.
119 Benes, Pameti, p294.
120 FO 371 24289 Cl 1069/2/12 various minutes, 14 October to 11 November 1940.
121 FO 371 26394 Cl 1155/1320/12 Foreign Office minute, 6 October 1941.
'"2 For the text of the agreement see Zizka, Bojttjid Ceskoslovemko, p88 and for documents related to these 
negotiations see J. NSmeCek, H. Nov&ckova, I. Sfovlcelc & M. Tejchman (eds), Ceskoslovemko- sovetske 
vztahy v diplomatickych jedncmich, Vol. 1, Prague, 1998, pp 199-216.
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acceptance of Benes’s political objectives, therefore, contrasted sharply with the Foreign 
Office’s continued reluctance to withdraw its previous reservations. As a consequence, 
Benes and his government soon realised that the Soviet Union’s entry into the war, and the 
increased levels of support now emanating from the United States had fundamentally 
altered the balance of power between themselves and the British authorities. From this 
point onwards, Benes and his colleagues increasingly looked to Washington and Moscow 
for support for their post-war objectives, the very support that London seemed unwilling, 
or more likely, unable to give. On a number of occasions Benes proceeded to bypass the 
British entirely and secured agreements with the other two Great Powers first, thus placing 
the Foreign Office in a position where it had little choice but to accept the resulting 
agreements.
There is one final point that needs to be highlighted regarding this final phase of the 
recognition process and that was the increasingly acrimonious nature of these negotiations, 
due to the Central Department’s failure to clearly explain to the exiles the reasons for these 
long delays. After all Churchill had agreed to extend full recognition to Benes in April 
1941, yet the necessary arrangements were not finalised until the middle of July, and only 
then in order to keep pace with Moscow. These delays were to prove increasingly 
frustrating to Benes, his fellow exiles and, more importantly, the Czech population in the 
Protectorate. While these delays were unavoidable from the Central Department’s 
perspective, not least the because of the objections of South Africa’s premiere, General Jan 
Smuts, it does seem that they failed to give a coherent explanation to the Czechoslovaks
1 ? Tfor these delays. As a consequence Benes and his government increasingly came to 
believe that these delays were solely due to the Foreign Office’s disinclination to grant full 
recognition. This was a development that, in conjunction with those influences listed
120 Taborslcy, ‘Politics in Exile,’ in Mamatey & Luza (eds), A History o f the Czechoslovak Republic, p328.
93
above, led to an increase in tensions and a decrease in co-operation between the two 
parties.
However, this final phase of the recognition process did not begin immediately 
after the second phase had been completed, even though it was clear that Benes would 
have preferred it to have done so. In fact, it was Bruce Lockhart who persuaded him to 
delay re-opening these talks, as he was aware of the negative impression this might have 
made while the Battle of Britain was still raging.124 Instead, Benes and his government 
spent the latter half of 1940 consolidating their civil and military administration in exile. A 
Czechoslovak National Council was created, instituted by Presidential decree and designed 
to function as an advisory body to the state administration, and, in addition, on 25 October 
1940 both an Anglo-Czechoslovak Armed Forces Agreement and a Financial Agreement 
were signed.125 These were treaties that integrated Czechoslovak soldiers and pilots into 
the British war effort and helped to secure the Provisional Government’s economic 
position. These developments meant that this brief respite proved extremely valuable for 
Benes, especially as Eden replaced Halifax as Foreign Secretary in December 1940. Eden 
was, in theory at least, more sympathetic to the Czechoslovak cause than the previous 
incumbent. This pause also allowed Benes to move out of London and to a more salubrious 
and safer surroundings of a country house at Aston Abbots, in Buckinghamshire.
Although the Provisional Czechoslovak Government had been recognised by other 
governments in exile, and certain Dominion governments, excluding Canada, the 
continued provisionality of its status meant that Benes was not willing to delay reopening
124 Bruce Lockhart, Conies the Reckoning, p99.
123 See FO 371 24289 Cl 1204/2/12 Bruce Lockhart minute on the establishment of Czechoslovak National 
Council, 17 October 1940 & FO 371 24290 C13413/2/12, Bruce Lockhart minute on the official opening of 
the Czechoslovak State Council, 12 December 1940. See also K. Jech & K Kaplan (eds), Dekrety prezidenta 
repub/iky, 1940-1945, dokumenly, Vol. 1, Brno, 1995, pp81-92. FO 371 24368 Cl 1579/1419/62 Text of
British-Czechoslovak Armed Forces Agreement, 25 October 1940 & FO 371 24292 C l3060/8893/12 Text of
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negotiations for long.126 However, the Foreign Office was entirely satisfied with the level 
of political recognition it had given the Czechoslovaks and was reluctant to consider any 
enhancement of this current position. As a result, by the beginning of 1941, the recognition 
process had stalled. Once again it was up the course of events that broke this impasse and, 
on this occasion, the decisive factors proved to be three lunches and a rousing chorus of the 
British national anthem.
The process began with two lunches in February 1941, the first between Benes and 
Eden on 10 February 1940 and the second with Churchill on 26 February. During both the 
Benes was able to put his case for further recognition and received a sympathetic response 
from both men, a clear example of Ministerial short-circuiting of the Central Department’s 
advice.127 In addition, and as has already been mentioned, Churchill paid a visit to inspect 
Czechoslovak troops based at Leamington Spa and to have lunch on 18 April 1941. While 
he was there, and in Bruce Lockhart’s absence, Benes handed Churchill a memorandum 
entitled the Political and Judicial Relationship o f the Czechoslovak Republic to Great 
Britain that requested full recognition of his government.128 The visit ended with the 
soldiers singing ‘Rule, Britannia’ (organised by Masaryk), which seemed to have the 
desired effect.129 As a result the Prime Minister sent a personal minute to Eden two days 
later that stated, ‘I see no reason why we can not give the Czechs the same recognition as 
we have given the Poles, and encourage the Americans to follow our example. In neither 
case should we be committed to territorial frontiers.’ To this Eden added, ‘I shall be glad of
126 FO 371 24289 C9653/2/12 Bruce Lockhart to Halifax, 5 September 1940, FO 371 24290 Cl 1819/2/12 
Bruce Lockhart minute, 31 October 1940 & FO 371 34346 & Young (ed), The Diaries o f Sir Robert Bruce 
Lockhart, p 106 & 119.
127 Young (ed), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, pi 13.
!2S FO 371 26394 C4078/1320/12 Benes’s memorandum, 18 April 1941, entitled ‘Political and Judicial 
Relationship of the Czechoslovak Republic to Great Britain.’
129 Young (ed), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, pi 15.
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draft observations. My views on this question are similar to the Prime Minister’s.’130 With 
these events the third, and final, phase of the recognition process had begun.
Benes’s memorandum argued for full recognition based on the fact that the Czech 
population in the Protectorate did not understand the term ‘Provisional’ and because many 
saw themselves as being allies of the ‘second category.’ For some, or so Benes argued, this 
was a blatant continuation of Britain’s Munich style policies. Bruce Lockhart replied to 
Benes’s memorandum in a despatch to Eden on 20 April,
The insistent demand for full recognition comes, and always has 
come, from the home Czechs, who, as the Chiefs of Staff admit, 
supply us with perhaps our most valuable military intelligence...They 
do not understand the word ‘provisional.’ They suspect it and see in it 
not only a slur but also the last remnant of the Munich policy...
He added that,
In the case of the home Czechs the most practical form of immediate 
support is full recognition. We have promised to restore their liberties.
This is a post-war promise. To ignore the war implications of that 
promise is to risk depriving ourselves of valuable military 
advantages.Iji
The logic of Bruce Lockhart’s argument was sound, in early 1941 Britain still needed all 
the military assistance it could muster and the recognition of Benes and his colleagues as
1 ’° FO 3 7 1 26394 C4078/1320/12 Prime Minster's Personal minute, M.456/1, 20 April 1941, Churchill to 
Eden on Dr Benes’s recognition memorandum, 23 April 1941, and Eden’s minute.
131 FO 371 26394 C4078/1320/12 Bruce Lockhart to Eden, 20 April 1941.
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fully fledged allies might well bring military advantages. Roberts’s response, after his own 
talks with Bruce Lockhart, set out the Central Department’s continued reservations. These 
were that a separate government remained in Prague, that the Foreign Office did not accept 
the legal continuity of Czechoslovakia, did not want to commit itself to any borders in 
Central Europe and that it had reservations over giving Czechoslovaks legislative authority 
over the emigre Sudeten Germans in Britain. Lastly, that neither the Dominions nor the 
United States seemed eager to offer further recognition.132
In the ensuing discussions Strang and Makins both accepted that Eden and 
Churchill had explicitly requested full recognition should be extended to Benes, but noted 
the relevance of these reservations. The department then sought the advice of Sir William 
Malkin, the Foreign Office’s legal advisor who commented on the department’s reluctance 
to proceed and, as Strang noted,
Sir W. Malkin’s minute reinforces the misgivings expressed by the 
Department at the step which we now propose to take. On grounds of law 
and fact, the right degree of recognition to afford Dr Benes and his 
government is the recognition which we have already accorded, namely that 
of a provisional government...To recognise him in that capacity [fully] is a 
matter not so much of law or fact as of faith.133
The legal position was therefore made clear, as was the concept that any further 
recognition had to be regarded as a political rather than a legal proposition. Although Eden 
retained his own qualifications about committing Britain to re-establish Czechoslovakia, 
given his and Churchill’s prior acceptance of greater recognition it appeared that full
'■’2 FO 371 26394 C4078/1320/12 Roberts minute on his talk with Bruce Lockhart, 20 April 1941.
133 FO 371 26394 C4078/1320/12 Strang minute, 25 April 1941.
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recognition would be proffered on political grounds, regardless of the Central 
Department’s concerns.134
It was to be another three months, however, before this occurred. There were three 
main reasons for this extended delay. First, that as usual Czechoslovak issues came a long 
way down Britain’s list of priorities, especially as the war had taken yet another turn for 
the worse at the beginning of 1941. Second, there were delays caused by the actual 
machinery of British foreign policy decision-making. Lastly, there were the reservations 
the Central Department maintained over the Czechoslovaks’ position in international law. 
A meeting had been scheduled to discuss further recognition on 7 May 1941, but it was 
‘indefinitely postponed’ at the last moment and was not convened until 21 May.135 The 
reasons for this delay were the result of a combination of factors, as Roberts informed 
Bruce Lockhart.
Eden had put off the meeting on recognition [of the Czechoslovak 
Government] which had been fixed for today because it was ‘not 
urgent’. Very disappointing. Frank, who said he was not an admirer of 
the Secretary of State, told me Eden could not stand up to criticism 
and after a dose of it (e.g. his bad handling by the Commons on 
Tuesday) always drew back from anything which might burn his 
fingers. Sargent, whom I saw afterwards, told me the same thing and 
doubted if we could get much out of him at this moment.136
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When this meeting was finally called it was concluded that there was no real case for 
grating any further recognition, but that such a move might be politically expedient.137
As a result of this decision a letter was sent to Benes on 26 May to enquire about 
the possible effects that such a decision might have on the Hacha Government in Prague, 
with whom Benes was in contact and on the Anglo-Czechoslovak war effort.138 Benes’s 
reply of 28 May clearly reiterated that the two bodies, the government in the Protectorate 
and the exiles, were in close contact, and that full recognition would be a great advantage 
to all concerned.139 Once again, at this stage in the proceedings it appeared as if Benes had 
fulfilled all his obligations and that recognition would be forthcoming. However, although 
Roberts’s subsequent minute clearly stated that Benes had now answered the Foreign 
Office’s queries and that they were at last ready to offer full recognition one problem 
remained: the attitude of the Dominions.140
The reluctance of Australia, Canada and South Africa to agree to this development, 
had an important effect on Anglo-Czechoslovak relations for the simple reason that these 
delays were regarded by the Czechoslovaks as little more than a smoke screen for further 
British procrastination.141 Although there is little evidence to confirm their opinion the 
Foreign Office did fail to explain the need to consult the Dominions on this question. The 
reluctant attitude of these governments towards the Czechoslovak exiles was not a new 
development and had first emerged the previous year, General Smuts had previously
announced on 8 July 1940 that, ‘I frankly dislike Benes’s persistence. He has already
occasioned too much trouble.’142 The reason for his reluctance, and Canada’s and 
Australia’s, were much the same as the Foreign Office’s; the collective memory of far-
137 FO 371 26394 C5553/1320/12 Makins minute, 21 May 1941.
138 FO 371 26394 C5553/1320/12 Eden to Benes, 26 May 1941.
139 FO 371 26394 C59S0/1320/12 Benes’s reply to Eden, 28 May 1941.
140 FO 371 26394 C5980/1320/12 Roberts minute, 4 June 1941.
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reaching commitments made in Central Europe during the last war.14'1 When Eden 
attempted explained the situation to Masaryk on 12 June it was clear that he had some 
trouble accepting this explanation.144
Harold Nicolson provided the most likely reason for this difficulty in his book 
Diplomacy.
This glorious experiment [The British Commonwealth of Nations] is 
not, as yet, fully understood by foreign diplomatists. They imagine 
that members of the British Commonwealth are bound by some secret 
compact to support each other in all international negotiations...This 
assumption is incorrect. There is nothing which need prevent a 
Dominion Government from taking a wholly independent line in 
foreign policy.145
It is open to debate whether the Czechoslovaks in London understood this relationship; 
nevertheless the resulting delay was sufficient for Benes to complain about Eden’s 
methods.146
The Foreign Office certainly took these objections seriously enough to attempt to 
resolve this issue. Eventually, on 20 June 1941 Strang offered a compromise solution. He 
suggested that the British authorities would cease to mention the term ‘Provisional’ in 
reference to the Czechoslovak government in exile, but would not offer full recognition. 
Instead, the exiles would be viewed as having the same rights as all the other exiled 
governments and be given an accredited minister, but would not be placed on the
14 ’ FO 371 26394 C5994/1320/12 Telegram to the Foreign Office from the Government of Australia, 4 June 
1941.
144 FO 371 26394 C6475/1320/12 Eden minute, 12 June 1941.
143 H. Nicolson, Diplomacy, London, 1939, p i77.
146 Otahalova & Cervinlcova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovemkepolitiky, Vol. 1, p228.
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diplomatic list.147 These proposals were then forwarded to the Dominions to gauge their 
reactions and both the South African and Australian authorities reluctantly agreed to this 
concession.148 However, although these delays were well founded from the British 
perspective they caused trouble for Benes in both the Czechoslovak National Council and 
among the population in the Protectorate.149 Bruce Lockhart noted that Benes and 
Masaryk were increasingly annoyed by these postponements,
Both were dejected...by the long delay in the granting of full 
recognition...Dr Benes could not understand what the difficulties were. Jan 
wanted to know if the Czechoslovak aviators who had died fighting for 
Britain were to be regarded as provisionally dead.150
For a final time this impasse was broken by events outside the control of the 
Central Department, when, on 22 June 1941, Axis forces invaded the Soviet Union. The 
Soviets had maintained retained close, and largely amicable, contacts with Benes and these 
relations soon bore fruit.151 On 24 June Bruce Lockhart reported to Eden that the Soviet 
military attache in London had approached the head of Czechoslovak military intelligence 
regarding possible co-operation and in doing so had offered full recognition to Benes’s 
government.152 Bruce Lockhart submitted a fuller analysis of this situation to the Central 
Department two days later.
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President Benes informed me that he was perturbed by the possibility 
of Russia's recognising the Czechoslovak Government in London 
before Britain and the United States had accorded their full 
recognition. This may be the President’s method of exerting additional 
pressure on us, but I do not exclude the possibility of the Soviet 
authorities taking this step. Indeed, it is just the kind of action that 
might be expected of them. Nor do I think that President Benes's 
apprehension is purely tactical...the effect of Russian recognition on
the home Czechs and on the Slovaks might be dangerously
* 1 exhilarating.
The Foreign Office was presented, as it had been in late 1939, with the possibility of a 
foreign government offering a greater level of recognition to the Czechoslovaks than they 
had done. This would have placed the British authorities in a delicate position, and as 
Makins noted, might also ‘greatly encourage Russophile tendencies in Czechoslovakia and 
may well weaken Dr Benes’s own position.’134 The Foreign Office was now faced with the 
possibly that their hesitancy over the recognition question might undermine Benes’s 
position, increase Soviet influence in Central Europe and have a negative impact on 
relations with their newest ally.
These considerations were heightened by the fact that recognition terms offered to 
Benes by the Soviet Ambassador, I. M. Maisky, contained none of the reservations that the 
British had maintained for nearly three years. The Soviets offered to recognise Benes’s 
conception of the juridical continuity of the Czechoslovak state, made the physical 
restoration of the Republic one of their war aims, and granted the full recognition of Benes
133 FO 371 26410 C 7140/7140/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum to Central Department, 26 June 1941.
154 FO 371 26410 C7680/7140/12 Makins minute, 9 July 1941.
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as the official president of Czechoslovakia with full diplomatic relations.155 Once more it 
was an impassioned letter from Bruce Lockhart to Eden on 7 July that forced the pace of 
the Foreign Office’s decision making.
The real reason for the President’s [Benes’s] loss of his usual patience 
is the situation created by the entry of Russia into the war...I believe 
the time has now come when we should consider at least the 
possibility of Russia being able to check the German advance. If this 
should happen, the effects might be far reaching...A turning point in 
the war would be reached, and the chief credit would go to Russia.
The check to Germany would in fact, be recognised by all Europe as a 
Russian victory, and the effect on the peoples of Europe, but 
especially on the Czech people might be very serious in its 
dimensions...156
Although Bruce Lockhart’s suggestion that the Soviets might soon be able to recover from 
the German onslaught placed him in a tiny minority at this stage in the war, his warning 
over Soviet influence in the region was to prove prescient. The effect of this warning was 
swift and Eden sent for Bruce Lockhart the next day, when, according to his diaries, the 
Foreign Secretary immediately overturned the Central Department’s previous policy and 
demanded that Benes and his government now be recognised fully.157 Once again, the 
Central Department’s advice had been ‘short-circuited’ by direct ministerial intervention 
and the influence of external events. On 14 July Roberts noted that, ‘No doubt Dr Benes is
135 FO 3 7 1 26410 C7680/7140/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum on Maisky's meeting with Benes, 9 July 
1941 & Nemecek et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. L, pp201-205.
156 FO 371 26388 C 7511/216/12 Bruce Lockhart to Eden, 7 July 1941.
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making the most of the Soviet issue, but it does represent a real danger to the Czechs 
(USSR have offered full recognition but it is to be announced).’158 Makins and Strang 
initialled his minutes without comment.
That same day the War Cabinet considered this issue and concluded, ‘Hitherto we 
had recognised the Czecho-Slovak Government as a Provisional Government. Now that 
Russia has given full recognition, the Foreign Secretary thought that we ought to do the 
sam e...’159 After he had signed a treaty with the Soviet Union Masaryk had an audience 
with Eden and exchanged letters on recognition.160 As a result the British authorities now 
accepted the Czechoslovaks as being politically equal to all the other allies and appointed 
an ambassador, Philip Nichols.161 Certain reservations were maintained, however, and 
Eden’s letter noted that Britain did not accept the juridical continuity of the Czechoslovak 
Republic or agree to support any particular frontiers in Central Europe.162 Although this 
meant that Benes had not yet managed to secure British agreement for all his political 
objectives, in time the Foreign Office would have to compromise on these principles too. 
The issue of the Munich Agreement still to be tackled, however, and the Czechoslovaks 
were not able to secure a public denunciation from the Foreign Office until the following 
summer. The next day Lord Halifax, now the British ambassador in Washington, received 
a message from the Czechoslovak National Council for America thanking the British 
government for its recognition of Benes.I6j This was a fitting end to this process, which 
had begun in the United States three years previously. For all the delays and the Central 
Department’s well founded reservations over full recognition Benes and his government 
had succeeded in achieving their aims on this question.
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The importance of the recognition question in Anglo-Czechoslovak relations lies in 
the fact that it illustrated the way in which the Czechoslovak exiles were able to direct 
British policy on issues that they felt were politically vital. The reason why Benes was able 
to do this was relative simple; the Foreign Office, and the British government more 
generally, had few constructive policies regarding Central Europe at the start of the war. In 
fact, the reservations that the British authorities maintained throughout the recognition 
process were entirely negative. They referred solely to issues the British authorities did not 
wish to support, and were designed to avoid any sort of long-term commitments or 
entanglements in the region. While this approach was reasonable given the manner in 
which Czechoslovakia had been dissolved by March 1939 and the ad hoc nature of British 
recognition of its successor entities this did mean that the British position was rather 
confused. By contrast Benes and his colleagues had a very clear view of their political 
objectives and pursued them tenaciously in the face of British objections. The most crucial 
of these was the creation of a government in exile that could lobby the Great Powers to re­
establish Czechoslovakia within her pre-1938 frontiers. Moreover, due to the absence of 
clearly defined policies, Benes and his government were able to use the course of events, 
from 1939 to 1941, to pressurise the Foreign Office to acquiesce in their demands.
This is not to suggest that the recognition of a Czechoslovak government in exile 
went against British interests, it did not. Rather, that the incremental nature of British 
foreign policy formation, and the lack of any clearly defined policies with regard to 
Czechoslovakia, allowed Benes to exploit these inconsistencies and ultimately to secure his 
objectives. This was a process that was aided by the Czechoslovaks’ skilful use of 
propaganda, their British supporters and the frequent 'short circuiting' of the Central 
Department’s advice. Lastly, and most importantly, Anglo-Czechoslovak negotiations on 
the recognition question were often protracted and tense and the Soviet Union's swift and 
full recognition of a Czechoslovak government in exile and marked the beginning of the
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end of the British authorities’ ability to limit and control the political activities of Benes 
and his ministers.
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Chapter Three 
Anglo-Czechoslovak military relations, 1939 to 1945.
The primary focus of most secondary sources concerned with Anglo- 
Czechoslovak relations in exile during the Second World War has been the political 
interaction between the two parties.1 In these works the military aspects of the 
Czechoslovak ‘action abroad’ and its contacts with the British authorities often tends to 
be subservient to the overriding concern with the course of diplomatic negotiations and 
international agreements. As a result, the influence of military factors and the effect that 
the course of the war itself had in shaping these developments has often been under 
represented. Although military histories of these relations also exist they tend to do the 
reverse and focus more on the traditional military concerns of who fought where and 
when, consigning the political aspects of relations to a secondary position.2 This is not to 
say that collectively these texts ignore the interplay of political and military factors, and 
some do manage to fuse the two, but rather that over all they often fail adequately to 
express just how close the connection between the war and political relations actually 
was.J This was a fact that Lord Strang (formally head of the Central Department) later 
highlighted in his essay ‘War and Foreign Policy,’ in which he stated that the formation 
of British policy in this period was subservient to wider strategic influences, and when
1 E. Benes, Pameti. Od Mnichova k nove voice a k novema vitezstvi, Prague, 1947, M. Dockrill, ‘The 
Foreign Office, Dr Eduard Benes and the Czechoslovak Government-in-exile 1939-1941,’ Diplomacy and 
Statecraft, Vol. 6, No. 3, (November 1995), pp701-718, E. Taborslcy, ‘Politics in Exile 1939-1945,’ in V.S. 
Mamatey & R. Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 19IS-1948, Princeton, 1973, pp322- 
342. ^
2 E. Cejka, Ceskoslovensky odboj na Zapade 1939-1945, Prague, 1997, R. Luza, ‘The Czech resistance 
movement,’ in Mamatey & Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp343-361, C. 
MacDonald, The Killing of Obergruppenfiihrer Reinhard Heydrich, London, 1989 & L.M. White (ed), On 
All Fronts. Czechoslovaks in World War II, Three Volumes, New York, 1991- 2000.
3 See A. Brown, Airmen in Exile. The Allied Air Forces in the Second World War, Stroud, 2000, pp23-134 
and MacDonald, The Killing of Heydrich, pp 67-85.
‘there was a conflict between political and military considerations, military 
considerations usually prevailed.’4 Quite simply, British policy toward the Czechoslovak 
exiles during this period was, to a greater or lesser extent, affected by the military 
conduct of the war and this aspect of relations needs to be examined in its own right.
Nowhere was this interaction more clearly illustrated than in the long-drawn out 
process of British recognition of a fully accredited Czechoslovak government in exile. 
The British decision to recognise a Czechoslovak National Committee in December 1939 
was a direct result of the need to establish some form of political body to direct the Czech 
and Slovak soldiers and airmen gathered in France, as well as a desire to keep in step 
with the French Government over this question.5 The subsequent recognition of a 
Provisional Czechoslovak Government in Exile in July 1940 was granted because France 
had been defeated, elements of the Czechoslovak armed forces had been evacuated across 
the Channel and Britain now needed all the military assistance that she could secure.6 The 
final phase of recognition, in July 1941, was once again motivated by military 
considerations, this time by the German invasion of the Soviet Union and Moscow’s 
swift and full recognition of Edvard Benes and the Provisional Government in Exile. At 
every step of this process, therefore, it can be shown that military considerations had a 
direct bearing on British policy towards the Czechoslovak political exiles.
Such influences returned to the fore during the negotiations over the proposed 
British denunciation of the Munich Agreement in 1942. This time the decisive factor in 
the Foreign Office’s grudging acceptance of Benes’s demands on this question proved to
4 Lord Strang, ‘War and Foreign Policy 1939-45,’ in D. Dilks (ed), Retreat From Power. Studies in 
Britain’s Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, Vol. 2, London, 1981, pp98-99.
5 FO 371 22900 C202702/7/12, Halifax to Benes, 20 December 1939.
6 FO 371 24289 C7646/2/12 Strang Memorandum on talk with Benes, 21 June 1940.
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be the brutal Nazi retaliation against Lidice after the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. 
Significantly, this was an attack that had been undertaken in collaboration with and with 
the direct assistance of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a British organisation 
designed to foster ‘sabotage and subversion’ and to organise national revolts in occupied 
Europe and one that actually played a far greater role in influencing both British and 
Czechoslovak foreign policy during the war than has previously been recognised. It 
should be noted, however, that SOE’s objectives were not to cause arbitrary havoc in 
behind the German lines or to ‘set Europe ablaze.’ Its primary functions were to establish, 
organise and arm resistance movements in order to carry out specific acts of sabotage and 
to ready these groups to launch ‘national revolts’ at the end of the war in support of the 
advancing allied armies. In the case of Czechoslovakia and Poland this was something 
SOE conspicuously failed to do.7
In fact, there were three distinct elements within the context of military relations 
that will be examined in this chapter; the course of the war against Germany, the role of 
regular armed forces and finally the role of subversive and resistance organisations in 
Occupied Europe. First, there was the course of the war itself, the defeats and victories, 
the addition of new allies and after 1941 the troublesome complications of coalition 
warfare; the effects these events had has already been detailed. The second was the 
influence of the regular armed forces; in the Czechoslovaks’ case those soldiers and 
airmen who had escaped from the Protectorate and had gathered in Poland, France, the
Q
Balkans, and later in Britain. To these were later added two Czechoslovak divisions in
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7 M.D.R. Foot, SOE. An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 1940-1946, London, 1999, pp 
16-21.
8 Cejka, Ceskoslovensky odboj na Zdpade, pp94-95 & J. Josten, Oh, My Country, London, 1949, pp22-29.
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the Soviet Union, established in February 1942, though these units were not of direct 
concern to the Foreign Office.9 After 1940, however, the political rewards these regular 
forces produced was greatly reduced. Principally, this was because only a small number 
of soldiers and airmen actually managed to reach Britain, which meant that they were 
never really more than a symbolic force, especially in comparison to the larger numbers 
of French and Polish soldiers based in Britain.10 Consequently, after 1940 the 
organisation with the greatest effect on Anglo-Czechoslovak military relations was SOE. 
In addition, the difference in British and Czechoslovak attitudes towards the interaction 
of political and military considerations must be examined, not least Benes’s preference 
for Intelligence gathering as opposed to sabotage. Lastly, the liberation of Prague in May 
1945 and British attempts to encourage the United States to reach the Czechoslovak 
capital before the Red Army provides a dramatic example of the interaction of these two 
important factors in Anglo-Czechoslovak relations.
The British authorities had long been actively involved in assisting Czechoslovaks 
to join the army in France. These actions unwittingly assisted Benes in achieving his 
political objectives by swelling the army’s ranks and by helping to cement relations 
between the Czechoslovak and British intelligence organisations, although this was not 
recognised at the time and the central objective was to bolster the west’s defences against 
German attack. British Military Intelligence had actually been helping evacuate 
armament engineers and equipment from the Protectorate and the Balkans as far back as
9 J. Nemecek, H. Novackova, I. Sfovi'cek & M. Tejchman (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy v 
diplomatickych jedndnich, Vol. 1, Prague, 1998, pp236-238.
10 By comparison the Poles had some 20,000 soldiers, 4000 sailors and 14,400 pilots fighting along side 
British and allied forces in a number of theatres. R. Kedward, ‘France,’ & K. Sword, ‘Poland,’ both in 
I.C.D. Dear & M.R.D Foot (eds), The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford, 2001, pp316-318 & 
702-703. See also F. Moravec, Master of Spies, London, 1975, p200 & A. Prazmowska, Britain and 
Poland, 1939-1943. The Betrayed Ally, Cambridge, 1995, pp41-43.
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March 1939, and a small Czechoslovak military training camp for volunteers had been 
established at Birchington on Sea by September.” During early 1940 Military 
Intelligence, Research (MI(R)), one of the forerunners of SOE, was in contact with the 
Czechoslovak military authorities in France and had begun to help them transport men 
from Britain and further afield to join them.12 These were important contacts, as MI(R)’s 
Colonel Colin Gubbins would later become a central figure in SOE.13 Recruitment for 
these Czechoslovak units later became more official, although without the compulsory 
element that existed in France, and the Foreign Office, War Office, Home Office and the 
Czech Refugee Trust Fund all worked together to organise and fund the dispatch of 
Czechoslovak nationals to France.14 These activities were not too successful, however, as 
less than 10% of the available Czechoslovak manpower in Britain was actually called up 
and because of the Central Department’s suspicions that, ‘Dr Benes’s real objective was 
clearly to improve the position of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee.’15 This was a 
perfect illustration of just how close the relationship between military capacity and 
political potential was seen to be by the Foreign Office.
11 HS 4/15 Major A. Hesketh-Pritchard memorandum on relations with Frantisek Sigmund of the 
Zbrojovka Arms factory in Brno, December 1940; FO 371 22900 C l8276/ 7/12 Frantisek Slaby to Foreign 
Office, 7 November 1939 & HS 4/30 Memorandum by Colonel J. Holland, Section D, on training of 
Czechoslovak soldiers in Britain, 10 September 1939.
12 FO 371 24287 C1205/2/12 Strang memorandum on War Office liaisons through Gubbins with 
Czechoslovaks and assistance for soldiers who had escaped to Hungary, 22 January 1940 & C3411/2/12 
Makins memorandum on Gubbins’s request to extract several Czechoslovaks from Hungary, 4 March 1940.
13 FO 371 24292 C2414/1419/62 Strang to General Fredrick Beaumont-Nesbitt, 7 March 1940, on military 
relations with Czechoslovaks. See also P. Wilkinson, Foreign Fields; the story of an SOE operative, 
London 1997, p61 and P. Wilkinson, & J. Bright Astley, Gubbins and SOE, London, 1997, pp48-49.
14 FO 371 24365 C6284/1419/12 Memorandum ofthe arrangements between the Czech Military 
Delegation and the Czech Refugee Trust Fund, 30 March 1940 & minutes of a variety of Interdepartmental 
meeting on this question 26 January to 7 March 1940.
15 FO 371 24365 C3626/1419/12 Minutes of interdepartmental meeting between Foreign Office, Czech 
Refugee Trust Fund, War Office and Home Office, 7 March 1940.
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With the fall of France some of these Czechoslovak troops were evacuated to 
Britain on 22 June 1940 from Sete and the Minister of War, Anthony Eden, took a 
personal interest in their safety.16 Whereas up until this point the British authorities had 
always dealt with the Czechoslovak military units through the French, now they were 
their own responsibility and some form of political agreement would have to be reached. 
On 25 October 1940 a British-Czechoslovak Armed Forces agreement was signed 
between Jan Masaryk and Lord Halifax.17 This agreement had been facilitated by the 
Allied Forces Act, designed to allow for the establishment of six foreign armies on British 
soil and which was rushed through Parliament on 21 August 1940.18 Under its terms 
Czechoslovak forces were placed under British command, the Brigade was to be 
reconstituted and the costs, in line with earlier financial agreements, were to be covered 
by Britain.19 It is revealing that the British went to quite some lengths to keep these 
agreements a secret between the signatories, for political reasons. They were not 
considered to be State treaties that would have necessitated ratification by Parliament with 
accompanying public scrutiny. In the case of the Czechoslovaks and Poles this was a 
particular necessity as the British authorities maintained reservations over the post-war
16 FO 371 26420 C4340/14/62 The Secretary of State for War, A Eden Message to Polish and Czech troops 
printed in The Times 15 July 1940, Benes, Pameti,p\52, Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p 92 & Z. 
Kordina, ‘The 1940 Evacuation of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces from France,’ in White, On All Fronts, 
Vol. I,pp63-81. The 1st Czechoslovak Division had had nearly 11,500 men in France at the end of May 
1940, less than half reached Britain. This was largely because the majority were Slovaks who resided in 
France and were unwilling to leave.
17 FO 371 24368 Cl 1579/1419/12 Text of Agreement and E. Benes, Sestlet exilu. A drnhe svetove valky, 
Prague, 1947, pp445-453.
IS House of Commons Debates, 5th Series Vol. 364. Cols 1350-1414, 21 August 1940.
19 FO 371 24292 Cl 3060/8893/12 Text of financial agreement between the British Government and the 
Provisional Czechoslovak Government in Exile, signed by Sir Kingsley Wood and Dr Eduard Outrata on 
25 October 1940.
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frontiers of both countries, reservations that were not so apparent in relations with their 
French, Belgian and Norwegian allies.20
Although this Armed Forces agreement allowed for the reconstruction of a 
Czechoslovak army in Britain this force suffered from many problems. Trouble had 
started in France where, according to Benes’s memoirs, the manner of its recruitment led 
to difficulties in command and significant tensions between officers and the large 
numbers of Slovaks and Sudeten Germans in the ranks who were now technically citizens 
of different states.21 These difficulties were heightened by the fact that recruitment in 
France was compulsory, a procedure that was considered, but never introduced in Britain. 
Accusations of anti-Semitism, ‘undemocratic tendencies,’ extreme left and right wing 
leanings and a high proportion of officers and intellectuals in the ranks haunted the army 
in France and, as a result, no more than half of the soldiers were willing to come to 
Britain.22 On arrival the situation was so tense that 480 soldiers, who were accused of 
having Communist sympathies, were immediately interned at the request of the 
Czechoslovak military authorities.23 It should be recognised, however, that given the 
numerous difficulties in escaping from Nazi occupied Central Europe to the west, the fact 
that any Czechoslovak troops had managed to reach Britain was, in itself, quite 
impressive.
Virtually unknown is the collaboration between the British and Soviet authorities 
in 1940 and 1941 who were actively engaged in transferring Czechoslovak soldiers from
20 Brown, Airmen in Exile, pp54-55.
21 Benes, Pameti, pl74-182.
22 E. Kulka, ‘Jews in the Czechoslovak Armed Forces During World War II,’ in A. Dagan (ed), The Jews of 
Czechoslovakia, Vol. 3, New York, 1984, pp371-376 & Benes, Pameti, pl76-177.
23 FO 371 24368 Cl 125/1419/62 R.D. Coleridge minutes on conditions in Czechoslovak army camp, 21 
August 1940, see also Strang minute, 16 September & Cejka, Ceskoslovensky odboj na Zapade, pp 275- 
276.
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the Soviet Union, where many had remained since the fall of Poland, to British military 
control in the Middle East.24 In February 1941 Sir Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador 
to Moscow, reported to the Foreign Office that ‘Arrangements for departure of Czech 
Legion are now complete. Soviet authorities are being helpful but insist on secrecy of 
movement. Any publicity abroad may prejudice further success of scheme.’25 Though no 
record of the development of these plans remains in the files, the British government met 
the full cost of transferring these men from Moscow to Odessa, under the terms of the 
Anglo-Czechoslovak military agreement of 1940. Payments were made directly to 
Gosbank in Moscow and were personally authorised by the Prime Minister.26 This 
episode demonstrates two key points; firstly, that the Czechoslovaks enjoyed relatively 
good relations with the Soviets in early 1941 and that secondly that the British authorities 
were party to these contacts. These relations also contrasted sharply with Polish 
experiences in the Soviet Union, where many of the officers and men overrun by the Red 
Army in 1939 in the eastern districts of Poland had either been murdered at Katyn or 
imprisoned.27
As for the fighting abilities of this force Bruce Lockhart later commented, after a 
visit of inspection in January 1941, that,
The brigade contained a considerable percentage of bespectacled 
intellectuals on whose frame the modern British battle-dress, worn now by
24 FO 371 26378 & FO 371 26379, both 1941.
23 FO 371 26377 C 1516/32/12 From Cripps, Moscow, to Foreign Office, 17 February 1941.
20 See FO 371 26377 C l768/32/12 & C2180/32/12. There is a reference to these troops in Russia amongst 
R W Seton Watson’s published papers. J. Rychh'k, T. D. Marzik & M. Bielik (eds), R.W. Seton Watson and 
his relations with the Czechs and Slovaks, Documents 1906-1951, Vol. 1, Prague & Martin, 1995, pp592- 
593.
27 Prazmowska, Britain and Poland, pp94-95.
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so many and becoming so few, hung clumsily...Among them were some 
splendid types of Slav manhood.28
But this rather dismissive opinion was not one shared by SOE. The men it trained for 
operations in the Protectorate mainly came from the Brigade in Leamington Spa and their 
conclusions were that, ‘The Czechs were found to be among the best of all SOE trainees 
and turned out equally good parachute jumpers. Their keenness, discipline, intelligence 
and courage were everywhere given high praise.’29 Nevertheless, the relatively small 
numbers of soldiers and airmen that had reached Britain meant that these forces would be 
soon worn down when serving in the front line, especially as they had no reserves with 
which to replenish the ranks.
As a result, and as was the case with Belgian forces in Britain, their military 
usefulness was limited. Nichols summarised these aspects in a memorandum of 
December 1942 that again highlighted the delicate interplay of political and military 
considerations,
...the Independent Brigade can never hold up their heads in Prague unless 
they have been in actual combat with the Germans....The dilemma is plain 
the Brigade must go into action but it must not be decimated...the future 
employment of the Czechoslovak Brigade... must be regarded largely from
2S FO 371 26376 Cl 132/6/12 Bruce Lockhart to Eden, 31 January 1941.
29 HS 7/108 F.E. ICeary, Major P. W. Auster and Major G. I. Klauber, SOE Country History, 
Czechoslovakia 1940-45, p7.
the political as opposed to the purely military angle: that the method of its 
employment is in fact a political rather than a military question. What is 
required, of course is that the Brigade should go into action, should play 
its part, but should not be called upon to make heavy sacrifices.30
This was a succinct and pertinent analysis of the Brigade’s position within the Allied war 
effort. The Foreign Office understood the difficulties and their attitude towards these 
troops changed during the course of the war, from viewing them as being a real 
contribution to the war effort in 1940 to seeing them as a largely symbolic political force 
by 1942.
Although many Czechoslovak pilots fought in the Battle of Britain and later 
bombed Germany, while soldiers served with distinction in France in 1940, Tobruk in 
1942 and at Dunkirk in 1944, their overall contribution to the war effort was relatively 
small; not least when compared to the activities of the Czechoslovak brigades on the 
eastern front that would actually be involved in the liberation of Czechoslovak territory.31 
Although the Czechoslovak authorities made frequent requests in 1944 and 1945 for 
these forces to be transferred to the front line in Central Europe, they never were and
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30 FO 371 30855 C l243/12431/12 Nichols to Roberts, 8 December 1942.
31 FO 371 26386 Cl 1971/158/12 Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck to Benes, 27 October 1941 and 
C12189/158/12 Benes to Lieutenant Colonel K. Klapalek, Commander of Czechoslovak forces in Tobruk,
4 November 1941. FO 371 38975 Cl 1241/11241/12 Nichols to Central Department, 24 August 1944, copy 
of Benes’s speech to Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade, 21 August 1944, prior to its departure to Dunkirk. 
See also Cejka, Ceskoslovensty odboj na Zctpade, ppl49- 218, 327-337 & 463-469, J. Erickson, The Road 
to Berlin. Stalin’s War with Germany, Vol. II, London, 1999, pp291-292 & 307, M. Ludikar, ‘Short History 
of the Czechoslovak Air Force in World War II,’ in White, On All Fronts, Vol. 3, pp51-59 & F. Ostry, ‘In 
Pursuit of Liberation,’ in White, On All Fronts, Vol. 1, pp41-52.
returned to Prague only after its liberation.32 Nevertheless, the existence of these units 
played a crucial, if largely symbolic, role in demonstrating to the British authorities 
during 1939 and 1940 that the Czechoslovaks in exile were fully committed to the allied 
war effort.
The role-played by SOE in Anglo-Czechoslovak military contacts was perhaps 
the most important of the three. The significance of this relationship lay in the fact that 
SOE’s involvement brought together two of the most significant military assets that 
Benes and the Czechoslovaks in exile could call upon; Colonel Frantisek Moravec and 
his intelligence organisation, the druhy odbor (Second Department or Deuxieme Bureau), 
and the resistance networks in the Protectorate.33 Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS) had long-standing contacts with Moravec and they had brought him and some of his 
colleagues to London from Prague on the very morning of the German invasion in March 
1939.34 The intelligence capabilities Moravec possessed were greatly valued by the 
British authorities, and later by the Soviet Union, and provided Benes with much political 
kudos and leverage at the outbreak of hostilities.35 These assets actually proved far more 
politically valuable to Benes than the small number of soldiers and airmen based in 
France and Britain. Moreover, as control of SOE came under the auspices of the Foreign
32 FO 371 38944 Cl 6468/1343/12 Sinclair Air Ministry, to Eden, 23 November 1944, regarding request 
from Masaryk that Czechoslovak squadrons be allowed to be sent to liberated Czechoslovakia and FO 371 
47139 N 3640/1904/12 Nichols to Eden, 3 April 1945.
33 See J. Dolezal & J. Kfen (eds), Czechoslovakia's fight, 1938-1945, Documents on the Resistance 
Movements of the Czechoslovak People, Prague, 1964 & Luza, ‘The Czech resistance movement,’ in 
Mamatey & Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp343-361.
14 HS 7/108 Keary et al, SOE Country History, Czechoslovakia, p3, also F. H. Hinsley et al (ed), British 
Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 1, London, 1979, pp 57-58, 83, 277, 462, C. Andrew, Secret 
Service, London, 1985, pp 392-393, Foot, SOE, p278, Cf The Daily Telegraph, 15 March 1939 & 
Moravec, Master of Spies, p61.
33 In early 1940 the SIS made a loan of £50,000 to Moravec, a donation that was indicative of the high 
regard they held him in, he then placed part of these funds Benes’s disposal. See L. Otahalova & M. 
Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, Prague, 1966, p85.
Office this meant that the Central Department knew of its involvement in Czechoslovak 
affairs and monitored its activities.
At the beginning of the war the SIS found itself totally reliant upon both the 
Czechoslovak and Polish Intelligence services, a reliance that was then transposed into a 
certain amount of political capital. Captain Peter Wilkinson, later head of SOE’s Czech 
section, referred to Moravec’s organisation as the ‘doyen’ of allied intelligence services 
up until the summer of 1941.36 This position was secured by the information that 
emanated from Moravec’s agent ‘A-54,’ (The Abwehr officer, Paul Thummel) and later 
from Colonel Heliodor Pika in Moscow, and these sources gave the exiles access to the 
secretive core of the British government. Exactly how great a political advantage was 
generated by Moravec’s actions during this period is difficult to calculate, however, the 
Foreign Office was sufficiently concerned to comment on these contacts in January 
1940F7 Robert Bruce Lockhart stressed the contribution that the Czechoslovak 
intelligence service was already making in his first memorandum to the Foreign Office in 
September 1939.
Masaryk said that the Czech organisation in London was already
rendering important services to this country through its military espionage
organisation. Almost the whole of the Czech Deuxieme Bureau was now
36 P. Wilkinson’s talk given to Special Forces Club on the ‘Anthropoid’ mission, 1982, in his private papers 
held at the Imperial War Museum (These had not been catalogued at the time of writing).
37 FO 371 22900 C20582/7/12 Cadogan minute, 16 January 1940 & Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), 
Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, pp 186-187. See also Andrew, Secret Service, p463, 
Luza, ‘The Czech resistance movement,’ Mamatey & Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 
p 348, V. Modrak, ‘Radio Contact,’ in White (ed), On All Fronts, Vol. 3, pp 133-146, Moravec, Master of 
Spies, p 189, K, Pacner, Ceskoslovensko ve zvldstnich siuzbdch, Pohledy do historic ceskolovenskych 
vyzvednych sluzeb 1914-1989,Vol. 2, Prague, 2002, pp5-67, B.F. Smith, Sharing Secrets with Stalin. How
in London...He is anxious to obtain some assurances that his country will 
be restored in the event of a Franco-British victory...He promised to obtain 
for me the exact information regarding the number of German troops in 
the country.
Lockhart added, T believe that of all the smaller nations if Europe they are the most 
capable of waging a determined and successful underground war against foreign 
oppression,’ an opinion that he was later able to support with a steady flow of detailed 
intelligence reports from the Protectorate.38 One thing is certain, and that is that 
Moravec’s department was a significant addition to the portfolio of assets that Benes 
could call upon in exile. Crucially this meant that the British authorities were predisposed 
to maintaining Moravec’s, and thus, Benes’s support and this meant proffering political 
incentives in order to secure their continued co-operation. Thus in this case military and 
political considerations were inexorably linked and it is clear that Benes was aware of the 
potential political benefits in this relationship, especially given his previous experiences 
during the First World War.
Given the high regard with which the SIS held Moravec and the Czechoslovak 
resistance organisations they were subsequently of great interest to SOE when it was 
created in the summer of 1940.39 The principal aim of this organisation was not merely
the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941-1945, Lawrence, 1996, pp32-33 & 68 & R. Strobinger, Agent A-54, 
Prague, 1964.
38 FO 371 228899 Cl 5006/7/12 Rex Leeper to Cadogan, 13 September 1938, which included Bruce 
Lockhart’s memorandum & FO 371 24292 C l0002/10002/12 Bruce Lockhart’s Intelligence Summery 
from sources in the Protectorate, 16 September 1940.
39 See HS 4 /30 & 4/31.
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arbitrary sabotage and mayhem in occupied Europe, but the creation of secure, well- 
organised and equipped national resistance organisations capable of instigating ‘general 
risings’ and revolts during the final stages of the war.40 Moravec’s relations with SOE, 
however, were not altogether satisfactory, mainly because of the conflict between the 
exiled government’s political objectives and SOE’s purely military concerns. After a 
successful start in 1941 relations faltered after SOE mounted a joint operation with 
Moravec to assassinate the leading Nazi in the Protectorate, Heydrich.
Two Czechoslovak agents trained by SOE, Josef Gabci'k and Jan Kubis, whose 
operation was code-named Anthropoid, were delivered to the Protectorate by SOE in late 
1941 and after spending several months undercover ambushed Heydrich on his way to 
work on 27 May 1942 (He later died from septicaemia caused by shrapnel from a grenade 
thrown by Kubis.41) The consequences of this act were as devastating for the resistance in 
the Protectorate as they were politically fruitful for the exiles in London, but after this 
event the intimacy of contacts between Moravec and SOE deteriorated markedly.42 This 
was an important development, because being able to demonstrate control over an active 
resistance movement at home. was an important consideration for all the exiled 
governments in London. These were obligations that SOE believed the Czechoslovak 
exiles in London seemed increasingly unable, and possibly unwilling, to fulfil, even in 
the face of persistent calls from the Soviet Union (after 1941) for more sabotage in the 
Protectorate 43
40 As per the Chiefs of Staffs directive to SOE of 25 November 1940, COS (40)27(0), cited in HS 7/8 
History of Special Duties Operations in Europe, pi 1.
41 HS 4/39 and MacDonald, The Killing of Heydrich, pp 169-172.
42 HS 7/108 Keary et al, SOE Country History, Czechoslovakia, pp9-l 1.
43 Nemecek, et al.(eds), Ceskoslovensko-sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, pp 70-71.
In addition, SOE’s relations with Benes and Moravec were repeatedly hindered by 
conflicts between British and Czechoslovak political objectives, the political situation in 
the Protectorate and, somewhat ironically, by a lack of available Czechoslovak 
manpower in Britain. By the summer of 1944 it was apparent to SOE that the 
Czechoslovak military authorities were unwilling to send more men from the Brigade in 
Leamington Spa to be trained as SOE agents (referred to as patriots) and undertake 
sabotage work, even though SOE had set up a specialist training school for them.44 This 
was because General Sergej Ingr, the Czechoslovak Minister of Defence, believed that 
any reduction in the Brigade’s numbers would have prevented them from participating in 
Allied operations on the Continent.45 The Czechoslovak authorities felt that facing the 
German army in battle was more important than dismantling of the Brigade to provide 
SOE with more agents. In fact, the relations became so bad that by June 1943 SOE 
stopped trusting the intelligence materials Moravec passed to them and the SIS.46 This 
information had once been highly sought after, but by 1943 it was increasingly regarded 
as politically motivated fabrications.47 This was a distinct possibility, because Benes 
admitted to JaromiT Smutny, head of the President’s Office, as early as 8 March 1941 that 
he felt it acceptable to falsify intelligence material passed on to the British if the political 
rewards warranted it.48 While such behaviour proved to be counter productive it does
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44 HS 4/5 Report on Czechoslovak activity May 1942-May 1943 & HS 7/277 SOE’s War Diary for Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, p33.
43 HS 4/4 SOE memorandum, 18 May 1944.
46 HS 4/4 from CSO(T) (Sir Campbell Stuart’s propaganda department under the Foreign Office’s control) 
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reveal that Benes regarded intelligence material as yet another asset to be utilised for 
political advantage.
By early 1944 SOE’s Czech section was contemplating severing its contacts with 
the Czechoslovaks principally because of what they saw as Benes’s constant interference 
and Moravec’s unwillingness to undertake sabotage operations at the expense of 
intelligence related activities, attitudes that SOE believed hindered active resistance.49 
SOE’s subsequent failure to supply the uprisings in Slovakia in September 1944 and in 
Prague in May 1945, which after all was its raison d ’etre, did little to improve the 
situation. Nevertheless, SOE’s relations with the Czechoslovaks had an effect on the 
exiles’ political standing, and conversely, SOE’s failure to provide adequate supplies for 
the revolts on Czechoslovak territory compelled Benes and his government to rely ever 
more heavily on the Soviet Union for military support in the closing stages of the war, 
which undermined Benes’s policy of maintaining an equidistant position between the 
western and eastern allies. Indeed, this situation was the primary reason why the British 
authorities tried to encourage the United States to liberate Prague before of the Soviet 
Union in may 1945.
It is also necessary to comment upon the differences between the British and 
Czechoslovak attitudes towards military action and resistance during the war, especially 
as there were a number of important discrepancies between their respective positions. 
The British approach was relatively straightforward, particularly under Winston
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Churchill’s leadership; the war would have to be waged, with all available means, until 
the final German defeat. Although post-war planning was a constant consideration for the 
British government, the many complex questions surrounding post-war reconstruction, 
settlements and nation building would be left in abeyance until the anticipated victors’ 
peace conference.50 In many ways this was a sensible position to take, and it was one that 
was entirely commensurate with Britain’s own position at the start of the war and later 
within the Grand Alliance, as well as stemming from a desire to avoid what were seen as 
the ‘mistakes’ of 1919 -  that is agreeing to grandiose post-war plans that later caused 
further conflict in Europe.51
The British authorities, therefore, were primarily concerned with what the exiled 
governments gathered in London could do to assist the war effort as opposed to the 
varied political objectives they espoused. After all, the defeat of Nazi Germany had to 
precede the implementation of any post-war policies. Moreover, the objectives of the 
various exiled governments were often mutually exclusive, especially in the case of the 
Poles and the Czechoslovaks, and might bind the British government to commitments it 
would not be able to implement at a later date. It was these considerations that 
underpinned the various reservations the British authorities maintained over their 
recognition of the Czechoslovak government in exile. It was the Czechoslovaks’ ability 
to aid the prosecution of the war, therefore, which translated into British political support 
for Benes and the exiles.52 This was something that the exiles were well aware of and
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Bruce Lockhart highlighted this when he quoted the Slovak politician, Milan Hodza, who 
had remarked, ‘We realise there can be no victory for us unless we shed our blood 
copiously.’55 For the British authorities this meant access to Moravec’s intelligence 
organisation, the contribution made by the regular armed forces and, after 1940, the 
activities of the resistance in the Protectorate and the preparations for a ‘National 
Uprising.’ These last two aspects came under the auspices of SOE and as the regular 
Czechoslovak forces in Britain were largely a symbolic entity after July 1940 when 
resistance and sabotage work in the Protectorate became an increasingly important 
indicator of the exiled government’s contribution to the war effort.
One caveat needs to be added to this analysis, however, and that is that the 
existence of well regarded intelligence organisations, viable resistance movements and 
regular army units abroad did not automatically result in exiled governments’ securing 
the political objectives they desired, either from Britain or the other Great Powers. Both 
the French and the Poles had far larger military and resistance organisations at their 
disposal than the Czechoslovaks, yet these assets did not immediately translate into 
support for their respective political agendas.34 Military and intelligence assets, therefore, 
were only of use to an exiled government if they could be combined with skilful 
diplomacy in order to extract the greatest amount of political benefit.
For the Czechoslovak emigres the relationship between the political and the 
military was far more complex. Benes and his government had a number of political
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problems with which they had to contend, and these took priority over purely military 
activities and in turn affected the attitude of the exiles and their collaborators in the 
Protectorate towards military considerations. This is not to say that they were unwilling 
to fight, but rather that Benes always had his own political objectives uppermost in his 
mind. This was a point that he made plain to Bruce Lockhart in September 1939, who 
then reported these comments to the Foreign Office.
Dr Benes lays great stress on the importance of Czech divisions taking 
their place in the front line with French and British troops. This the Czechs 
regard as the most practical step towards recognition by France and Britain 
of Czechoslovakia’s right to independence.55
Thus Benes was always primarily interested in the political advantages to be had from 
those armed forces in Britain and Moravec’s intelligence work and was correspondingly 
concerned by the inherent political dangers of unregulated sabotage activities at home. 
He also understood that the liberation of Czechoslovakia could only be achieved in 
collaboration with the Allied armies, ultimately the Red Army, and not by the efforts of 
the exiles alone.
It should be recognised that Benes was already well acquainted with the delicate 
interaction between political and the military consideration during wartime. This was, in 
fact, the second time he had been involved in organising the liberation of Czechoslovakia 
from abroad. Thus his experiences during the First World War provided a template for
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his activities in the Second.56 Indeed, Benes made this link explicit in his memoirs where 
he recounted that his plans for just such an undertaking began prior to his departure from 
Prague in 1938, when he gathered his closest advisors together and told them that,
...we must again begin an all-round struggle as in 1914. We will have to 
prepare the organisation of resistance at home, establish permanent contact 
with anti-Nazi Europe and organise an army at home and outside our 
frontiers...A numerically strong political and military emigration will be 
needed and it must leave the country in time.57
This was duly achieved through the exodus of soldiers and airmen from the Protectorate, 
largely organised by Benes’s supporters, Moravec’s extraction to London and the 
establishment of radio links to the resistance groups left behind.
For Benes these assets were tools to further his political agenda and foremost 
amongst them was the intelligence gathered by Moravec.58 Benes knew exactly how to 
utilise these assets to the greatest political effect and that is what he did from March 1939 
onwards, although the British authorities were also aware of this potential source of 
leverage and did what they could to limit its effects. SOE was also aware of Benes’s 
previous experiences during the First World War and belatedly understood the limiting
126
36 See E. Benes, My War Memoirs, London, 1928, pp44-45, 72-75.
57 G. Lias, (trans), The Memoirs o f Dr Eduard Benes, From Munich to New War and New Victory, London, 
1954, pp51-52 & original text Benes, Pameti, p76.
38 Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, pp 187-188 & 
Benes, Pameti, p i30 & 157.
influence of political issues on Moravec’s ability to encourage sabotage. As Wilkinson 
noted in November 1942,
The Czechs on the other hand, by skilful propaganda have managed to 
build up a very considerable reputation for underground action. This has 
little historical basis... a study of Benes's history of the Maffia during the 
last war show that this revolution too was essentially political rather than 
military and its leaders were professors and publicists rather than officers 
or desperadoes.59
This analysis not only illustrated the frustration SOE felt in its dealing with the 
Czechoslovaks, but also accurately summarizes Benes’s attitude to the relationship 
between military and political considerations.
This was particular important for Benes as he had to consider a variety of 
sensitive issues while in exile, and balance his objective of re-establishing 
Czechoslovakia within her pre-1938 frontiers and annulling the terms of the Munich 
Agreement with the fact that these events had profoundly disillusioned the Czechoslovak 
population and damaged his own reputation.60 When unrest and strikes broke out in the 
Protectorate on 28 October and 17 November 1939 these acts of defiance led to the death 
of a young student, Jan Opletal, a tightening of the German regime and the arrest of many
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people involved in the resistance movements.61 Collectively these factors made the 
effective encouragement of sabotage in the Protectorate all the more difficult in the years 
to come. Benes and his government also had to contend with the many political divisions 
that existed among themselves and the population at home. These relations were further 
complicated by the presence of a ‘Quisling’ government in Prague, under Emil Hacha, by 
the existence of a variety resistance groups whose members allegiances spanned the 
political spectrum, and, after the Soviet Union’s entrance into the war in 1941, by the 
increasingly popularity of KSC.62 If Czechoslovakia was to be restored under Benes’s 
leadership after the war then great care would have to be taken not to allow any one of 
these groups to secure an undue advantage over the others.
In addition to these concerns there was the issue of the tense relations between the 
Czechs and the pro-Axis Slovak State, and the separatist tendencies of the other 
constituent peoples of the former State. These tensions became especially acute during 
the liberation of Czechoslovak territory by the Red Army in 1944 and 1945, when Slovak 
desires for autonomy returned to the fore. Finally, Benes and his colleagues could see for 
themselves the problems associated with resistance movements experienced by other 
exiled governments in London, principally the Poles, the Greeks and the Yugoslavs.63
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Quite simply, for Benes resistance in the Protectorate was something of a double-edged 
sword. Although it was necessary to demonstrate his control over the resistance 
movements at home, not least in order to avoid the impression of wholesale collaboration 
with the Germans; the unregulated encouragement of separatist or Communist resistance 
movements by SOE could produce unwelcome political repercussions.64
It was these considerations that resulted in Benes and his government expending 
most of their energies during the war on intelligence gathering activities and preparations 
for a ‘national uprising,’ as opposed to sabotage in the Protectorate, not least because the 
former resulted in far greater political rewards than the latter.65 As a later briefing paper 
for Gubbins outlined in early 1944, ‘SOE’s experience is that the traditional type of 
Intelligence Department does not produce the right mentality and methods for subversive 
success.’66 In fact, Moravec later explained that the government in exile never regarded 
SOE’s sabotage work as a primary consideration. He argued that the government in exile 
and the resistance in the Protectorate, ‘attached little importance to organised sabotage 
and partisan warfare,’ and that, ‘They maintained that the Western Allies were, in fact, 
not interested in this type of resistance because it represented only a negligible 
contribution to the allied war effort.’67 This is a questionable conclusion, but one that 
sheds much light on the increasingly difficult relationship between SOE and Moravec 
after the summer of 1942.
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The most explicit example of the close relationship between military and political 
considerations occurred during the final weeks of the war when the British authorities 
attempted to encourage General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), to order American ground forces to liberate 
Prague. During this period Anglo-Czechoslovak relations became subsidiary to the 
prevailing dynamics of coalition warfare and although the Foreign Office and the Prime 
Minister were keen to secure a western military presence in Prague, and thus a political 
presence too, they ultimately failed to convince the United States of this need. The 
difference between the British and American perceptions of this situation was first raised 
by V.F.W. Cavendish-Bentinck, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), in a 
memorandum on this question on 13 April 1945.
It may be politically desirable the Americans should get to Prague first, 
but I am informed by the Director of Military operations that it is militarily 
highly improbable. Our overriding objectives are (a) to establish a firm 
link up with the Russians, and (b) to prevent crystallisation of resistance in 
the redoubt area.68
This minute raised some important considerations as in the event Eisenhower would 
refuse to move on Prague because he regarded it as a political objective and not as a 
military one.
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This is an important point as it was a commonly held assumption amongst senior 
military commanders in the United States army, including Eisenhower that military and 
political objectives should be kept strictly separate.69 Nor did Eisenhower have explicit 
instructions from Washington to pursue political goals in Central Europe.70 Moreover, 
Britain’s ability to influence Eisenhower’s tactics was hindered by the increasingly 
strained nature of Anglo-American military relations, which had been becoming 
increasingly fractious; not least over the disagreements regarding zones of occupation 
and the capture of Berlin that dominated Anglo-American relations during late March and 
early April 1945.71 In the wake of Churchill’s failure to convince the United States to 
capture Berlin there was little reason to believe that they would now be willing to occupy 
Prague solely at his request.
Eisenhower’s own thinking on this matter was also influenced by three other 
factors in addition to his disinclination to pursue purely political objectives. First, that he 
was still preoccupied by the possibility of German resistance crystallising in a mythical 
‘National Redoubt,’ even though no such redoubt was being planned. But the influence of 
the redoubt question on Eisenhower’s thinking in late April and early May cannot be 
overemphasised. It dominated his strategic planning and was largely responsible for his 
decisions not to advance on either Berlin or Prague.72 Indeed, the RAF and USAAF 
bombed the Skoda works in Plzen on the night of 17 to 18 April and again on 25 April to
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prevent its output helping to stiffen resistance in the Redoubt area.7"5 This was something 
that the RAF had been previously been unable to do and an action that later gave rise to 
Soviet suspicions that this had only been done in order to deny these resources to them, a 
charge the RAF forcefully denied.74
Second, that Eisenhower had also been very careful during the Third Army’s 
advance across Germany to liase closely with his Soviet opposite number, General Alexei 
I. Antonov, and to delineate clear demarcation lines between the two forces, in order to 
avoid any possible complications arising from their eventual contact. Between 21 to 24 
April they had agreed upon clear boundaries that left the Third Army on the Moldau 
(Vltava in Czech) and Elbe Rivers and Prague to the Soviets.75 Finally, Eisenhower had 
to consider that the war in the Pacific continued and that this was a significant priority in 
Washington. The sooner his men were finished fighting in Europe the sooner they could 
be moved to the Far East to end the war there.76 Taken together, and combined with 
Eisenhower’s disinclination to pursue political goals, it was these factors that dissuaded 
him from taking Churchill’s advice.
Nevertheless, the idea that the United States should be encouraged to liberate 
Prague was accepted as a reasonable policy by the Foreign Office and Churchill took a 
personal interest in these matters, intervening on several occasions.77 It is also important 
to note that British support for this objective at the eleventh hour belatedly seemed to 
parallel Benes’s own policy of locating Czechoslovakia between east and west. Yet
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Britain’s desire to attempt to limit the extent of the Red Army’s occupation and 
domination of Central Europe was never an idea that would be shared by the new 
President, H.S. Truman, the State Department or Eisenhower.78
On 18 April 1945 United States forces had crossed onto Czechoslovak territory 
and the British government, Churchill in particular returned to the question of who would 
liberate Prague. Cadogan had sent the first official British request that the United States 
give serious consideration to the liberation of Prague to Ambassador J.G. Winant back on 
16 April 1945.
Mr Eden feels that the advantage to be gained is considerable and would 
be glad to know whether your government shares his view. Mr Eden is 
aware that there may be operational difficulties...He was anxious, 
however, that I should put these views to you as representing his own 
estimate of the political aspect of the matter...79
On 22 April Sargent wrote to Churchill to explain that no answer had been received from 
Winant, and that as the, ‘political issues at stake are so important,’ another attempt should 
be made to gauge Washington’s position and secure their support.so Churchill replied, ‘ I 
entirely agree with your minute...Will you draft accordingly for Mr Eden and for Chiefs 
of Staff [COS].’81
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Churchill discussed this question directly with Eisenhower on 24 April. This was 
a further indication of the seriousness with which this question was viewed in London; 
indeed the officials in the Northern Department were largely sidelined on this issue in 
favour of deliberations at the highest levels of government. In fact, Czechoslovak issues 
had not received such high-level attention since Eden’s dispute with Benes over his treaty 
with Stalin in 1943. But regardless of the Prime Minister’s personal intervention 
Eisenhower made it plain that he felt Prague was in the Soviet zone and he had no 
intention of moving forward to liberate it. Churchill then requested that the COS consider 
the military aspects of this question and suggest a suitable line to take with the Chiefs of 
Staff in the United States.82 Cadogan followed this approach up with a letter to General 
Sir Hastings Ismay in which he refuted the suggestion that Czechoslovakia had been 
decisively allotted to the Soviet zone, accepted the tactical constrains on Eisenhower, but 
stressed the political advantages that the Foreign Office felt were to be had.83
The COS duly considered these requests on 26 April 1945, but concluded that ‘a 
thrust into Czechoslovakia would... detract from the weight of his [SCAEF] main thrust,’ 
and that Eisenhower was still concerned by the prospect of the creation of a ‘National 
Redoubt’ in Austria.84 At the same time they added that they felt that Eisenhower might 
have over-estimated German strength in the Protectorate and they accepted that there 
were political advantages to be gained. A draft telegram to Washington was produced and 
a copy forwarded to the Foreign Office, which requested that the SCAEF’s attention be 
drawn, ‘to the political significance of Prague...’ though it added, ‘We do not of course
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suggest that such operations should be allowed to delay the final German collapse.’85 The 
resulting reply from the Chiefs of Staff in the United States stressed that any final 
decision was up to the SCAEF and that for military reasons they, ‘did not favour issuing 
a directive to General Eisenhower’ along these lines.86
But both Churchill and the Foreign Office viewed this question as being too 
important for the final decision to be left solely to the military commanders on the 
ground. In San Francisco Eden approached the Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, 
and brought the issue to his attention. Stettinius agreed with Eden and sent his own 
messages in support of the plan to liberate Prague to Truman and Admiral William D. 
Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.87 This unofficial approach was then 
followed up, on Sergeant’s advice, by a note from Churchill to Truman on 30 April 
(originally drafted by Sargent). In which he re-iterated the British position and urged the 
President to agree to the advance on Prague. As such it is worth quoting from at length.
There can be little doubt that the liberation of Prague and as much as 
possible of the territory of western Czechoslovakia by your forces might 
make the whole difference to the post-war situation in Czechoslovakia, 
and might well influence that in nearby countries. On the other hand, if the 
western allies play no significant part in Czechoslovakian liberation, that
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country will go the way of Yugoslavia. Of course, such a move by 
Eisenhower must not interfere with his main operations against the 
Germans, but 1 think the highly pertinent political consideration mentioned 
above, should be brought to his attention...I hope this will have your 
approval.8S
This was a message that unequivocally stated British policy, highlighted the political 
importance Churchill attached to this question, and urged Truman, in no uncertain terms, 
to order such a move. Yet even this direct appeal did not have the required effect as the 
President decided that such political considerations should not be allowed to interfere 
with Eisenhower’s military tactics. Eisenhower had even told General George C. 
Marshall, General of the Army, the previous day that, CI shall not attempt any move I 
deem militarily unwise merely to gain a political prize [Prague] unless 1 receive specific 
orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff’89 Therefore, Truman’s reply to Churchill on 
the 1 May seemingly brought to an end any possibility that the United States would agree 
to liberate Prague.90 Sargent passed on this conclusion to Eden on 3 May 1945.91
Although the British government’s attempts to encourage Eisenhower to advance 
on Prague seemed to have ended in failure by the beginning of May 1945, subsequent 
events briefly conspired to re-kindle this possibility. The outbreak of national uprisings
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against the Germans led to renewed calls from London that the Third Army advance 
further eastward. Even though British attempts to persuade Eisenhower had so far 
achieved very little the Foreign Office decisively re-iterated its position in a message to 
SHAEF’s forward headquarters on 2 May 1945.
Present aim of His Majesty's Government is to strengthen Dr Benes’ hand 
against Communists and Russians and against any separatist tendencies.
We would like to see Government for whole of Czechoslovakia 
established in Prague as soon as possible. His Majesty's Government have 
urged on United States Government and American Chiefs of Staff the 
great political advantage of General Eisenhower's forces penetrating as far 
as possible into Czechoslovakia and liberating Prague if possible.92
However, these additional missives failed to modify Eisenhower’s previous position.
Given the developing situation in Prague, and the launching of national uprisings 
in advance of the Red Army and the possibility that it might delay the final defeat of 
Germany, Eisenhower again approached his Soviet opposite number on 4 May. He 
requested that Patton’s Third Army be allowed to advance from its previously agreed 
position along a line running between the cities of Karlsbad, Pilsen and Budovice (sic) on 
towards the left bank of the Vltava. The answer was polite, but firm, and was passed on 
to the Foreign Office two days later.93 On its receipt Sargent informed Churchill that, ‘I
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am afraid this means that General Eisenhower has pledged himself not to go to Prague.’94 
While Eisenhower had now decided to investigate the possibility of moving his forces 
further eastward his request had been made on the very same day that the Red Army had 
finally decided to launch its final offensive of the war, on Prague itself.95 There may well 
have been an opportunity for United States forces to reach Prague in April, but by 4 May 
1945 this possibility no longer existed. For ail the British government’s appeals the 
opportunity for western forces to liberate Prague first had been lost.
The west’s failure to reach Prague in May 1945 had a commensurate effect on the 
opinions of some of the Czechoslovak population, many of whom regarded this failure as 
another example of the west’s lack of interest in the region. Upon his arrival in western 
Bohemia in May 1945 an SOE officer, Harold Perkins, noted,
in Plzen we heard the first rumours of the Prague disappointment at non 
delivery of arms from the West ...There is not the slightest sign in Prague 
that any other country has fought this war than Russia - and that hurts 
when one considers the support we gave to the Benes Gov...I feel very 
strongly on this matter, but my temperature is lessened by the knowledge 
that it is not a true reflection of the real Czech majority but rather forced 
on them from the east who are losing no time in taking advantage of the 
situation granted to them by the liberation of the capital by the victorious, 
glorious ect ect Red Army -what a rabble...96
138
94 FO 371 47086 N5307/207/12 Sargent to Churchill, 6 May 1945.
95 Konev, Year of Victory, pp 193-23 8.
96 HS 4/7 Perkins to Gubbins, 16 May 1945.
139
This quotation clearly demonstrated that by the end of the war Britain’s contribution to 
the actual liberation of Czechoslovakia had been, at best, slight and this fact was now 
being utilised by the Soviet Union and the KSC to the fullest political effect.
Although the British authorities had tried their utmost to encourage Eisenhower to 
reach Prague because of his different attitude towards the interaction of military and 
political considerations he had refused to do so 011 purely military grounds. These were 
events that forced the Czechoslovak government in exile to rely far more heavily on 
military support from the Soviet Union than they would have liked and this reliance 
ultimately had an effect on the political orientation of the Czechoslovak State after the 
war. Therefore, while Benes and the other Czechoslovak exiles in Britain had been able 
to extract a significant amount of political capital from the military assets they controlled, 
it is questionable whether these successes were outweighed by the negative impact of the 
west’s failure to reach Prague. Nevertheless, the interplay between military and political 
considerations had been a crucial component in Anglo-Czechoslovak relations 
throughout the Second World War.
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Chapter Four 
Anglo-Czechoslovak-Soviet Relations 1939 to 1945.
The German invasion of the Soviet Union, on 22 June 1941, proved to have 
lasting consequences for Anglo-Czechoslovak relations; not only did the Soviet Union’s 
entrance into the war necessitate a fundamental reappraisal of British policy towards 
Moscow and Stalin’s regime, but the addition of this new ally also had an effect on all the 
various exiled governments gathered in London, not least on the Czechoslovaks and the 
Poles.1 This was especially true with regard to the debates amongst the ‘Big Three’ over 
military strategy and the reconstruction of Europe after the war, exchanges that would 
ultimately have an effect on the liberation of Prague in May 1945.2 It also needs to be 
recognised that this was an alliance forged out of mutual need and had not sprung from a 
desire for co-operation, and consequently mutual suspicion was an integral part of these 
relations from the outset. Although Britain was an ally of the Soviet Union, and had no 
illusions regarding that country's contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany, the 
historical differences between Britain’s and Czechoslovakia’s relations with the Soviet 
Union prior to 1941 began to have an increasing effect on their own bilateral contacts.3 
As a result Anglo-Czechoslovak relations, which had often experienced difficulties since 
the war began, became increasingly tense as the Czechoslovak exiles were forced to
1 See M. Kitchen, British Policy towards the Soviet Union During the Second World War, London, 1986, 
pp 56-83, G. Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin. British Documents on Anglo-Soviet relations 1941- 
45, Cambridge, 1984, pp79-81 & C. Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin’s Cold War. Soviet strategies in Europe, 1943 to 
1956, Manchester, 1995, Chapter 1.
2 See C. Barnett, ‘Anglo-American Strategy in Europe,’ in A. Lane & H. Temperley (eds), The Rise and 
Fall of the Grand Alliance 1941-45, London, 1995, ppl74-189, R Luza, ‘The Liberation of Prague: An 
American Blunder? A note by Radomir Luza,’ Kosmas .Journal of Czechoslovak and Central European 
Studies, Vol. 3, No 1, Summer 1984, pp40-52, A.J.P. Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, Oxford, 1992, 
pp576-577 Note B & W. Ullmann, The United States in Prague, 1945-1948, New York, 1978, Chapter 1.
3 See G. Lias, Benes of Czechoslovakia, London, 1940, Chapter 5, G Warner, ‘From Ally to Enemy: 
Britain’s relations with the Soviet Union 1945-1948,’ in M. Dockrill and B. McKercher (eds), Diplomacy
become more finely attuned to the new realities of Soviet influence in Central Europe 
than the British.4 This development necessitated a reassessment of the exiled 
government’s international position and from late 1941 onwards this was reflected in 
Edvard Benes’s conception of Czechoslovakia’s role as a ‘bridge’ between east and west. 
The Foreign Office, however, increasingly came to view Benes’s willingness to negotiate 
and compromise with Moscow as evidence of his political naivete and pro-Soviet 
sympathies. Furthermore these were policies that the Foreign Office came to regard as 
being detrimental to both British and Polish interests.
It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that British attitudes towards the 
Soviet Union were homogenous, or overwhelmingly hostile, but, in much the same way 
that the Munich Agreement had polarised attitudes within Britain’s foreign policy- 
making elite, so contrasting attitudes towards the Soviet Union also came to influence 
British policy.5 When the military situation in Europe looked bleak, as it continued to do 
until late 1943, the British authorities cautiously welcomed the support of an additional 
ally and made full use of the Czechoslovaks’ long standing political, military and 
intelligence contacts with Moscow. As the fortunes of war began to turn, however, and 
plans for the post-war organisation of Europe began to be a growing source of 
disharmony, opinions within the Foreign Office gradually altered. Anglo-Czechoslovak 
relations were particularly sensitive to these changing dynamics, and as relations
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4 See H. Ripka, ‘A New Central Europe’ Central European Observer, 30 May 1941.
3 See M. Dockrill, British Establishment Perspectives on France. 1936-1940, London, 1999, pp96-97, 
Roberts, 'The Holy Fox ’: A Biography of Lord Halifax, London, 1991, p295, R. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the 
Reckoning, London, 1947, pp266-273 &N. Nicolson (ed), Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letter 1939-1945, 
London 1967, pp455-456.
deteriorated, so the Czechoslovak exiles found themselves increasingly at odds with their 
British hosts on issues related to the Soviet Union.
This is to not suggest that British decision-making became unduly biased because 
of the Czechoslovaks contacts with Moscow, in fact British policy continued to be 
formed in the same dispassionate, pragmatic and reactive manner it had been before. 
Rather, from June 1941 onwards every issue upon which the British authorities had had 
to make a decision regarding the Czechoslovak question was intimately connected to both 
countries relations with the Soviet Union. Indeed, it was indicative of these tensions that 
after spending six years of exile in London Benes and his government eventually returned 
to liberated Czechoslovak territory via Moscow and not from the British Isles.
There were three main phases in the development of these tripartite relations. The 
first covered the period immediately prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union up 
until early 1943. It was marked by relatively friendly, if cautious, relations between the 
British, Czechoslovaks and Soviets. An Anglo-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance was 
signed in May 1942 and the Czechoslovak government in exile worked closely with 
Moscow on intelligence and military matters. Some problems existed already, especially 
regarding Moscow’s demands over frontiers and their opposition to the planned 
Czechoslovak-Polish federation, but these had yet to develop into insurmountable 
difficulties. The second phase lasted from early 1943 up to the beginning of the Slovak 
National Uprising (SNP) in late August 1944. This phase was marked by a growing 
hostility between the Soviets and the Polish government that culminated in the total 
cessation of all contacts between the two parties. In addition, Benes’s desire to sign a 
treaty with the Soviet Union became a major source of antagonism between the
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government in exile and the Foreign Office. Although Benes eventually signed the treaty 
in December 1943 he did so against the Central Department’s explicit advice.
The final phase of relations was dominated by the Red Army’s advance through 
eastern and central Europe and its liberation of an increasing swathe of Czechoslovak 
territory. During this period, from the start of the SNP until the eventual liberation of 
Prague, the Foreign Office’s ability to influence the exiled government’s policies 
declined dramatically. Although some efforts were made to rectify this situation, for the 
Czechoslovak government the physical presence of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak soil 
far out-weighed the vague political re-assurances that emanated from London. In 
addition, the Great Power conferences convened in Teheran and Yalta had not as yet 
directly addressed issues related to Czechoslovakia, nor had the British authorities 
revised their previous reservations over the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia within 
her pre-1938 frontiers. It was these reasons, as opposed to any ideological rationale, that 
impelled Benes to travel to Moscow in March 1945 and from there on to Prague, by 
which time agreements had been made to incorporate the Czechoslovak Communist Party 
(KSC) into the government.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to examine what effect the Soviet Union’s 
entrance into the war had on Anglo-Czechoslovak relations and whether the Foreign 
Office’s policies adversely affected Benes’s proposed course of balance between the 
eastern and western allies. As the greater part of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations were 
strictly bilateral they were of little direct concern to the Central Department, unless they 
happened to affect the Poles. The Foreign Office also paid little attention to the activities
143
144
of the KSC until late in the war, as their actions were similarly regarded as an internal 
Czechoslovak matter. As a result, this chapter will focus on those events outlined above.
The most important difference between British and Czechoslovak relations with 
the Soviet Union was the length and warmth of their previous contacts. For the British, as 
Churchill declared on 1 October 1939, the Soviet Union was ‘a riddle wrapped in a 
mystery inside an enigma’ and relations since the October revolution of 1917 had 
fluctuated from outright hostility to being ‘frigid but unproductive’ by the winter of 
1939.6 Moreover, there existed a broad range of opinions in Whitehall and beyond 
regarding the nature of Stalin’s regime and the advisability of co-operation.7 This 
spectrum of opinions was eventually made subservient to the need to co-operate militarily 
with Moscow, but as the end of the war approached traditional suspicions of Moscow’s 
intentions in Europe returned to the fore. Yet the defining feature of the Foreign Office’s 
approach toward the Soviet Union was one of pragmatic ambivalence, a stance that was 
only made possible by Great Britain’s physical separation from the rest of the continent.
For Benes and his fellow Czechoslovak emigres relations with Moscow were very 
different, both politically and geographically. As Hubert Ripka argued in his 1944 book 
East and West, written to defend the exiled government’s policies towards the Soviet 
Union, Czechs and Russians had long historical associations and a common interest to
6 See P. W. Doerr, “ Frigid but Unproductive:’ British Policy towards the USSR from the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
to the Winter War, 1939’ Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 36(3), pp423-439, O. Figes, A People’s 
Tragedy. The Russian Revolution 1891-1924, London, 1996, pp573-575, G. Brook-Shepherd, The Iron 
Maze. The Western Secret Services and the Bolsheviks, London, 1999, R. Overy & A. Wheatcroft, The 
Road to War, London, 1999, ppl 12-114 & 237-247, K. Sword, ‘British reactions to the Soviet Occupation 
of Eastern Poland in September 1939,’ Slavonic and East European Review, 69, 1, (January 1991), ppBl-
101 & A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, Oxford, 1992, ppl37-138, & 528.
7 See P.M.H. Bell, John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union, 
London, 1990, Carlton, Churchill and the Soviet Union & H. Hanak, ‘Sir Stafford Cripps as British 
Ambassador to Moscow, May 1940-June 1941,’ English Historical Review, 94 (1979), pp 48-70.
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halt the German Drang nach Osten.8 Even though Czechoslovak soldiers had fought the 
Bolshevik regime during the Russian civil war Benes had later cultivated close relations 
with the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s as part of his foreign policy.9 These 
approaches culminated in the signing of a Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of mutual 
assistance in May 1935, which instigated limited military co-operation.10 Lastly, and far 
more controversially, Moscow had assured Prague during the Munich crisis of its 
willingness to stand by its treaty obligations should Germany attack. Whether this was 
ever a realistic probability is highly debatable, but the offer certainly seems to have 
influenced Benes’s view of the Soviet Union.11 This meant that the Czechoslovaks had 
had a totally different set of experiences, and expectations of Moscow than the British 
did. The Czechoslovak government in exile was, therefore, more willing to enter into bi­
lateral relations with Moscow than were the Poles, for example. This does not necessarily 
mean that this behaviour could be directly equated with a predilection for Communism, 
but was rather based upon Benes’s own conception of the European balance of power and
s H. Ripka, East and West, London, 1944, pp4-7  & 39-50. See also R. W. Seton-Watson, History of the 
Czechs and Slovaks, London, 1943,pp 210 & 285-286 & J.V. Polisensky, History of Czechoslovakia in 
Outline, Prague, 1991, pp98-99&104-105.
9 Lias, Benes o f Czechoslovakia, ppl 88-189, Lukes, Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler & M. 
MacMillian, Peacemakers. The Paris Conference of 1919 an Its Attempt to End War, London, 2001, pp243, 
250-251.
10 E. Benes, Pameti. Od Mnichova k nove voice a k novemu vitezstvi, Prague, 1947, p355-357, A. Klimek, 
Boj o hrad, Kdo po Masarykovi? Prague, 1998, pp4l4-416, F. Moravec, Master of Spies, London, 1975, 
pp63-68, Ripka, East and West, pp28-32 & P. Wandycz, ‘Benes’s Foreign Policy,’ in V. Mamatey & R. 
Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, Princeton, 1973, p228-230.
11 See R, Overy, Russia’s War, Penguin, London, 1999, p39-41, Overy & Wheatcroft, The Road to War, 
p234-239 & H. Ragsdale, 'The Munich Crisis and the issue of Red Army's transit across Romania,’ Russian 
Review, October 1998, Vol 57, Issue 4, pp614-618.1. Lukes, 'Stalin and Benes in the final days of 
September 1938: New Evidence from the Prague Archives,' Slavic Review, Spring 1993, Vol 52, Issue 1, 
pp28-49,1. Lukes,' Stalin and Czechoslovakia in 1938-39: An Autopsy of a Myth,' Diplomacy and 
Statecraft, July/November 1999, Vol 10, Issues 2&3, pp l3-47. & Z. Steiner, 'The Soviet Commissariat of 
Foreign Affairs and the Czechoslovakian Crisis in 1938: New material from the Soviet Archives,'
Historical Journal, 1999, Vol 43 Issue 3, pp751-779.
his ‘scientific’ implementation of diplomacy.12 Consequently he came to view an alliance 
with the Soviet Union as necessary to preserve Czechoslovakia’s security and, given the 
Red Army’s presence 011 Czechoslovak territory, he had little alternative but to reach 
some form of accommodation with Moscow regardless of British reservations.
Although tripartite Anglo-Czechoslovak-Soviet relations did not begin in earnest 
until June 1941 there is evidence that all three parties were in contact well before this 
date. According to both Benes’s and Frantisek Moravec’s memoirs and recently 
published documents those Czechoslovak emigres in the west maintained contacts with 
the Soviet authorities throughout 1939, often through the Soviet ambassador in London, 
Ivan M. Maisky.13 In addition, the Czechoslovak legation in Moscow had remained open 
after March 1939 (as had those in London and Paris) complete with its ambassador, 
Zdenek Fierlinger, although it was eventually forced to close on 14 December 1939.14 
These contacts were intensified in October 1940 when Heliodor Pika, formally the 
Czechoslovak army’s technical expert to the Zbrojovka arms factory, arrived in Istanbul 
from Romania where he established contacts with Soviet Intelligence agencies. Soon 
after his arrival, in December 1940, Benes personally approved plans for limited co­
operation with the Soviets and Plica was chosen to go to Moscow as a liaison officer in
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13 Benes, Pameti, pp235-237, F. Moravec, Master of Spies, London, 1975, pp 198-199 & pp202-203 & J. 
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April 1941.15 This was a full four months before Colonel George Hill arrived in Moscow 
as head of an Special Operations Executive (SOE) liaison team, code named ‘SAM.’16
These early intelligence contacts were of particular importance because, as Benes 
and Moravec had already demonstrated through their activities in London, these assets 
could to be translated into political capital. Communications between Moravec’s druhy 
odbor (Second Department or Deuxieme Bureau) and his Soviet opposite number in 
London, Ivan A. Chichaev, provided Moscow with access to his highly regarded 
intelligence networks and in turn the Soviets urged Moravec to undertake sabotage 
activities in the Protectorate.17 Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Foreign 
Office were equally interested in Pika’s reports from Moscow.18 It is less well known, 
however, that the British and Soviet authorities were also actively engaged in transferring 
Czechoslovak soldiers from the Soviet Union, where many had remained since the fall of 
Poland, to British military control in the Middle East.19 The Czechoslovaks, therefore, 
had direct contacts with the Soviet authorities at a time when Britain had few and Anglo- 
Soviet relations left much to be desired.
Indeed, these contacts soon proved their worth when the German invasion of the 
Soviet Union began. This was because the first official Soviet approach to the
15 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 1, pp 166-167 & R. Luza, ‘The Czech 
Resistance Movement,’ in Mamatey & Luza (eds), A Histoiy of the Czechoslovak Republic, p247.
16 C. Andrew, ‘Anglo-American-Soviet Intelligence Relations,’ in Lane & Temperley (eds), The Rise and 
Fall of the Grand Alliance, pl21-122.
17 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 1, pp227-228.
18 FO 371 26410 C8720/7140/12 Orme Sargent minute, 28 July 1941, FO 371 26394 C7992/1320/12 Bruce 
Lockhart to Eden, 26 June 1941, FO 371 26411 C8720/7140/12 Bruce Lockhart to Sargent, 28 July 1941 & 
FO 371 38921 C7840/35/12, Roberts memorandum, 9 June 1944. See also L. Otahalova & M. Cervinkova 
(eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, Prague, 1966, p222 & B. F. Smith, Sharing 
Secrets with Stalin. How the Allies traded Intelligence 1941-1945, Lawrence, 1996, pp32-33.
19 FO 371 26377 C1516/32/12 From Cripps, Moscow, to Foreign Office, 17 Feb 1941 & FO 371 26377 
C 1768/32/12 & C2180/32/12. See also J. Rychlfk, T. D. Marzik & M. Bielik, (eds), R. IV. Selon Watson 
and his relations with the Czechs and Slovaks, Documents 1906-1951, Vol 1, Prague and Martin, 1995, 
pp592-593.
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Czechoslovak provisional government in London, relayed to the Central Department by 
Robert Bruce Lockhart, had explicitly linked political recognition to ‘an exchange of 
military information.’20 As the Foreign Office was then deliberating whether to extend 
the degree of recognition it had so far granted to Benes’s government the Soviet offer 
forced the pace of decision making and both governments recognised a fully accredited 
Czechoslovak government in exile on 18 July 1941. From this point onwards the British, 
Czechoslovak and Soviet governments were involved in a delicate, and closely 
intertwined, tripartite relationship.
The British authorities had now to reappraise own their attitude towards Moscow 
and on 12 July 1941 a limited Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed that committed both 
parties to assist each other during the war, however, this was not a formal alliance.21 This 
was because many leading British political figures were still understandably suspicious of 
Soviet intentions and the general consensus of opinion was that the Soviet Union would 
soon be defeated and that the United States was a more reliable ally.22 As a result the 
British authorities were reluctant to enter into a closer relationship with Moscow or 
unilaterally acknowledge Stalin’s expansive political and territorial demands. Yet the 
Foreign Office still put a significant amount of effort into trying to reconcile the Poles 
and the Soviets (who were still technically at war with each other) and they signed a 
similar joint agreement on 30 July.23
20 FO 371 26394 C7992/1320/12 Bruce Lockhart to Eden, 26 June 1941, & Nemecek et al (eds), 
Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. I, pp 166-167, pp 190-191.
21 L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. 2, London, 1969, pp 13-14.
22 J. Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955, London, 1985, pp404-406, A. 
Danchev & D Todman (eds), Field Marshal Lord Alanhrooke, War Diaries, London, 2002, pi 66, D. Dilks 
(ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945, London, 1971, pp 390-393, J. Harvey (ed), The 
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Soviet Union, pp58-66.
23 A. Prazmowska, Britain and Poland 1939-1943, The Betrayed Ally, Cambridge, 1995, pp82-88.
These restrictions were still in evidence when Anthony Eden, the Foreign 
Secretary, travelled to Moscow in December 1941 for direct negotiations with the Soviet 
authorities with a severely limited mandate from the War Cabinet.24 While Eden was 
there Stalin continually pressed him for a guarantee of the Soviet Union’s western 
frontiers as they had stood in June. Eden refused, in line with Britain’s earlier 
reservations over Czechoslovakia and Poland’s frontiers, but failed to secure Stalin’s 
agreement for the proposed Czechoslovak-Polish federation.25 Although Eden’s 
reluctance was entirely consistent with British policy, these frontier questions later 
became an intractable problem for the Great Powers and their allies. In addition, just 
before these talks commenced the United States had also entered the war and Churchill 
travelled to Washington to hold discussions there too. It was these events that laid the 
foundations of the Grand Alliance that was to fundamentally alter the prevailing 
dynamics of Anglo-Czechoslovak relations.26
The Czechoslovak government in exile also needed to reassess its relations with 
Moscow in June 1941: At first Benes had assured the Foreign Office that he would prefer 
to see Germany and the Soviet Union exhaust each other, a position that Robert Bruce 
Lockhart noted was ‘very similar to our own.’27 In September, Jan Masaryk again 
reassured Frank Roberts that he did not adhere to any ‘Pan-Slav’ ideologies and that the 
‘Czechoslovak government looked mainly to the west...’28 Yet, at the same time, detailed 
bilateral negations were underway to establish a Czechoslovak army on Soviet territory.
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In addition, Benes had written to Stalin on 6 August 1941 to express his admiration for 
the Red Army’s struggle against Germany and his hopes for good relations between the 
two countries based on the treaty of 193 5.29 Clearly then, while the outcome of the 
fighting on the eastern front was still uncertain Benes was keen to keep his options open. 
In November, however, Benes made a keynote speech in Aberdeen that more clearly 
expressed his ideas on the Soviet Union’s future role in Europe,
If Soviet Russia were again to be excluded from the organisation of 
Europe the new collaboration of organised political units in Europe would 
lose their equilibrium...This continual disturbance of equilibrium and the 
exposure of Soviet Russia to isolation was one of the reasons of the second 
European war. And if the error were repeated it would probably lead to a 
third and still more disastrous European and world war.30
Benes’s speech immediately set alarm bells ringing in the Central Department. Not only 
had he ventured into the, as yet, uncharted waters of post-war planning, but he had also 
made references to frontiers in Europe, which was a sensitive issue given that Poland’s, 
Czechoslovakia’s and the Soviet Union’s territorial claims were incompatible. In 
response the department noted that Benes was ‘talking far too much’ now that his 
government had been fully recognised and that the Foreign Secretary should warn him to 
stay away from such issues/1
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Eden duly sent for Benes on the 13 November and as he later reported to the new 
ambassador to the Czechoslovaks, Philip Nichols, Benes explained that the Soviets were 
concerned that Britain might try to seek a separate peace with Germany at their expense. 
Revealingly Eden asked Benes to reassure Moscow on this point, the first of several 
occasions when the Foreign Office used Benes’s contacts with Moscow to try and smooth 
the course of coalition warfare. Benes also complained that the allies currently lacked any 
coherent policies on the future of Europe, a point with which Eden agreed,32 The 
importance of this argument lay in the fact that while Benes had his own clearly defined 
long term political objectives the Foreign Office had few, beyond rather vague plans for a 
variety of European federations after the war. This position was a direct result of the 
Foreign Office’s .traditional methods of policy formation and, as the outcome of the war 
was still so uncertain, it appeared to them unwise to commit themselves to policies that 
might have to be reversed. While this attitude was sensible from the Foreign Office’s 
perspective, the Central European view was very different and as the war progressed and 
Soviet defeats became victories these divergent attitudes became ever more apparent. 
Benes's comments were noted, but no action resulted from this encounter.
During the first five months of 1942 relations within the Grand Alliance remained 
unsettled, a consequence of the mutual suspicions that existed between the three Great 
Powers and the increasingly fractious debates over the opening of a ‘Second Front.’34 
Nevertheless, given the Soviet Union’s predominant role in the war against Nazi 
Germany and the British government’s desire to quell Soviet fears of a possible Anglo-
32 FO 371 26388 C 12636/216/12 Eden to Nichols, 13 November 1941.
33 FO 371 26388 C12636/216/12 Roberts minute, 13 November 1941.
34 Kitchen, British Policy towards the Soviet Union, pp 118-121.
German rapprochement, plans for a bilateral treaty of alliance were drawn up.35 Thus the 
British authorities found themselves trying to steer a difficult course between the Soviet 
Union’s territorial and political demands and the reluctance of the United States to be 
drawn into any bilateral agreements at this time. In spite of these difficulties it was 
clearly understood in London that any agreement with Moscow would also have to 
address the question of the Soviet Union’s western frontiers. Moreover, the Foreign 
Office was increasingly concerned about the Soviet Union's future intentions in Eastern 
Europe and preferred to sign a treaty, even in the face of objections from the United 
States, rather than be faced with a decisive Soviet occupation of the region.36
Benes and the Czechoslovak government in exile were well informed about the 
preparations for this treaty, as they had been about Eden’s talks in Moscow, and they saw 
it as an opportunity to re-open discussions on several unresolved issues.37 On 1 May, in a 
letter to Makins, Nichols outlined Benes’s belief that any Anglo-Soviet agreement would 
raise, ‘the question of the future of Poland and his own country,’ specifically the question 
of frontiers.38 In the event, however, Anglo-Soviet negotiations over the treaty that 
commenced with Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav M. Molotov’s, arrival in Britain 
on 20 May and ended on 26 May, managed to avoid any explicit reference to frontiers. 
Instead, the final treaty committed the two powers to a 20-year mutual assistance pact 
and an agreement not to enter into any unilateral negotiations with Germany, but no
152
33 L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (Abridged), London, 1962, pp 194-200.
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decisive agreement on the opening of the ‘Second Front’ was reached?9 Crucially the 
treaty also included a clause that prohibited either state from signing treaties with any 
smaller powers, referred to as ‘a self-denying ordinance.’ In the event both parties, and 
even the United States, were satisfied with the final agreement, and although the 
avoidance of any conclusions on post-war frontiers was considered a success, in 
retrospect this was more of a Pyrrhic victory than was realised at the time, as it meant that 
discussion of this issue had merely been postponed. Ultimately these questions were 
resolved by the Red Army’s de facto presence in Eastern Europe rather than by 
international agreement.
The conclusion of this treaty did have a significant number of effects on 
subsequent Angio-Czechoslovalc-Soviet relations. First, Benes regarded the conclusion of 
this alliance as further support for his policy of balance between the eastern and western 
powers. As he later noted,
The signature of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 26th, 1942, on co­
operation...held out the promise that at that time there really was an 
intention and determination to secure friendly and allied co operation 
between the two systems for at least twenty years after the conclusion of 
the peace...! believe that peaceful co-operation between the two systems is
19 Di Iks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pp451-457 & Kitchen, British Policy towards the 
Soviet Union, p i22.
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possible and that it is right and necessary...and that they should tolerate 
one another loyally after the war.40
Second, Benes believed that the treaty would prove to be a catalyst for a break-through in 
the negotiations with the Foreign Office on the denunciation of the Munich Agreement. 
This was because, as he recounted in his memoirs, when Eden visited him on 4 June to 
inform him of the contents of the treaty he also agreed to ‘annul’ Britain’s adherence to 
the Munich Agreement.41 (Although the violent German reaction after the assassination 
of Heydrich also played a significant role in the Foreign Office’s decision to officially 
repudiate its position on Munich.)
The final consequence of the Anglo-Soviet treaty was Benes’s decision to try and 
extend the terms of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement of 18 July 1941 into a full 
alliance, just as the British authorities had done. Some historians have long regarded this 
decision as evidence of Benes’s pro-Communist leanings, however, the reasons behind 
this decision need to be examined in order fully to comprehend his perception of the 
international situation in 1943 and his subsequent determination to continue along this 
path in the face of the Foreign Office’s strenuous objections.42
By the beginning of 1943 the Grand Alliance’s position had changed 
signi ficantly; the course of the war had been altered and the seemingly unending series of 
German victories since 1939 had been reserved. Moreover, after a promising start
40 Translation from Lias, The memoirs of Dr Eduard Benes, p283. Original text in Benes, Pameti, pp426- 
427. See also extracts of Benes’s speech of 18 July 1942 regarding his interpretation of the Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty in E. Taborsky, The Czechoslovak Cause in International Law, London, 1944, pp 144-146.
41 Benes, Pameti, p303~304.
42 See J. Brown, Who's next The Lesson of Czechoslovakia, London, 1951, pp26-29. Also J. Korbel, The 
Communist subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938- 1948, The Failure of Coexistence, Princeton, 1959, pp76- 
93 & —, Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia : The Meaning of its History, New York, 1977, pp 156-217.
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Czechoslovak-Polish relations had deteriorated and negotiations on federations had 
stalled. Yet at the same time the Foreign Office continued to refuse to make any 
commitments in regards to frontiers in Central Europe. While this policy had not changed 
over the previous four years it was now increasingly apparent to Benes, and the Foreign 
Office, that the Red Army was far more likely to reach the territory of the former- 
Czechoslovakia before any British or American forces would.43 If this scenario proved to 
be accurate then Moscow would be in a position to exert a powerful influence over the 
region, regardless of whether or not Benes had signed any agreements with them. From 
Benes's perspective it was better to sign something, however untrustworthy the co­
signatory, than be faced with a Soviet occupation and no agreement. It was no 
coincidence that the British decision to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union the previous 
May was based upon very similar considerations. This was an unenviable position, but 
this was the context within which Benes had to work.44
Furthermore, Benes had also to contend with an increasingly popular and well- 
organised Czechoslovak Communist party based in Moscow, which in theory at least 
represented an alternative to his own administration.45 But while Benes may be accused 
of underestimating the ideological aspects of relations with the Soviet Union, his over­
riding preoccupation was Czechoslovakia’s security after the war and he had long 
maintained the best way to achieve this was through close collaboration with Moscow.46
43 See FO 371 34334 C2304/206/12 Bruce Lockhart’s memorandum to Sargent, 15 February 1943 & J. 
Erickson The Road to Berlin, London, 1999, chapters one to three.
44 Benes, Pameti, p357.
45 E. Taborslcy, ‘Politics in E xile- 1939-1945,’ in Mamatey & Luza (eds) A History of the Czechoslovak 
Republic, p341.
4(1 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 1, pp 453-456. See also E. Benes, ‘Principles 
and assumption of our Foreign Policy,’ Socialogickd Revue, Vol. II, 1931, cited in H. Ripka, East and 
West, London, 1944, p41, E. Benes, The organisation of post-war Europe, in Foreign Affairs, January 1942,
At the same time he was fully aware of the inherent dangers of such contacts and sought 
assurances from the outset that the Soviets would respect Czechoslovakia’s sovereignty 
and would not interfere in her internal affairs.47 This was a dangerous game of diplomacy 
with high stakes, but as the experiences of the Polish Government in exile would prove, 
failure to enter into a constructive dialogue with Moscow could prove more disastrous 
still. While Benes’s reasoning was essentially pragmatic it was not a policy that found 
much favour in the Central Department.
The Foreign Office had long been aware of Benes’s attitude toward the Soviet 
Union, and as has been outlined, took full advantage of his contacts when it benefited 
them.48 The Foreign Office was, however, reluctant to allow ‘minor allies’ to negotiate 
treaties as and when they saw fit as it was felt that such activities would soon escalate 
into a race between the lesser allies to bind themselves to their favoured Great Power. 
This scenario would not only have undermined the fragile edifice of the Grand Alliance, 
but would have opened the Foreign Office to a variety of unwanted political demands 
from the various exiled governments in London. The accepted wisdom in Whitehall was 
that the Great Powers would negotiate a post-war political framework between 
themselves prior to the establishment of more localised relations with smaller powers; an 
understanding shared by both Washington and Moscow. While the equality of all partners 
in the coalition against the Axis powers was voiced in theory, in practice, the ‘Big Three’ 
made all the important decisions between themselves during the war. The ‘smaller allies’ 
were expected to accept this situation without complaint, in return for the Great Powers’
20, 2, pp229-230, E. B. Hitchcock, 7 Built a Temple for Peace ’ The Life of Eduard Benes.' New York, 
1940, pi 74 & C. Mackenzie, Dr Benes, London, 1946, p301.
47 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 1, pp462-463.
4S FO 371 34334 C2304/206/12 Bruce Lockhart’s memorandum, 15 February 1943.
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efforts to liberate their occupied homelands, in a manner not dissimilar to the Congress of 
Vienna of 1814 to 1815.49 Indeed, this was why the ‘self-denying ordinance’ clause had 
been inserted in to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942; though no ‘smaller power’ (except 
the Yugoslavs) had actually been informed of this clause, which was entirely in keeping 
with the British authorities’ policy of secrecy regarding its own bi-lateral agreements.50 
Benes, however, was not inclined to accept such instructions given his own experience as 
a statesman, and thus the stage was set for a battle of wills between the Foreign Office 
and the government in exile over the proposed treaty with the Soviet Union.51
Benes had already travelled to Washington in early 1943 for talks with President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and although the Central Department found the visit 
unobjectionable, they were concerned by indications that Washington was also interested 
in using Benes’s contacts with Moscow to help improve their own relations with the 
Soviet Union.52 Even more worrying, from the British perspective, was the possibility 
that Benes had appeared willing to mediate with the Soviets over the Baltic States and 
Poland at Roosevelt’s request.213 Upon his return Benes told Eden on 16 June that he 
intended to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union, depending on the situation he found when 
he arrived in Moscow. It was at this point that Eden mentioned to Benes the hitherto 
‘secret’ clause in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty regarding the ‘self-denying ordinance.’54 Eden 
then warned Benes that if he signed the treaty this would indicate, ‘that Czechoslovakia
49 See B. H. Liddell Hart, The Soviet Army, London, 1953, pi 27, H. Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, 
London, 1945,pp xi-xiii, Overy, Russia’s War, ppl 15, 143, 239 & 256. V. Zubok & C. Pleshakov, Inside 
the Kremlin’s Cold War, London, 1996, p7.
30 FO 371 34338 C5228/525/12 Roberts to Nichols, 31 May 1943.
31 See P. Zinner, ‘Czechoslovakia: The Diplomacy of Edvard Benes,’ in G. Craig & F. Gilbert (eds), The 
Diplomats 1919-1939, Princeton, 1953, pplOO-123.
32 FO 371 34343 C5476/791/12 Roberts minutes, 20 May 1943.
53 FO 371 34352 C7084/6009/12 Eden to Nichols on conversation with Benes, 16 June 1942.
54 FO 371 34338 C7363/525/12 Eden to Nichols, 17 June 1943.
had definitely joined the Russian camp...’55 In response, Benes revealed he had already 
discussed the possibility of a treaty with Roosevelt and that the President had agreed to 
the suitability of such a move. This was a point later refuted by the State Department 
when Sumner Wells noted that Benes was liable, ‘to interpret casual remarks as tacit 
understandings.’56
Benes’s remarks were regarded by the Foreign Office as the first official 
notification they had been given about the proposed treaty, even though Nichols had been 
forewarned.57 Indeed, it was this prior warning that had been the impetus behind Eden’s 
decision to meet Benes for lunch that day.5S As had occurred the previous year over the 
formula for Britain's repudiation of the Munich Agreement this meeting proved to be the 
beginning of a protracted and increasingly acrimonious exchange of views between the 
Czechoslovak government in exile and the Foreign Office. Although a mutually 
acceptable solution to this situation was eventually reached, in the wake of the Foreign 
Ministers’ Conference in Moscow in October, the disputes that raged over this issue 
throughout the second half of 1943 marked the lowest ebb in Anglo-Czechoslovak 
relations during the war.59
The Foreign Office’s immediate concern was that any such treaty would not only 
contravene the terms of the ‘self-denying ordinance,’ but that it would also , have a 
disastrous effect on the Poles and might well cause complications with the other allies.60
55 FO 371 34338 C7363/525/12 Eden to Nichols, 17 June 1943.
56 FO 371 34352 C8031/6009/12 Allen minute, 15 July 1943, and FO 371 C8317/525/12 Halifax to Foreign 
Office, 29 June 1943 & 2 July 1943.
57 FO 371 34338 C6407/525/12 Nichols to Roberts, 3 June 1943.
58 FO 371 34338 C6407/525/12 Roberts minute, 9 June 1943, initialled by Sargent, 9 June 1943, Cadogan,
10 June 1943 and Eden, 12 June 1943.
39 See Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. 2, pp581-594.
(1° FO 371 34338 C6407/525/12 Roberts minute, 9 June 1943, Sargent, 9 June 1943, Cadogan, 10 June 1943
and Eden, 12 June 1943.
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This was a pertinent point as by then Polish-Soviet relations had entered a particularly 
difficult phase.61 Furthermore, the Foreign Office’s legal advisors swiftly rejected the 
argument put forward by Benes that this would not be a new treaty but merely an 
extension of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of 1935.62 This was consistent with the 
Foreign Office’s refusal to accept the concept of the juridical continuity of the pre-war 
Czechoslovak Republic. Eden was so worried by this proposed treaty that he immediately 
approached the War Cabinet to gain their approval for issuing a formal warning to Benes. 
The Cabinet concurred and added that it would, however, agree to a tripartite treaty 
between the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland.63
Eden met Benes again on 30 June, an unprecedented recurrence of such high-level 
contacts and indicative of how seriously the Foreign Secretary viewed the situation, and 
informed him of the Cabinet’s decision. Eden also showed Benes a copy of an aide 
memoire regarding the ‘self-denying ordinance’ prepared after his discussions with 
Molotov on 9 June 1942. Fie added that given the ‘present state of Polish-Russian 
relations’ the proposed Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty would ‘not be a helpful 
contribution,’64 once more underlining the Foreign Office’s primary consideration in this 
matter - the Poles. Although Benes accepted Eden’s explanation of his reasons for 
objecting to the treaty, he stressed its importance and the need to guarantee 
Czechoslovakia against future threats to its integrity while binding the Soviets and the 
KSC to his government. Benes then pressed Eden to admit that he only objected to the
01 Prazmowska, Britain and Poland, pp 166-182.
62 FO 371 34338 C7155/525/12 W.E. Beckett minute, Second Legal Advisor, 24 June 1943.
63 CAB 65/34, War Cabinet Conclusions, 89 (43), 28 June 1943 & FO 371 34338 C7492/525/12 Foreign 
Office’s copy of the War Cabinet’s conclusions, 28 June 1943.
64 FO 371 34338 C7493/525/12 Eden to Nichols, 30 June 1943.
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timing of the treaty and not to the principle of a bi-lateral agreement. They both agreed 
that the Soviet authorities would have to be approached over this question, but Benes 
made it clear that he intended to sign the treaty as soon as possible.65
Benes had been in regular contact with Soviet representatives over the possibility 
of concluding a treaty as early as December 1942 and at no point had the Soviet 
authorities raised the issue of the agreed ‘ordinance’ with Britain.66 On the same day 
Benes also met the Soviet ambassador to the allied exiled governments in London, 
Alexander Y. Bogomolov, to confirm the Soviet position on the treaty. Bogomolov had 
told him that Moscow knew of no ‘ordinance’ that prevented them from signing 
agreements with other states and that if the British objected then Benes’s visit and the 
treaty would both have to be delayed.67 Soviet representatives in London had also made it 
clear to the Foreign Office that they did not recognise the ‘self-denying ordinance’ and 
that any British objections to the treaty, especially those based solely on the detrimental 
effects it might have on the Poles, would further harm Allied relations.68 While relations 
within the Grand Alliance had momentarily improved with the abolition of the Comintern 
on 8 June, they had faltered again over the handling of Italian surrender, the continued 
absence of a 'Second Front' and Stalin’s subsequent withdrawal of Maisky and Maxim M. 
Litvinov from their respective posts.69 In addition, it should be noted that Soviet 
negotiations with the French National Committee of Liberation, in May and June 1943,
05 Benes’s minutes of his conversation with Eden, 30 June 1943, in Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- 
sovetske vztahy, Vol. 1, pp525-528.
66 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 1, pp418-419 & 420-423.
67 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 1, pp523-525 & 528-529.
68 FO 371 34339 C9512/525/12 Nichols to Harrison, 5 August 1943 & FO 371 34338 C7700/525/12 Eden 
to Clark Kerr, 2 July 1943.
69 Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, pp-256-257 & Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin’s Cold War, pp37-39 & 
Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin, ppl 30-133.
over the question of recognition had resulted in further disagreements between Churchill, 
Roosevelt and Stalin.70 All in all the summer of 1943 was a difficult time for the Grand 
Alliance and for the Foreign Office the Czechoslovaks’ insistence on signing a treaty 
with the Soviet Union could not have come at a more inopportune moment.
The Foreign Office had no intention of merely accepting Moscow’s explanation 
that they had misunderstood the terms of the agreement and of allowing the treaty to 
proceed. A meeting was hurriedly convened to consider this issue on 5 July. Its 
conclusions were stark.71 Alexander Cadogan noted in his diary,
We can’t stop it. Russians now say we have no self-denying ordinance, 
and they seem prepared to sign. Decided thing to do was appeal once more 
to Russians not to do so. If they insist, we must at least urge that the treaty 
must not be directed in any way against Poland and, if possible, should 
provide for Polish accession.72
The British position was not a strong one and the Foreign Office was well aware, of this, 
but it was not about to allow a ‘minor ally’ to disrupt the delicate balance of power within 
the wartime coalition purely in the pursuit of its own national interests. Once again the 
War Cabinet supported this decision, the first and last time Czechoslovak issues would be 
so regularly considered at such a senior level.73 Given that all the interested parties had 
accepted the inevitability of the treaty by early July, albeit with reservations over the
70 Erickson, The Road to Berlin, pp91-92 & Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pp527 & 
553-555.
71 FO 371 34338 C7700/525/12 Harrison minutes on proposed meeting, 5 July 1943, and subsequent 
minutes by Strang, 5 July 1943, Sargent, 6 July 1943 and Cadogan, 6 July 1943.
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timing, it seemed as if the matter had been resolved. This was not least because Benes 
had long proposed that Poland be allowed to accede to the treaty, if she so wished, in 
order to circumvent Soviet suspicions about federations.74 But this issue was not resolved 
quite so easily and these disagreements became far more public before the situation was 
finally resolved.
On 7 July Benes cancelled his trip to Moscow after further discussions with 
Bogomolov, who had told him that ‘Soviet Circles’ were unwilling to proceed in the face 
of British objections.75 As a result the situation worsened, not least because all the parties 
now re-interpreted this decision in the light of their own perceptions, further adding to the 
confusion and antagonism that surrounded the issue. Bogomolov blamed the 
Czechoslovaks for causing all these problems and creating conflict with the Soviet Union 
due to their desire to avoid friction with the British.76 The pro-Soviet Czechoslovak 
ambassador in Moscow, Fierlinger, repeated this opinion in conversation with the British 
ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.77 On 19 July Masaryk told Nichols that Benes was 
unhappy at the way in which both London and Washington had handled the situation.78 
Four days after that Ripka reported to Nichols that he was also unhappy at Britain’s 
behaviour, to which Eden responded, ‘I don't see that M. Ripka has much ground for his 
indignation, it was the Russians who cried off the visit while we were in discussions 
with them.’79 Whatever the real reasons behind the postponement of Benes’s journey it
72 Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p540.
73 FO 371 34338 C7810/525/12 Foreign Office’s copy of the War Cabinet’s conclusions, 5 July 1943.
74 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 1., pp444-450.
73 FO 371 34338 C7426/525/12 Nichols to Foreign Office, 29 June 1943 & J. Nemecek, et al (eds), 
Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy v diplomatickychjedndnich, Vol. 2, Prague, 1998, pp22~25.
76 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, pp34-35.
77 FO 371 34338 C7922/525/12 Clark-Kerr to Foreign Office, 9 July 1943.
78 FO 371 34339 C8317/525/12 Nichols to Strang, 19 July 1943.
79 FO 371 34339 C8752/525/12 Nichols to Foreign Office, 24 July 1943, & Eden minute 6 August 1943.
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was the way in which each interested party perceived the causes that proved to be 
decisive. Benes in particular had become increasingly frustrated by the whole affair and 
took the Foreign Office’s position as a personal affront.80 At the same time discussion of 
this matter had begun to spill out of diplomatic circles and references to it appeared in the 
press and subsequently, and even more worryingly for the Foreign Office, in the House of 
Commons.
The widening of these discussions had actually begun with the usually compliant 
Czechoslovak State Council, an organ that had become increasingly vocal in its opinions. 
In response to these delays and following a report on the situation by Ripka, the Council 
issued a resolution on 22 July that urged the conclusion of the treaty as soon as 
possible.81 This development was followed in August by articles in The Daily Worker and 
Pravda that blamed the delays on ‘opposition in British circles,’ comments that resulted 
in a stern letter of disapproval being sent to Moscow by the Foreign Office.82 Though 
neither of these developments proved to be disastrous, they did portend that the whole 
dispute was about to enter an even more acrimonious phase.
On 1 September Eden informed Masaryk that as a result of recent Anglo- 
American negotiations in Quebec he felt that a solution to the treaty issue had been 
found, especially as the treaty was not as explicitly anti-Polish as he had originally 
feared.83 Bruce Lockhart then told Benes that there were now no British objections to his
QA
travelling to Moscow. Subsequently, Benes announced he would leave for the Soviet
80 Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, p361.
81 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, p43.
82 FO 371 34339 C8752/525 Telegram to Moscow embassy sanctioned by Eden, 15 August 1943.
83 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, p55.
84 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, p57-58. No record of either conversation
is to be found in the Foreign Office files.
capital in mid-September, a reasonable enough conclusion given the information he had 
so recently received.85 Once again a mutually acceptable resolution to this impasse 
looked possible. Unbeknown to either Eden or Benes, however, Churchill had been in 
personal communication with both Roosevelt and Stalin regarding the arrangements for 
the first meeting of the heads of the three Great Powers and they had agreed that a 
conference of Foreign Ministers should be convened in Moscow first. On 13 September 
Eden met Maisky and they jointly agreed that Benes’s visit (and the treaty) should be 
delayed until after the Moscow conference, when Britain and the Soviet Union would 
have the opportunity to discuss the whole question of the ‘self-denying ordinance’ 
Maisky agreed, although the Foreign Office decided not to inform Benes of this decision 
quite yet.86 As a result, less than a week after Eden had informed the Czechoslovak 
government that he had no objection to the visit, he told them that it would have to be 
delayed until after the Foreign Ministers’ conference.87 On the face of it this was a clear 
reversal of the Foreign Office’s position.
By mid-September the Foreign Office’s usual patience in their dealings with the 
Czechoslovaks had begun to wear thin, so much so that Eden, who had been usually 
sympathetically disposed towards the Czechoslovaks, noted on 16 September,
Benes is behaving like a petty intriguer and shows no signs of 
statesmanship. If Dept, cares to prepare a brief I will speak from it to M. 
Masaryk. We did not stop M. Benes going to Moscow. The Russians
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stopped him. He should be grateful to us from saving him from the 
position of an ignominious Muscovite vassal.8S
This quote not only dramatically illustrates the strength of feeling generated in the 
Foreign Office by these discussions, but also Eden’s belief that it had been the Soviets,
J
not the British, who were ultimately responsible for the delay. Perhaps most importantly, 
Eden’s minute gives an indication of his, if not the entire Department’s, underlying belief 
that the conclusion of this treaty would place Benes and his government very firmly 
within the Soviet camp. The Central Department did indeed prepare a brief and the next 
day Eden duly informed Masaryk about the British government’s decision, stressing that 
it had been reached due to Churchill’s insistence that the treaty be delayed.89 No mention 
was made of Benes’s behaviour or the Foreign Secretary’s views on the political 
advisability of such a treaty.
Although Benes agreed to delay his visit once more, at least until after the Foreign 
Ministers’ conference, this additional postponement exposed some troubling divisions 
within his government in exile.90 As has already been detailed, Benes’s style of 
leadership was highly centralised and authoritarian, but even so, since his arrival in 
Britain in the summer of 1938 he had had to contend with a number of challenges to his 
authority. Though none of these had actually developed into a serious threat to his 
position the increasing number of Red Army victories during 1943 had resulted in the 
formation of a pro-Soviet lobby amongst some of the exiles in London, which was 
compounded by the incorporation of several Communist representatives in the State
88 FO 371 34339 C l0733/525/12 Eden minute, 16 September 1943.
89 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovemko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, pp58-59.
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Council. Many emigre politicians were increasingly unhappy at the delays over the 
signing of the treaty (foremost amongst these was Ripka) and, rightly or wrongly, 
attributed many of these problems to British procrastination.91 These underlying tensions 
surfaced dramatically in response to what was regarded by the Foreign Office as an 
innocuous question in the House of Commons.
On 22 September W. Brown had tabled a question related to Benes’s planned trip 
to Moscow and asked what the Foreign Secretary had done to assist him. In response to 
this written question Eden revealed the existence of the ‘self-denying ordinance’ and 
stated that as soon as he had informed Benes of these facts the President had himself
09delayed the visit. Two days later an infuriated Czechoslovak State Council passed 
another resolution, once again instigated by Ripka, that roundly criticised Eden’s 
comments and that urged that the treaty should be concluded regardless of British 
objections.93 Full responsibility for all the delays was placed on the British. Although 
Benes had been informed of this proposed resolution and had urged caution he did not 
veto its publication.94 Moreover, the text of this communique was forwarded to both the 
State Department and the Soviet government and was leaked to the British press.95
The Foreign Office was furious, as was Benes who informed Nichols, in no 
uncertain terms, of his unhappiness with Eden’s statement. Benes fumed at these delays 
and as Nichols recounted, ‘...his vanity is a little hurt at the turn of events have taken 
over the visit; in addition he is genuinely distressed at his inability to get on with his
1)0 Benes, Pameti, p365.
91 FO 371 34340 C12214/525/12 Roberts’s minute 13 October 1943.
92 House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, Vol.392, Cols. 174-176, 22 September 1943.
93 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, pp59-62.
94 Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, p388.
95 FO 371 34340 Cl 1407/525/12 Nichols to Eden, 1 October 1943, including text of the Czechoslovak 
memorandum.
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policy and plans for the future security of his State.’96 These were complaints he repeated 
to Bruce Lockhart, who also criticised the Foreign Office’s procrastination.97 Though the 
Central Department admitted that the Czechoslovaks had not been consulted over the 
wording of the statement in the House, Roberts added,
In view of the fact that our parliamentary statement was extremely 
moderate and took full account of Czech susceptibilities, there seems little 
need for the Czechs to have rushed into print again in a way which was 
described by the Times as a sharp rejoinder to the Secretary of State’s 
statement. The Czechs have embarrassed us quite enough in recent 
weeks...98
This was yet more evidence of how exasperated the Central Department had become, and 
how earnestly they believed that all the delays had originated with the Soviets. Eden 
visited Masaryk once more on 7 October and informed him of the Foreign Office’s and 
the Cabinet’s disapproval of the Czechoslovak government’s actions.99 In his defence, 
Masaryk highlighted the difficulties he was experiencing with certain colleagues within 
the government.100 Soon after letters were despatched to the British ambassadors in
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Washington and Moscow, by both Churchill and the Foreign Office, that outlined the 
British government’s position on this issue in order that the respective ambassadors be 
able to ‘clear the air’ prior to the forthcoming conference in Moscow.101
Though the dispute rumbled on for several more weeks, the very public nature of 
the argument over the statement in the Commons seemed to have tempered both sides’ 
desire to continue on in this manner.102 Moreover, Eden left for Moscow in the middle of 
October and any resolution of this matter would now emerge from the discussions there 
and not from the continued altercations in London. In the event the conference proved to 
be far more successful than any of the allies had thought possible.103 Eden raised the 
issue of the ‘self-denying ordinance’ with Molotov and by 24 October he had seen a draft 
of the treaty and was confident that it was not detrimental to the Poles. He then decided 
that the treaty should not be opposed and that the ‘self-denying ordinance’ clause should 
be dropped.104
Although the Prime Minister at first agreed to Eden’s suggestion, the Central 
Department -  concerned by Eden’s habit of revising foreign policy while abroad - 
mounted a stem defence of the War Cabinet’s previous conclusions of 29 September.103 
These had stated that any such treaty would be counter-productive for both the British 
government and the Polish government in exile and that if the Secretary of State
101 FO 371 34340 Cl 1655/525/12 Letters from Churchill and the Foreign Office to Halifax and Clark Kerr, 
respectively sent on 16 & 17 October 1943.
102 FO 371 34340 C l2409/525/12 Nichols to Eden, 18 October 1943, and Nichols to Roberts, 19 October 
1943.
103 See W. Churchill, Closing the Ring, London, 1952, p265, Kitchen, British Policy towards the Soviet 
Union, p 167 & Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (Abridged), pp244-247. For a 
concise description of the conference and its conclusions see Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, pp571-572.
104 FO 371 34340 C12466/525/12 & C12467/525/12 Eden to Foreign Office via Clark Kerr in Moscow, 
both 24 October 1943.
105 FO 371 34340 C12467/525/12 Churchill’s minute to Cadogan, 25 October 1943.
capitulated over this issue it would make it increasingly difficult to ‘manage’ Benes in 
future and would further weaken Masaryk’s pro-western position.106 Churchill authorised 
the Department to send Eden a message to this effect the very next day, which was 
copied to the various Dominion governments.107 This missive had little impact, however, 
and on 26 October the Soviet embassy in London officially extended an invitation to 
Benes to come to Moscow to sign the treaty. Soon after Ripka officially requested that 
the British provide the necessary transportation for the journey. Upon his return Eden 
confirmed to Nichols that the Foreign Office no longer had any objections to the treaty 
and that the ‘self-denying ordinance’ had indeed been dropped.108
Benes duly expressed his approval of this development to Nichols and apologised 
for his government’s handling of the whole issue, adding that he intended to do what he 
could for the Poles when he was in Moscow. In response Roberts noted that,
It is satisfactory that having won their point, the Czechs appear to be in a 
modest and not vainglorious mood. I understand that Dr Ripka recently 
told members of the Czech Foreign Service that the position of the Poles 
was extremely difficult and that they should all show adequate 
comprehension of this fact.109
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The Foreign Office had not forgotten the seriousness of the dispute, however, and 
Nichols made it plain to Ripka in early December that,
...his government would be well advised not to make too much 
propaganda over their treaty with Russia...if they were in fact to ‘play up’ 
the signature it would not be well received in governmental circles 
here...there was a slight wound which would take a little time to heal...110
Benes finally got his treaty when, on 12 December 1943, Molotov and Fierlinger signed a 
Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-war Co-operation between the 
Czechoslovak Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Moscow, with 
Benes and Stalin in attendance.111
Although the Czechoslovak government in exile had achieved its goal of 
regularising its relations with the Soviet Union, this had been achieved at some cost to 
Anglo-Czechoslovak relations. From the British perspective the months of wrangling and 
negotiations indicated a worrying increase in the Czechoslovak government’s pro-Soviet 
tendencies. Although Benes and others continued to stress their belief in the necessity of 
pursuing a foreign policy ‘between East and West’ the treaty did seem to place them 
closer to Moscow than to London or Washington.112 Furthermore, the manner in which 
Benes had pursued his objective had raised awkward questions about the British
110 FO 371 34341 C14339/525/12 Nichols to Harrison on conversation with Ripka, 4 December 1943.
111 See Benes, Pameti, pp379-391, see also Mackenzie, Dr Benes, pp301-314 for Benes’s own 
interpretation of how and why the Treaty came to be signed.
112 FO 371 34341 C l5065/525/12 Nichols to Eden, 22 December 1943, on Ripka’s speech to Czechoslovak 
State Council after the signing of treaty. Also FO 371 38920 C268/35/12 Washington Embassy to Central 
Department, on reactions in the United States to Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty, 15 December 1943. See also 
Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, pp231-232.
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government’s ability to control the behaviour of the exiled governments in London. As a 
result the Foreign Office was inclined to leave Benes to his fate, not least as its attention 
was now focused on other issues and on preserving their own international position.
The results of the treaty were not all negative, however. Benes’s visit had shown 
that agreements between the minor allies and the Soviet Union were possible and 
although the Foreign Office had no first-hand information regarding what Benes and 
Stalin had discussed, the President’s own reports were encouraging.113 Benes’s visit also 
seemed to offer the opportunity to improve Soviet-Polish relations, a possibility accepted 
by both Churchill and Eden during their talks with Benes in Algeria in January 1944.114 
Tentative proposals were also aired for an Anglo-Czechoslovak treaty upon similar lines 
to the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty designed to reinforce Masaryk’s position, who was 
now regarded as Britain’s ‘best friend’ within the government in exile.113 But these plans 
were never pursued.
From the Czechoslovak perspective the treaty with the Soviet Union was an 
unavoidable necessity. The government in exile had already observed at first hand the 
fate of the Polish government in exile and of King Peter of Yugoslavia and had no desire 
to find itself in the same predicament.116 Moreover, it was apparent that the Red Army 
would soon reach Czechoslovak territory and some form of agreement was deemed
113 See FO 371 34341 C14759/525/12 & C14842/525/12 Balfour telegram to Central Department, 15 
December 1943, FO 371 34341 C14861/525/12 Balfour memorandum on talks with Benes for War Cabinet 
Distribution, 18 December 1943 & FO 371 38920 C2068/35/12 Balfour memorandum on Benes visit to 
Moscow, 12 January 1944.
114 Churchill, The Closing of the Ring, pp399-400 & R. Jenkins, Churchill, London, 2001, p728.
115 FO 371 34341 Cl 5065/525/12 Roberts minute, 4 January 1944 & C l5309/525/12 Halifax to Foreign 
Office, 29 December 1943.
116 FO 371 34341 C15309/525/12 Halifax to Foreign Office on conversation with Masaryk, 29 December 
1943. See also M. Wheeler, ‘Yugoslavia, Government-in-Exile,’ in l.C.D. Dear & M.R.D Foot (eds), The 
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preferable to none at all.117 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Soviet Union was 
still the only Great Power that had so far supported Benes’s political objectives in full: 
the re-creation of Czechoslovakia within her pre-1938 frontiers, the ‘juridical continuity’ 
of the Republic, the state’s future security and the transfer of the Sudeten German 
minority.118
Benes himself was clear, given the allies’ agreements on continued post-war co­
operation and what he regarded as the new and less suspicious attitudes in Moscow, 
forging closer links with the Soviet authorities was now unavoidable.119 Benes also made 
it clear in his memoirs that he regarded the treaty as a success.
In reply to all questions 1 repeated emphatically that I accepted at its face 
value what the Soviet Union was promising us and that in my experience I 
had hitherto had no reason at all to mistrust its word...[addendum in 
footnote] Was I mistaken in either my opinion or my expectation or was 
I not? Only the future can answer. Come what may, I was to the fullest 
possible extent sincere and honest in my belief.120
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Though this statement might appear in retrospect to be overly naive, it does seem 
accurately to reflect Benes’s views on the matter, especially since his entire foreign 
policy was based upon this belief.121 While many officials in the Central Department, 
Roberts in particular, viewed such unqualified faith in the Soviet Union’s goodwill with 
much scepticism there was little they could offer in the way of alternative support (either 
military or political).122 Indeed, the uprisings in Slovakia and Prague dramatically 
illustrated the very real limitations of the west’s ability to assist Czechoslovakia during 
the final months of the war. In this light, Benes’s policy, for all its inherent 
complications, does appear to have been the only course of action he could have 
pursued.123
Moreover the treaty was signed just in time, as on 8 April 1944 the first units of 
the Red Army crossed the eastern frontiers of the former Czechoslovakia.124 On the 24 
April, the Czechoslovak government in exile concluded a civil affairs agreement with the 
Soviet Union, in order to regulate the administration in these newly liberated 
territories.125 Soon after, in early May, Benes and Ripka approached the Foreign Office 
(through Nichols) to request that that Britain sign a similar agreement, analogous to those 
that had already been signed by the United States and Britain with Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Norway. After considering the issue the Foreign Office decided that 
while there were political advantages to be gained from doing so, these were outweighed
121 FO 371 38975 Cl 1241/11241/12 Nichols to Central Department, 24 August 1944. Text of Benes speech 
to the Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade Group, 21 August 1944.
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by the disadvantages of such a move; especially since it was felt that the United States 
would be unlikely to agree and because the Polish government in exile was likely to 
request a similar agreement, which would have to be refused outright. It was decided that 
a supportive parliamentary question should be tabled instead, not least, as the British 
authorities had not made any public statements that referred to the Czechoslovak 
government since August 1942. Nichols informed Benes on 27 May that no agreement 
would be signed, as it was thought highly unlikely that any British or American troops 
would reach the area, adding that Eden would say something in the Commons.126 
However, events in France that summer delayed any announcement and the idea was 
quietly shelved in early July. This exchange was to be entirely symptomatic of the final 
phase of Anglo-Czechoslovak-Soviet relations during the war. Although the Foreign 
Office had declared its support for Benes’s position between east and west these good 
intentions rarely translated into concrete policies.127 Quite simply the British authorities 
were more concerned by events closer to home and the Czechoslovak question 
languished at the bottom of the Foreign Office’s list of priorities.
The realities and difficulties of the Soviet liberation and occupation of 
Czechoslovakia and the Foreign Office’s decreasing ability to offer assistance to Benes 
and his government soon became apparent over the question of Podkarpatskd Rus 
(Subcarpathian Ruthenia) in the eastern part of the former Czechoslovakia. The Foreign 
Office had long been aware of possible difficulties over this region as reports had reached 
them as far back as March 1943 that indicated that Benes was having problems with the
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only Ruthenian representative in London, Dr Paul Cibere.128 These problems had 
escalated during the second half of 1944 and it had became increasingly apparent to the 
Foreign Office that certain sections of the Ruthenian population had begun to demand 
that the region be incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine.129 Although this was a matter 
solely of concern to the Czechoslovak government in exile and the Soviet Union it was 
one that the Central Department was aware of and enquired about, especially since they 
had heard rumours that Benes had told his old friend Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the 
United States Minister in London, that he was quite prepared to let the region pass into 
Soviet hands.130
Conversely, the Czechoslovak government in exile was sufficiently concerned 
about the inherent problems in dealing with these newly liberated territories to send a 
governmental delegate, Frantisek Nemec, to deal with the various National Committees 
that were being spontaneously formed in these areas.131 A delegation of 22 people, 
including General Rudolf Viest, had left for the liberated territories and the embryonic 
Slovak Uprising in late August.132 Unlike Viesf s, however, Nemec’s relations with the 
Slovak National Council were cool from the outset and he soon began to experience 
troubles when he arrived in Ruthenia in late October 1944; by December relations had 
become so tense that he was ordered back to Moscow.133
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While the Foreign Office had tried to keep abreast of these developments, there is 
little evidence that they knew just how serious the difficulties had become or the full 
extent of the discussions between the exiles in London and the Soviet authorities over this 
issue.134 Yet crucially these discussions hinged upon a Soviet request that the 
Czechoslovak government recognise the Lublin Committee (which they did in January 
1945), claims over the disputed Tesln region and the very real possibility that the 
problems in Ruthenia might be replicated in Slovakia.135 These issues did concern the 
Foreign Office and directly related to the increasingly precarious position of the Polish 
government in exile. The explicit linkage of the resolution of the Ruthenian issue to the 
Lublin Committee caused the Foreign Office to urge the Czechoslovaks to ‘go slow’ on 
this sensitive issue for as long as possible.136 At worst these separatist tendencies, and 
tensions between the various Czechoslovak political organisations in London, Moscow 
and in the liberated territories could have made it impossible for Benes to reconstruct 
Czechoslovakia at the end of the war. They could even, as had already happened in 
Yugoslavia and Greece, have escalated into civil war.
As a result of these developments Ripka informed Nichols, on 29 December, that 
Benes had decided to leave London for Moscow. In turn, Nichols informed the British 
authorities that the Soviet authorities had urged Benes to return to the liberated territories 
as soon as possible in order to resolve any further difficulties before they arose.137 He 
concluded by stating that the Czechoslovak government in exile was determined to 
administer all of Czechoslovak territory, within the pre-Munich frontiers, during the
134 See Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy Vol. 2.
135 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, pp400-402 & pp 475-476.
136 FO 371 47085 N207/207/12 Nichols to Warner, 5 January 1945.
137 FO 371 47077 N49/28/12 Nichols to Foreign Office, 29 December 1944.
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period between the cessation of hostilities and the proposed peace settlement, but Nichols 
thought it likely that the Czechoslovaks would hand Ruthenia over to the Soviets if 
necessary. In fact, this was a fairly accurate assessment of the position as Benes later 
wrote to Stalin along these lines on 29 January 1945 and the region was incorporated into 
the Soviet Union by mutual agreement on 29 June 1945.bS
Even though Eden and others officials in the Foreign Office continued to insist 
that Britain was still committed to supporting the Czechoslovak government, the actual 
levels of support they were able to offer during 1944 undermined these reassurances. It 
seemed that whenever the Czechoslovak government requested something specific, 
whether it be re-supplying the Slovak uprising or openly declaring support for the 
transfer of the Sudeten Germans, these requests were denied. Although there is no 
evidence that these British failures were in any way deliberate Benes’s policies required 
both the western and eastern allies to proffer an equal amount of support in order to 
operate successfully. While the Foreign Office had no wish to see Czechoslovakia fall 
under the Soviet’s influence, as looked likely with Poland, there was little that they felt 
could be done to prevent this happening without causing unwanted complications with 
the United States and the Soviet Union. This crucial discrepancy between British and 
Czechoslovak policies had one significant consequence; it forced Benes to form ever- 
closer links with the Soviet Union.
While this was definitely not in Britain’s interest, it should be recognised that it 
was a partial consequence of the Foreign Office’s disinclination to deal equitably with
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Benes and his government after December 1943. Nor had this development been lost on 
Benes, as he admitted to Nichols just weeks before his departure for Moscow.
[Benes] made the interesting observation, which he asked me to regard as 
most confidential, that long ago he had come to the conclusion that he 
must rely on himself and not the Western Allies, for, he said, in the last 
resort, these Allies would have; if the necessity arose, to abandon him, i.e. 
to the tender mercies of the Russians, though he did not say so.lj9
It could be argued, therefore, that the Czechoslovak government in exile was a victim of 
its own success in regularising its relations with Moscow as this had the effect of 
identifying the government in exile, at least in eyes of certain Foreign Office officials, too 
closely with the Soviet Union.
During the first few months of 1945 Benes prepared for his journey to Moscow, 
where he arrived on 17 March 1945. His departure not only marked a definitive break in 
nearly six years of close Anglo-Czechoslovak relations, but ushered in a period of 
sporadic and often unsatisfactory contacts between the Foreign Office and those 
Czechoslovak representatives in the liberated territories. This situation lasted for several 
weeks, culminating in an almost complete cessation of all communications in April 1945, 
as a result of the Soviet decision not to allow the western diplomatic corps to join Benes’s 
entourage in the eastern Slovakian town of Kosice.
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Even after Benes had left London for the last time the Foreign Office continued to 
receive information about his political activities through its representatives in the Soviet 
Union, Clark Kerr and Roberts.140 The embassy sent a final memorandum to London on 
Benes’s talks with the Soviet authorities and with the KSC on 31 March 1945.141 The 
Foreign Office took a particular interest in the political configuration of the new 
‘National Front’ government and its policies, especially the various KSC members who 
had been given seats in the Cabinet and Fierlinger’s appointment as Prime Minister. 142 
Orme Sargent’s reaction to these announcements was unambiguous; ‘It looks to me like a 
capitulation to the Communists whatever Dr Benes may say...’14j It seemed to some in 
the Foreign Office that their earlier uneasiness over Benes’s closeness to Moscow had 
been all too justified. These anxieties were reinforced by the Soviet Union’s subsequent 
refusal to allow the despatch of the western diplomatic corps to Slovakia, via Romania. In 
an attempt to try and expedite a solution to this problem Eden personally approached the 
Soviet Ambassador in London, Feodor T. Gousev and expressed his irritation and 
displeasure at this development.144 Gousev explained that the Soviet High Command had 
now revised its position because of a lack of suitable accommodation and because of 
continuing military operations in the region. As a result the anticipated departure of the 
British diplomatic mission was postponed indefinitely.145
140 FO 371 47085 N3308/207/12 Clark Kerr, Moscow, to Foreign Office, 26 March 1945 on his meeting 
with Benes.
141 FO 371 47085 N3477/207/12 Telegram from Moscow Embassy to Foreign Office, 31 March 1945.
142 FO 371 N3949/650/12 Nichols to Foreign Office, 9 April 1945, see also K. Kaplan, The Short March.
The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1948, London, 1987, p i4. FO 371 47085 
N3477/207/12, Clark Kerr to Allen, 30 March 1945, see M. Hodny (ed), Ceskoslovenstipolitici, 1918- 
1991, strcne zivotopisy, Prague, 1991, p91 & Bloomfield, Passive Revolution, pp59-67.
143 FO 371 47085 N3477/207/12 Sargent minute, 2 April 1945.
144 FO 371 47149 N 3411/3411/12 Eden to Clark Kerr, 28 March 1945.
145 FO 371 47149 N3454/3411/12 Nichols to Warner, 29 March 1945.
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The real reasons behind this Soviet decision are difficult to ascertain, Kosice was 
indeed a small provincial town and the proposed diplomatic missions consisted of more 
than 200 people; Czechoslovak, British, American, French, Belgian and Dutch 
representatives.146 It was entirely possible, therefore, that this was more personnel than 
could be accommodated, especially since the transition to civilian administration was not 
yet complete.147 On the other hand this development aroused Anglo-American suspicions 
and fostered the perception that this was really a Soviet ploy to isolate and influence the 
Czechoslovak leadership.148 The inherent difficulties in reaching any definitive 
conclusion over this issue were outlined by an official in the Northern Department on 31 
March.
It is difficult to decide how for the Soviet Government's actions are 
dictated by the purely practical considerations which they allege as 
pretexts, and how far they may have more sinister motives in mind. 
Conditions in Eastern Slovakia are certainly at the best of times extremely 
primitive...On the other hand the episode does not leave a good 
impression and it will certainly be difficult to persuade public and 
parliamentary opinion that the Russians are not deliberately trying to place 
a ring-fence round Czechoslovakia in the same manner as they have so far 
succeeded in doing in Poland.149
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The problems in delineating Soviet motives were heightened by the usual lack of 
transparency in Soviet decision making and the lack of radio communications with the 
Czechoslovak government in Slovakia. Given the dearth of sufficient information, and in 
the light of Soviet actions in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, both Britain and the United 
States had to guess at Soviet motives and began to suspect the worst.150 These concerns 
led to a temporary reversal of Britain’s increasingly ambiguous attitude towards 
Czechoslovakia since December 1943 and a belated and largely ineffectual attempt to 
exert some measure of western influence in the region.
Initially, Sargent, Cadogan and Eden decided to take a ‘wait and see’ approach 
over the despatch of the diplomatic corps, which was by now the standard British 
response to any new development in Czechoslovak affairs.151 This was based upon the 
expectation that the Czechoslovak government itself would use its own contacts with the 
Soviets to find a solution. But this position was soon revised as a result of another 
telegram from Moscow. According to Clark Kerr the United States embassy had been 
given instructions by the State Department to insist that its mission be allowed to proceed 
immediately to Slovakia. This information sparked a flurry of activity within the Foreign 
Office and illustrated that both Britain and the United States were now sufficiently 
concerned by this issue to consider taking joint action to resolve it. This was not least 
because they both feared that Czechoslovakia might soon suffer the same fate as
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Poland.132 In the event little was achieved and Nichols only managed to reach Prague on 
13 May 1945, several days after the end of the war.153
Roberts highlighted these concerns in a memorandum from Moscow on the state 
of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations on 16 April 1945. It contained references to Masaryk’s 
and Edward Taborsky’s fears that the Soviets might still reject Benes’s leadership and 
dismember Czechoslovakia.154 Consequently, by the middle of April, the British 
authorities had become convinced that the only solution to Czechoslovakia’s current 
situation (and the lack of contacts with its government) was for western forces to push as 
deeply into the country as possible and ideally to liberate Prague itself.155 As Churchill 
himself noted, if the United States liberated the capital then the question of the Soviets’ 
refusal to allow the diplomatic missions to proceed would then be solved. This was an 
important consideration as nobody in the west had yet managed to contact Benes.156 
These concerns were further heightened when Eden and Cadogan met a depressed and 
worried Masaryk at the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco at 
the end of April.137
The idea that the United States should be encouraged to liberate Prague was soon 
accepted by the Foreign Office and Churchill took a personal interest in these matters, 
intervening on several occasions.158 But this plan also failed, largely as a result of
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General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s disinclination to pursue political objectives in Central 
Europe and it was the Red Army that finally liberated Prague on 9 May. It is important 
to recognise that although British support for this objective seemed to parallel Benes’s 
own policy of locating Czechoslovakia between east and west, Churchill’s interest in this 
matter was not solely designed to liberate Prague for its own sake. Rather he was now 
more concerned with limiting Soviet domination in Central Europe and Prague was the 
last place where this could still be achieved. As Soviet power and influence in Europe 
grew and the threat from Nazi Germany subsided so Churchill had become increasingly 
concerned about Stalin’s intentions in Europe and had begun to revert to his traditional 
position of hostility toward the Soviet regime.159
It was the Prime Minister’s own developing suspicions of Soviet ambitions that 
now shaped British policy and culminated in his ‘Iron Curtain’ telegram to President 
Harry S. Truman on 12 May 1945, later repeated and expanded in his speech in Fulton, 
Missouri in 1946.160 As Churchill later commented on this period,
The whole relationship of Russia with the Western Allies was in flux.
Every question about the future was unsettled between us. The agreements 
and understandings of Yalta...had already been brushed aside by the 
triumphant Kremlin. New perils, perhaps as terrible as those we had 
surmounted, loomed and glared upon the torn and harassed world.161
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It was in this context that the decision to try and occupy Prague was made, but this 
sudden interest in the fate of Czechoslovakia was too little and came too late.
The unity of the Grand Alliance, which Benes viewed as a necessary pre­
condition for the success of his foreign policy, was already being tested to the limit by 
May 1945 and soon faltered. Moreover, British policy on the liberation of Prague was 
diametrically opposed to the Soviet Union’s security concerns in the region, and was one 
that would increase, rather than reduce, tensions between the eastern and western 
allies.162 Therefore the unsuccessful British decision to urge Eisenhower on to Prague has 
to be viewed in the light of worsening Anglo-American relations with Moscow, rather 
than as a fundamental reappraisal of the prevailing course of British policy toward 
Czechoslovakia.
The history of Anglo-Czechoslovak-Soviet relations from 1941 to 1945 would 
seem to indicate that the Soviet Union’s entry into the war did indeed have an ancillary, 
and detrimental, effect on bilateral relations between Britain and the Czechoslovak 
government in exile. It was the Soviet Union’s offer of full recognition of Benes’s 
government, and his political agenda, in July 1941 that encouraged the Foreign Office to 
follow suit albeit with reservations and against the Central Department’s advice. After 
this development, there was a lingering suspicion amongst many British officials that the 
Czechoslovak government’s friendly relations with Moscow had only been achieved at 
the Polish government’s expense and had ultimately destroyed plans for post-war 
federation. It was these concerns that repeatedly influenced British decision-making on
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pp32-35.
this question and which were the principle reasons behind the Foreign Office’s reluctance 
to allow Benes to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1943. The long drawn out 
and acrimonious negations that followed further reduced the warmth of Anglo- 
Czechoslovak relations (which had never been particularly close) and resulted in a 
marked decline in bilateral contacts from 1944 onwards. From the Czechoslovak 
perspective Britain’s reserved position on a number of critical issues meant they were 
impelled to look elsewhere to secure their objectives and Moscow proved to be far more 
accommodating. By the time the Red Army had begun to liberate and occupy the territory 
of the former Czechoslovakia Britain was increasingly unable to provide the kind of 
political and military support Benes earnestly desired to counterbalance Soviet 
influences. Moreover, the developing situation in Ruthenia and Slovakia meant that 
Benes had little choice by early 1945 but to return home via Moscow. Once he had left 
London what little influence the Foreign Office had over the direction of his policies 
dissipated, and were further curtailed by the inability of the western diplomatic corps to 
join him in Kosice. Admittedly, the last minute efforts made by Churchill and senior 
officials in the Foreign Office to encourage the United States to liberate Prague indicated 
a continued concern for Czechoslovakia’s position, but these were hindered by the 
complexities of coalition warfare and came far too late. Consequently, Britain’s 
ambiguous policies towards Moscow and the tensions within the Grand Alliance meant 
that Benes’s ambition to forge a foreign policy between east and west was at best an 
unlikely proposition.
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Chapter Five 
Anglo-Czechoslovak-Polish relations 1939-1945
The Czechoslovak political exiles based in Britain during the Second World War 
were not the only foreign representatives reliant upon Britain’s political and military 
support, even though they were one of the first groups to seek refuge in the British Isles 
from the turmoil of continental Europe. By the end of 1940 they had been joined by 
exiles from Belgium, France, Norway and Poland and other European nations now 
occupied by Nazi Germany.1 This exiled community of politicians, soldiers, airmen, 
sailors and refugees contained representatives from all points on the political spectrum. 
They had brought with them many of their own political and national disputes and sought 
to influence the British foreign policy forming elite in order to try and secure British 
endorsement of their respective political agendas.2 This influx of Europeans presented the 
British authorities with a unique set of difficulties as they were obliged to navigate a 
difficult path between these objectives, their own national interests, and, after 1941, the 
interests of the Soviet Union and the United States.3 The constraints of coalition warfare 
meant that British decision making was often limited by the need to refer questions of 
policy, not least those related to the post-war settlements, to the other members of the 
Grand Alliance. As a result the treatment these exiles received, both during and after the 
war, varied a great deal.
1 See M. Conway & J. Gotovitch (eds), Europe in Exile. European Exile Communities in Britain 1940- 
1945, Oxford, 2001 & A. Glees, Exile politics during the Second World War: The German Social 
Democrats in Britain, Oxford, 1982.
“ D. Cameron Watt, Personalities and Policies. Studies in the formation of British Foreign Policy in the 
Twentieth Century, London, 1965, ppl-15.
3 F. Roberts, Dealing with Dictators. The Destruction and Revival of Europe 1930-70, London, 1991, pp53- 
54.
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For some, such as the Belgians, Norwegians and Poles, British political 
recognition was swift, while for others, such as the fighting French led by General 
Charles de Gaulle and the Czechoslovaks, this process was a more convoluted affair beset 
with delays and reservations. This is not to suggest, however, that British recognition of 
the legitimacy of these governments also sanctioned their political agendas, it did not, 
and from 1940 onwards the British authorities declined to commit themselves to the 
restoration of any frontiers in Europe until the war had been won.4 While this policy had 
little effect on the future frontiers of Norway or Belgium it had completely different 
implications for Poland and Czechoslovakia. This was especially problematic as the 
Czechoslovaks wanted to restore their frontiers as they stood before September 1938, the 
Poles wanted to restore their frontiers as of August 1939 and from December 1941 
onwards the Soviet authorities demanded international acceptance of their borders as they 
had existed in May 1941. Quite clearly, these objectives were mutually exclusive and the 
Czechoslovaks and Poles were soon at odds over the question of the disputed territory of 
Tesln (Cieszyn in Polish, Teschen in German).5
Although both governments spent much time between 1940 and 1943 preparing to 
enter into a joint federation after the war, these British sponsored proposals were fatally 
undermined by their increasingly divergent attitudes towards the Soviet Union.6 Benes 
and his colleagues also had to deal with the fact that the British authorities consistently 
viewed their interests as subservient to those of Poland. Yet, for all these difficulties it
4 FO 371 24289 Cl 1069/2/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum, 14 October 1940.
3 See V.S. Mamatey, ‘The Establishment of the Republic,’ & T. Prochazka, ‘The Second Republic, 1938- 
1939,’ both in V. Mamatey & R. Luza (eds), A Histoiy of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948,
Princeton, 1973, pp33-35 & 259-260.
6 See I. St’ovicek & J. Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polskdjedndni o konfederaci a spojenectvx 1939- 
1945, Prague, 1995 & P. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers. 1940-1943, 
Bloomington, 1956.
was the Czechoslovak exiles who managed to return home, with much of that state’s 
territory intact, and remain in power- albeit with concessions to the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party (KSC); While the Poles fell foul of the power dynamics within the 
Grand Alliance. As a result Poland’s frontiers were heavily revised, with the west’s tacit 
agreement at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 and the exiles in London were 
excluded from power in favour of the ‘Lublin Committee.’7 The purpose of this chapter 
is therefore to examine how Anglo-Czechoslovak relations were influenced by British 
policy towards the joint Czechoslovak-Polish federation project and to consider what 
effect the Soviet Union’s entrance into the war subsequently had upon these relations.
These tripartite relations did not suddenly spring into existence in September 
1939, however, they had already been shaped by earlier contacts and three key influences 
need to be considered. The first was the largely acrimonious nature of Czechoslovak- 
Polish relations during the inter-war period, especially over the disputed region of Tesin. 
Second, the differences in British decision making toward these Central Europe states 
prior to the outbreak of war, especially with regard to the German invasion of Bohemia 
and Moravia in March 1939 and the subsequent Anglo-French guarantee of Poland’s 
independence (though not her frontiers). Finally, the way in which the British foreign 
policy-forming elite regarded the stability of inter-war Central Europe, as crafted at the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and how this perception resulted in support for the 
federalisation of Central Europe.8 These factors would have a significant effect on how
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October 1940 & FO 371 26376 C528/6/12 Sir H. Kennard letter on federations, 15 January 1941.
the two exiled governments interacted with each other and how, in turn, the British 
authorities perceived their relative importance and dealt with them.
Czechoslovak-Polish relations immediately prior to the Paris Peace Conference 
and during the inter-war period were at best equivocal and at worst openly hostile. 
Disputes over borders and the direction and style of their foreign policies - as regards the 
League of Nations, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia’s occupation of 
Tesin in 1920 and Poland’s re-occupation of the region in October 1938 -had soured 
relations between the two countries.9 Furthermore, the actions of the Polish government 
after the Munich Agreement and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 had done 
little to improve relations. The Polish authorities had soon recognised the Slovak State 
and, on 1 July 1939, sequestrated the property of the Czechoslovak legation in Warsaw, 
even though the legations in Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States had 
remained open as a sign of these governments’ disapproval of Germany’s actions. Even 
so Benes contacted the former Czechoslovak ambassador in Poland, Juraj Slavik, on 2 
August, in an attempt to try and re-open communications with the Polish authorities. In 
his message Benes explained that the ‘action abroad’ was dedicated to the liberation of 
Czechoslovakia, was not hostile to Poland, did not want to revive the complex frontier 
question and requested that Poland allow the Czechs and Slovaks to decide their future 
relationship on their own.10 But this attempt to restore relations had little effect and the 
Polish government maintained its reserved position towards Benes and his colleagues in 
London and Paris. This was because many Poles, General Wladyslaw Sikorski in
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particular, took a critical view of Benes and preferred to deal with other Czechoslovak 
exiles who they felt had less tarnished reputations, such as the former Prime Minister 
Milan Hodza.11 This was largely the result of the acrimonious nature of Czechoslovak- 
Polish relations during the preceding two decades. Senior Polish officials continued with 
this policy following the establishment of a Polish government in exile in France. They 
did not recognise the Czechoslovak National Committee, formed in late 1939, and only 
appointed a Charge d’Affairs to the Provisional Government in exile 011 27 November 
1940. This level of recognition was again belatedly followed on 24 October 1941 by the 
appointment of an official envoy to the government in exile, Adam Tarnowski, three 
months after British recognition had been granted.12
These tensions were exacerbated by Sikorski’s disinclination to compromise over 
frontiers, a position dictated by the internal dynamics of his own government and the 
views of the population at home.13 Benes too was determined to restore Czechoslovakia’s 
frontiers as they had stood before September 1938, including Tesln, and this issue 
became increasingly intractable.14 These problems were heightened by the Foreign 
Office’s refusal to consider urging Poland to return the region in 1939 and their later 
disinclination to commit themselves to any frontiers in Europe, whether they be Polish or 
Czechoslovak.15 While this was a sensible position for the British authorities to take, it 
was one that did little to help foster conciliation between the two parties. Nevertheless,
11 FO 371 26410 Cl 1872/7140/12 Roberts minute on talks with Masaryk, 11 September 1941
12 St’ovicek & Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polskd jednani o konfederaci, p37.
13 E. Barker, Churchill and Eden at War, New York, 1978, pp247-248 & A. Prazmowska, Britain and 
Poland 1939-1943, The Betrayed Ally, Cambridge, 1995, pl42.
14 FO 371 30828 C l 1381/151/12 Nichols to Strang, 17 November 1942.
15 FO 371 22899 Cl 3304/7/12, Troutbeck’s memorandum ‘Our Attitude towards the Czechs and Slovaks in 
Time of War,’ 1 September 1939 & House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 365, Col. 40, 5 
September 1940 & Vol. 373, Col. 1379, 30 July 1941.
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Benes made repeated attempts to try and resolve this impasse; during talks in 1941 he 
suggested that Tesin should become the capital of any future federation, although the 
Poles did not accept this proposal.16 He tried again during a dinner with Sikorski and 
Edward Raczynski, the Polish foreign minister, on 23 November 1942. During this 
meeting Benes suggested that in order to settle this issue both he and Sikorski should 
stand in Trafalgar Square and publicly admit that mistakes had been made in the past and 
that they now wanted to work together, but this dramatic proposal also failed to expedite 
a solution.17 In fact, this question was never adequately resolved during the war and it 
was a measure of its intractability that the Czechoslovak and Polish governments were 
still locked in disagreement over the region in 1946, when the Soviet Union had to 
intervene to prevent further conflict.18
Another issue that caused complications for both parties was the Polish 
government’s financial and political support for a number of Czechoslovak emigres 
opposed to Benes’s leadership.19 This support had begun when the Polish authorities had 
encouraged the formation of a Czechoslovak legion in Poland against Benes’s strict 
instructions, led by General Lev Prchala.20 Prchala’s activities preceded the formation of 
an anti-Benes lobby among some of the Czechoslovak exiles in London that later 
crystallised around Hodza, the Czecho-Slovak National Council and the Czech National 
Union.21 Indeed, when Slavik passed Benes’s message to the Polish government in
16 FO 371 26376 C6578/6/12 Bruce Lockhart resume of conversions between Benes and Sikorski on 5 
June, 16 June 1941.
17 FO 371 30828 C12165/151/12 Nichols to Roberts, 3 December 1942.
18 K. Kaplan, The Short March. The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia, 1945-1948, London, 1987, 
pp 19-22.
FO 371 24288 C6035/2/12 Roberts minute, 24 April 1940.
20 Sfovicek & Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polskd jedndni o konfederaci, pp27-28.
21 FO 371 38929 C7324/224/12 Memorandum from G. Lias, 29 May 1944.
August 1939 he had described himself as the ‘only political representative of our action 
in Poland,’ a thinly veiled reference to this situation.22 These tensions persisted after 
Prchala reached London and culminated in a successful libel action in the British courts 
against Benes’s nephew, Bohus, over a critical article he had written in the weekly 
journal the Czechoslovak. By way of a response Hubert Ripka, State Minister of the 
Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent a strongly worded memorandum to the 
Foreign Office that accused Prchala of having misappropriated Czechoslovak State funds 
in Poland in 1939.23 But the Central Department tried to play down these rivalries as far 
as possible. These organisations and individuals were opposed to Benes for a variety of 
reasons, political, national and historical (some rejected the idea of re-establishing 
Czechoslovakia), but all were primarily concerned by what they regarded as the exiled 
government’s increasingly pro-Soviet policies after 1941. As a result they found a natural 
ally in the Polish government in exile. Although it is necessary to recognise that while the 
activities of these emigres consumed a disproportionate amount of attention, neither the 
Foreign Office nor Benes ever regarded them as a genuine threat to his leadership.
The British authorities were well aware of these activities and an investigation by 
the British security service (MI5) in August 1940 noted the close co-operation between 
these disaffected groups and the Poles.24 A later investigation by MI5 and the Special 
Branch in 1944 revealed that another of Benes’s opponents, Petr Pridavok, had been 
receiving direct financial support from the Polish government in exile and had contacted
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representatives of the Slovak government (at that time an enemy state) in the Vatican.23
The Central Department, however, decided that any prosecution under defence
regulations would be counter-productive.26 Although these groups never presented a
realistic threat, the financial and political support they received from the Poles further
exacerbated relations between the two governments.27
Although Benes and Sikorski met several times during the war their relationship
was never entirely free of suspicion, which made planning a federation problematic. The
Foreign Office was well acquainted with these difficulties and repeatedly sought to 
*
facilitate co-operation between the two allies by instigating communications through the 
British representatives to each government. These were Robert Bruce Lockhart and Philip 
Nichols on behalf of the Czechoslovaks and Sir Howard Kennard, Frank Savery and later 
Sir Owen O’Malley on behalf of the Poles. Though these attempts were occasionally 
fruitful any decisive reconciliation was always highly unlikely. The reason for this was 
first highlighted in August 1940, at an early stage in bi-lateral talks, by the British 
military liaison officer to the Poles Brigadier Charles Bridge who reported to the Central 
Department that,
General Sikorski appeared to be sympathetically disposed towards the 
Czechs. He said, however, that they had often misunderstood the Polish 
point of view. He thinks that Mr Benes was wrong to exclude Mr Hodza
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from his Cabinet and expressed the opinion that if the Czechs remained 
strictly outside the Russian orbit, they and the Poles could work 
harmoniously together for the reconstruction of Europe.28
This quote is particularly revealing because it illustrated that as early as 1940 Sikorski 
was already concerned by Czechoslovakia’s close links to the Soviet Union. (He was well 
aware of the Czechoslovak-Soviet mutual assistance treaty of May 1935, an agreement 
that had been signed after Poland’s treaty with Nazi Germany in January 1934.) This was 
a concern that, for all the Foreign Offices’ attempts to encourage a genuine 
rapprochement between the two parties resulted in a fundamental breakdown in relations 
by the end of 1943.29
While there were clear political benefits for Benes and his government in co­
operating with the Poles between 1939 and 1941, the Soviet Union’s entrance into the 
war changed this position. As the war progressed Benes and his colleagues were faced by 
a stark choice; they could maintain relations with the Polish government in exile and 
support their increasingly anti-Soviet position, or conversely, attempt to establish friendly 
and productive relations with Moscow. The two positions were incompatible and 
although Benes tried to steer a middle course between them by allowing for Polish 
accession to the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of December 1943 such agreements were 
deemed unacceptable by the Polish exiles after the revelations of the Kaytn massacre and
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Sikorski’s death.30 As a result, Benes and his government’s policy of regularising 
relations with Stalin’s regime created further enmity amongst the Poles and effectively 
curtailed any hope of successful co-operation while in exile.
An equally important influence on Czechoslovak-Polish relations in exile was the 
attitude taken by the British authorities toward each country. A casual examination of 
British foreign policy prior to the outbreak of the war would seem to suggest that there 
were clear differences. When Germany invaded Czechoslovakia 011 15 March 1939 the 
British response was limited, yet when Poland was invaded five months later, Britain 
declared war. However, such a simplistic analysis does not explain the far more 
ambiguous reasons behind the Anglo-French guarantee of Poland’s independence on 31 
March 1939 that was eventually finalised on 25 August.31 In fact, the British authorities 
were no more willing to preserve Poland’s territorial integrity than they had been to 
preserve Czechoslovakia’s, especially since many British officials regarded both 
countries as artificial creations of the Paris Peace Conference that contained unwieldy 
ethnic populations with genuine grievances.32 The guarantee was actually offered because 
of the course of events in Europe after March 1939 and the need to make a more coherent 
stance against German aggression.33 Therefore Britain did not go to war because of a 
greater sense of obligation towards Poland than Czechoslovakia, but rather in order to
30 J. Nemecek, H. Novackova, I. St’ovfcek & M. Tejchman (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy v 
diplomatickych jedndnich, Vol. 1, Prague, 1998, Vol. 1., pp444-450, Polish Cultural Foundation, The 
Crime of Katyn, Facts and Documents, London, 1989 & Prazmowska, Britain and Poland, pp 143 & 184- 
190.
31 See S. Newman, March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland. A Study in the Continuity of British 
Foreign Policy, Oxford, 1976, p203 & A. Prazmowska, Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Second 
World War, London, 2000, pp l50-157.
32 R. Overy, & A. Wheatcroft, The Road to War, London, 1999, pi 13.
33 D. Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945, London, 1971, p 157, R.A.C. Parker, 
Churchill and Appeasement, London, 2000, p218 & A. Roberts, ‘The Holy Fox': A Biography of Lord 
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send an unequivocal message to Berlin and, when this was ignored, the British authorities 
found themselves committed to respond.
Yet the fact that Poland had, unlike Czechoslovakia, actively resisted the German 
invasion had several important consequences. First, that a number of well placed British 
military officials, including Colin Gubbins, Peter Wilkinson and Harold Perkins, were in 
Poland as part of General Sir Adrian de Wiart’s military mission and formed close links 
with the Polish military and intelligence organisations which were later evacuated to 
Britain.34 These contacts proved important because all three men would be leading 
members of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in which the Poles held a prominent 
position. When these contacts were combined with the Poles’ well-regarded intelligence 
service and their large and effective resistance organisations they often received 
preferential access to SOE’s limited resources in comparison to the Czechoslovaks, 
differences that were graphically illustrated during the uprisings in Warsaw and Slovakia 
in the late summer of 1944.35 Quite simply, far more of SOE’s time and energy was 
spent dealing with the ‘over-riding claims of the Poles’ than with the Czechoslovaks.36
A second consequence was the fact that a large number of Polish soldiers, airmen 
and politicians had managed to escape to the west, at first based in France and then in 
Britain. The sheer number of Polish military personnel involved and their willingness to 
fight, some 20,000 soldiers, 4000 sailors and 14,400 pilots in all, meant that careful
14 P. Wilkinson, Foreign Fields: the story of an SOE operative, London 1997, pp67-73 & P. Wilkinson, & 
J. Bright Astley, Gubbins and SOE, London, 1997, pp38-45.
35 E.D.R Harrison, ‘The British Special Operations Executive and Poland,’ The Historical Journal, 43, 4, 
(2000), pp 1082-1090.
36 HS 7/108 F.E. Keary, Major P. W. Auster and Major G. I. Klauber, SOE Country History, 
Czechoslovakia 1940-45, p34 & M.D.R. Foot, SOE. An Outline History of the Special Operations 
Executive 1940-1946, London, 1999, pp264 & 278,
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consideration had to be given to Polish matters by the Foreign Office and War Cabinet.37 
Certain officials also felt that Britain had a moral obligation towards the Poles and this 
notion informed British decision-making.38 It was symptomatic of the British position 
that no such debt was felt to be owed to the Czechoslovaks (although it was to the 
Sudeten German exiles in London) and many British officials shared Polish reservations 
over Benes’s increasingly friendly contacts with Moscow.39 This did not mean, however, 
that the Poles received preferential treatment from the British authorities or received 
additional support for their political objectives.
As these questions were also part of the Central Department’s remit this meant 
that its officials spent far more time dealing with Polish issues than with Czechoslovak 
ones.40 Indeed, the proportion of the department’s time spent on Polish issues further 
increased after June 1941 as they attempted to engineer a reconciliation between the 
Poles and the Soviets. Yet for all their efforts these attempts proved futile due to a 
combination of Polish intransigence, a lack of any coherent British policies toward 
Central Europe, and Moscow’s increasing influence (and intransigence) after 1943.41 
Moreover, as Polish-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate, so British concerns over 
Poland’s future began to have an effect on policy towards Benes and his government. 
This was most apparent during the dispute over Benes’s decision to sign a treaty with the
37 K. Sword, ‘Poland,’ in I.C.D. Dear & M.R.D Foot (eds), The Oxford Companion to World War //, 
Oxford, 2001, pp702-703.
38 FO 371 30828 C l0670/151/12 Roberts minute, 17 October 1941.
39 FO 371 30835 C6867/326/12 Roberts to Nichols, 17 July 1942, HO 294/39 on origins of British 
Committee for Refugees from Czecho-Siovakia, October 1938 to June 1939 & HO 294/44 establishment of 
Czech Refugee Trust Fund, June 1939.
40 Roberts, Dealing with Dictators, pp 55-56.
41 A. Eden, The Reckoning, London, 1965, p434, Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pp 
523-529, 589-590 & 677-678, E. Raczynski, In Allied London, London, 1962, pp 178-179 & Young (ed), 
The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, pp 272-274.
Soviet Union in the summer of 1943, when the Foreign Office’s objections were based on 
the repercussions they felt such a development would have on the Poles.42 When taken 
together these influences meant that Polish issues were consistently seen as a greater 
priority by the Foreign Office. While this position largely reflected the Poles’ greater 
contribution to the war effort, it also had a commensurate effect on British policy towards 
Benes and his government, especially in relation to the Soviets.
Yet it was in reference to the negotiations over the proposed formation of a 
Czechoslovak-Polish federation after the war that British attitudes had the greatest effect- 
on these bi-lateral relations. This was not least because British support for federations in 
central and south-eastern Europe proved to be the only coherent long-term policy that 
emerged from the Foreign Office during the first three years of the war. 3 Moreover, it 
was a policy that ultimately failed and that was then superseded by plans for large-scale 
transfers of populations. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office’s support for federations 
stemmed from one basic perception; that the patchwork of nation states created in 1919 
was inherently unstable and some alternative from of international system was needed to 
increase security in the region. As Bruce Lockhart noted on 7 October 1940,
Taken at its lowest valuation, Polish-Czechoslovak federation would seem 
to be a desirable end, for it provides the only practical means at present 
available to us of filling the dangerous vacuum created by the collapse of
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the small states of Central Europe. If it can be achieved, it will set an 
admirable example to the Balkan States.44
This was a view that was shared by many in the Foreign Office and the Cabinet and 
resulted in swift and wholehearted British support for these plans when they were first 
announced in late 1940.
However, it should be recognised that the idea of federalising parts of Europe was 
not a new one. The Poles in particular looked back to the Medieval Polish-Lithuanian 
federation as a viable model for the future organisation of Europe and Josef Pilsudski had 
already attempted to revive these ideas in 19 1 8 45 Indeed, throughout negotiations on this 
question it was the Poles who took the lead in driving the talks forward and were 
consistently more enthusiastic about this project than were the Czechoslovaks, who 
preferred a less comprehensive form of co-operation namely the creation of a 
confederation. In addition, federalised reforms had long been proposed within the Austro- 
Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and both Benes and Tomas G. Masaryk had briefly 
flirted with these solutions before the First World War.46 Furthermore, the British 
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 had unsuccessfully argued for the 
federalisation of Central Europe at this time.47 Many other people outside government 
circles also saw federalism as a viable solution to Europe’s troubles; a Federal Union
44 FO 371 24289 C10776/2/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum, 7 October 1940.
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1941,’ Diplomacy and Statecraft, 1995, Vol. 6, No.3: pp715-716.
movement had been established in London in 1938 and the British Labour Party’s war 
aims, announced on 8 November 1939, proclaimed that ‘Europe must federate or 
perish.’48 Even Benes had expressed approval for these ideas in his lectures in Chicago 
during early 1939.49 These pronouncements were complimented by a number of popular 
books on this subject such as W.B. Curry’s The Case for Federal Union, a collection of 
essays edited by M. Channing-Pearce and Hodza’s well known Federation in Central 
Europe. In fact, Hodza became a leading proponent of federal reforms, although his 
contribution to this issue was always commensurately lower than that of the Poles. But 
perhaps the most startling example of the wide scale prevalence of such opinions was the 
last minute proposals for a union of Britain and France announced on 16 June 1940, even 
though this plan only enjoyed limited support within the War Cabinet.50
Taken together these factors meant that the Foreign Office was predisposed to 
support such an option, not least because it appeared to be a reasonable policy, avoided 
any specific territorial commitments to either Poland or Czechoslovakia, and promoted 
dialogue between the two governments. On 8 March 1940 Gladwyn Jebb, Private 
Secretary to the Permanent Under-Secretaries of State, noted,
To my own mind, the federal ideas of Dr Hodza, and his proposed 
economic unions with Austria and Poland, are at least as worthy of
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investigation as the plans of Dr Benes to restore the Czechoslovak state in 
all its original untenability.51
More importantly the Central department also felt that such talks might help to improve 
Polish relations with the Soviet Union, as a result of Benes and his government’s long 
standing contacts with Moscow.52 Although the Foreign Office would never be directly 
involved in these bilateral negotiations they consistently supported and promoted these 
plans. Indeed, the Foreign Office became so enthusiastic about the potential of post-war 
federations that they brokered a similar agreement between the exiled Greek and 
Yugoslav governments in London, which was signed in the Foreign Office on 15 January 
1942.53
Preliminary discussions between Benes and Sikorski had actually begun in Paris 
in October 1939 and the two leaders met again in London on 18 and 19 November when 
they agreed on a framework for mutual co-operation while in exile.54 However, the 
Czechoslovaks’ inferior political position (the Poles were already a fully recognised 
government in exile) meant that Benes was reluctant to enter into further talks until a 
greater level of parity had been achieved?5 Benes wanted to secure further support for his 
political objectives and increase the level of recognition the ‘action abroad’ had so far 
received. These two aspects were of course closely linked, because higher levels of 
recognition would increase Benes’s ability to pursue his political goals. In addition, he
51 FO 371 24287 C2455/2/12 Jebb minute, 8 March 1940.
52 FO 371 24292 C 1327/8531/12 Roberts minute, 16 December 1940.
33 FO 371 30827 C897/151/12 Roberts minute, 22 January 1942.
34 FO 371 22900 C l8919/7/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum on Czechoslovak-Polish relations, 20 
November 1939 & Sfovlcek & Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polskajedndni o konfederaci, p 33-34.
55 St’ovlcek & Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polskd jednani o konfederaci, p37.
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had no intention of entering into such talks until he had been able to ascertain Anglo- 
French attitudes toward this question, especially as his political position still depended on 
their tacit support. In talks with his colleague Hubert Ripka on 12 February 1940 Benes 
noted,
I favour a certain type of federalisation. For tactical reasons let us not say 
what we want and whom we would like to have as our federalisation 
partner. Let us wait till the French and English tell us what they want and 
how far they are ready to go...It would be a certain kind of Stciatenbimd\ 
not Bundesstaat [confederation not federation].56
Quite simply, Benes had no intention of entering into negotiations with the Poles from a 
subservient political position or of jeopardising his long-term political objectives and 
until he knew that the relevant authorities in London and Paris were amenable to such a 
plan/7 Benes reiterated this approach at a speech at the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs on 8 March 1940 when he publicly acknowledged that plans for a federation were 
now under consideration, although talks did not begin in earnest until a Czechoslovak 
provisional government in exile had been recognised in June.58
Given this situation it is important to note that the concept of a Polish- 
Czechoslovak federation that emerged during this period contained the seeds of its own 
failure. This was because, from the outset, the Polish exiles visualised a federal union that
50 Cited in St’ovicek & Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polska jednanf o konfederaci, p39 fn.
57 FO 371 30828 C l0671/151/12 Roberts minute, 25 January 1943.
38 St’ovicek & Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polska jedndnl o konfederaci, pp39-40.
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was explicitly designed to be a cordon sanitaire against both German and Soviet 
expansionism.59 While Benes accepted this concept in 1940, and given his inferior 
political position he had little choice, it was one that would need to be radically re­
considered once the Soviet Union entered the war.60 Nevertheless, a series of 
Czechoslovalc-Polish meetings ensued in late August and September to discuss 
arrangements and the question of relations with the Soviet Union was broached, but no 
definitive agreement was reached.61 These discussions culminated in a joint declaration 
announced on 11 November 1940, drafted in French (the lingua franca for these talks) 
and published in English. It declared that the two countries would enter into a political 
and economic bloc, with two parliaments, two central banks and eventually one currency. 
In addition, foreign policy and military affairs would be jointly co-ordinated.62 A 
permanent Czechoslovalc-Polish Committee of co-operation had already been established 
and convened for the first time in January 1941.63
The Central Department welcomed these proposals and promised to give them 
‘maximum publicity,’ which was duly provided when Winston Churchill approved of 
these developments in the House of Commons on 26 November 1940.64 The 
department’s officials noted, however, that the Poles seemed far keener to construct a 
federation than the Czechoslovaks and that the question of relations with the Soviet
39 St’ovlcek & Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovenslco-polskd jednani o konfederaci, pp68-71 & Prazmowska, 
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62 FO 371 24292 Cl 1838/8531/12 Bruce Lockhart’s memorandum on proposals for federalisation, 1 
November 1940. For text see E. Benes, Sest let exilu. A druhe svetove vdlky, Prague, 1947, pp455-456.
63 FO 371 24292 Cl 120/8531/12 Bruce Lockhart to Halifax, 16 October 1940.
64 FO 371 24289 C 10776/2/12 minutes by Roberts, Makins, Strang and Cadogan 14 to 18 October 1940, 
FO 371 24292 Cl 1838/8531/12 Roberts minute, 6 November 1940 & HC Deb., 5th Series, Vol. 367, Col. 
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Union had yet to be resolved.65 It appeared by the end of 1940, therefore, that these 
federative plans had got off to a successful start and might prove to be a useful model for 
the re-organisation of other parts of Europe after the war. These negotiations continued 
during the first six months of 1941, with the Foreign Office’s continued support. A 
variety of joint Czechoslovak-Polish committees and sub-committees were formed, 
which respectively dealt with juridical, political, economic and military issues, and apart 
from some understandable disputes over frontiers these negotiations progressed relatively 
smoothly.66
At the beginning of 1941 Bruce Lockhart submitted a lengthy memorandum in 
which he urged the Foreign Office to make federations a ‘definite British war aim’ and 
asked that the ‘whole support of our diplomatic effort [be] given resolutely to its 
achievement.’67 This was an eminently sensible proposition given the lack of coherent 
British policies on the region, but the inter-departmental minutes that followed showed 
that there were some serious difficulties to be surmounted. G. Warr, an official in the 
Northern Department, expressed concern over the ‘Russian problem’ and warned that it 
might hinder collaboration between the two exiled governments.68 Yet in response 
Roberts insisted that,
...the idea of Polish-Czechoslovak co-operation is clearly an excellent 
one, both as regards the prosecution of the war, and as regards the
65 FO 371 24292 C l3276/8531/12 Roberts minute, 16 December 1940 & FO 371 26376 C5549/6/12 F. 
Savery memorandum on talks with August Zaleski, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, 28 May 1941.
06 FO 371 26388 C2249/216/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum, 4 March 1941 & Sfovlcek & Valenta (eds), 
Ceskoslovensko-polskajedndni o konfederaci, pp75-115.
67 FO 371 26376 C6/6/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum, 1 January 1941.
68 FO 371 26376 C6/6/12 G. Warr, 9 January 1941.
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constitution of a possible bulwark against further imperialist designs from 
both Germany and the USSR in post war Europe.69
While this approach might have desirable in early 1941, and was a view later shared by 
the United States, it was not an idea that the Soviets were able to accept.70 Consequently, 
the failure to secure Soviet acceptance for these ideas meant that these plans were 
sacrificed on the altar of allied unity, although it was to be the Czechoslovaks and not the 
Poles, Soviets or the British who were later blamed for this failure.71
Another note of caution was voiced by Sir H. Kennard, the British Ambassador to 
the Polish Government in Exile, who warned that previous attempts to impose systems on 
Europe, as with the settlements of 1919, had proved less than successful and that 
federations might not fare any better. He also raised the question of Poland’s eastern 
borders with the Soviet Union, adding that ‘in the eyes of the Poles the influence of 
Moscow has always been dangerously strong in Prague.’72 Benes too was beginning to be 
concerned by Sikorski’s attitude towards Moscow and these suspicions intensified after 
his talks with the Polish leader during a visit to view Czechoslovak troops in Leamington 
Spa on 26 January 1941.7j
These increasingly divergent attitudes towards Stalin’s regime became an even 
greater problem after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, an event 
that had three immediate consequences for these federative plans. The first was that the
69 FO 371 26376 C6/6/12 Roberts minute, 10 January 1941.
70 FO 371 30828C10670/151/12 Roberts minute, 17 October 1942.
71 Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, p370, Roberts, Dealing with Dictators, p60. S. Beria & F. Thom 
(ed), (trans, B Pearce), Beria, My father. Inside Stalin's Kremlin, London, 2001, pp325-326, fns. 19 to 23.
72 FO 371 26376 C6/6/12 Sir H. Kennard to Central Department, 15 January 1941.
73 R. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, London, 1947, ppl 10-111 & Benes, Pameti, pp227-228.
British, Polish and Czechoslovak authorities all had to reassess and re-negotiate their 
relations with Moscow in the light of Soviet accession to allied status. In fact, given 
Britain’s military position in the summer of 1941 there was little option but to regularise 
relations in order to co-ordinate the war against Germany and this was something that all 
three parties clearly understood. This was soon achieved through an Anglo-Soviet 
agreement signed on 12 July and a Polish-Soviet agreement, brokered by the British 
authorities, signed on 30 July.74 However, the inherent difficulties in finalising the latter 
agreement did result in a definite cooling in Anglo-Polish relations.75 The Czechoslovaks 
also regularised their relations with the Soviets when the government in exile was 
recognised by both Britain and the Soviet Union on 18 July; this was in addition to the re­
opening of the Czechoslovak embassy in Moscow and the commencement of bi-lateral 
talks on military issues.76 Second, all three parties had now to reconsider the plans for 
federations that had been so far drawn up and assess how Moscow would react to them. 
As Orme Sargent, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, concluded on 21 June,
The unpalatable truth is that unless the Poles and the Czechs can gain the 
good will of the Russians, there is very little chance of there being a 
confederation at all for it is the Russians who will be in the position to 
torpedo it.77
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This warning proved to be especially prescient in the light of later events. Finally, that the 
Czechoslovak-Polish bi-lateral talks that had been underway since late 1940 were 
suspended and did not recommence for several months.
From this point onwards, therefore, the key to the future success or failure of 
these federative plans lay with the Soviets and the Czechoslovaks soon broached this 
issue in their talks with them that summer. Although the Soviet authorities were clearly 
suspicious of the Poles’ motives the Soviet Ambassador, Ivan M. Maisky, raised no 
objections during his talks with Benes on 8 July 1941.78 Nor did the information reaching 
the Foreign Office suggest that there were any Soviet objections to these plans, at least 
according to reports from Bruce Lockhart, who noted that the Czechoslovak Ambassador 
in Moscow, Zdenek Fieriinger, had spoken to Andrei Y. Vyshinsky about this question.79 
Consequently, as no fundamental problems had been encountered, negotiations 
recommenced in November after Jan Masaryk announced a joint Czechoslovak-Polish 
declaration at the Inter-Allied Conference on 24 September. But the two governments’ 
respective positions had now fundamentally changed. Quite simply, given their the 
political recognition they had now secured the Czechoslovak exiles had less to gain from 
entering into a federation than they had in 1940 and the original enthusiasm and 
momentum behind these plans had been lost.
In addition, the resumption of talks proved to be little more than a brief hiatus 
before relations between all the interested parties deteriorated once more. These problems
7S L. Otahalova & M. Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, Prague,
1966, pp241-242.
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first emerged during Anthony Eden’s visit to Moscow in December 1941; while the 
Foreign Secretary managed to avoid agreeing to Stalin’s demands on frontiers and war 
aims he failed to secure Soviet approval for federations.81 This proved to be a serious 
omission because as Moscow’s relations with the Polish government in exile became 
more strained the Soviets started to view these federative plans as little more than a novel 
variation on the inter-war cordon sanitaire and became more hostile towards them.82
Czechoslovak-Polish talks continued during the first five months of 1942, the 
various bi-lateral committees began to meet again, a further joint declaration on co­
operation was announced on 23 January and was followed soon after by a congratulatory
O'?
message to both governments from Eden. This was another indication that the Foreign 
Office was still firmly committed to supporting federations and it was soon followed by a 
similar agreement between the Greek and Yugoslavian government in exile, signed on 15 
January.84 But further problems surfaced on 19 January when Sikorski announced to 
Eden that he now wanted to include Lithuania in any future federation, that Poland 
should be re-constructed within her pre-war borders and that he wanted Poland’s Jewish 
population to be removed to Palestine.85 This meeting proved to be the beginning of a 
determined campaign by the Polish government in exile to disrupt allied relations with
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82 FO 371 30828C10670/151/12 Bruce Lockhart to Sargent, 12 October 1942 & Ripka’s minutes of his 
conversation with A. Y. Bogomolov, 27 July 1942 in Sfovi'cek & Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polska 
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the Soviet Union and one that had important repercussions for their relations with both 
the British and the Czechoslovak governments.86
Moreover by February 1942 Soviet representatives in London had begun to make 
it very clear to the Czechoslovak exiles that as no agreement had been reached over 
Poland’s eastern frontiers during Silcorski’s recent visit to Moscow, they now viewed the 
federations with open suspicion. This resulted in what Alexander Y. Bogomolov, the 
Soviet Minister in London, called a ‘friendly warning’ to Benes about the inadvisability 
of entering into any form of anti-Soviet bloc with the Poles, especially one designed to 
undermine Soviet plans for the Baltic states.87 This placed both the Foreign Office and 
the Czechoslovak government in exile in a difficult position, not least as Britain was 
preparing to sign a treaty with Moscow and Benes’s stated policy was to work closely 
with the Soviet authorities both during and after the war. It also marked the start of an 
increasingly bitter propaganda campaign by both the Czechoslovaks and the Poles to 
foster international support for their respective agendas and by the summer of 1942 bi­
lateral relations had deteriorated even further.88
One of the reasons for this shift in the Polish position was the fact that many 
Poles, and certain British officials, had begun to view the Czechoslovak government in 
exile as being far too close to the Soviet authorities. In fact, from May 1942 onwards the 
Polish and Czechoslovak exiles were now in direct competition over who could secure 
the greatest level of support for their political objectives. For the Poles this meant closer 
ties to the United States and for the Czechoslovaks it meant closer ties with the Soviets,
80 Prazmowska, Britain and Poland, p i22.
87 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy, Vol. 1, pp301-303 & 304-305.
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clearly this was a situation that would make their bilateral contacts all the more difficult. 
Sikorski had already visited the United States in early 1942, and would travel there again 
in December, in order to try to secure Washington’s support against Soviet territorial 
ambitions and to finalise a bi-lateral treaty. He failed on both counts.89 Furthermore, the 
unwillingness of both the Soviet Union and the United States definitively to support post­
war federations, and the Czechoslovaks’ refusal to continue without such assurances, 
meant that these plans looked increasingly unlikely to succeed.90
In a speech to the Czechoslovak National Council on 18 May that was later 
relayed to the Central Department by the new British ambassador to the Czechoslovak 
government, Philip Nichols, Ripka clearly spelt out the Czechoslovak position with 
regard to the Soviet Union and Poland. He made it clear that the Poles had to establish 
friendly relations with the Soviet Union before plans for a federation could proceed.91 
This statement reinforced the suspicions of some Foreign Office officials that the 
Czechoslovaks were allying themselves too closely to Moscow to the detriment of the 
Poles. An early indication of this viewpoint can be found in Nichols’s ‘Most 
Confidential’ memorandum to William Strang, of 28 May that summarised the 
proceedings of a luncheon party attended by Benes, Ripka, Sikorski and Raczyhski. 
During lunch the Poles had referred to the Czechoslovaks’ apparent preference for ‘their 
other friends,’ that is the Soviet Union.92 In response to this document Roger Makins, 
then head of the Central Department, noted on 7 June that,
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The full recognition accorded to Dr Benes (which rather went to his head) 
combined with the entry of Russia into the War effected a marked change 
in his position. The Russians made overtures to the Czechs, gave them 
assurances and flattered them, with the result that Dr Benes has for some 
months past been casting sheep's eyes towards Moscow and has allowed 
Polish-Czechoslovak relations to deteriorate...Although, as we know, the 
Poles are intolerably difficult to deal with, I am quite satisfied that the 
main fault in this matter lies with the Czechs...93
Although this was not an opinion shared by all in the department it became the prevailing 
view on the situation.
The federation project was left in abeyance during the first nine months of 1942 
as the Foreign Office’s attention was primarily focused on relations within the newly 
established Grand Alliance, preparations for a treaty with the Soviet Union and the war 
itself. As a result the Anglo-Soviet treaty, signed on 26 May, did not include any explicit 
reference or agreement over these federative plans.94 Once more the opportunity to reach 
a conclusive understanding with Moscow over this issue had been sacrificed in order to 
limit disagreements between the two signatories. While this was a wholly realistic 
position for the British authorities to take, it was one that had a negative effect on the 
only coherent policy the Foreign Office had with regard to central Europe. The 
Czechoslovak government also, had other matters to contend with, not least because on
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the day after the treaty was signed the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, 
Reinhard Heydrich, was attacked by two Czechoslovak parachutists in Prague, trained 
and transported to the area by SOE. The savage Nazi retribution that followed Heydrich’s 
death brought Czechoslovakia’s plight to the forefront of the world’s attention and 
consequently allowed Benes to secure one of his most cherished objectives -  an official 
British denunciation of the terms of the Munich Agreement- on 5 August.95 As a result 
little consideration was given to the federation question by either the British or 
Czechoslovak authorities until the early autumn.
On 25 September the Polish government passed a copy of a draft treaty to 
Masaryk that proposed that both governments officially accept the creation of a 
federation, with the proviso that such an arrangement would be agreed to by the home 
populations after the war.96 As none of the Great Powers, and certainly not the Soviets, 
had officially agreed to accept such a proposal this development placed the Czechoslovak 
exiles in a difficult position and worsened their relations with the Poles. Ripka 
subsequently informed Nichols that he felt that this was a Polish ploy to force his 
government to commit themselves to this treaty in advance of any agreement with 
Moscow. He then added, ‘We do not intend to allow ourselves to be made the dupe of the 
Poles any more than we are prepared to be played with by the Russians.’97 Indeed, five 
days later Raczynski wrote to Eden to ask him to encourage Benes to sign the treaty 
immediately regardless of the Soviet position.98 He had perhaps been encouraged to do-so 
by Eden’s keynote speech at Leamington Spa, on 29 September, that had once more re-
95 FO 371 30835 C7210/326/12 Eden to Masaryk, 5 August 1942.
96 St’ovicek & Valenta (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polska jedndni o konfederaci, pp262-263.
97 FO 371 30828 C9428/151/12 Nichols to Strang, 28 September 1942.
98 FO 371 30828 C9661/151/12 Raczynski to Eden, 1 October 1942.
iterated Britain’s support for federations in central and south-eastern Europe.99 But given 
that any federal proposals in the region were totally dependant on Soviet support, and 
Eden and the rest of the Foreign Office clearly understood this, little could be done 
without Moscow’s explicit approval, and the Poles were told as much by the Central 
Department.100
This exchange happened to occur at a time when Anglo-Soviet relations had 
become increasingly strained over the western allies’ failure to open a decisive ‘Second 
Front’ in Europe. Concerned by the wider implications of these tensions, Bruce Lockhart 
addressed this topic in a long memorandum to the Foreign Office on 12 October. This 
paper not only provided a solution to the current Czechoslovak-Polish impasse, albeit 
accidentally, but also coincidentally, proved to mark the end of these federative schemes. 
While Bruce Lockhart was primarily concerned with Soviet suspicions of British 
intentions, he also addressed Soviet suspicions of the Poles and federations. He bluntly 
stated that any suggestion that British support for federations actually meant the creation 
of a new anti-Soviet cordon scinitciire would irreparably harm relations with Moscow and 
that explicit Soviet approval had to be sought to avoid this impression. He also placed 
much of the blame for the failure to reach an agreement on the Poles, and concluded by 
suggesting that they be informed by ‘indirect means’ that the Foreign Office believed that 
any tripartite reconciliation was now impossible.
The Foreign Office’s response to Bruce Lockhart’s paper had the effect of 
realigning British policy on federations. First, it was noted that there were ‘influential
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elements’ in both Britain and the United States that did want these federations to be 
directed against the Soviet Union and that the Poles had been encouraged by these 
tendencies. Second, it was noted that the main source of Soviet annoyance seemed to 
stem from the British refusal to force the Poles to accept the Curzon Line and this was 
not something that the Foreign Office was currently willing to do. Third, the opinions 
expressed back in May, which placed the blame for the failure of the talks solely with the 
Czechoslovaks, had been revised. Strang took a pragmatic view and noted on 22 October 
that, ‘The Poles must not try to hassle the Czechs, 01* take umbrage at their relations with 
the Soviet Union. The Czechs must not give the Poles the impression that they side with 
the Russians against the Poles.’ Finally, when Eden met Benes on 2 November to discuss 
this issue and the president suggested that the best solution would be for a more 
straightforward Czechoslovalc-Polish treaty of alliance designed to allay Soviet concerns 
the Foreign Secretary accepted this idea without hesitation.101
Eden sent a letter to Masaryk on 19 November approving of this course of action 
while reiterating that he remained in favour of federations and was willing to help 
facilitate them in any way possible.102 Consequently, plans were drawn up by the 
Czechoslovak exiles for just such a treaty, these were then were relayed to and discussed 
with the Poles on 20 and 23 November 1942, and a preparatory draft was completed by 
the end of the year. While both the Poles and Foreign Office accepted these proposals, 
the Soviet authorities still maintained their reserved position towards what they regarded
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as ‘Polish hostility.’103 It was these objections that ultimately proved fatal for even this 
limited bi-lateral treaty, especially when Polish-Soviet relations continued to worsen 
during 1943 and culminated in a complete cessation of all contacts by the end of April. 
Anglo-Czechoslovak relations were also be placed under immense strain by Benes’s 
decision to sign a formal treaty with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1943. The 
Foreign Office strenuously objected to this idea as soon as it was informed of this plan, 
principally because of the negative effects that it would have on the Poles.104
In fact, the Foreign Office had received worrying indications of a decisive break 
down in Czechoslovak-Polish relations by the start of the new year. On 1 January 1943 
the British censor intercepted and stopped a dispatch from the London correspondent of 
the New York Times that claimed that the Czechoslovak government had sabotaged the 
federation project on Moscow’s orders, and it was believed that the Poles had planted the 
story.105 The Czechoslovak government was also becoming frustrated by the situation and 
Roberts noted that the ‘Czechs were fed up with their awkward position between the 
Poles and the Russians.’106 Sikorski was in Washington at this time and after his 
interview with Lord Halifax, a Central Department official, E. D. Allen, noted,
We have recently heard from a most secret source, purporting to represent 
the views of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, that General Sikorski is 
known to be very dissatisfied with the Czechs owing to what is described
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as their withdrawal from the Polish-Czech Confederation. The General 
describes Dr Benes’s new proposal for a 20 years pact as a step backwards 
and has been saying that the British Foreign Office favour it.107
Yet in spite of these rumours when Eden met Benes again on the 29 January he urged 
him to continue with negotiations and assured him that he would ask the British 
Ambassador in Moscow, Sir A. Clark Kerr, to discuss the matter as soon as possible.108 
Clark Kerr duly met with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, on the 25 
February and was told that his position on the question of federations was ‘reserved.’109 
Consequently the Central Department made the fateful decision in early March to ‘keep 
the present confederation schemes on ice’ and to wait until Polish-Soviet relations had 
improved.110
Of course the Central Department had no way of knowing that such an 
improvement would never materialise. The revelations regarding the mass graves of 
Polish officers at Katyn that emerged on 12 April, the subsequent cessation of diplomatic 
relations between the Poles and the Soviets, on 25 April, and Slkorsld’s death on 4 July 
(his successor was Stanislaw Mikolajczyk) meant that these plans were never revived.111 
These events also had a disastrous effect on Anglo-Polish co-operation, which had been 
heavily dependant on Sikorski’s own personal relations with Churchill and never
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recovered after his death.'12 What hope there was of reviving bi-lateral negotiations was 
undermined by the actions of the usually pliant Czechoslovak State Council. On 19 May 
1943 it issued a strongly worded resolution that attacked the Polish interpretation of 
events at Katyn as ‘anti-Soviet propaganda’. It also denounced the Polish government’s 
failure to renounce the annexation of Czechoslovak territory carried out after Munich 
(that is Tesin) and its continued support for anti-Benes’s elements in Britain; as a result 
all talks between the two governments were halted.113 Any possibility that they might 
recommence ended with the conclusion of a Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty in December 
1943, to which the Poles were invited to accede. Although sporadic contacts continued, 
the political gulf that now divided the Polish and Czechoslovak governments in London 
proved too broad to be bridged, even though the Foreign Office continued to try.114
Apportioning blame for the failure of this federative project and the British 
policy that supported it is difficult; certainly all those who were involved - the 
Czechoslovaks, Poles, British and the Soviets - must all share some of the responsibility. 
It should also be noted that while the Poles had adopted a hostile approach in their 
dealings with the Soviet Union, for understandable reasons, and the Czechoslovaks had 
pursued a more conciliatory attitude for their own reasons, ultimately both policies 
conflicted with the Great Powers’ perceptions of their wider strategic interests. For the 
Poles this meant conflict with the Soviet Union, the occupation of their state and the 
forcible imposition of the Communist ‘Lublin Committee.’ For the Czechoslovaks their 
attempts to establish workable and friendly relations with Moscow resulted in their being
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113 St’ovlcek & Valenta, (eds), Ceskoslovensko-polska jednani o konfederaci, pp335-339.
114 Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pp676-677.
viewed by elements within the Foreign Office as an ‘ignominious Muscovite vassal.’115 
Even Masaryk later admitted to Roberts that the Czechoslovak exiles were being 
increasingly regarded in some quarters as ‘Stalin’s messenger boys.’116 Little 
consideration was given to the fact that Benes’s position was largely influenced by an 
understandable desire to avoid the same mistakes the Poles had made, especially after the 
Red Army crossed Czechoslovakia’s eastern frontiers in 1944. In the final analysis, and 
given the historical relations between the Czechoslovaks and the Poles and the deep 
tradition of mutual hostility that existed between the Poles and the Soviets these 
federative plans were probably overly optimistic from the outset. If nothing else these 
failures reinforced the belief of many in the Foreign Office that attempts to undertake 
long-term post-war plans, while the future remained uncertain and without the full 
support of all the Great Powers, were doomed to failure. Quite simply British foreign 
policy objectives in Central Europe, which had always been limited and secondary to 
national interests, had now become further subservient to wider strategic considerations.
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219
Chapter Six
Anglo-Czechoslovak-Sudeten German relations, 1939-1945.
As with so many other aspects of the Czechoslovak’s ‘six years in exile’ in 
London during the Second World War the historiography of the Sudeten German 
question during this period has been seriously distorted and mythologised by the political 
imperatives of the Cold W ar.1 As a result, various competing and contradictory accounts 
have emerged that often reflect little but the pre-conceptions and partisan viewpoints of 
their respective authors.2 These debates still continue and have sharply polarised opinions 
while hindering the formation of any balanced and objective conclusions over this issue.3 
Consequently the Sudeten German question remains a sensitive and controversial 
problem in Europe even today. More important in this context, it was an issue in which 
the British government and Foreign Office played an important role between 1939 and 
1945.
1 As defined by C. Buffet, & B. Heuser (eds), Haunted by History. Myths in International Relations, 
London, 1998, p ix.
2 For the Sudeten German interpretation of events see for example, D. Brandes, Der Weg zur Vertreibung
1938-1945. Plane und Entscheidungen zum ‘transfer’ der Deutschen aus der Tschecho-Slowakei und aus 
Polen, Munich, 2001, W. Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, London, 1963, W. Turnwald, Documents on 
the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, Munich, 1953 & A. De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, London, 1979. 
Some Czech authors have also wholeheartedly accepted these interpretations see M. Churan, Postupim a 
Ceskoslovensko. Mytus a skutecnost, Prague 2001. Many British historians have now accepted these 
accounts at face value. See M Burleigh, The Third Reich. A New History, London, 2000, pp798-799, N. 
Davies, Europe. A History, London, 1996, pl060 & fn. 5 on p 1170. M. Mazower, Dark Continent. 
Europe’s Twentieth Century, London, 1999, pp220-221& fn. 12-13 on p 449. For the Czechoslovak 
version see J. Korbel, Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia: The Meaning of its History, New York, 1977,
pp 186-187, J. Mlynarik, ‘The Nationality Question in Czechoslovakia and the 1938 Munich Agreement,’ in 
N. Stone (ed.), Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and Crises 1918-1988, London, 1989, pp89-100 & J.
Nemecek, Cesta k dekretum a odsunu Nemcii, Prague 2002. For a comprehensive analysis of this issue and 
the variety of competing interpretations see E. Hahnova, Sudetonemecky problem: Obtizne s loucem s 
minulostf, Usti nad Labem, 1999.
3 M.D. Brown & E. Hahn, ‘The Sudeten Dialogues,’ Central Europe Review, 1 May 2001, Vol 3, No. 16, 
www.ce-review.org & T. Burcher, The Sudeten German Question and Czechoslovak relations since 1989, 
London, 1996.
Although the actual transfer of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia (and 
the resulting debates) are outside the scope of this thesis, relations between the Foreign 
Office and the exiled Sudeten German representatives in London during the war, 
principally with the Social Democrat leader, Wenzel Jaksch, are not. Nor is British 
involvement in the development of, and ultimate support for, plans for the post-war 
transfer of the Sudeten Germans, and this chapter will focus on these two key aspects of 
these relations. Significantly, an examination of both of these issues reveals a 
fundamental reversal in British policy towards the Sudeten German emigres in Britain 
during the war and the early acceptance of transfers as a viable solution to the complex 
relations between nation states and their constituent ethnic minorities in Central Europe.4
Moreover, differing attitudes within the Foreign Office and the British 
government as a whole towards the Sudeten German question also had a wider effect on 
Anglo-Czechoslovak relations. This was because a small, but significant, group within 
the Central Department maintained close links with some of these anti-Fascist democratic 
Sudeten Germans and sought to encourage the Czechoslovak authorities to incorporate 
these exiles into their political organs abroad. This was not only in order to attempt to 
create a unified political body in exile that was representative of all the constituent 
peoples of the former Czechoslovak Republic; but also because they felt that Britain had 
a moral and a financial obligation toward these German refugees, and because it was felt 
that they might provide a convenient political counter-weight to a government led by
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4 The word transfer was the term used in Article XIII of the Potsdam Declaration of August 1945 to 
describe the post-war removal of the Sudeten German populations from Czechoslovakia. For clarity this 
thesis will confine itself to the use of the term transfer, as opposed to expulsion or ethnic cleaning. See 
Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, 2 August 1945, London, 1947, pi 3.
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Benes.5 There were other officials in the Foreign Office who were less sympathetically 
disposed towards these Sudeten Germans exiles and therefore less inclined to offer them
f i  *this level of support. While this group had less of an impact on British policy toward the 
Sudeten Germans during the first three years of the conflict, these positions were actually 
reversed after 1942.
As a result, throughout the long drawn out process of granting official recognition 
to Benes and his government the British authorities consistently refused to grant them 
any jurisdiction over the Sudeten Germans in Britain, at least until these had been offered 
adequate representation in the Czechoslovak State Council.7 Not surprisingly, this was an 
issue that proved to be a source of tension between the two parties, principally because 
many Czechoslovaks felt that the Sudeten Germans had received preferential treatment in 
Britain, especially in relation to the monies distributed by the Czech Refugee Trust 
Fund.8 Yet even while the British maintained reservations on this question, and some 
officials within the Central Department openly supported certain Sudeten German exiles, 
plans were also being considered within the Foreign Office for the large scale transfer of 
this minority from Czechoslovakia after the war. It is also worth noting that that the
5 FO 371 30835 C6867/326/12 Roberts to Nichols, 17 July 1942, HO 294/39 on origins of British 
Committee for Refugees from Czecho-Slovakia, October 1938 to June 1939 & HO 294/44 establishment of 
Czech Refugee Trust Fund, June 1939.
6 Most notably Sir Robert Vansittart, see FO 371 30834 C6447/326/12 Vansittart to Eden, 10 May & 4 
June 1942. Also Robert Bruce Lockhart, see FO 371 30834 C6447/326/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum 
on Jaksch to Eden, 14 June 1942.
7 On this issue see FO 371 24289 C7646/2/12 Strang memorandum on talks with Benes, 21 June 1940, 
C8466/2/12 Makins minute, 1 August 1940 and C8159/2/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum, 4 August 1940. 
FO 371 24291 C8917/534/12 Bruce Lockhart minute on discussions between Benes and Jaksch, 17 October 
1940. See also FO 371 26392 C 13260/639/12 Nichols letter to Central Department, 28 November 1941.
8 FO 371 24364 C3626/1419/62, Foreign Office memorandum on Inter-Departmental meeting on Czech 
Refugee Trust Fund, 7 March 1940 & HO 294/50 British Committee Executive and General Committee 
Minutes, 27 July 1939.
legacy of the Munich Agreement was closely tied into these tripartite relations, especially 
for Benes, and its revocation was one of his central objectives in exile.9
These seemingly contradictory positions were entirely representative of the 
Foreign Office’s often ambiguous stance on the Sudeten German question during the war. 
This was a result of the differing views on this issue held by different groups within 
Whitehall, contradictions that were only finally resolved in early 1945, by which time the 
British authorities had finally withdrawn their assistance for Jaksch and had openly 
declared their support for the ‘principle of transfers.’10 This was a solution that Jaksch 
and his colleagues had consistently rejected ever since Benes had first officially proposed 
it in May 1941.11 Benes and the newly established Czechoslovak government finally 
secured international agreement for the transfer of the Sudeten Germans from 
Czechoslovakia during the Potsdam Conference in August 1945 and the transfers 
themselves were duly undertaken, under international supervision, between 1945 and 
1947.12
Anglo-Czechoslovak-Sudeten German relations during the ‘six years in exile’ can 
be divided up into several distinct phases. The first lasted between early 1939 and late 
1941 and was marked by open British support for Jaksch (albeit with some dissent) and 
close contacts between Benes and the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party, which 
included the offer of several seats for their representatives on the recently established
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Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948, Princeton, 1973, p334.
10 FO 371 30834 C6671/326/12 Eden memorandum to War Cabinet on Anglo-Czechoslovak relations, 2 
July 1942 & C6671/326/12 Nichols to Benes, 7 July 1942.
11 Contained in Benes’s lecture at the Alliance Fran9aise, Manchester on 17 May 1941 as reported in the 
Central Europe Obsen>er, 30 May 1941.
12 R. Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans. A Study in Czech-German Relations, 1933-1962, 
London, 1964 & pp279-292 & T. Stanek, Odsun Nemcu z Ceskoslovensko, Prague, 1991, pp 169-239.
Czechoslovak State Council. The second phase was largely confined to 1942 and 1943. 
During this period British support for Jaksch ebbed and was decisively curtailed by 
Britain’s repudiation of the Munich Agreement in August 1942, Negotiations between 
Benes and Jaksch were also suspended at this time, as a result of Reinhard Heydrich’s 
assassination and the destruction of Lidice, after which the offer of seats on the Council 
was suspended (and effectively rescinded), apparently at the insistence, and with the 
agreement, of the resistance movements in the Protectorate. Instead, other Sudeten 
German representatives in London, most notably members of the Communist party, who 
were more supportive of the transfer scheme, were given seats on the Council.13 Jaksch 
and his colleagues were thus effectively marginalised by Benes during this period, as 
were their supporters in the Foreign Office.
The final phase of these relations lasted between 1944 and the end of the war. By 
the beginning of 1944 Jaksch’s support within the Foreign Office dissipated even further 
as by this stage Britain and the other Great Powers had all agreed to the ‘principle of 
transfers.’ These developments effectively ended any possibility of autonomy for the 
Sudeten Germans in a re-constructed Czechoslovak state, which was Jaksch’s preferred 
option. Even so, from the late summer of 1944 onwards Jaksch’s opposition to the 
transfer issue did elicit support from several British MPs, but his contacts with the 
Foreign Office effectively ended when Frank Roberts was posted to Moscow in January 
1945.14 Therefore between 1939 and 1945 British policy on the Sudeten German 
question can be shown to have undergone a dramatic reversal. This change in policy
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13 E. Wiskemann, Germany's Eastern Neighbours, Oxford, 1956, pp63-65,
14 Jaksch, Europe's Road to Potsdam, p398.
culminated in British support for the wholesale transfer of the Sudeten Germans from 
Czechoslovakia after the war had ended.
The history of Anglo-Czechoslovak-Sudeten German relations during this period 
began before the war had started, and developed in such a way as to give many 
Czechoslovak exiles, Benes in particular, the impression that the British authorities were 
more sympathetically disposed toward the Sudeten German emigres than toward ethnic 
Slav ones. This view was one that can now be shown to have some basis in fact and was 
focused on two main issues, the Czech Refugee Trust Fund and Britain’s refusal to allow 
Czechoslovak political emigres to exercise any jurisdiction over Sudeten German 
refugees on British soil. In the wake of the Munich Agreement significant numbers of 
former Czechoslovak citizens, of both Slav and German origin, began to leave the region 
in order to escape the Nazi regime.15 Perhaps not surprisingly these Sudeten German 
refugees received little support from the government of the Second Republic, which was 
more concerned with the significant numbers of Slav refugees from the same region. As a 
result, and largely by default, their welfare became a British responsibility. This was a 
development that was to give rise to some unforeseen consequences.
It is important to note that Britain had begun to assist these Sudeten German 
refugees to emigrate from Czechoslovakia soon after the signing of the Munich 
Agreement in September 1938. This situation was a result of a growing sense of unease 
that arose in British public opinion (and in some corners of Whitehall) over the way in 
which Czechoslovakia had been treated, even though many people had been genuinely
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15 See J. Bartos, ‘Mnichov a Ceskoslovenske pohranici' v roce 1938,’ in K. Zeleny (ed), Vyhndni Cechtt z 
pohranici, Prague, 1998, ppl6-18 & A. Glees, Exile Politics during the Second World War: The German 
Social Democrats in Britain, Oxford, 1982, pp20-21 & 29-33.
relived that war with Germany had been avoided at Czechoslovakia’s expense.16 These 
sentiments helped lay the foundations for the gradual rejection of appeasement policies 
after March 1939, the identification of the ‘Guilty Men’ of Munich and a corresponding 
sympathy for the plight of Czechs and Slovaks.17 Perhaps as a further consequence of this 
reaction to Munich a desire to assist the post-Munich state developed; firstly as a private 
venture, then later, as part of the financial remuneration package paid to the Second 
Republic as compensation for the economic dislocation and hardship caused by the
I RMunich settlement. Part of which was explicitly designed to deal with the refugee 
problem.19 After the German invasion in March 1939, and due to a dramatic increase in 
the numbers of refugees from the region arriving in Britain these monies were then 
transferred to the newly established Czech Refugee Trust Fund, this meant that the 
British authorities had a clear financial responsibility, in addition to the moral 
responsibility some officials felt was owed, towards these German refugees in Britain.20
The central reason why the Fund became such a consistent source of conflict in 
Anglo-Czechoslovak relations was because Benes and his colleagues believed that the 
Fund was principally assisting Sudeten Germans, including Jaksch, and not Czechs and 
Slovaks, and because the British refused to allow Benes or his government to have any 
say in the management of the Fund itself.21 They believed that the Fund was biased in 
favour of Sudeten German refugees and neglected ethnic Slavs, who in turn had to rely
16 R. Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, London, 1947, pp21-22.
17 See Cato, Guilty Men, London, 1940, H. Nicolson, Why Britain is at War, London, 1939 & R. W. Seton- 
Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, London, 1943, pp370-371.
18 HO 294/44 various documents on the establishment of the Czech Refugee Trust Fund, October 1938 to 
October 1939.
19 FO 371 22903 C 1720/1720/12 Annual Report on Czechoslovakia 1938, prepared by the British Embassy 
in Prague, 14 January 1939.
20 See FO 371 30834 C6590/326/12 Roberts minutes, 2 July 1942.
21 FO 371 29193 W2044/112/48 transcript of speech by Frantisek Nemec, 14 February 1941.
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on the support of the Czechoslovak legation in London, headed by Karel Lisicky.22 In 
fact, there is some evidence to support this assertion.
According to Foreign Office estimates in 1940 no more than 20 per cent of the 
former Czechoslovak citizens in Britain were in fact ethnic Slavs. The majority consisted 
of Sudeten Germans, Austrian and German refugees and Jews out of a total population of 
approximately 10,000.23 Such demographic evidence further reinforced the Central 
Department’s opinion that these people required protection from their fellow 
Czechoslovak exiles, who might discriminate against them. Moreover, the Fund’s 
predecessor, the charitable British Committee for Refugees from Czecho-Slovakia, had 
been explicitly created to mainly assist Sudeten German, Reich German and Austrian 
refugees.24 Indeed, this situation was replicated in the exiled Czechoslovak community 
in Stockholm, where Sudeten Germans also outnumbered ethnic Slavs 25 Indeed, both 
Robert Bruce Lockhart and Edward Taborsky noted in their diaries that Sudeten German 
claimants seemed to dominate the Fund.26 Therefore, even before the war had begun the 
British authorities had unintentionally placed themselves in a position where they were 
actively supporting Sudeten German refugees in Britain, in preference to other refugees 
from the former Czechoslovakia.
22 FO 371 22897 C3381/7/12 & C3548/7/12 internal Central Department minutes on continued recognition 
of Czecho-Slovak Legations, 1 6 -1 8  March 1939.
23 M. Cornwall, ‘The Rise and Fall of a ‘Special Relationship’?: Britain and Czechoslovakia, 1930-48,’ in 
B. Brivati & H. Jones (eds), Themes in Contemporary British History. ' What difference did the War 
make?’ Leicester, 1993, pp 139-140.
24 HO 294/38 various documents on the operations of the British Committee for Refugees from Czecho­
slovakia, late 1938 and early 1939.
25 FO 371 38988 C17067/17067/12 Press Reading Bureau, Stockholm, to Central Department 25 
November 1944. Detailed five-page memorandum about disputes within Czechoslovak colony in Sweden 
since the beginning of the war.
26 E. Taborsky, Pravda zvitezila. Denik druheho zahranicniho odboj, Prague, 1947, pi 43 & pp 134-135 & 
K. Young (ed), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, Vol. 2, London, 1980, p73.
This position was to become even more pronounced during the summer of 1939, 
by which time both Benes and Jaksch had settled in London and had begun their political 
work in exile, a situation that forced the Central Department to reconsider its position 
towards these two figures. While the Central Department was keen to limit Benes’s 
political activities from the outset they were less sure of how to deal with Jaksch. An 
early assessment of his objectives, passed on by the Home Office’s Aliens Department, 
noted that he had been, ‘a prominent member of the Czech Social Democratic party,’ and 
now worked to secure aid for Socialist refugees from the Sudetenlands.27 Although the 
Foreign Office had no illusions regarding the actual level of support Jaksch had enjoyed 
in Czechoslovakia, what made Jaksch such an attractive proposition for the Central 
Department were his policies 011 the future of the Sudetenlands.2s Whereas Benes made 
no secret of his desire to ultimately re-establish Czechoslovakia within her pre-1938 
borders Jaksch was an adherent of the so-called ‘Fourth Plan,’ under which the 
Sudetenlands were to be granted autonomy. He also argued that after the war the Sudeten 
Germans should be given the opportunity to decide whether they wanted to remain as part 
of Germany or rejoin any future Czechoslovak state.29 Consequently in the summer of 
1939 Jaksch’s ideas were far closer to the prevailing attitudes within the Central 
Department on the Czechoslovak question than were Benes’s, especially since there was
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27 FO 371 22904 C042/51552/12 E.N. Cooper, Home Office to R. Makins, 1 June 1939.
2S FO 371 26392 C918/639/12 Foreign Office minute 011 Sudeten German Czechoslovak negotiations, 25 
January 1941.
29 A thesis he set out in his book Was kommt nach Hitler? cited in Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, 
p348.
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little support in Whitehall for restoring Czechoslovakia to her pre-Munich form.30 This 
was a position that later evolved into a clear policy by the British government not to 
commit itself to any territorial frontiers in Central Europe during the war.31
Therefore from early 1939 onwards Foreign Office officials regarded Jaksch as a 
legitimate political representative of the thousands of Sudeten German refugees in Britain 
and someone whose views on the future of Central Europe largely paralleled their own. 
In addition, officials from the Foreign Office, Home Office and the British military had 
already been in close touch with Jaksch before March 193 9.32 Jaksch and the Sudeten 
Germans thus enjoyed a privileged position in comparison to many other Czechoslovak 
emigres in London and he was able to lobby the Central Department on questions related 
to their status in exile.33 Thus the stage was set for a contest of wills between Benes and 
Jaksch as to which of the two would be able to exert the greatest influence over British 
policy and reap the resulting political rewards.
British attitudes on this issue were deeply influenced by the widespread 
perception that Czechoslovakia had been an inherently unstable and artificial creation and 
that the Sudeten Germans had legitimate grievances concerning their treatment at the 
hands of the Czechoslovaks.34 The prevalence of such opinions was reiterated in John 
Troutbeck’s memorandum of 1 September 1939 that outlined possible British attitudes
30 L. Woodward, British Foreign policy in the Second World War, Vol.5, London, 1976, pp63-66,
31 See FO 371 24288 C6035/2/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum on possible recognition of a Czechoslovak 
Provisional Government, 12 May 1940, and accompanying minutes. See also FO 371 26394
C7992/1320/12 Eden to Benes, 18 July 1940 & FO 371 26389 C235/235/12 Roberts minutes on British 
attitude toward the Vienna Award of 1938, 10 January 1941,
32 HO 294/44 Lord Halifax to Sir Walter Layton, Honorary President of the British Committee for 
Refugees from Czecho-Slovakia, 3 November 1938 & P. Wilkinson, Foreign Fields. The Story of an SOE 
Operative, London, 1997, p58.
33 Glees, Exile politics, pp46-47.
34 K. Robbins, Politicians, Diplomacy and War in Modern British History, London, 1994, pp273-297.
towards the Czechs and Slovaks during the war. This document was widely distributed 
within the department and summarised British policy on the Czechoslovak question at the 
outset of hostilities.35 Although the memorandum was mainly concerned with the 
question of political recognition, in it Troutbeck noted that,
It is likely that we shall be pressed both by Dr Benes and a certain section 
of British opinion to proclaim the restoration of Czechoslovakia’s 
independence as one of our war aims. There are however numerous 
objections to this course...Dr Benes for his part would mean pre-Munich 
Czechoslovakia, as he is par excellence the exponent of the theory that the 
ancient Kingdom of Bohemia is indivisible. But for us to proclaim the 
restoration of Czechoslovakia as a war aim, would imply that it was our 
object to bring the Sudeten Germans back under the Czech yoke, if 
necessary by force.. ,36
Admittedly, Troutbeck also argued the case for recognition and concluded that Benes was 
probably the best person to secure the support of Czechs and Slovaks during the war, but 
his use of the phrase ‘Czech yoke’ is telling.
Consequently, with the outbreak of the war the Central Department regarded 
Jaksch as a possible counter-weight to Benes’s unpalatable political objectives and, as a 
result, Jaksch received official encouragement and support. This was not least as the
35 William Strang, the head of the Central Department, noted that, ‘This is a very useful paper with the 
conclusions of which I agree.’ FO 371 22899 C13304/7/12 Strang minute, 4 September 1939.
36 FO 371 22899 C l3304/7/12 Troutbeck Memorandum ‘Our attitude towards the Czechs and Slovaks in 
Time of War,’ 1 September 1939.
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Foreign Office retained an interest in maintaining links with anti-Fascist German groups 
in order to glean information about the situation in Germany and to be prepared for the 
possible early defeat of Nazism.37 Roger Makins made such attitudes plain in January 
1940 when he noted, ‘We are anxious for political reasons to give discreet 
encouragement to Jaksch and his organisation; they may in due course become of some 
importance to us?38 In addition, when the Home Office approached the Foreign Office to 
suggest suitable members for a committee to vet Czechoslovak emigres in Britain 
Troutbeck immediately suggested both Lisicky and Jaksch. Trout beck’s reply also 
revealed that the Foreign Office was fully aware of the tensions between the various 
Czechoslovak refugees now in London: ‘There is certain to be a good deal of ill feeling 
among all these emigres from Czecho-Slovakia, based both on personal and political 
antagonism.’39 During the first few months of the war, therefore, the Central Department 
regarded Benes and Jaksch as having equal legitimacy to represent former Czechoslovak 
citizens abroad and dealt with them accordingly. Although, the Central Department 
realised that Benes’s political experience out-weighted Jaksch’s its officials preferred to 
see the development of a united front among all the various Czechoslovak exiles in 
London and it was this objective that they now encouraged.40
Benes and Jaksch had already had several meetings to discuss their activities 
abroad, both prior to and immediately after Britain’s declaration of war on Germany. 
They had first met on 3 August 1939 with a further meeting on 3 September. Although 
their recollections of events differed somewhat, they agreed that both sides were willing
37 Glees, Exile politics, p45.
38 FO 371 24291 C534/534/12 Makins to Captain M. Jeffes, Passport Control, 12 January 1940.
39 FO 371 22901 C 13149/28/12 Troutbeck’s reply to Home Office, 8 September 1939.
40 FO 371 22899 C17089/G Strang minutes on his talk with Bruce Lockhart, 26 October 1939.
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to enter into constructive talks over the future organisation of Czechoslovakia and on 
wartime co-operation. However, their accounts disagreed over whether any plans for 
transfers had yet been formulated. If they had, which is highly questionable, Benes 
certainly did not tell Jaksch.41 Nevertheless, it seemed as if the two leaders would be able 
to work together in exile even though their ultimate objectives were mutually exclusive.
At this stage in relations both Benes and Jaksch had reason to explore possible 
grounds for co-operation, especially as neither had yet been officially recognised as 
representing any sort of political movement. It should also be noted that Benes’s political 
position was particularly weak in the autumn of 1939, not least as he had to deal with 
rivalries between himself and other Czechoslovak politicians in London and Paris.42 
Therefore he was in no position to reject Jaksch’s approaches. Nor was Jaksch in a strong 
enough position to proceed independently, especially as it was Benes who had a virtual 
monopoly on contacts with the Czechoslovak military and intelligence assets in exile.43 
Unity of action was therefore the pre-eminent consideration for both Benes and Jaksch at 
this early stage of the war and was clearly in their mutual interest. This was made clear 
by the newly appointed British liaison officer to the Czechoslovaks, Bruce Lockhart, in 
his first report to the Central Department of 5 October 1939. He stated, Tt is the intention 
of the Provisional Government [sic] to settle by its own efforts all the outstanding 
differences between Czechs and Slovaks and Sudeten Germans and to establish a united 
front before openly declaring its war aims.’44 However, this position and co-operation
41 Benes, Pameti, pp 317-319 & Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, pp356-357.
42 FO 371 22899 C l6118/7/12 Bruce Lockhart minute on internal divisions amongst the Czechoslovak 
exiles, 21 September 1938.
43 L. Otahalova & M. Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historie ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, Prague,
1966, pp 17-18.
44 FO 371 C15901/7/12 Bruce Lockhart report on Czech and Slovak exiles, 5 October 1939.
between Benes and Jaksch would not last, regardless of British hopes to the contrary.45 
The establishment of a Czechoslovak National Committee by December 1939 and further 
developments during 1940 would see Benes’s and Jaksch’s political objectives begin to 
diverge, not least as a result of actions taken by the Foreign Office itself.
The creation of the Czechoslovak National Committee had ostensibly been agreed 
to by the French and British governments simply in order to provide a measure of 
political control over the Czechoslovak soldiers and airmen who had gathered in 
France.46 Furthermore, the Central Department accepted that recognition of the National 
Committee was designed to forestall any recognition of a Czechoslovak government in 
exile.47 Although this development had the effect of enhancing Benes’s political position 
while Jaksch remained a private citizen, the form this first phase of recognition took had 
intentionally been kept to the bare minimum by the authorities in Paris and London. 
Moreover, the Committee, as constituted in late 1939, itself did not contain any Sudeten 
German representatives, only Czechs and Slovaks.48 Yet, the grudging nature of British 
recognition of Benes and his colleagues contrasted sharply with their far more supportive 
attitude towards Jaksch.
These differences were further highlighted during the first few months of 1940. 
During this period the Central Department seriously considered the possibility of 
recognising his Sudeten German Office on an equal footing with Benes’s National 
Committee. On 4 January 1940 Jaksch had requested that three of his colleagues in
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Stockholm be allowed to travel to Britain and visas were soon granted.49 In the same 
week Jaksch asked that 175 Sudeten Germans be allowed to join the British army instead 
of the Czechoslovak force gathering in France and this too was accepted without demur.50 
This was a significant development as the National Committee had earlier announced a 
general mobilisation of ail Czechoslovak exiles ‘living outside their country’ on 17 
November 1939 and under the terms of a decree issued by the French government failure 
to comply meant imprisonment.51 But the British authorities refused to allow Sudeten 
Germans to be included in this call up and in line with of Jaksch’s earlier request to allow 
them to join the British army.
The reason for this attitude was not solely due to the Foreign Office’s preference 
for Jaksch, but also because it was felt that any enhancement of the Committee’s powers 
compulsorily to recruit Czechoslovaks (especially Sudeten Germans) in Britain would be 
used by Benes to bolster his own political position.53 Although no formal announcement 
of this policy was ever made the Central Department’s position on this question was 
supported by the information they had received on the dismal conditions of the 
Czechoslovak army in France.54 The consequence of this policy was that once again it 
appeared that the British authorities were treating the Sudeten Germans more 
sympathetically than other citizens from the former Czechoslovakia.
49 FO 371 24291 C534/534/12 R. J . Stopford, Ministry of Economic Warfare to Makins, 9 January 1940.
50 FO 371 24291 C702/534/12 Jaksch to Makins, 11 January 1940.
31 FO 371 24365 C6284/1419/12 Czechoslovak memorandum on general mobilisation of Czechoslovak 
emigres, Benes to Cadogan, 26 April 1940.
52 FO 371 24287 C2683/2/12 Roberts minute, 21 February 1940.
33 FO 371 24365 C6284/1419/12 Roberts minute on Czechoslovak recruitment in Britain, 5 May 1940 & 
FO 371 24365 Cl 419/1419/62 Foreign Office memorandum on Interdepartmental meeting, 26 January 
1940 & C326/1419/62 Foreign Office memorandum on Interdepartmental meeting, 7 March 1940.
54 FO 371 24368 Cl 1125/1419/12 War Cabinet Allied Forces (Official) Sub-Committee, R.D. Coleridge 
minutes on conditions in Czechoslovak Army in France, 21 August 1940 & FO 371 24365 C6284/1419/12 
Sir Henry Bunbury, Czech Refugee Trust Fund to Home Office, 15 July 1940.
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Despite this, the British authorities also assisted a number of Czech and Slovak 
soldiers and engineers from around the world to reach the western front.55 In addition, the 
Trust Fund had agreed to pay the transportation costs for those Czechoslovaks who 
wished to travel from Britain to France in order to join the army there/6 But it was the 
fact that the British continued to treat the Sudeten Germans as a separate entity that 
infuriated the members of the National Committee. They regarded the Sudeten Germans 
as a constituent part of the former Czechoslovakia and insisted they should come under 
their jurisdiction. The Foreign Office’s attitude towards Jaksch was regarded as nothing 
less than a direct result of the continued influence of Munich over British policy, not least 
as the agreement still stood on British statute books and because Benes was determined to 
have it annulled.57
It should be noted, however, that this was an incorrect interpretation of British 
policy, even before the changes in government of May 1940/8 This was chiefly because 
the Czechoslovak question actually received very little attention in early 1940 and, 
according to Bruce Lockhart’s diaries, was not regarded as a priority.59 Admittedly policy 
towards Jaksch was a result of British obligations inherited after Munich and because, 
unlike Benes, he did not insist on the reconstruction of Czechoslovakia within her pre- 
1938 frontiers. In retrospect British support for Jaksch can be shown to have reached its 
zenith in early February 1940 when he asked the Central Department to extend the same
53 FO 371 24287 Cl 205/2/12 Strang minute on the evacuation of Czechoslovak soldiers from Hungary, 22 
January 1940.
56 FO 371 24365 C6284/1419/12 Minutes of Interdepartmental meeting at the Home Office, including 
representatives of the Czechoslovak Refugee Trust Fund and the Czechoslovak Legation in London, 15 
March 1940.
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39 Young (ed), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, p58.
level of recognition to his Sudeten German Office as had been granted to the National 
Committee.60 Although the Central Department had some reservations over the 
advisability of this course of action these were not deemed sufficiently important to 
refuse the request.61 This was a clear indication of the weight that the Foreign Office still 
attached to allowing Jaksch to act independently of Benes. In the event, however, Jaksch 
himself withdrew this request and confined himself to remaining in frequent contact with 
the Central Department over its policy towards Czechoslovakia.62 But if nothing else 
Jaksch’s request further underlined the fact that elements within the Foreign Office 
regarded him as having an equal right to political representation in exile.
The issue of unity was continually raised during talks over extending the political 
status of the Czechoslovak exiles to that of a Provisional Government, discussions that 
were only finally concluded on 21 July. Although the pace of progress on this issue was 
slow the changes in the British government in May 1940 did exert a limited influence, not 
least because Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden were more sympathetically disposed 
towards Benes than the previous administration.63 But a greater influence was exerted by 
the fact Britain now needed all the military assistance it could get, 64 and it was soon 
recognised that Benes was far better placed to provide this and it was this consideration 
that played the decisive role in the War Cabinet’s decision to grant this heightened level 
of recognition.65
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Nevertheless, when provisional status was finally granted on 21 July 1940, after 
an exchange of letters between Benes and Halifax, the Central Department maintained its 
reservations over Benes’s and his government’s jurisdiction over the Sudeten Germans in 
Britain. The unique level of autonomy that Jaksch and his colleagues had so far enjoyed 
was thus continued. Makins made this point clear on 1 August when he noted,
I’m not at all satisfied about the position as regards the Czecho-Slovak and 
Sudeten minorities in this country now that a Provisional Czecho-Slovak 
government has been recognised... I believe that the majority of Sudetens 
in this country are not Benes’s men and that Dr Benes will put the greatest 
possible amount of pressure on them. We must do our utmost to avoid 
giving facilities to Dr Benes to persecute individuals who do not accept his 
leadership.66
This was clear evidence that the change in government did not have a commensurate 
effect on the Central Department’s attitude on this question. Makins’s use of the 
hyphenated ‘Czecho-Slovakia’ was also indicative of his own disinclination to see an 
unhyphenated state reconstructed. Indeed, in response to complaints from Jaksch Makins 
returned to this question on 29 August. He noted that Benes had still not offered Jaksch 
seats on the State Council, adding, ‘perhaps Dr Benes will proceed rather more 
vigorously when he learns.. .that we do not regard the Sudeten Germans as coming in any 
way under his jurisdiction until he has made progress with Sudeten democratic leader in
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this country.’67 Although Benes resented these demands, principally because he felt all 
the allied governments in London suffered from a certain amount of disunity (especially 
the Poles) he had little choice but to accede to them.68 Jaksch had also been made aware 
of the Foreign Office’s position.69 Consequently by October 1940 Benes had offered both 
Milan Hodza and Jaksch places on the Czechoslovak State Council.70 It seemed therefore, 
that by the end of 1940 the Central Department had succeeded in securing a prominent 
position for the Sudeten German exiles in Britain within the Czechoslovak ‘action 
abroad.’
In fact, Jaksch would never take his seat in the Council and by the beginning of 
1941 Benes had begun to develop plans for the post-war transfer of a sizeable proportion 
of the German minority from any reconstructed Czechoslovak state; plans that he and his 
government began to disseminate across the media and to the Foreign Office. By the end 
of 1942 all contacts between Benes and Jaksch ended and the latter’s support within the 
Foreign Office had been seriously eroded. Just how was such a dramatic reversal of 
British policy possible? In part it was the result of two documents produced in early 
1940, the first by Jaksch and the second by the Foreign Office’s own research 
department, based at Balliol College, Oxford.
In March 1940 the Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social 
Democratic Party produced a policy statement, the so-called ‘Loughton Declaration,’ that 
was entirely indicative of the strong political position they enjoyed at this time. It called
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for any future Czechoslovak State to be organised along federal lines and for the Sudeten 
Germans to be granted ‘regional autonomy with their own provincial government.’71 
When combined with Jaksch’s insistence that the Sudeten Germans should still be 
allowed to decide whether they remain part of greater Germany, comments that he 
repeated in later speeches, it was apparent that such policies would have been hard to 
reconcile with Benes’s plans for Czechoslovakia.72 Even if the ever-pragmatic Benes had 
agreed to such drastic concessions (which is debatable) it is highly unlikely that his 
fellow exiles or the population in the Protectorate would have followed suit. Indeed it 
was largely as a result of pressure from these quarters that Benes finally severed all ties 
with Jaksch at the end of 1942.73
Furthermore, Jaksch’s intransigence on these issues may well have been re­
enforced by his belief that he had the wholehearted support of the Foreign Office and that 
British reservations over the re-construction of Czechoslovakia meant that there was an 
opportunity to re-negotiate the Sudeten Germans’ position within it.74 But his faith in 
British assistance proved to be misplaced, especially because of the growing anti-German 
feelings amongst the British public as the war progressed, which led after June 1940 to 
the widespread internment of foreigners in Britain.75 Jaksch’s abrasive style also caused 
problems within his own party and a splinter group led by Josef Zinner eventually broke 
away on 18 October 1940. It was these opponents who would later provide Benes with
71 Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, p359.
72 See Jaksch, Was kommt nach Hitler? p i6 cited in Benes, Pameti, pp483-484.
73 FO 371 24289 C8159/2/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum, 7 August 1940 & Luza, The Transfer of the 
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more pliant Sudeten Germans to include in the State Council.76 In effect JaksclTs policies 
in 1940 and his reliance on support from the Foreign Office meant that any negotiated 
settlement with Benes and the Provisional Government would become increasingly 
unlikely, especially when Benes’s political fortunes began to eclipse those of Jaksch.77
The second key document from this period emerged from a number of meetings 
and seminars Benes attended in early 1940. It was from these sessions that the first clear 
proposals for the post-war transfer of the Sudeten German minority would emerge, 
ironically produced by the Foreign Office’s own research department. The concept of 
population transfers was not a new one; Greco-Bulgarian and Greco-Turkish exchanges 
of populations had been carried out under the auspices of the League of Nations in the 
1920s.78 Benes was aware of these events and there is some evidence to suggest that he 
had considered transfers as far back as September 1938.79 The Nazi regime had also 
made use of population transfers, not only of ethnic Germans; plans had been drawn up 
for the expulsion of all the Czechs from the Protectorate.80 It is open to speculation, 
however, as to why Benes should have begun to consider this question in early 1940. It 
may have been a result of the inactivity of the ‘Phoney War’ period when people had the 
time to ponder the contours of a future Europe, plans for post-war federations were also
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popular at this time. But it is more likely that developments within the Protectorate 
itself were the cause.
The antagonism generated by the Nazi regime in Bohemia and Moravia soon 
translated into widespread support, amongst many Czechs, for the transfer of the German 
population after the war. These were sentiments shared by those soldiers and airmen who 
had escaped to France and then on to Britain. They also predominated amongst the 
various resistance groups within the Protectorate and these views were soon transmitted 
to the exiles in London. At this stage there is no evidence that the Foreign Office had 
even considered the possibility of post-war transfers or were aware of the sympathy for 
this option in the Protectorate and given their continued support for Jaksch they seemed 
an unlikely proposition.
It was in a speech to the Royal Society on 22 January 1940 that Benes first raised 
the possibility of transfers as a solution to Czechoslovakia’s minority problems.83 He 
returned to this issue during a conference at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 
Oxford on 8 March, where he stated the necessity of undertaking some limited internal 
and external transfers of Sudeten Germans combined with border rectifications. This 
would create more compact Sudeten German areas in western and northern Bohemia who 
might then be granted their own c local government.’ These suggestions were well 
received by his British audience, possibly to Benes’s surprise.84 This was a significant
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development, as this question now became the subject of a research memorandum 
produced by the Foreign Press and Research Bureau (FPRB), an organisation staffed by 
members of Royal Institute of Foreign affairs, including Professor Arnold Toynbee, and 
funded by the Foreign Office.85
Written by John David Mabbott and entitled The Transfer o f Minorities, it was 
completed in late May 1940.86 Crucially Mabbott’s memorandum not only suggested that 
transfers were indeed possible, based on evidence from previous exchanges of 
populations between Greece and Turkey and supported by Hitler’s own opinions on the 
subject, but concluded that it was probably the best solution to Czechoslovakia’s ethnic 
minority problems. (He also examined the feasibility of undertaking transfers in other 
European countries such as Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, 
the Soviet Union and Italy87). He went on to set out a clear framework in which transfers 
might occur, including an assessment of the social and financial costs of such an 
operation. Lastly, and most importantly, he concluded that such a large-scale transfer 
would have to be undertaken with international consent and co-operation.88 A meeting 
was convened to consider Mabbott’s paper on 24 May 1940; it included Toynbee and 
Robert W. Seton Watson among others, and concluded that,
While there was general agreement that views for and against transfer
must be given due consideration, it was held that it was not the business of
55 See C. Brewin, ‘Arnold Toynbee and Chatham House,’ in A. Bosco & C. Navari (eds), Chatham House 
and British Foreign Policy 1919-1945, London, 1994, pp 135-161.
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Mr. Mabbott and his advisers to suggest policy. Their object should be to 
get an agreed memorandum if possible...an account of varying views on 
the principle of transfer, but not a recommendation to adopt any one of 
them.89
Mabbott’s memorandum did not constitute an outline of British policy at this stage, but it 
was the first clearly defined and coherent attempt to examine just how feasible such post­
war transfers of ethnic Germans from Central Europe might be.
There is no evidence to indicate who might have commissioned this paper, but its 
importance lies in the fact that it was the first of a number of such memoranda on 
transfers written by Mabbott, later versions of which were forwarded to the Foreign 
Office and were widely distributed.90 Eventually an Inter-Departmental Committee on the 
Transfer of German populations, chaired by Troutbeck, was formed to consider this 
question further in December 1943.91 The significance of Mabbott’s memorandum was 
further heightened by the fact that Seton Watson handed a copy of this paper to Benes 
(even though it was clearly marked secret) and several distinct similarities between it and 
Benes’s later plans can be identified. However, a direct correlation between these two 
documents has yet to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; but it seems reasonable to 
suggest that Benes used Mabbott’s paper as a guide on how to construct a credible policy 
on transfers that would have been acceptable to the British authorities.
89 SEW 13/1/1 R.W. Seton Watson Archives, SSEES, notes on meeting held to consider J.D. Mabbott’s 
paper, 24 May 1940, p 5.
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It should be made clear, however, that the subsequent evolution of a policy on 
transfers was driven by the exiles themselves and not by the Foreign Office. Nor was it 
developed by Benes in isolation, but was refined by other politicians in exile such as Dr 
Ladislav Feierabend, General Sergej Ingr, Jaromlr Necas and Hubert Ripka. 92 Moreover 
these plans enjoyed wide cross party support amongst the exiles in both London and 
Moscow and, even more importantly, the population and resistance movements in the 
Protectorate. This was a significant factor as Benes’s legitimacy in exile was largely 
dependent on their support. If his policies diverged too radically from those opinions 
expressed in the Protectorate, he risked losing their political support on his return home, 
and Benes was far too experienced a politician to take such a risk. Thus the plans for 
transfers were developed with close reference to these influences. Bruce Lockhart and 
later Ambassador Philip Nichols kept the British authorities informed of these developing 
ideas, but the plans themselves were developed within the exiled government itself and 
the Foreign Office had then to react to each new development.
There is no evidence to suggest that the Central Department was aware of these 
emerging plans until October 1940 when Benes told Bruce Lockhart that he had decided 
that, for any post-war federal arrangements to succeed, the renewed Czechoslovak state 
would have to be as ethnically ‘homogenous as possible.’ Benes suggested that this might 
be achieved through a combination of internal and external transfers of the Sudeten 
German minority along with some limited border modifications.93 Yet this relatively
02 For an outline of Benes’s developing plans on transfers see Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans, 
pp 228-249, K. Novotny (ed), Edvard Benes. Odsim nemcu z Ceskoslovensko, Prague, 1996 & H. Ripka, 
The Future of the Czechoslovak Germans, London, 1944.
93 FO 371 24289 C l0776/2/12 Robert Bruce Lockhart memorandum on discussion with Benes regarding 
Czechoslovak-Polish co-operation and post-war planning, 7 October 1940.
restrained policy of limited transfers combined with territorial readjustments, which 
Bruce Lockhart duly reported to the Foreign Office, was not the only solution under 
consideration. On 30 November 1940 in a conversation with Latham, of the Foreign 
Office’s Political Intelligence Department, Benes went further and indicated that he 
wanted to remove up to two thirds of the Sudeten German population, through 
deportations and frontier modifications.94 Whichever statement represented the most 
accurate summation of Benes’s and his government’s views one thing was clear by late 
1940; plans for a significant transfer of the ethnic German population were now firmly on 
the agenda.
Given the Department’s continuing support for Jaksch they might have been 
expected to reject such a scheme out of hand. But at this stage of the war Czechoslovak- 
Polish negotiations on a possible federal state continued, plans the Foreign Office overtly 
encouraged, and both countries had large German minorities that would have to be ‘dealt 
with’ in one way or another. It is open to speculation whether Benes introduced the 
concept of transfers within the context of current talks with the Poles in order to secure 
British agreement on the former because of their support for the latter. It is certainly a 
possibility. What was interesting about the Central Department’s immediate response to 
these proposals was that, on the whole, they regarded them as being plausible and worthy 
of further consideration.
Roberts noted that it was difficult to know at this stage in the war what would be 
possible later. As a result he concluded that, ‘The whole problem bristles with difficulties 
and the solution will depend upon the extent to which Germany is defeated...’ Makins
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rejected the proposals as ‘exaggerated,’ but agreed with Roberts that it would be difficult 
to reach any definitive conclusions at this time. Strang, however, was more forthcoming, 
‘M. Benes’s ideas [on transfers] have a good deal to commend them...there will be no 
peace for the new Czech state unless the German minority are swept right out of it...’ 
Cadogan also initialled the paper, although without comment.95 These responses might at 
first seem curious, but they were essentially a result of the Foreign Office’s realisation 
that at this stage in the war, when Europe’s future was still so uncertain, it would be 
sensible to keep the largest number of policy options open. Crucially though, the concept 
of transfers was not dismissed.
The development of these preparatory plans further illustrated just how deeply 
Benes’s political tactics influenced the formation of British policy on the Sudeten 
German question. Although Benes’s thoughts had not yet crystallised into firm policy 
proposals, his utterances to Bruce Lockhart can be viewed as a means of communicating 
his thoughts, unofficially, to the Foreign Office in order for him to assess their reactions. 
This was a technique he would use again when trying to ascertain Eden’s views on 
transfers in January 1942.96 Given the radical implications of these suggestions, the 
international situation at that time and the Provisional Government’s political position 
Benes’s cautious approach was understandable. As Benes had previously demonstrated, 
he was quite capable of pursuing two quite separate objectives and of modifying his aims 
and policies in correlation to his perception of the relative strength of his political 
position, negotiating techniques were to earn him a reputation as an awkward customer
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within the Central Department.97 Nevertheless by the end of 1940 Benes had succeeded 
in raising the question of transfers with the British and had thus begun to undermine 
Jaksch’s preferred option of autonomy for the Sudetenlands. Having said that, the British 
government still refused to discuss any post-war frontiers in Central Europe, still refused 
to allow the Provisional Czechoslovak government to exert any jurisdiction over the 
Sudeten Germans in Britain and had not, as yet, officially renounced the Munich 
Agreement.
Throughout the first six months of the following year Benes and his government 
continued to advance their plans for transfers and to promote them in the wider public 
sphere. A series of internal memoranda, speeches and published articles set out their 
tentative plans for internal and external transfers, border modifications and the retention 
of a much-reduced Sudeten German population.98 As had been previously stated these 
developments were purely an internal Czechoslovak matter and although the Central 
Department was kept informed they made no official statements on them, nor, at this 
stage were they asked to.99 By contrast Jaksch made his opposition to these emerging
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plans plain to the Central Department in January 1941, but his actions could not compete 
with the Czechoslovak government’s far more successful propaganda campaign.100
The Central Department also maintained their insistence that Jaksch should be 
incorporated into the State Council, even though this had now become politically 
impossible for the Czechoslovak exiles in London. Benes had previously reneged on his 
promise to offer Jaksch seats on the State Council 011 11 December 1940, citing pressure 
from within his own government, but limited contacts between the two men continued. 
However, Benes and Jaksch’s respective political positions had altered once more by the 
summer of 1941. Whereas the Foreign Office had previously regarded the two men as 
equally worthy of representation in 1939 and 1940, by the time of the German invasion of 
the Soviet Union, it was realised that Benes controlled more assets of value to the British 
war effort than did Jaksch. Consequently, it gradually became apparent that British 
requests that Jaksch be included in the State Council would remain unfulfilled.
It was these considerations that began slowly to undermine Jaksch’s standing with 
the Foreign Office. The situation was further complicated by a growing disinclination 
amongst the Czechoslovak exiles in Britain and the population in the Protectorate to enter 
into any sort of political co-operation with the Sudeten Germans, regardless of British 
wishes to the contrary. Thus, the more secure Benes’s political position became the less 
inclined, or able, he was to give way to these requests. The Central Department, however, 
persevered with its previous policy of supporting Jaksch long after he could have 
possibly been regarded as an asset.101
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These diverging attitudes were reinforced by four important events in 1941, The 
first was a keynote speech by Konrad Henlein (the leader of the Fascist Sudeten 
Germans) in the Protectorate on 4 March 1941, in which he celebrated the destruction of 
Czechoslovakia at Munich and admitted that this had been his ultimate objective in 1938, 
a confession that fatally damaged the cause of autonomy for the Sudetenlands, as Jaksch
i n n
himself later admitted. As a result, when Benes asked the resistance in the Protectorate 
whether they would accept Sudeten German participation in the ‘action abroad’ they 
responded that it would be unacceptable.103 Benes shared this conclusion with Jaksch on 
22 September.104 The second was the appointment of Reinhard Heydrich as Reich 
Protector of Bohemia and Moravia on 27 September 1941.105 His declaration of a state of 
emergency and the wave of arrests and executions that followed his arrival hardened the 
resolve of the resistance and the population that post-war transfers were the only solution 
to the Sudeten German question. Consequently, even if Benes had wanted to co-operate 
with Jaksch, this was increasingly unlikely in the face of this mounting hostility from his 
own colleagues in exile and the resistance at home. Ultimately, this pressure would mean 
that any co-operation with Jaksch would become politically impossible, especially after 
Heydrich’s death in June 1942 and the resulting German retribution. But even these 
events did not stop the Foreign Office from continuing to insist that Jaksch should be 
allowed to join the State Council.106
102 Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, pp363-364.
103 Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans, pp231-232.
104 Benes, Pameti, p321 & Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, pp364-365.
10:1 See Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, On the Reign Of Terror in Bohemia and Moravia under 
the Regime of Reinhard Heydrich, London, 1942, Rhode, ‘The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,’ in 
Mamatey & Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp269-321 & C. MacDonald, The Killing 
of Obergruppenfiihrer Reinhard Heydrich, New York, 1989, pp 107-111.
106 See for example FO 371 30835 Cl 1650/326/12 Roberts minute on Czechoslovak-Sudeten German 
relations, 24 November 1942.
Third, that the delicate balance that seemed to have been achieved between the 
three parties by the summer of 1941 was disturbed by the announcement of the ‘Atlantic 
Charter’ in August. This was the first attempt by Britain and the United States to provide 
a framework of war-aims, something that the British authorities had so far been at pains 
to avoid.107 Indeed, Czechoslovak and Polish reactions to the Charter underlined the 
advisability of this British policy.108 The Charter seemed to provide an opportunity for 
Jaksch to try and further secure his, and the Sudeten German’s position in the face of 
developing plans for transfers. He felt that Article 2 of the Charter protected the Sudeten 
Germans against forcible transfers, although he accepted that internal transfers might be 
necessary to create more ethnically homogenous Sudeten German areas in the post-war 
Republic.109 Jan Masaryk voiced his concerns regarding the Charter to Roberts on 27 
August, stating that ‘Many Czechs had, however, been seriously perturbed and a message 
had come in from Prague asking whether the Declaration foreshadowed new ‘Henlein 
plebiscites.’110 These comments further illustrated the unease with which the home 
population regarded the Sudeten Germans’ international position. Thus when the 
Czechoslovaks came to accede to the terms of the Charter on the 29 August 1941 they 
maintained their own reservations about the Sudeten Germans’ rights to ‘self- 
determination’ at the expense of an independent Czechoslovak state, a point Benes
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reiterated in a letter to Jaksch on 1 December 1942.m He had no intention of allowing 
the Charter’s fine words to be used by Jaksch as a means of political leverage, and, in the 
event they were not.
Jaksch’s relations with both the Foreign Office and the Czechoslovak government 
in exile were further affected by the Soviet Union’s entrance into the war in June 1941, 
the fourth and final important event of that year, principally because it heralded another 
enhancement of Benes’s and his government’s political position. In fact, Jaksch’s own 
position might have become totally untenable had it not been for the Foreign Office’s 
continued sponsorship of him. Taken collectively these events subtly shifted the political 
balance in favour of Benes’s and his government’s plan for transfers and away from 
Jaksch’s preferred option of autonomy for the Sudetenlands. Moreover, Benes had re­
opened negations with the Foreign Office on the subject of full de jure recognition in 
April 1941.
Even so, the British authorities retained their reservations over frontiers, juridical 
continuity and the Czechoslovak government’s jurisdiction over the Sudeten Germans.112 
Conversely these were the very points that Benes most wanted to be revised and the very 
ones that ‘protected’ Jaksch and his colleagues. So even when the Foreign Office agreed 
fully to recognise the Czechoslovak government in exile they continued to treat the 
Sudeten German refugees in Britain as a separate case, much to Benes’s annoyance.113 
The way with which this issue was dealt led to a highly duplicitous situation, in which
111 FO 371 26423 C9796/14/62 Roberts minute on Czechoslovak acceptance of the terms of the Atlantic 
Charter, 29 August 1941, FO 371 30841 Cl 163/3269/12 Nichols to Eden, 16 November 1942, copy of 
Benes’s speech to State Council on 12 November 1942, Benes, Pameti, pp465-466 & Luza, The Transfer 
of the Sudeten Germans, p231.
112 FO 371 26394,07992/1320/12, Letter granting full recognition to a Czechoslovak Government in exile 
from Eden to Masaryk, 18 July 1941.
113 Nemecek, et ai (eds), Ceslcoslovensko-sovetshe vztahy, Vol. I,pp212-214.
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these reservations would be kept secret from the public in Britain and the Protectorate 
during and even after the war. The problem concerned the final paragraph of Eden’s letter 
of recognition, which read,
... pending a outcome of the discussions which I understand have been 
proceeding for some time past between our Government and certain 
Sudeten leaders in London, His Majesty’s Government feel themselves 
obliged to reserve the position as regards the exercise of jurisdiction in 
British territory over certain categories of former Czechoslovak 
nationals.114
Of course, this passage referred to Jaksch and his nomination to the State Council, and 
was consistent with Britain’s position on this issue. Although Benes had little choice but 
to accede to these terms he protested at the inclusion of this passage. According to Bruce 
Lockhart’s memoirs when presented with Eden’s letter Benes replied, ‘There is a mistake 
in the last paragraph,’ to which Bruce Lockhart added, There was, but it was soon 
altered.’113
Thus the final signing of the Anglo-Czechoslovak agreement was delayed until 
the 30 July and, although this reservation stood, during a lunch time meeting at Claridges 
Eden agreed that this passage would not appear in public.116 This was a concession that
114 Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politik)>, Vol. 1, pp247-248.
113 Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p i20.
116 Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Doknmenty z historie ceskoslovenskepolitiky, Vol. 1, pp255-256. See 
also Benes, Sest let exilu, p459-456, Taborsky, The Czechoslovak Cause in International Law, p95, Zizka 
(ed), Bojujici Ceskoslovensko, pp89-90. All of which can y the edited version of Eden’s letter. See also FO 
371 30834 C2945/326/12 Foreign Office memorandum on Czechoslovak-Sudeten German relations, 23 
March 1942.
Benes readily accepted and he noted that ‘It shows that even with the English it pays 
never to give in.’117 The passage was not included in the published version of Eden’s 
letter nor were its terms promoted and even the Czechoslovak State Council was not 
informed of its existence. Jaksch, however, was. Nevertheless, this episode clearly 
illustrated the complex and confused position that the Foreign Office had managed to 
find itself in over the Sudeten German question by the summer of 1941.
Although this series of events had undermined Jaksch’s position by late 1941, 
certain members of the Central Department, principally Makins and Roberts, continued to 
offer him assistance and support. This is clear evidence of the increasingly divergent 
attitudes that existed within the Foreign Office over the Sudeten German question. Two 
cases in particular illustrate this point. The first concerned the Central Department’s 
assistance in transporting some of Jaksch’s colleagues from Sweden to Britain and the 
second his access to the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) radio broadcasts to 
occupied Europe.
In November 1941 the Secretary General of the Sudeten German Social 
Democratic Party, Ernest Paul, was flown in from Stockholm to attend a conference in 
Britain using an air service operated by the Special Operations Executive (SOE). 
According to Jaksch’s memoirs this was achieved with the explicit help and support of 
the Foreign Office.158 It is now clear that SOE was in contact with Jaksch, had 
conscripted a number of Sudeten German recruits for special training and had used his
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contacts in Sweden to establish a courier route to Germany and the Sudetenland.159 In 
early 1942, however, Roberts passed on a request to SOE that Paul be transported back to 
Stockholm. This episode is of particular interest because Peter Wilkinson, head of SOE’s 
Czech section, queried this application. In a meeting with Roberts on 20 January 
Wilkinson was told that the Foreign Office had agreed to Paul’s return and that he should 
be allowed to undertake the return journey in order to ‘save the FO losing face.’120 He 
then went further and explained that in the event of the sudden collapse of the Third 
Reich these Sudeten German refugees were regarded as being politically useful and that it 
was official Foreign Office policy to support the Sudeten German Social Democrats in 
exile.121 This explanation seemed to go much further than officially stated policy and 
appeared to view the Sudetenlands and their inhabitants as clearly distinct from the rest of 
Czechoslovakia.
As SOE had recently undertaken a series of operations to the Protectorate together 
with Czechoslovak military intelligence Wilkinson was ‘appalled’ that Roberts expected 
him to keep quiet about this arrangement.122 This was something he would have been 
unable to do, since the Czechoslovaks knew about the air service and would have 
regarded any assistance for Jaksch as, ‘a breach of faith.’123 This was a serious 
consideration for SOE at this time as relations with the Czechoslovaks had just begun, 
briefly, to be operationally fruitful. The files do not reveal whether Paul ever made it
119 HS 4/13 SOE’s German section memorandum on contacts with Jaksch and other Sudeten Germans, 22 
December 1941, see also Wilkinson, Foreign Fields, p58.
120 HS 4/13 Colin Gubbins to Sir Frank Nelson, memorandum on SOE air services to Stockholm, 23 
February 1942.
121 HS 4/13 Colin Gubbins to Sir Frank Nelson, memorandum on SOE air services to Stockholm, 23 
February 1942.
122 See HS 4/18, 19, 22, 24, 35, 36, 39, 50 & 58, also MacDonald, The Killing of Heydrich, ppl38-140.
123 HS 4/13 Colin Gubbins to Sir Frank Nelson, memorandum on SOE air service to Stockholm, 23 
February 1942.
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back to Sweden, but Roberts’s comments would seem to lend some credence to Benes’s 
complaints that the British continued to support Jaksch behind his back, accusations the 
Central Department tried to play down.124
The second example concerned Jaksch’s access to broadcast time on the BBC and 
provides an excellent illustration of how Benes used his British contacts to subvert 
Jaksch’s support within the Central Department. In September 1941 Makins had noted 
that Jaksch was pleased with his fortnightly broadcasts on the BBC’s German service, 
which had begun back in July.125 This situation meant Jaksch was not under the control of 
the BBC’s Czechoslovak service, which broadcast daily to the Protectorate and was 
operated by some of Benes’s closest supporters.126 Thus Jaksch had once more been 
treated equally, yet separately, from the other Czechoslovaks exiles in London and the 
Provisional Government had no control over his broadcasts, a serious omission given the 
centrality of propaganda to the Czechoslovak ‘action abroad.’127 On 16 January 1942 
Jaksch complained to Roberts that Benes and Ripka wanted him moved across to the 
Czechoslovak service for just this reason.128 Three days later Benes also brought up the 
same issue with Nichols, who informed him that the British government was unlikely to 
agree to such a move as it might be regarded as having an impact on the Sudeten 
Germans’ place within any future Czechoslovak state.129 Within the Department Roberts
124 FO 371 30835 C9161/326/12 Nichols to Roberts, 21 September 1942.
125 FO 371 26392 C10002/639/12 Makins minute, 4 September 1941. See also C9386/326/12 Roberts 
minute on talks with Jaksch, 29 September 1942.
126 See P. Drtina, Ceskoslovensko muf osud, Prague, 1991, pp535-560. One of the most popular speakers on 
this service was Jan Masaryk, for the texts of his broadcasts between 1939-1945 see J. Masaryk, Speaking 
to my Country, London, 1944 & Bruce Lockhart, Comes the Reckoning, p 112. See also M. Dobbs, 
Madeleine Albright. A Twentieth Century Odyssey, New York, 1999, pp83-89. Albright’s father, Josef 
Korbel, worked with Drtina in the BBC’s Czechoslovak section.
127 M. Dowling, Czechoslovakia, London, 2002, pp67-69.
128 FO 371 30834 C326/326/12 Roberts minute on talks with Jaksch about his broadcasts, 16 January 1942.
129 FO 371 30834 Cl 101/326/12 Nichols to Eden on talks with Benes, 19 January 1942.
defended the status quo.130 Thus the stage was set for a test of authority between Benes 
and Jaksch, to see who could exert the greatest influence on the Foreign Office (and thus 
the BBC). It was a contest that Benes would ultimately win and in doing so help consign 
Jaksch to political obscurity.
This struggle unfolded at the same time that Benes was negotiating with the 
Foreign Office over the denunciation of the Munich Agreement (see below), so the 
concept that Jaksch’s position with the BBC reflected Britain’s policy on the 
Sudetenlands was particularly troubling for him. He returned to this charge with Nichols 
on 9 February, but again Roberts and Makins rejected his proposal.131 Nevertheless, 
Jaksch’s airtime was reduced in early March, which he suspected had been done at 
Benes’s behest.132 Although another Central Department official, P.F Hancock, queried 
this reduction in airtime, Roberts noted that it was probably best to do nothing in order to 
avoid the impression that the Foreign Office was overtly supporting Jaksch.133 This was 
an indication that he was aware of the sensitivity of this issue. It was at this point that 
Bruce Lockhart, who had now been promoted to Director-General of the Political 
Warfare Executive (PWE), entered the fray, in support of Benes.134 On the 10 April he 
wrote to the department in an official capacity.
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There remains the important question: how Herr Jaksch came to be 
scheduled in the German pro gramme...This was done without my being 
consulted. No records are apparently available. Mr Kirkpatrick says the 
initiative was taken by Mr Crossman who said that his section was looking 
for ‘personality speakers’ and that the Foreign Office liked Herr Jaksch.135
He concluded that Jaksch’s propaganda value was questionable and that ideally he should 
be taken off the air forthwith. In response Roberts mounted a stout defence of Jaksch. 
‘We happen to have an outstanding Sudeten leader here and it would to my mind be most 
short-sighted not to make some use of him. He certainly cannot be used very effectively 
if he appears as a mere creature of the Czechs in their programmes.’136 Here the matter 
may have rested, and Jaksch might have remained on the BBC, had it not been for the 
intervention of Lord Vansittart, formally the Foreign Office’s Chief Diplomatic Advisor 
who had retired in April 1941.
Vansittart sent two letters to Eden 011 this subject on 10 May and 16 June 
respectively.137 At first Vansittart’s intervention might seem curious, especially given his 
earlier support for Henlein, but the reasons was relatively simple: Vansittart had a well 
known dislike for all things German and the Czechoslovak Ambassador to the Court of St 
James, Count Maximilian von Lobkowicz, and his wife lived in his house.138 In his 
original letter Vansittart did not conceal his views on the matter; ‘I think it monstrous that
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he should be able to broadcast at all, and doubly monstrous that he be allowed to 
broadcast as a German and not as a Czech.’139 Upon reading this Eden noted the next day 
that, ‘this is great nonsense...’ and chose not to reply.140
But Vansittart persisted and sent another letter a month later to complain about 
the lack of a response and to reiterate his position in more detail: ‘Herr Jaksch is a Czech 
subject. The Czech Government regard him both as hostile and Pangennan - the two 
terms are indeed, synonymous... ’ he then turned to the crux of this whole issue.
Moreover, the Foreign Office no doubt realises that the matter has a far 
wider implication than this. By continuing to let Herr Jaksch take part in 
the German transmissions, the Foreign Office is tending to create some 
suspicion that we have not made up our minds to the inevitable, which is 
the return of Czechoslovakia’s natural frontiers. The value of Herr Jaksch 
is certainly not such to compensate for that suspicion.141
Thus Vansittart was largely replicating the Czechoslovaks’ own attitude towards British 
support for Jaksch, in effect that it represented a continuation of Munich policies and a 
disinclination to reincorporate the Sudetenlands into Czechoslovakia. This was 
essentially the Central Department’s position especially during the delicate negotiations 
over the denunciation of Munich. Bruce Lockhart re-entered the debate soon after with a
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detailed memorandum to Eden on why Jaksch’s broadcasts should be discontinued.142 
Roberts and Makins again attempted to defend their previous position on Jaksch, but to 
no avail, they were quite simply out-gunned by Bruce-Lockhart and Vansittart and by the 
possibility of a more public campaign on this issue.143 Both Sargent and Cadogan were 
unable to reach any firm conclusions and on 22 June Oliver Harvey announced that Eden 
had decided to stop Jaksch’s broadcasts; Eden told Benes of his decision over lunch on 
the 25 June.144 In December 1942 Jaksch attempted to re-open the issue with a request 
that he be allowed back on the radio. Although Roberts once again supported his request 
it was refused.145 Benes had thus succeeded in out-manoeuvring both Jaksch and his 
supporters in the Central Department and had further isolated him.
In addition to the events described above 1942 proved to be a decisive watershed 
in Anglo-Czechoslovak-Sudeten German relations for three reasons. First, because it was 
the year in which two Czechoslovak agents attacked and fatally wounded Heydrich in 
Prague.146 This led to widespread Nazi reprisals, most notably the destruction of the 
village of Lidice, which galvanised international in support for Czechoslovakia’s struggle 
against the German occupation.147 After these events Czechoslovak-Sudeten German co­
operation in exile became even more unlikely, as did the two communities’ continued
142 FO 371 30834 C6447/326/12 Bruce Lockhart memorandum on Jaksch’s broadcasts on the BBC’s 
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146 M.D.R. Foot, SOE. The Special Operations Executive 1940-1946, London, 1999, pp278-282 & 
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coexistence after the war, a point that Benes made clear to Eden on 7 July 1942.148 Even 
Jaksch had to concede that after Lidice the probability of the Sudetenlands being granted 
any form of autonomous status had been irreparably damaged.149 More importantly, these 
events in the Protectorate meant that, after June 1942, the British authorities became far 
more willing to concede points to Benes over which they had previously maintained 
reservations. Quite simply Jaksch’s usefulness had begun to wane.
Second, largely as a result of the reprisals caused by Heydrich’s assassination 
Eden finally announced on 5 August 1942 Britain’s denunciation of the terms and 
consequences of the Munich Agreement.150 Benes had first raised the question of an 
official British repudiation of Munich in a conversation with Eden on 21 January 1942, 
and again with Nichols on 26 January, but for more than seven months the subsequent 
bilateral negotiations progressed inconclusively.151 Both sides produced a series of draft 
formulae on this subject, but could not agree on the final wording.152 Benes insisted that 
Britain had to annul Munich in order to avoid the possibility of too great a reliance on the 
Soviet Union, the only country that had so far agreed to reconstruct Czechoslovakia in 
her pre-Munich form and to support transfers. Moscow had consistently been far more 
supportive of Benes’s political objective than had the British, but the Foreign Office took 
a different view. Its officials argued that because of the events of September 1938 they 
could not automatically regard the Sudeten Germans as Czechoslovak citizens, and any
148 FO 371 30835 C6834/326/12 Eden to Nichols on converstion with Benes, 7 July 1942.
149 Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, p371.
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repudiation of Munich, 26 January 1942 & FO 30835 C5508/326/12 Foreign Office minute on ‘Discussions 
with the Czechoslovaks regarding the effect of the Munich Agreement and the future of Czechoslovakia, 
January to April 1942,’ 29 May 1942.
152 See for example FO 371 30834 C4047/326/12 draft formula by Sir Herbert Malkin, the Foreign Office’s 
Chief Legal Advisor, and Nichols of April 1942.
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admission of Czechoslovak jurisdiction over these people might be regarded as a 
territorial commitment to include the Sudetenlands in a future Czechoslovak State. In 
addition, British obligations to the Refugee Trust Fund and under the Czechoslovak 
Financial Claims Act meant that a straightforward annulment of Munich would be 
imprudent. Benes himself was increasingly frustrated at this ‘insurmountable opposition5 
from within the Foreign Office, and, as a result stalemate ensued by the end of April 
1942. It was only after the attack on Heydrich that talks recommenced in June.153
By then Nichols and several members of the Central Department had recognised 
that the Nazi reprisals in the Protectorate, and the world-wide revulsion they had caused, 
had made Britain’s previous position on the issue increasingly untenable.154 Once more, 
as had happened on so many other occasions, British policy was altered by the course of 
events and not by a fundamental change in the Foreign Office’s position. Eden made the 
linkage between Heydrich’s death and the denunciation of Munich explicit in a 
memorandum to the War Cabinet on 2 July 1942.155 This he repeated on the floor of the 
House on 5 August.156 The War Cabinet acceded to this proposal on 6 July, but added 
that the British authorities would only drop their reservations over Czechoslovak 
jurisdiction over the Sudeten Germans once they had entered the State Council.157 
Although both Benes and Ripka objected strenuously to the re-emergence of this clause, 
which further delayed the final exchange of letters, the Foreign Office refused to concede
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the point.158 Nevertheless this was a crucial development as this meant that Britain no 
longer stood by the agreement’s separation of the Sudetenlands from the rump of 
Czechoslovakia, a concept that Jaksch had thus far been able to use to his advantage. It 
also marked a significant victory for Benes, as the overturning of the Munich Agreement 
had been one of his most cherished objectives in exile.159
Benes also managed to surmount the jurisdiction problem, not by granting Jaksch 
his seat, although talks on this issue would continue for the rest of the year, but by 
allowing other Sudeten German representatives to join the State Council.160 Many of who 
were opponents of Jaksch and supported transfers.161 The Central Department was 
unimpressed by these new additions to the Council. As Roberts noted in response to a 
letter from these ‘pro-Benes’ Sudeten Germans on 18 September 1942, ‘This would be 
more impressive if these Czech puppets represented something.’162 By contrast Jaksch 
launched a campaign against Britain’s repudiation of Munich and dispatched letters of 
protest to the governments of Britain, Canada and the United States.163 Although 
sympathetic, the Central Department had finally conceded by September that the 
Czechoslovaks were likely to reoccupy their former frontiers when the war was won and 
that there was little the British authorities could now do to foster an agreement between
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Jaksch and Benes.164 The two men met several more times during the closing months of 
1942, but after their final encounter on the 1 December all co-operation and dialogue 
between them finally ceased.165
Inexorably linked to the repudiation of Munich was the question of transfers, the 
third and final development in 1942, and here too Benes set the agenda and managed to 
extract significant concessions from the Foreign Office. It was during this year that Benes 
officially presented his plans for post-war transfers to the British government for the first 
time and, more importantly, received their verbal acceptance of the ‘principle of 
transfers.’166 As with the negotiations over the denunciation of the Munich Agreement, 
progress on this question was incremental and gradual. At the start of the new year Benes 
had an article published in the prestigious American Journal Foreign Affairs entitled ‘The 
Organization of Postwar Europe.’ In this he argued that, ‘It will be necessary after this 
war to carry out a transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the last 
war.’ 167 This was a definitive statement of his position on this question and brought the 
concept of transfers to the attention of much a wider audience. Nichols forwarded a copy 
to the Central Department, who noted with satisfaction that Benes appeared to still be in 
favour of post-war federations.168 Benes then brought up transfers directly with Eden 
during a meeting on 21 January, when he unofficially detailed his proposals. He outlined 
plans to cede some Czechoslovak territory to Germany in order to rid the state of 6 to
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700,000 Sudeten Germans, transfer another 1,300,000 and leave approximately one 
million within Czechoslovakia.169 Although Eden did not officially accept these plans, 
and Benes did not officially present a position paper to the Foreign Office, these talks did 
have one significant outcome; the Foreign Office requested that the FRPS prepare a 
memorandum on the advisability and feasibility of transfers.
This was duly delivered by Toynbee on 12 February 1942 and proved to be an 
updated version of Mabbotfs 1940 memorandum, written by the same author.170 
Crucially the memorandum did not confine itself to the Sudeten Germans, but also 
considered transfers from Poland, Yugoslavia and Italy and within the context of 
continuing talks on post-war federations.171 These were plans that the British authorities 
were keen to encourage, because it placed these proposed transfers within a wider 
European context, meaning that ethnic Germans would have to be transferred from a 
number of European countries. Had this process been confined solely to Czechoslovakia 
the Foreign Office’s response may well have been different. Thus the Central 
Department’s reaction to Mabbott’s updated memorandum was positive and it was 
widely circulated within the Foreign Office and beyond.172 Mabbott’s paper firmly placed 
transfers on the British agenda and helped pave the way for the British acceptance of the 
principle of transfers, as did, incidentally, Molotov’s acceptance of Benes’s proposal for 
transfers on 9 June 1942.
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170 FO 371 30930 C2167/241/18 Toynbee to Foreign Office, 12 February 1942.
171 See FO 371 30828 Cl 0671/151/12 Roberts memorandum entitled ‘Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation. 
Developments between November 11, 1940— November 2, 1942,’ 4 November 1942.
172 FO 371 30930 C2167/241/18 Harrison minute, 2 March 1942, Roberts minute, 2 March 1942 & 
Gladwyn Jebb to Toynbee, 10 August 1942.
Indeed, the memorandum’s importance was underlined by the fact that even 
though 110 official agreement on transfers had yet been made Eden broached the subject 
in paragraphs seven and eight of his memorandum to the War Cabinet on the 
denunciation of Munich. Not only did he outline Benes’s proposals from January, but 
also borrowed heavily from Mabbott’s work on the subject and highlighted the fact that 
other counties in Central and South-eastern Europe would most likely wish to do the 
same. He concluded,
A population transfer on this scale would be a formidable undertaking. It 
will probably be impossible to avoid some measures of this kind in post­
war Europe...it is only too likely that the Czech and Polish populations 
will forcibly expel the German minorities form their midst [anyway]. The 
question is whether we should now commit ourselves to the principle of 
such transfers...173
The War Cabinet concurred. On 11 July Makins noted, ‘I am very doubtful whether we 
ought at this stage to put anything in wilting on the subject of transfers of population...I 
think a verbal communication to him [Benes] and, at the next convenient moment, to 
Herr Jaksch should suffice.’ Nichols was duly informed of this by Roberts on 17 July and 
passed the message on to Benes that the British authorities were ‘prepared to accept the 
application of the principle of transfers of populations.’174 Thus by the late summer of
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1942 both Britain and the Soviet Union had tentatively agreed that a proportion of 
Czechoslovakia’s Sudeten German minority would be transferred after the war had been 
w on.175 The overriding reason for the acceptance of this principle was not a desire to give 
Benes satisfaction over this issue, or a complete reversal of the Department’s previous 
support for Jaksch, but rather the realisation that many ethnic Germans would be forced 
out of Central and Eastern Europe after the war come what may.
Although this agreement was still provisional the Foreign Office was, 
surprisingly, actually prepared to go even further on this issue. When Benes brought up 
with Nichols the possibility of transferring Sudeten Germans on the basis of their ‘war 
guilt,’ as opposed to collective responsibility, the Foreign Office objected. As Cadogan 
noted,
I am rather doubtful about this principle of ejecting the "guilty"...because I 
fear that it might lead to the limitation of our right to make considerable 
transfers of population. We may want (and the Americans may propose) to 
use this remedy on a fairly large scale...176
Eden agreed. Thus the principle of transfers had not only been accepted, but was 
proposed as a solution to be used on a far larger scale than Benes may ever have 
imagined.
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As had previously been the case the further development of the transfer plans was 
largely an internal Czechoslovak matter, about which the Foreign Office was kept 
informed, but had little direct influence over its progression.177 Nor was there a need for 
intervention, given that the British authorities had made it plain that no transfers could be 
undertaken until after the war, and even then, only with the agreement of all three main 
allies.178 They had no intention of giving their unilateral support to such a proposal. 
These evolving plans and Benes’s trips to Washington and Moscow, where he secured 
both President Roosevelt’s and Stalin’s agreement for transfers have been well 
documented and researched and there is little need to reiterate them here.179 Suffice it to 
say that by the beginning of 1944 the Czechoslovak government in exile had received the 
agreement of the Great Powers, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union for the 
‘principle of transfers.’
It was only with the establishment of the European Advisory Commission (EAC) 
in late 1943, a body designed to deliberate a range of post-war problems, that the Foreign 
Office was obliged to consider these proposals once more.180 Although an Inter- 
Departmental Committee on the transfer of German populations had been established in 
December 1943 to consider British policy on this question it was increasingly apparent
177 See for example FO 371 34355 C9894/9894/12 Nichols to Eden, 30 August 1943, memorandum on 
Czechoslovak plans for transfers, FO 371 38921 Cl 10531/63/12 Text of Benes’s broadcast to the 
Protectorate on the need for transfers, 30 May 1944, and Gatehouse’s minutes, 18 July 1944. Also FO 371 
38923 C l5569/63/12 Nichols to Foreign Office, 10 November 1944.
178 FO 371 47085 N2123/207/12 Nichols to Warner, 27 February 1945.
179 See Benes, Pameti, pp 329-331, M. Cornwall, ‘Benes and Czechoslovakia’s German Minority,’ in J. 
Morrison, The Czech and Slovak Experience, Basingstoke, 1992, pp 190-194, Luza, The Transfer of the 
Sudeten Germans, pp234-249, Novotny (ed), Edvard Benes odsun nemcu z ceskoslovensko, ppl 00-130 & 
Taborsky, ‘Politics in Exile,’ in Mamatey & Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp336- 
337.
180 FO 366 1331 X I2259/11509/503 On establishment of EAC, 1 December 1943 & FO 371 50657 
U1021/3/70 Minutes of 7tl' EAC meeting ,14 February 1945, with Czechoslovak representatives.
that the final decision on transfers could not be made by the Foreign Office alone.181 
Rather, such drastic upheavals of populations would be have to be agreed to and managed 
by the three the Great Powers and the consultative bodies they had created. This was a 
factor that the Inter-Departmental Committee considered in May when it accepted that 
the Soviet Union’s influence in the areas effected by transfers would be paramount and 
that,
If British influence was to be effective in controlling or modifying the 
policy of transfer, British troops should be sent to the areas 
concerned...Planning for the future is based upon the assumption that 
there will be no spheres of influence in Europe. Therefore the three Great 
Powers should participate on equal terms.. .182
On 20 July the Ministerial Armistice and Post-war Committee, chaired by Clement 
Attlee, also considered this issue. It concluded that any organised transfers would have to 
be delayed for at least a year after the end of the hostilities, would take some five years to 
complete and ‘the amount of human suffering involved would be very great.’183 But as 
the end of the war approached it became increasingly obvious that British involvement in 
any transfers from Czechoslovakia would be extremely limited. In the event no British 
forces entered liberated Czechoslovakia, and the distribution of the occupation zones in
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Germany meant that very few of the transferred Germans would come under British 
administration. Ultimately, it was the United States and the Allied Control Commission 
that would have to take the largest share of responsibility for managing the transfers and 
the re-settlement of those transferred, facts that had a commensurate effect on the amount 
of time and consideration that these issues were given by the Foreign Office in the 
closing stages of the war.184
It was only when the Czechoslovak government delivered their final 
memorandum on transfers to the EAC on 24 August 1944, and sent a copy to the Foreign 
Office on 28 November, that British deliberations on this matter were synchronised with 
the exiled government’s proposals for the last time.185 Another of Mabbott’s papers 
followed it in early December.186 The Czechoslovak memorandum, written by their own 
research department under the supervision of Benes and Ripka, contained slightly higher 
figures for those to be transferred than before. The number of ‘loyal’ Sudeten Germans to 
be retained was reduced from one million to 800,000 and it was proposed that 150,000 
Lustian Sorbs might be exchanged for Germans.187 The British response, as might have 
been expected given the constraints of coalition post-war planning, was inconclusive and 
non-committal. When Eden replied to Nichols on 15 January 1945 he wrote,
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In the circumstances it is impossible for His Majesty’s Government to 
comment in detail...and ...do not feel able to offer any observations until 
they have discussed these question with their principle allies.. .For the time 
being, therefore, His Majesty’s Government must reserve their attitude in 
regard to the Czechoslovak government’s proposals.188
Combined with the EAC’s subsequent refusal to enshrine transfers in Germany’s 
surrender terms, this was an unsatisfactory conclusion to the issue for Benes, although a 
sensible one for the Foreign Office.189 This was especially so as Benes had hoped to have 
been able to return home with full allied acceptance for transfers, but in the event he had 
to satisfy himself with yet another ‘provisional’ agreement, a position that was wholly 
consistent with his relations with the British authorities since 1939.190
It was, however, a minor compensation that the Foreign Office sent several notes 
during the closing weeks of the war to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, to urge him not to 
allow United States forces in western Bohemia to fraternise with the local Sudeten 
German population.191 This was an issue first raised by Ripka on 20 April and later 
repeated by the Czechoslovak liaison team with Eisenhower’s headquarters. Although no 
definitive conclusions on transfers had been reached, and the Foreign Office repeated its 
previous reservations over the timing of transfers, it was made quite clear that, ‘The 
German regime in the Sudeteniand, as well as other areas of Czechoslovakia, is an alien
188 FO 371 38946 C l6563/1347/12 Departmental minutes, 3 to 12 December 1945 & Eden toNichols, 15 
January 1945.
189 FO 371 50657 U1021/3/70 Minutes of 7th EAC meeting, 14 February 1945, with Czechoslovak 
representatives.
190 FO 371 47085 N 1702/207/12 Nichols to Northern Department on talks with Benes, 13 February 1945.
191 FO 371 47086 N4702/207/12 V.F.W. Cavendish-Bentinck, Joint Intelligence Committee, to Foreign 
Office 21 April 1945.
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one to be uprooted and destroyed.’192 Transfers were now regarded as a foregone 
conclusion in London. All that remained to be settled, in effect, was the actual timing of 
the commencement of the transfer process and that was agreed upon at the Potsdam 
Conference in the late summer of 1945. The transfers themselves started early the 
following year.
If Benes’s hopes for a definitive British statement in support of transfers were to 
be frustrated by the end of the war he had still managed to extract most of the 
concessions on this issue for which he had hoped. Jaksch’s position on the other hand 
went from bad to worse. Jaksch continued to meet with Roberts for the rest of the war, 
but as the Czechoslovak governments proposals on transfers became more widely 
accepted so their relations with Jaksch became ever more acrimonious. An increasingly 
bitter war of words was played out between Jaksch and his Czechoslovak opponents, 
particularly Ripka.193 This ultimately developed into a fierce propaganda campaign 
against transfers in the Britain and the United States in 1944 and 1945.194 But although 
vocal these objections had little actual effect on British policy and could not prevent 
Benes’s successes in advancing plans for transfers.
192 FO 371 47086 N4465/4440/12 Nichols to Eden, 20 April 1945, N4701/207/12 from SHAEF forward 
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liberated areas of Czechoslovakia to commanding General 12th Army Group.
193 See FO 371 34330 C4729/96/12 extract from Evening Standard article ‘Sudetens split with Benesh,’ 22 
April 1943 & Cl 1724/96/12 Nichols to Roberts on Ripka’s complaints about Jaksch’s activities, 6 October
1943. See also FO 371 38945 C l3142/1347/12 copy of Ripka’s reply to Jaksch’s statement of his policies 
1 August 1944 & 30 August 1944.
194 See Times 19 & 29 February 1944, The New York Times, 10 August 1944 & Economist, 12 August 1944 
cited in Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam, pp 394, 397, 444. Also Daily Mail, 6 August 1945, Manchester 
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the House of Commons and British press, 19 October 1945. See also F. Voight, ‘Orderly and Humane,’ 
Nineteenth Centiny and After, No. DCCCXXV, November 1945, ppl 93-205 & ‘Dark Places,’ 
Nineteenth Centiny and After, No. CXXXIX, February 1946, pp49-66.
By 1944 Jaksch’s position with the Foreign Office had become even weaker in 
the face of international acceptance of the ‘principle of transfers’ and the realisation that 
the re-incorporation of the Sudetenlands into Czechoslovakia was, even with Britain’s 
continued reservations over frontiers, ever more certain.195 When he tried to secure a 
meeting with Eden in August 1944 after he had established the Democratic Sudeten 
Committee, as a counter-weight to the pro-Benes Anti-Fascist Committee of Democratic 
Germans of Czechoslovakia, it was refused by the Central Department.196 Only Roberts 
expressed his support and opposed the description of Jaksch as pursuing polices in the 
‘Henlein tradition.’197 But by now he was a lone voice in the Department, where once he 
had expressed the majority opinion. Even Roberts’s continued intervention on Jaksch’s 
behalf ended when he was transferred from the Central Department to take up a position 
as Minister in Moscow in late 1944.198
Thus Jaksch’s relations with the Central Department, which had once challenged 
Benes’s position in exile, ended rather pathetically. On 1 February 1945 Jaksch wrote to 
Roberts yet again to ask for his assistance in gaining airtime on the BBC, so that he might 
encourage his fellow Sudeten Germans in the Protectorate to rise up against the Nazis 
before the end of the war.199 Unfortunately for Jaksch, Roberts never received his letter 
and, in his absence, the Northern Department decided that the best course of action was 
to ‘keep out of Sudeten affairs as much as possible.’200 The Department’s reply to Jaksch
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198 Roberts, Dealing with Dictators, pp62-63 & 78-77.
199 FO 371 47083 N 1801/133/12 Jaksch to Roberts, 1 February 1945.
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was candid; Roberts had left for Moscow and Jaksch’s request was refused,201 The last 
vestiges of British support for Jaksch had ended. On 20 April Ripka officially requested 
through Nichols that the British authorities not permit Jaksch to travel to Czechoslovakia. 
The accompanying minutes plainly stated the various difficulties involved.202 In the event 
Jaksch never returned to Czechoslovakia and settled in West Germany, where he became 
active in Sudeten German emigre politics. He died in a car crash on 27 November 
1966.203
British attempts to support Jaksch, and to encourage his inclusion in the 
Czechoslovak government in exile, had failed completely by the end of the war. Benes 
had managed to circumvent the actual intent of the Foreign Office’s instructions, while 
appearing to have implemented them. As a result of this failure, the inconclusive results 
of Czechoslovak-Polish federation talks and external events in 1942, large-scale transfers 
of populations began to be increasingly viewed by the Foreign Office as a viable solution 
to Central Europe’s seemingly intractable minority problems. These were views 
supported by a number of memoranda on this question produced by the Foreign Office’s 
own research department. More importantly, the evolution of the transfer option was one 
that was entirely driven forward by Benes and his government in exile. Whereas the 
British government had been willing to appease Germany over the Sudeten Germans in 
1938 so as to avoid war, by 1945 they had completed a dramatic volte-face on this
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question and this was a direct result of Benes’s political machinations in exile, which had 
been diametrically opposed to the Central Department’s prevailing opinions on this issue.
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Chapter Seven 
The Special Operations Executive’s relations 
with the Czechoslovak exiles in Britain, 1940 to 1945
By the time that the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was formed in the 
summer of 1940 a provisional Czechoslovak government in exile had been established in 
London and those Czechoslovak soldiers and airmen who had escaped from France had 
been integrated into the British war effort.1 From this point onwards, however, the 
contribution of these regular forces to the war effort and the political advantages they 
conferred on the Czechoslovak ‘action abroad’ was gradually reduced due to their 
relative inactivity. Conversely, Czechoslovak military intelligence, the druhy odbor 
(Second Department or Deuxieme Bureau) headed by Colonel Frantisek Moravec, had 
been co-operating with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) for more than a year 
and had established secure radio and cornier links to the German Protectorate of Bohemia 
and Moravia.2 As a result Benes and his government had access to a highly regarded 
intelligence network that provided them with significant political benefits and they were 
not reliant on this new and unproven organisation. Nor was there any pressing need to 
change this situation given the financial assistance Moravec received from the SIS and 
the operational autonomy his organisation enjoyed at this stage in the war.3
1 See M.D.R. Foot, SOE. An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive 1940-1946, London, 
1999, pp7-26 P. Wilkinson, & J, Bright Astley, Gubbins and SOE, London, 1997, pp69-82.
2 See Wilkinson to Colonel Holland, 4 June 1940, in Wilkinson’s private papers at the Imperial War 
Museum (These had not been catalogued at the time of writing), FO 371 26388 C336/216/12, Bruce 
Lockhart to Strang, 24 January 1941, HS 7/108 F.E. Keary, Major P. W. Auster and Major G. I. Klauber, 
SOE Country History, Czechoslovakia 1940-45, p3 & L, Otahalova & M. Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z 
historic ceskoslovenskepolitiky, Vol. 1, Prague, 1966, ppl 87-188, See also V. Modrak, ‘Radio Contact,’ in 
L.M. White (ed), On All Fronts. Czechoslovaks in World War II, Vol. 3,"New York, 2000, pp 133-146.
3 Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historic ceskoslovenske politiky, p85.
Quite simply, from the Czechoslovak perspective intelligence gathering took 
priority over the sabotage activities SOE wished to encourage and this divergence of 
policy resulted in increasingly tense relations between the two organisations. Their failure 
to co-ordinate strategy, and SOE’s inability to provide the resistance organisations in the 
Protectorate and Slovakia with a regular air service and the supplies it had promised, 
resulted in some unforeseen and damaging political consequences. As the SOE’s archives 
have now been opened the interaction between Moravec’s druhy odbor and SOE can be 
examined in detail for the first time and this chapter will focus on how Czechoslovak 
relations with SOE affected and influenced their wider relations with the British 
authorities. This interaction can be most clearly demonstrated with reference to three 
particular events, the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich in May 1942, the Slovak 
national uprising (SNP) in the early autumn of 1944 and the Prague uprising of May 
1945.
Although SOE managed to send a total of 75 Czechoslovak agents and some 59 
tons of supplies to the Protectorate and Slovakia during the war its relationship with the 
Czechoslovak exiles in London never lived up to original expectations.4 This was mainly 
the result of the dynamics between competing political and military considerations. While 
the British authorities were often forced to allow military considerations to take 
precedence over political ones, Benes and his government took the opposing view and 
regarded military considerations as subservient to wider political objectives, not least the
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reconstruction of a Czechoslovak state after the war. In part this position stemmed from 
that fact that Benes clearly understood that the military assets at his disposal were 
insufficient to end the German occupation of Czechoslovakia and its liberation would 
only be secured with the assistance of the Great Powers, whose forces would do the 
majority of the actual fighting. The resulting tensions over how best to harass the German 
occupiers of the former Czechoslovakia meant that relations between Benes, Moravec 
and SOE were often troubled. These problems increased as the Soviet Union recovered 
from its early defeats in 1941 and began to push German forces back across Eastern 
Europe. From early 1944 onwards the British military authorities viewed the territory of 
the former Czechoslovakia as being part of the Red Army’s sphere of operational control 
and revised their previous policy of supporting resistance activities and uprisings in this 
region. These developments undermined Benes’s policy of maintaining a balance 
between the eastern and western allies and forced his government to form ever-closer 
relations with Moscow in order to compensate for this change in policy.
The inherent problems in relations between the Czechoslovak exiles and SOE 
rested on two key issues. The first was that SOE believed, with some justification, that 
Moravec and Benes were disinclined to undertake sabotage operations lest they interfere 
with their intelligence gathering activities.5 Second, the Czechoslovak exiles were 
persistently disappointed with SOE’s ability to deliver men and supplies to occupied 
Europe and did not regard acts of sabotage as an important contribution to the war effort.6
3 P. Wilkinson, Notes on SOE’s relations with Revolutionary Movements in Europe, 2 November 1942. In 
Wilkinson’s private papers held at the Imperial War Museum.
6 HS 7/108 Draft essay by Josef Korbel on the Czechoslovak resistance movements during the Second 
World War, November 1962, p33, based upon Korbel’s interview with Moravec conducted on 11 
September 1962.
In effect, what Moravec and Benes wanted from SOE was the one thing that the 
organisation was unable to provide - regular flights to deliver men, bombs and supplies to 
the Protectorate. Although this was not SOE’s fault it did have a significant effect on bi­
lateral relations. Many of SOE’s early missions to Central Europe were repeatedly 
delayed by a lack of long-range aircraft in SOE’s Special Duties Squadron, the distances 
involved and by weather conditions.7 The first insertion of an SOE trained Czechoslovak 
agent into the Protectorate, code-named Benjamin, took place on the night of 16/17 April 
1941, just two months after the first drops into Poland, but only after months of delays.8 
He also landed wildly off target. These were delays that Colin Gubbins noted, ‘put back 
our stock very badly with the Czechs who will merely consider it as another instance of 
our insincerity.’9 A later mission, code-named Bioscope, was eventually dropped after a 
delay of over six-months, and even the agents despatched to assassinate Reinhard 
Heydrich had to wait several weeks for an available flight.10
Similar problems surrounded Benes’s requests to the Foreign Office, Air Ministry 
and SOE that the Royal Air Force (RAF) bomb the Protectorate’s numerous armaments 
factories. Although several attempts were made they were all unsuccessful.11 Further 
requests were later made for allied bombers to support the Slovak uprising in 1944, but 
these were refused on the grounds that it was an unwarranted diversion of the bomber
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9 HS 4/1 Gubbins to Sir Frank Nelson, 17 February 1942.
10 HS 4/24 Report on Bioscope mission, April 1942 & C. MacDonald, The Killing of Obergruppenjtthrer 
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11 FO 371 30847 C2915/539/12 Bruce Lockhart to Strang, 15 March 1942, & Eden to Sir Archibald 
Sinclair, Air Ministry, 25 March 1942, HS 4/35 Benes letter to Lord Selborne, 23 November 1942 and FO 
371 47097 N 7907/233/12 Air Ministry Minute to Foreign Office, 28 June 1945.
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force.12 The primary reason for these difficulties was once again geographical, but SOE’s 
inability to procure the bombing cover the insurgents so desperately needed further 
undermined Benes’s and Moravec’s willingness to undertake the sort of sabotage 
missions SOE desired.
Such disappointments were even more observable in SOE’s failure to deliver the 
large amounts of arms and supplies required to equip the ‘secret army’ in the 
Protectorate, in anticipation of a ‘national uprising’ to be launched at the appropriate 
moment.13 Moravec had asked that significant amounts of arms and munitions be 
despatched to the Protectorate where they would be stockpiled by the resistance.14 These 
plans for ‘revolutions’ in occupied Europe had originally been proposed by the British 
Chiefs of Staff (COS) in the summer of 1940.15 The SIS, with the help of the 
Czechoslovak and Polish intelligence services, had already investigated this proposal and 
concluded that both countries were more than ready to undertake such ‘national 
revolutions.’16 But, given the RAF’s disinclination to divert aircraft to this task, the 
distances involved and competing demands from other resistance movements SOE was 
also unable to fulfil this objective. Indeed, the British Joint Planning Staff (JPS) had 
realised as early as May 1942 that,
12 WO 216/2384 G-3 Records of SHEAF operations, September 1944 to May 1945, General Ingrto 
Colonel William Dunn, American Military Attache to the Allied Forces, 1 September 1944 & subsequent 
reply from Brigadier General A.S. Nevins, 14 September 1944.
13 HS 8/237 Head of Section report, November to December 1941, P. Wilkinson, 25 November 1941.
14 HS 4/15 Moravec to Gubbins, 30 April 1941, HS 8/272 SOE memorandum A study of requirements for 
the organisation of insurrection in German occupied territories, pi 3 & Appendix B, 21 May 1941, SOE 
estimated that to would need 150 aircraft to supply the ‘secret army’ in the Protectorate.
15 FO 371 24289 C7646/2/12 Troutbeck minute, 21 June 1940.
16 HS 4/31 meeting between Moravec, Lieutenant Colonel Jo Holland and Captain Peter Wilkinson, both of 
Section D, 5 January 1940. See also D. Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, London, 1971 ,p 
pp214-215 & Wilkinson & Bright Astley, Gubbins and SOE, p79.
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Action as regards Poland and Czechoslovakia must be limited to the 
support of sabotage groups alone, as the physical problem of transporting 
materials for a secret army was beyond any solution without an 
unwarrantable diversion of the bomber effort.17
Moreover, by June 1942 SOE had begun to suspect that Czechoslovakia’s ‘secret army’s’ 
purpose was ultimately political, and that it would use these arms to try to secure 
Czechoslovakia’s frontiers by force at the end of the war.18 This was something that 
would have been diametrically opposed to the prevailing British policy on frontiers in 
post-war Europe. SOE later began to doubt whether this ‘secret army’ in fact existed, 
especially since Benes claimed to be able to mobilise 200,000 men at short notice.19
Yet serious questions remain about whether SOE kept the Czechoslovaks and the 
Poles fully informed of the improbability of their being able to deliver such supplies, 
especially since such an admission would have seriously undermined SOE’s credibility 
with both governments. Throughout the war many senior Polish and Czechoslovak 
military leaders continued to rely on the timely despatch of such supplies, views that 
were possibly encouraged by elements within SOE itself.20 This was clearly illustrated by 
that fact that even as late as July 1943, over a year after the JPS’s report, SOE promised 
to send enough weaponry to the Protectorate to equip 50,000 men, a promise that was
logisticaily impossible.21 In fact, the situation became so bad that in October 1943 the
17 HS 7/8 History ofthe Special Duties Operations in Europe (Airforce), 1939-1945, Part 1, p i7.
18 HS 4/5 internal SOE minutes, 12 June 1942.
19 FO 371 26394 C4078/1320/12 Bruce Lockhart to Eden, 20 April 1941.
20 J.G. Beevor, SOE: Recollections and Reflections, 1940-1945, London, 1981, pl93, J. Ciechanowski, The 
IVarsaw Uprising of 1944, Cambridge, 1974, p74, & P. Wilkinson, Foreign Fields: the story of an SOE 
operative, London 1997, p i24.
21 HS 7/277 SOE’s War Diary for Poland and Czechoslovakia, p90.
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Poles, frustrated by SOE’s continued inability to supply their ‘secret army,’ threatened to 
cease all their resistance activities unless the situation improved.22 It did not, and 
although SOE was more successful in delivering arms to the resistance in Yugoslavia 
(some 16,500 tons between 1943 and 1945, compared to 59 tons to Czechoslovakia), it 
would never be able to fulfil these promises.23 So even if Benes and Moravec were 
reluctant to imperil their intelligence work for the sake of sabotage when they did ask for 
assistance from SOE such help was seldom forthcoming. Therefore Benes and his 
government had reasonable grounds to be suspicious of SOE’s abilities and consequently 
maintained their own policies regarding the equitable balance between political 
considerations and military operations in the Protectorate.24
Of all the operations that SOE was involved in the assassination of Heydrich in 
1941, undertaken by two Czechoslovak ‘patriots’ Josef Gabcik and Jan Kubis, was 
undoubtedly the most successful. It was also a dramatic example of how military action 
could result in significant political repercussions and why the Foreign Office viewed 
SOE’s activities with some apprehension.25 This was because Heydrich’s death, and the 
retaliation that followed, resulted in a veritable flurry of political consequences that SOE 
had not anticipated and the Central Department had then to deal with. This was not least 
because the international standing of Benes’s government was greatly enhanced by this 
dramatic example of resistance in occupied Europe. As Moravec later remarked,
22 HS 8/897 Lord Selborne’s (Minister in Charge of SOE) to Churchill, 21 October 1943, see also E.D.R 
Harrison, ‘The British Special Operations Executive and Poland,’ The Historical Journal, 43, 4, (2000),
pp 1081-1082.
23 HS 7/9 History of the Special Duties Operations in Europe (Airforce), 1939-1945, Parts II & III, 
Appendix 1.1 pxxiv. The British COS authorised a minimum of ten flights per month to the Protectorate in 
January 1945, but even this number was never achieved, p240.
24 HS 7 / 108 Keary et al, SOE Country History: Czechoslovakia, plO.
25 Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pp435-436.
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‘Czechoslovakia received world-wide attention and in the delicate matter of our 
contribution to the war effort we jumped from last place to first?26 The reasons why 
Heydrich was targeted are complex abut several distinct features can be identified; 
foremost amongst these was Heydrich’s sustained and successful attacks on the resistance 
groups in the Protectorate and their intelligence gathering capabilities, the issue of the 
Protectorate’s industrial output, its constitutional relationship to the Reich and 
developments in Anglo-Czechoslovak-Soviet relations.27
As has already been detailed, one of the cornerstones of Anglo-Czechoslovak 
relations was the long standing relationship between Moravec and the SIS and one of 
Heydrich’s first acts on his arrival in the Protectorate was to undermine the effectiveness 
of these resistance organisations. These activities were particularly ruthless and rapidly 
began to degrade the ability of the resistance movements to collect intelligence materials 
and transmit them back to London.28 On 4 December 1941 Bruce Lockhart reported to 
the Foreign Office that, ‘Dr Benes has not be able to communicate with his secret centre 
in Prague.. .the result of the arrests and reign of terror instituted by Heydrich at the end of 
September?29 In addition, Heydrich’s constitutional proposals for the closer 
incorporation of the Protectorate into the Reich and the continuing negotiations over the 
proposed Anglo-Soviet treaty in London in May 1942 also influenced the decision to
26 F. Moravec, Master of Spies, London, 1975, p222.
27 See CAB 102/641, Cabinet Office Historical Section, W.J.M. Mackenzie, History of the Special 
Operations Executive, Vol III & HS 7 / 108 Keary et al, SOE Country History: Czechoslovakia. There is 
also a lot of interesting material contained in the archives of the Imperial War Museum, especially in Peter 
Wilkinson’s private papers, Colin Gubbins’s desk diaries from 1941 to 1945 and in the Museum’s Special 
Operations Executive’s sound archive, oral history recordings,
2S See the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs On the Reign of Terror in Bohemia and Moravia 
under the regime of Reinhard Heydrich, London, 1942 & MacDonald, The Killing of Heydrich, pp 11 -115. 
Moravec admitted this to his NKVD liaison Officer in London, I. A. Chichaev on 17 March 1942 in J. 
Nemecek, H. Novackova, I. St’oicek & M. Tejchman (eds), Ceskoslovensko- sovetske vztahy v 
diplomatickych jedndnich, Vol. I, Prague, 1998, pp308-309.
29 FO 371 26418 C 13638/10893/12 Bruce Lockhart to Eden, 4 December 1941.
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undertake this dangerous operation.30 Heydrich’s actions struck a blow against the most 
important asset the Czechoslovak exiles in London had at their disposal. Some form of 
response, or reprisal, by Moravec and Benes was therefore to be expected and SOE 
seized the opportunity to support such an act.31
It should be reiterated that the Protectorate was one of the key industrial centres of 
the Third Reich and much of the resistance’s work was designed to limit the massive 
amounts of arms produced there. Indeed, Benes had made several unsuccessful attempts, 
to encourage the RAF to bomb these industrial targets.32 These failures were 
compounded by the Soviet Union’s persistent demands that the flow of arms from the 
Protectorate be stemmed by increased sabotage regardless of the cost to the local 
population, instructions that were relayed to Moravec by the Soviet Union’s military 
intelligence liaison officer in London, I. A. Chichaev.33 The German authorities were also 
concerned with arms production in the Protectorate and, in part, this was why Heydrich 
had been sent to Prague to replace the ageing Freiherr Konstanin von Neurath. Once he 
was there Heydrich’s objectives were clear; to liquidate the resistance, to secure the 
unstinting support of the population for the Reich’s war effort and to increase industrial 
production in order to secure supplies for the Eastern Front.34 These were objectives that
30 HS 4 / 3 9  Report on assassination, prepared 24 June 1942, Section One & Czechoslovak Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, On the Reign of Terror in Bohemia and Moravia under the regime of Reinhard Heydrich, 
pp71-78.
31 A suggestion confirmed by Peter Wilkinson in his notes for a talk given to Special Forces Club on the 
‘Anthropoid’ mission, 1982. Wilkinson’s private papers at the Imperial War Museum.
32 See FO 371 24292 C l0821/1082/12 from Bruce Lockhart to Lord Halifax, 9 October 1940, FO 371 
26408 C5286/5286/12 Bruce Lockhart to Eden, 16 May 1941, & HS 4 /I Lord Selborn’s letter to Secretary 
of State for Air, 13 April 1942, which requested the bombing of industrial targets in the Protectorate.
33 Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko-sovetske vztahy, Vol. 1, pp308-309.
34 See Heydrich’s speech in Prague on 2 October 1942 in J. Doiezal & J. Kfen (eds), Czechoslovakia's fight,
1938-J945, Documents on the Resistance Movements of the Czechoslovak People, Prague, 1964, pp60-66. 
See also Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, On the Reign of Terror in Bohemia and Moravia, 
pp24~28.
lie largely managed to achieve.35 It was no accident, therefore, that the two assassins, 
were actually diverted from their original objective, at no small risk to their primary 
mission, to assist with the bombing of the Skoda works in Plzen in April 1942.36 These 
raids, code-named Cannonbury I & II, had little effect, but demonstrated the supreme 
importance that Benes attached to damaging these industrial facilities.37
The final factor that contributed to the assassination of Heydrich was SOE’s own 
position within the hierarchy of British armed services. Although SOE was an 
independent organisation, it was a new and junior service and its right to exist as a 
separate entity was repeatedly challenged. These debates were compounded by SOE’s 
unorthodox, and to some underhand, agenda and the dichotomy between these objectives 
and wider British foreign policy.38 As a result its survival was only secured through the 
personal intervention of the Prime Minister on several occasions.39 Therefore, given 
SOE’s precarious position in late 1941 and the need to prove its worth, both to the British 
military authorities and the Czechoslovaks, SOE readily agreed to help target Heydrich.40 
Although assassination was never a consistent feature of SOE’s work it seems apparent 
that for an extremely small group of British and Czechoslovak officials the operation was 
regarded as being of sufficient value to be allowed to proceed; though, crucially, neither 
side allowed their involvement to become known during the war. Peter Wilkinson, then
33 R. Luza, ‘The Czech resistance movement,’ in V. Mamatey & R. Luza (eds), A History of the
Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, Princeton, 1973, pp353-354
36 MacDonald, The killing of Heydrich, ppl39 8c 152-153 & J. Cvancara, Nekomu zivot, nekomu smrt,
Prague, 1997, p77.
37 See HS 4 / 35 for details on Cannonbury I, 26 April 1942, and Cannonbury II, 4 May 1942,
38 On the problems SOE experienced see Dilks (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pp312-313, K. 
Philby, My Silent War, London, 1968, ppl8-19 & Wilkinson & Bright Astley, Gubbins & SOE, pp87-89 &
pp100-I02.
19 Wilkinson & Bright Astley, Gubbins cfe SOE,, ppl40-141.
40 Note on Czech Resistance 1939 to 1943, Wilkinson, October 1979. In Wilkinson’s private papers at the 
Imperial War Museum.
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head of SOE’s Czech section, later made it clear that not only was the operation 
completely planned and controlled by the Czechoslovaks, but that SOE never revealed its 
involvement to the SIS or the Foreign Office.41 A mere handful of SOE officers, no more 
than twelve, knew about the proposed mission and few people, apart from Churchill, 
were informed of SOE’s role.42 There were good reasons for such secrecy, not least 
because had SOE’s involvement been advertised it was unlikely the assassination would 
have been sanctioned. The Foreign Office would have most certainly balked at the idea, 
as any announcement that SOE had embarked on a policy of assassination would have 
brought many unwelcome political repercussions. As Frank Roberts later noted, 
‘However much we may welcome Heydrich’s fate it is not, I imagine, the policy of H.M. 
Government to go out of their way to glorify political assassinations.’43 In the event, SOE 
was more than happy for Moravec and Benes to claim that the resistance in the 
Protectorate had carried out the assassination by itself, even though SOE’s role was later 
used (within strictly delineated parameters) as an example of its effectiveness.
Exactly who ordered the assassination on the Czechoslovak side is more difficult 
to ascertain. Moravec stated in his biography that the decision was made in collaboration 
with Benes, yet evidence in the SOE files undermines this interpretation.44 In fact, these 
records suggest that the Czechoslovak military authorities had already considered 
pursuing a policy of selective assassinations as early as October 1939.45 Plans for the 
assassination of key quisling officials, code-named Iron, were made in the autumn of
41 HS 4 / 39 Most secret message regarding Anthropoid, Wilkinson to Gubbins, 22 June 1942. It was only 
after the end of war in 1945 that the truth about the attack began to appear in the press see The Daily 
Telegraph, 2 June 1945, by Seaghan Mayes.
42 HS 8/250 SOE Headquarters’ reports to the Prime Minister, March to June 1942, p7.
43 FO 371 30848 C5922/5404/12, Roberts minutes, 10 June 1942.
44 Moravec, Master of Spies, p213.
43 HS 4 / 31  Meeting between Gubbins and Colonel Josef Kalla, 10 October 1939.
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1942, re-examined by Benes in January 1943 and briefly revived in May 1944.46 
Moreover, the files suggest that Benes had to be convinced of the advisability of the 
operation, although by who is unclear.47 The most likely interpretation is that Moravec, or 
one of his close advisors, instigated the plan, which then was accepted by Benes, before 
SOE was approached in October 1941.
The majority of Czechoslovak emigres in Britain were not told of these plans, nor 
were the resistance organisations in the Protectorate.48 When the resistance did discover 
the identity of the assassins’ target, after being asked to assist the agents while they were 
in Prague, the resistance demanded that the whole operation be cancelled.49 In fact, the 
consequences of the assassination were as dire as they had predicted and effectively 
obliterated the non-Communist resistance and severed its links to London/0 After the 
attack, and Heydrich’s subsequent death, Benes maintained that the resistance itself had 
carried out the operation, publicly declaring this to be the case in a broadcast on the 
BBC.51 He never formally admitted his involvement during his lifetime (there is little 
documentary evidence to connect him with it) and this was perhaps unsurprising given 
the resistance’s objections and the costly retribution exacted on the population of the 
Protectorate.52 These considerations reinforce the thesis that the assassination was
46 See HS 4/4 The Iron mission, see also Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historie 
ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, p310.
47 HS 4/ 39 Report on Anthropoid mission by Wilkinson, 30 May 1942.
48 HS 4/ 39 internal SOE minutes, 23 July 1942, and reply.
49 For text of original message from the resistance in the Protectorate to London see V. Krai, Otdzky 
hospoddkskeho a socdlniho vyoje v ceskych zemich v letech 1938-1945, Prague, 1957-1959, Vol III pp 242- 
243. For SOE’s copy of the interception of the same message see HS 4 /39 Intercepted German radio 
transmission, 26 May 1942.
50 HS 8/196 Minutes of meetings of Foreign Office/SOE liaison committee, 6 October 1942.
31 P. Tigrid, Kcipesnipruvodce inteligentmzenypo vlastnim osudu, Toronto, 1988, p i56.
32 The actual number of Czechs that lost their lives, as a result of the assassination is difficult ascertain, but 
it was somewhere between 2000-5000 in total. See Luza, ‘The Czech resistance movement,’ in Mamatey & 
Luza (eds), A Histoiy of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp353-354 fn.
undertaken for political rationales, not least to prove the vitality of resistance in the 
Protectorate, to both the British and the Soviet governments, and to avenge Heydrich’s 
destruction of Moravec’s intelligence networks. It is also possible that the assassination 
may have been viewed by SOE as a way to help secure its own position and ingratiate 
itself with the Czechoslovaks, by aiding, what was in effect a politicised Czechoslovak 
operation, which had few wider strategic or tactical benefits for Britain. Additionally, it 
was hoped that such support might reverse Moravec’s cautious approach to subversive 
operations in the Protectorate and thus encourage the escalation of sabotage work there, 
thus reinforcing SOE’s own reputation at a critical juncture.
It should be noted, however, that such a suggestion is rather speculative and that 
after Heydrich’s death many members of SOE felt that Moravec had been playing them 
off against the SIS to his own advantage.53 This was only possible because 
Czechoslovak-SIS relations were far closer than those with SOE and these two British 
organisations were often in competition over resources and how best to conduct 
operations in occupied Europe. In the aftermath of the assassination, however, these 
objectives were not achieved and the Czechoslovaks seemed, at least to some in SOE, to 
lose all interest in subversive activities in the Protectorate, not least as many of the 
resistance networks had been destroyed and the majority of those agents sent from Britain 
had been arrested or killed.54 In fact, Moravec went so far as to state that the ‘Protectorate 
was an unsuitable country for subversive operations,’ and he continued to focus on 
intelligence gathering and preparations for ‘national uprisings’ later in the war.523
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53 HS 4/4 letter from unnamed Major in SOE to Broadway Buildings (the SIS offices), 15 April 1943.
54 MacDonald, The Killing of Heydrich, pi 91-200.
33 HS 7 / 108  Keary et al, SOE Country History: Czechoslovakia, p 12.
As a result of these events SOE’s initial enthusiasm for Moravec and the 
Czechoslovaks began to wane. With the collapse of the western orientated resistance in 
the Protectorate, SOE and SIS collaborated to strip the Czechoslovaks of control of their 
secret radio codes and their operational autonomy.56 This action was undertaken because 
it had became apparent to SOE and the SIS that prior to June 1942 neither had had 
received any ‘first-hand’ information from the Protectorate, as both were entirely reliant 
on ‘second-hand’ de-coded information passed on by Moravec?7 Although this 
information had once been highly valued and taken on trust, after the assassination this 
was no longer the case.58 In fact, the level of trust between SOE and Moravec had sunk 
so low that on 21 October 1942 Alfgar Hesketh-Pritchard, of SOE’s Czech section, stole 
a radio log book from a Czechoslovak transmitter station in Dunstable to show 
Gubbins.59 An anonymous SOE memorandum went so far as to state that,
In face of the disturbing effect of such actions [the assassination] on steady 
underground work, it seems that the emigre Government is willing to risk 
reprisals at home and repercussions on its own position and political aims, 
but not for tactical SOE aims.60
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56 HS 4 /I Record of a luncheon given by Lord Selborne for President Benes, General S. Ingr and Colonel 
Moravec, also present were members of SOE’s Czech Section on 24 September 1942.
57 HS 4 / 277 Detailed outline of operational activities in the Protectorate after the summer of 1942, p 142, 
HS 4/4 SOE internal minute, 1 May 1943, & briefing paper for Gubbins, 5 January 1944.
58 HS 4 / 5 on 9 July 1943 a report was forwarded to SOE from Ambassador Nichols and the Foreign 
Office.
59 HS 7/277 SOE’s War Diary for Poland and Czechoslovakia, p36.
60 HS 4/5 SOE Memorandum on Czech activity May 1942 to May 1943, 13 May 1943.
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Henceforth, SOE, SIS and later the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), took 
control of all operations to the Protectorate and Slovakia, and joint planning and working 
committees were established for this purpose.61 Czechoslovak military intelligence and 
the sending of agents to the Protectorate was placed under far stricter SOE/SIS control, 
and they laboriously tried to re-establish resistance networks in the Protectorate during 
1943 and 1944.
Moravec’s standing within the intelligence community and the operational 
autonomy he had previously enjoyed was therefore seriously curtailed. SOE’s relations 
with him also began to deteriorate, to the point where plans were made to oust Moravec 
and replace him with General Miroslav and even to close SOE’s Czech section 
altogether.62 Heydrich’s actions in the Protectorate had, quite simply, undermined the 
most important asset that Benes and his government had at their disposal. Nevertheless, 
Benes managed to use the assassination to his advantage and the Foreign Office was 
obliged to compromise on a number of political issues as a consequence. Thus the kudos 
and political leverage once provided by Moravec’s intelligence organisation, the regular 
Czechoslovak armed forces in Britain and the resistance in the Protectorate had, in effect, 
served their political purpose and Benes’s interest in these assets declined 
correspondingly.
From the middle of 1942 onwards Benes and his government turned their 
attention to regularising their international position. These developments were firmly
61 HS 7/277 SOE’s War Diary for Poland and Czechoslovakia, pp7 & 89 & HS 7 / 108 Keary et al, SOE 
Country History: Czechoslovakia,ppl 1-12. Weekly planning meetings began in the summer of 1942. An 
Anglo-Czechoslovak Planning committee met for the first time on 5 October 1942 to plan future 
operations.
62 HS 4 / 7 Memorandum by Perkins, 18 September 1942. General Miroslav was an officer in 
Czechoslovak military intelligence and he operated under a now de guerre, his real name was Bedfich 
Neumann. Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historie ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, p807-808.
located in the diplomatic arena and collaboration with SOE, which had never been an 
overriding priority, largely fell into abeyance during 1943 and early 1944. SOE was well 
aware of these factors and it was noted in May 1943 that, ‘The general impression was 
that the Czechs had made extremely good use of their early evacuation to Great Britain; 
and that they were trading heavily on the shocking treatment which was meted out to 
them in 1938.’63
As the tide of the war turned resistance movements across Europe began to 
prepare uprisings in support of (or in some cases to disrupt) the approaching allied 
armies, actions that were meant to be the culmination of SOE’s work in occupied 
Europe.64 SOE’s operations with the resistance in France, in support of the Normandy 
landings in June 1944 proved to be relatively successful, as was its continued support for 
Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia.65 Yet, SOE’s inability to support the uprisings in Warsaw 
and Slovakia, both of which commenced in August 1944, proved to have serious political 
repercussions. Even though the British authorities had no direct involvement in the 
planning, timing or tactical direction of the Slovak uprising they became involved when 
the Czechoslovak government in exile made repeated requests for support, both political 
and military, for the insurgents. Moreover, unlike the assassination of Heydrich, about 
which the Central Department was not informed, the uprising in Slovakia was of direct 
concern to the Foreign Office. Britain’s failure to support the Slovak uprising meant that 
only the Soviet Union sent military assistance to the insurgents and the Red Army’s 
subsequent occupation raised the question of heightened Communist influence in the
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63 HS 4/5 SOE Memorandum on Czech activity May 1942 to May 1943, dated 13 May 1943.
64 HS 7/11 History of Special Operations (Air) in the Mediterranean Theatre, pp74-77.
65 Foot, SOE, pp317-324.
region.66 This was a development that undermined Benes’s policy of maintaining equality 
in his relations with the western and eastern allies and belatedly resulted in the British 
government’s attempts to encourage American forces to liberate Prague in May 1945. 
Therefore, some of the background planning for the uprising must be examined, even 
though it was a Czechoslovak affair, in order fully to comprehend the British position.
While the uprising had Benes’s backing, and the government in exile was 
involved in its preparations from late 1943 onwards, the revolt revealed some troubling 
divisions amongst the various groups that were involved in its organisation, not least the 
differences between the political exiles in Britain, the insurgents in Slovakia and their 
respective political organs, such as the Slovemkd narodna rada (the Slovak National 
Council).67 These divisions caused serious problems for the commanders of the uprising 
and exposed just how unwilling some Slovaks were to rejoin a Czechoslovak state.68 
These issues demonstrated that, although Benes’s control over the emigres in Britain was 
(largely) secure, as was his stewardship of the exiled government’s foreign policy, his 
authority over the population back home was far more tenuous. This was a crucial 
consideration, as it would mean that the Czechoslovak emigres in London were unable to 
fulfil a key precondition imposed by SOE; that support would only be forthcoming if the 
uprising was triggered by a prearranged signal from London.69 Yet, while the uprising 
eventually failed it did help remove the stigma of Slovakia’s collaboration with Nazi
66 C. Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin’s Cold War. Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943-1956, Manchester, 1995, pp35- 
67.
67 G. Husak, Svedechn o slovenskem ndroduim posvstdni, Prague, 1974, A. Josko, ‘The Slovak Resistance 
Movement,’ in Mamatey & Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp370-380, V. Precan 
(ed), Slovenske ndrodne povstanie. Dokumenty, Bratislava, 1966 & E. Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, 
Cambridge, 1973, pp57-59 & pp60-76.
6S Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, pp74-75
69 HS 7/277 SOE’s War Diary for Poland and Czechoslovakia, p94 & Precan (ed), Slovenske ndrodne 
povstanie, pS5.
290
29!
Germany and reversed the rather lack-lustre performance of resistance in Czechoslovakia 
since 1942.
Preparations for the Slovak uprising can be traced as far back as the summer of 
1943, even before Benes’s talks with Stalin in December when he inquired about Soviet 
military assistance for a possible revolt on Czechoslovak territory.70 While he was there 
the Soviets had made it clear to Benes that they were unimpressed with the current levels 
of resistance in the Protectorate and Slovakia. These complaints had an immediate effect 
and, upon his return to London, he made explicit reference to the need to encourage 
resistance in Czechoslovak territory in a keynote speech to the State Council on 9 
February 1944.71 Nevertheless, the Soviet Union agreed to support the rising even though 
Slovakia was an Axis power and her soldiers had fought on the eastern front.72 By April 
the Ukrainian Partisan Staff was training Czechoslovak partisans and preparing to send 
them back into Slovakia.73
However, whereas the Soviet Union had agreed to support an uprising in 
Slovakia, the British authorities neither believed such a revolt possible nor agreed to offer 
any assistance prior to its commencement. This contrast was made all the more striking 
by the fact that that SOE had been informed of the possibility of an uprising in Slovakia 
before the Soviet authorities. The subject had first been raised at a meeting between 
Miroslav, Gubbins (now the head of SOE) and Harold Perkins on 10 July 1943. During
70 Otahalova & Cervinkova (eds), Dokumenty z historie ceskoslovenske politiky, Vol. 1, pp742-743 and 
Precan (ed), Slovenske ndrodne povstanie, ppl 17-118 & the minutes of Benes talk with General G. S. 
Zhukov, 18 December 1943, and General A. Hasal’s talks with Zhukov, 5 January 1944, and with the 
Soviet Army authorities, 2 March 1944. All in Nemecek, et al, Ceskoslovensko-sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, 
p 174-177, 191-194 & 232-237.
71 FO 371 38927 C2987/134/12 Nichols to Roberts, 2 March 1944.
72 Josko, ‘The Slovak Resistance Movement,’ in Mamatey & Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak 
Republic, pp373-375.
73 J. Erickson, The Road to Berlin. Stalin’s War with Germany, Vol. 2, London, 1999, p292.
these talks SOE agreed to deliver arms for up to 50,000 men, to transport 500 
Czechoslovak parachutists to the region, to transfer Czechoslovak fighter squadrons in 
Britain to airfields in the vicinity and to have the RAF bomb strategic targets. Although 
these were generous terms, there is little evidence that SOE had either the logistical or 
political ability to implement this agreement.
In addition, Miroslav mentioned that 80% of Slovak soldiers were opposed to the 
Tiso regime in Bratislava and that plans for a revolt were already in hand, although the 
timing would be spontaneous. To which Gubbins replied,
a) that he could only secure the equipment requested in Miroslav’s letter 
if he could show the COS the strength and location of the resistance 
groups who would use the equipment;
b) that aircraft would only be made available to convey large scale 
airborne support to Czechoslovakia if the rising was organised to take 
place at a signal given from this country.74
This reply was entirely indicative of SOE’s previous experiences with the Czechoslovak 
military authorities and their suspicion that such ‘secret armies’ were in fact non-existent. 
The Czechoslovaks repeated their claim that elements within the Slovakian army were
prepared to fight in support of the allies in a later meeting with SOE on 29 September
1943, but SOE did not go beyond the terms of Gubbins’s earlier reply.75 On 14 December 
General Sergej Ingr, the Czechoslovak Minister for Defence, sent another official enquiry
14 HS 7/277 SOE’s War Diary for Poland and Czechoslovakia, pp90-91 & 94.
73 HS 7/277 SOE’s War Diary for Poland and Czechoslovakia, pp l35-136.
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to Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Nye, Vice-chief of the Imperial General Staff. Once 
again SOE responded by stating that it felt resistance in Slovakia was non-existent and 
that it wanted to see more credible evidence of these preparations before any definitive 
plans were drawn up.76
Benes’s speech to the State Council in February 1944 was well received in 
London and Roberts noted that, The Czechs want to be on good terms with everyone- 
and who shall blame them! They have taken Russian strictures on their passivity at home 
to heart.’77 Both the SIS and SOE were made aware of this development, but continued to 
view the possibility of an uprising with scepticism.78 They reiterated their doubts after yet 
another meeting with Miroslav 011 29 March when he stated that Slovak divisions would 
be prepared to resist if the Germans tried to disarm them. The War Office’s intelligence 
department replied that they already had been disarmed and that they knew of no viable
1 • 79resistance organisations in the region.
By April 1944, therefore, SOE had still not offered any assistance for the uprising, 
unlike the Soviet Union, and spent much of the first half of the year complaining to 
ambassador Philip Nichols and the Foreign Office about the lack of Czechoslovak co­
operation in organising subversive warfare.80 In fact, relations between SOE and the 
appropriate Czechoslovak military authorities had reached a low point by 1944.81 Indeed, 
when rumours reached the Central Department in February that Benes was talking with 
the United States and the Soviet Union about a possible insurrection in Slovakia these
76 WO 216/99 Ingr to Nye, 14 December 1943, and subsequent minutes 23 December 1943.
77 FO 371 38927 C2987/134/12 Roberts minute, 7 March 1944.
78 FO 371 38927 C2564/134/12 Roberts minute, 25 March 1944, on talks with the SIS and SOE.
79 HS 7/277 SOE’s War Diary for Poland and Czechoslovakia, p 186.
80 HS 4/4 Draft briefing paper for Gubbins on SOE-Czechoslovak relations, 5 January 1944.
81 FO 371 38927 C1619/134/12 Nichols to Roberts, 1 February 1944.
were immediately dismissed as further examples of the President ‘talking big.’82 No 
mention was made of a possible uprising at either of the monthly Foreign Office-SOE 
committee meetings in April or May.83 Finally, talks between the British COS, the 
Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, and the Czechoslovak military authorities had made it plain that they 
considered Czechoslovakia to lie outside the west’s sphere of military responsibility, in 
line with the decisions made at the Allied conference at Tehran.84
So not only did the Foreign Office and SOE feel that any uprising was 
improbable, but they also made it plain that any such insurrection would not be their 
responsibility. In fact, the Foreign Office only began to consider the question after it had 
received an official request from Miroslav, on 14 July 1944, for Britain to send supplies 
for a planned revolt in Slovakia at the end of the month.85 Roberts noted,
It is relevant to mention that hitherto SOE have been most dissatisfied with 
their contact with the Czechoslovak government...SOE are therefore 
particularly anxious not to rebuff this proposal, which should easily be 
carried out as it only involves two or three flights...It may seem odd that 
the Czechs should consult us in this matter. This is, however, consistent
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meetings on 12 April and 9 May 1944. See also HS 8/197 Minutes of Foreign Office/SOE liaison 
committee meetings 15 February 1944 and 12 April 1944.
84 FO 371 38927 C2564/134/12 from Charles Peake, Political Liaison Officer with Supreme Allied 
Commander, to Central Department, 16 February 1944.
83 FO 371 38927 C9350/134/12 Perkins to Roberts, 14 July 1944. Miroslav originally sent the request to
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with their recent policy, which is to avoid becoming too exclusively 
associated with and dependent on the Russians.86
It seems, therefore, that the British authorities were willing to help supply a revolt for 
political reasons, with a token number of flights, and as long as the Soviets agreed. But 
this was a far cry from SOE’s earlier promise to send equipment for 50,000 men. A letter 
was dispatched to the British Ambassador in Moscow requesting that he ascertain the 
Soviet position and that if 110 reply had been received by 7 August then SOE would send 
supplies regardless, a tactic developed to compensate for the Soviets’ irregular responses
o n
to official British requests. Although the Soviet Union never replied, the lack of any 
response had already been anticipated and circumvented by the Foreign Office.
But this policy was complicated by the Warsaw uprising which started on 1 
August 1944 and which the COS had originally refused to support believing that it was 
operationally impossible. The uprising, therefore, placed the British in an awkward 
position. On the one hand they wished to help the Poles if they could (after all such 
risings were SOE’s raison d ’etre), but on the other hand these events threatened to 
destabilise relations with Moscow. SOE, however, had always enjoyed closer relations 
with the Poles than with the Czechoslovaks and this appreciation translated into
86 FO 371 38927 C9782/341/12 Roberts minute 19 July 1944.
87 FO 371 38927 C9782/341/12 Central Department to Clark Kerr, 31 July 1944 & FO 371 38941
Cl 1068/1343/12 Clark Kerr to A. Vyshinsky, 1 August 1944. Vyshiskiy’s reply of 6 August stated that 
Soviet military authorities were considering this question.
ss Ciechanowski, The Warsaw Uprising, p67, Danchev & Todman (eds), Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries, pp 
581-582 & p584, Dillcs (ed), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pp652-653, Foot, SOE, pp273-277, J. 
Garlinski, Poland, SOE and the Allies, London, 1969, pp l67-206, Harrison, ‘The British Special 
Operations Executive and Poland,’ The Historical Journal, pp l083-1089 & E. Raczynski, In Allied 
London, London, 1962, pp320-32.
89 For details of Anglo-Soviet relations during the Uprising and internal British deliberations on this subject 
see M. Kitchen, British Policy towards the Soviet Union, London, 1986, pp220-232 and P Wilkinson & J 
Bright Astley, Gubbins & SOE, London, 1993, pp201-207.
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continued autonomy for Polish military intelligence, priority access to materials and 
transport facilities and the ability of the insurgents on the ground to instigate an uprising 
without consulting London.90 But once the revolt began SOE did send re-supply flights to 
Warsaw at no small cost in men and machines, although their failure to send more 
ultimately created a rift between SOE and the Polish government in exile.91 Nevertheless, 
due to the inherent difficulties involved the uprising failed, with huge loss of life, on 1 
October. Fifty years later, debate still rages whether the failure of the rising was the result 
of deliberate Soviet policies or a combination of other factors such as unrealistic 
objectives and a lack of co-ordination.92 This experience had a direct effect on how the 
British authorities dealt with the events in Slovakia.
The outbreak of the Slovak uprising seems to have caught both Benes and the 
British authorities by surprise and apart from the solitary letter to Moscow no joint policy 
had been agreed.93 One of the causes for the unexpected start of the rising was the arrest 
and execution of the German military mission to Romania, led by General Paul von Otto, 
by Soviet partisans dropped into the region in late August. Partly as a result of this 
provocative act and partly due to Berlin’s growing concerns over Slovakia’s reliability, 
German and Hungarian forces began to occupy the country on 28 August.94 The uprising 
commenced the following day, under the auspices of the multi-party Slovak National
90 HS 7/277 SOE’s War Diary for Poland and Czechoslovakia, p34. Wilkinson’s meeting with Moravec, 9 
September 1942 HS 7/277 SOE’s War Diary for Poland and Czechoslovakia, p34. Wilkinson’s meeting 
with Moravec, 9 September 1942 & HS 7/9 History of the Special Duties Operations in Europe (Airforce),
1939-1945, Parts 11 & III, ppl 16-117 & ppl 18-124. See also Wilkinson, Foreign Fields, pp67-73 & 
Wilkinson & Bright Astley, Gubbins & SOE, pp38-49.
91 Harrison, T he  British Special Operations Executive and Poland,’ The Historical Journal, ppl 086-1089.
92 See Wilkinson & Bright Astley, Gubbins & SOE, pp206-207 & Erickson. The Road to Berlin, pp246- 
290.
93 FO 371 38927 C10289/134/12 Political Warfare Executive directive, 31 August 1944. See Masaryk’s 
telegram to Fierlinger in Moscow requesting Soviet assistance to the insurgents, 30 August 1944, in J. 
Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovensko-sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, p279.
94 Precan (ed), Slovenske ndrodne povstanie, pp334-335.
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Council and the Military Centre headed by Lieutenant Colonel Jan Golian, who was loyal 
to Benes.95 This proved to be a serious problem as SOE had warned the Czechoslovaks 
that any uprising would only be successful if prior arrangements with them had been 
made.96 These events presented the Foreign Office with a new set of difficult problems 
on top of the troubling situation in Warsaw. While they were fully aware of the 
advantages to be had by lending support to the Slovaks these had to be balanced against 
some very real logistical problems and the Soviet Union’s position.97
On 31 August 1944 Ingr wrote to Field Marshall Alan Brooke, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, asking for British support for the insurgents in Slovakia.98 
Discussions on this issue ranged across a number of bodies and departments - the COS, 
War Cabinet, Foreign Office and SOE.99 Predictably, the primary conclusions were to 
collect more information, liase further with the Soviets and proceed cautiously, not least 
in order to avoid what was referred to as the ‘Polish pitfall.’100 All of these were 
eminently sensible recommendations from the British perspective, but of little help to the 
insurgents on the ground or to the Czechoslovak government in London. Hubert Ripka 
then requested that the Slovak forces be given the same belligerent status as the Polish 
Home Army and the French Forces of the Interior.101 This request was soon granted by
93 Precan (ed), Slovenske ndrodnepovstanie, pp398-399, E. Cejka, Ceskoslovensky odboj naZapade, 
Prague, 1997, p 431 & M. Churan et al (ed), Kdo byl kdo, Vol I , Prague, 1998, pl74.
96 FO 371 38941 Cl 1772/1343/12 Roberts minute on Nichols’s talks with SOE, 31 August 1944 & 
Wilkinson & Bright Astley, Gubbins & SOE, pp201-202.
97 FO 371 38941 C 11772/1343/12 Roberts minutes, 31 August 1944, & FO 371 38942 C12213/1343/12 
Harrison minute on talks with Perkins, 9 September 1944.
9S WO 216/99 Ingr to Alan Brooke, 31 August 1944.
99 HS 8/197 Minutes of Foreign Office/SOE liaison committee meetings. 33r<l meeting, 19 September 1944 
& 34th meeting 10 October 1944.
100 FO 371 38941 C 11772/1343/12 minutes by Oliver Harvey, 31 August 1944, Sargent 1 September 1944 
and Eden 2 September.
101 FO 371 38941 Cl 1702/1343/12 Nichols to Central Department, 2 September 1944.
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the United States and the Soviet Union and, rather belatedly, by the British.102 
Nevertheless, the Slovak insurgents (referred to as the Czechoslovak Forces of the 
Interior - CFI) were eventually recognised as allied forces by all the Great Powers.
The lack of prior Anglo-Czechoslovak consultation on this issue was used by the 
COS to defend their decision to refuse to send any re-supply flights in early
109September. The COS were mindful of the difficulties in the re-supply of isolated 
forces, the continuing issues related to the Warsaw revolt and the fact that the Soviets 
were already sending men and materials to Slovakia.104 As a result, by the end of 
September, the COS decided not to help re-supply the CFI and concluded that air 
operations would best be conducted by the Soviets.105 The American Chiefs of Staff 
reiterated this decision on 22 September.106 A parallel request by Ingr for American 
support, especially for the bombing of tactical targets by the United States Army Air 
Force (USAAF) on 1 September was also refused.107 Nichols informed Benes of this fact 
on 7 September, stating that Slovakia was in the Soviet operational sphere and that it was 
unlikely that the West would be able to offer any assistance. 108 Benes was at pains to
102 FO 371 38943 C14160/1343/12 Foreign Office minute, 13 October 1944. The United States had 
unilaterally granted belligerent status to the Slovak insurgents on 7 September 1944. See FO 371 38942 
Cl 1939/1343/12 Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, 8 September 1944. Britain recognised their belligerent 
status on 9 October 1944.
103 FO 371 38942 C12068/1343/12 From Offices of War Cabinet to Foreign Office, 5 September 1944
104 HS 7 / 108 Keary et al, SOE Country History: Czechoslovakia, Appendix C, The Slovak Uprising, 
Henry Threlfall’s report, p 1-3. Precan (ed), Slovenslce narodne povstcinie, p545, See also Erickson. The 
Road to Berlin, p300 & pp303-304, F. Fajtl, Prvni doma, Prague, 1974, V Pfilcryl, Za vlady tiny, Prague, 
1993 & L Svoboda, Z Buzuluku do Prahy, Prague, 1967, pp 267-275.
105 WO 216/99 Ingr to Alan Brooke, 31 August 1944 and Joint Staff Mission, Washington, to COS 23 
September 1944 & FO 371 38942 C l2077/1343/12 Foreign Office to Moscow Embassy, 9 September
1944.
106 Josko, ‘The Slovak Resistance Movement,’ in Mamatey & Luza (eds), A History o f the Czechoslovak 
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107 WO 216/2384 G-3 Records, SHAEF Operations, September 1944 to May 1945, Ingr to Colonel W. 
Dunn, American military attache to the Allied forces, London, 1 September 1944, reply from Brigadier 
General A.S Nevins, 14 September 1944.
108 FO 371 38942 Cl 2076/1343/12 Nichols to Foreign Office, 7 September 1944.
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stress that he did not want the uprising to ‘make trouble in any way,5 adding that ‘If those 
plans [Allied strategy] made it impossible to grant such assistance he would understand, 
but he hoped, nevertheless that they would be able to help.’109 This was a pragmatic 
position to take since the events in Warsaw, and the resulting effect on inter-Allied 
relations, were uppermost in the minds of all concerned.110 Moreover, the Soviets were 
already assisting insurgents and the Red Army had begun to fight its way towards the 
areas they held.111
This is not to suggest, however, that the western allies did not offer any support to 
the uprising, but rather that it was insufficient and sporadic.112 Several SOE trained 
agents were already in Slovakia and joined the CFI, providing them with a radio link to 
London.113 On the 17 September a joint SOE/OSS/MI9 operation flew in more agents and 
some supplies to Tri Duby (an airfield held by the CFI) and left with fifteen allied 
airmen.114 But this was not an official mission and its primary purpose was to rescue 
those allied airmen downed while bombing the Romanian oil fields the previous June and 
July.113 An official mission was planned, code-named Mica, but was never sent.116 Thus, 
by default, Major John Sehmer, who had been originally bound for Hungary, and an OSS
109 FO 371 38942 C l2076/1343/12 Nichols to Foreign Office, 7 September 1944.
' 10 Kitchen, British Policy towards the Soviet Union, pp241-246.
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‘Slovakia,’ in I.C.D. Dear & M.R.D Foot (eds), The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford, 
2001,p788.
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mission led by Lieutenant James Holt-Green became the official western representatives 
to the CFI, though they were unable to secure the extra arms and equipment they urgently 
required.117 The Germans captured both these teams in late December 1944, after the 
rising had collapsed, and some were executed while others were sent to concentration 
camps. SOE headquarters was unaware of their fate and on 21 January 1945 a last 
desperate attempt was made to contact them by sending a lone, long-range fighter aircraft 
into the Slovak mountains.119
The British authorities also helped General Rudolf Viest fly to Slovakia from 
London to take charge of the 1st Czechoslovak Insurgent Army at Banska Bystrica.120 He 
was accompanied by a political delegation of other exiles who had left for the liberated 
territories in late August via Moscow.121 This was a move designed to try to overcome 
the increasingly strained relations between the various military and political groups 
involved in the uprising and to bring the revolt more closely under Benes’s control.122 
This was only partially successful and may have actually helped increase the tensions 
between the Communist and non-Communist elements within Slovakia and Sub- 
Carpathian Ruthenia.123
117 FO 371 38943 C14770/1343/12, Report from Major J. Sehmer with SOE mission to Slovakia, October 
1944.
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Finally, on 7 October SOE launched Operation Quartz from Italy, led by Major 
Henry Threlfall, which brought more supplies and based with Golian who stressed his 
desperate need for arms and bomber support. On his return Threlfall noted,
Altogether a most interesting and enjoyable excursion...it was in fact a 
very moving one, and the visit to that small army, which is doing its best 
with the most slender resources imaginable, really did make one 
understand rather better the human element involved in the phrase 
‘Resistance Movements’ which is such a common and everyday 
occurrence in the mass of paper we have to deal with. Golian and his 
officers were very dignified and reasonable, but there is no doubt they 
need help badly, and I feel it is up to us to do whatever we can.124
Threlfall also brought back with him three members of the Slovak National Council who 
then travelled on to Britain for consultations with Benes and his government.125 Jan 
Urslny, Laco Novomesky and Lieutenant Colonel Miroslav Vesel arrived in Britain on or 
around 13 October for meetings with both Czechoslovak and British representatives, and 
staged a press conference before returning to Slovakia on 14 November.126 This was a
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visit that demonstrated to the Central Department the increasing difficulties that Benes 
and his government were now experiencing in their relations with the Slovaks.127
In response to an enquiry from General Ingr on 27 September 1944 regarding 
future support for a possible rising in the Protectorate and Threlfall’s appeal the Central 
Department re-opened the debate on support for the insurgents, in part because they did 
not want ‘to leave the Czechoslovak Government with the impression that we are no 
longer interested in events in Czechoslovakia and that we regard them as being entirely in 
the Soviet sphere of interest.’128 The COS duly reconsidered this question on 7 October 
and again on 16 October, but on both occasions concluded that the Soviets were best 
placed to help.129 They even castigated SOE for exceeding the directives it had been 
given on 20 March 1943, and for encouraging the Czechoslovaks to expect assistance 
from Britain.130 This was a charge that SOE strenuously denied, but one that seemed to 
have motivated Ingr’s earlier request.131 Nevertheless, the COS made it clear that not 
only would no supplies be sent to Slovakia, but that no assistance would be offered to any 
future uprising in the Protectorate.132 Consequently, the Czechoslovak authorities 
attempted to have the Czechoslovak squadrons under the RAF’s command in Britain
127 FO 371 38930 C l6976/224/12 Nichols to Eden, 5 December 1944, & Roberts minute 13 December 
1944, see also J. Bloomfield, Passive Revolution. Politics and the Czechoslovak Working Class, 1945-8, 
London, 1979, pp34~38.
123 FO 371 38927 C13611/134/12 Text of Ingr’s request Assistance to the Czechoslovak Home Army in 
Bohemia and Moravia, 27 September 1944 & FO 371 38943 C l4312/1343/12 Foreign Office to Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, 14 October 1944.
129 CAB 79/80 COS (44) 331st meeting, 7 October 1944 & COS (44) 339th meeting, 16 October 1944.
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131 FO 371 38942 C14121/1342/12 Gubbins to Foreign Office, 13 October 1944.
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transferred to the liberated territories, in order that they might undertaken re-supply 
missions, but this request was also refused.133
According to Nichols, Benes was unhappy with the COS’s decision, as were those 
members of the Slovak National Council in London.134 Benes felt that the British were 
willing to see ‘her [Czechoslovakia] enter definitively and permanently the Soviet sphere 
of political influence...’, accusations Nichols sought to dispel by stressing the purely 
military and logistical nature of the COS’s decision.135 After this meeting Nichols made 
one last request to Eden for military supplies to be sent.136 Thus, for the final time the 
COS considered this question on 27 October and again rejected these calls. They 
reasoned that,
It is at least arguable whether it is not better from the point of view of 
prestige to stand firm on the principle that we cannot help at all rather that 
to render token assistance which benefits nobody and merely leads to 
appeals for additional help which cannot be met...they [COS] view with 
apprehension the prospect of being committed to supporting a rising which 
has every appearance of proving abortive.137
The Central Department continued to stress the political case, however, and Alexander 
Cadogan even approached the Prime Minister on 31 October, but the reply was the same
133 FO 371 38944 C 16468/1343/ 12 Archibald Sinclair, Air Ministry, to Eden, 23 November 1944, and 
subsequent discussions up until 22 December 1944. See also A. Brown, Airmen in Exile, Stroud, 2000, pp 
116-118.
134 FO 371 38943 C14652/1343/12 Nichols to Eden, 20 October 1944.
135 FO 371 38943 C l4664/1343/12 Nichols to Foreign Office, 23 October 1944.
136 FO 371 38943 C l4772/1343/12 Nichols to Eden, 23 October 1944.
137 FO 371 38943 C14863/1343/12 General Leslie Hollis, COS, to Foreign Office, 27 October 1944.
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-  the military arguments were decisive and any re-supply would only now ‘prolong the 
agony? 138 By the end of October these discussions had become largely academic as the 
uprising had faltered, overwhelmed by superior German forces and the remnants of the 
CFI retreated to the mountains to await the arrival of the Red Army.139
Much historiographical debate continues to surround the Slovak uprising, 
especially since these events fell hostage to competing the Cold War versions of 
history.140 But several key conclusions can now be made in the light of new archival 
research. First, that most of the operational planning for the uprising had been undertaken 
between the various Czech and Slovak political organs involved and the relevant Soviet 
military authorities. SOE’s and the OSS’s involvement was extremely limited prior to the 
outbreak of the revolt, even though they had been forewarned. Second, the Soviets did 
indeed send significant levels of men and materials to support the uprising, as well as 
launching a major operation to break through to the areas held by the CFI.141 That these 
proved insufficient was not necessarily an indication of a lack of Soviet willingness to 
lend support, even though this was the conclusion that the Czechoslovak government in 
exile eventually reached.142 This was an interpretation of events that the Foreign Office
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142 HS 7 / 108  Keary et al, SOE Country History: Czechoslovakia, p i2.
and the COS were more than happy to accept as it neatly diverted attention from their 
own refusal to sent assistance.143
Third, under the terms of the military agreements made at the Tehran conference 
the previous December Czechoslovakia had been placed in the Soviet sphere of military 
operations and given the west’s military position in the autumn of 1944 there was little 
reason to alter this situation. As a result, there were no overriding tactical reasons for the 
western allies to send supplies to a rising about which they (so it was believed) had little 
forewarning and from which they were geographically distant. These considerations 
underpinned the British COS’s decision not to approve requests for re-supply flights, 
despite the fact that both the Foreign Office and SOE repeatedly stressed the political 
advantages to be gained by doing so. Although the Central Department did not want 
Benes and his government to think that they had been left solely to the tender mercies of 
the Soviets there was very little they could actually do to dissuade him from this (largely 
accurate) perception.
Fourth, the outbreak of the Warsaw uprising prior to the revolt in Slovakia had 
disturbed the ever-delicate dynamics within the Grand Alliance. Although SOE had made 
great efforts to re-supply the Polish insurgents in Warsaw when the time came to consider 
lending the same assistance to Slovakia the inherent risks to allied harmony outweighed 
the very minor tactical advantages such assistance would have brought. Moreover, 
neither the British or the United States wanted to upset east-west relations at a time when 
they seemed to be progressing smoothly, and when thoughts were turning to the Soviet 
Union’s future involvement in the war in the Pacific. In any case, Air Marshal Sir John
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Slessor, commander in chief of all RAF forces in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 
had banned further flights to central Europe after the heavy losses over Warsaw.144
Finally, and most importantly, the re-supply by air of isolated ground forces was 
an inexact science in the 1940s. Both the British and the Germans had previously failed 
to supply their own forces in Stalingrad, Tunis, Arnhem and Warsaw (although British 
experiments in Burma had proved more successful).145 Therefore there is no reason to 
suppose that if the west had sent re-supply flights that they would have prevented the 
uprising from failing. Large scale bombing by the RAF and the USAAF might have made 
a difference, but neither London nor Washington ever seriously contemplated this course 
of action.146 At best, regular re-supply may have allowed the insurgents to prolong the 
uprising for a few more weeks, but that would not have been long enough for the Red 
Army to fight its way into central Slovakia. Even this scenario, however, was unlikely 
because at the very start of the uprising German forces had disarmed two Slovak 
divisions in eastern Slovakia and it was these forces that were supposed to have made 
contact with the Red Army.147 Therefore, even if Britain and the United States had had 
the appropriate weapons to send, and a sufficient number of aircraft to carry them such 
re-supply would not have guaranteed the success of the uprising.
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In effect, the uprising was doomed to failure once it was clear that allied ground 
forces would not reach the insurgents in time. It can be concluded, therefore, that the 
uprising was likely to fail from the outset and this had little to do with the levels of 
assistance that the Soviets sent or the west’s refusal to send more.148 Crucially, this shows 
that with close reference to the British files, the persistent myth that direct parallels can 
be drawn between Soviet behaviour during the Warsaw uprising and their behaviour 
towards the Slovaks can be firmly rejected, as can the suggestion that the Soviets refused 
western requests to use their airfields for re-supply flights. As has been clearly illustrated 
the COS’s decisions from as early as September 1944 onwards show that no such 
requests were made. Consequently the reasons why the uprising failed can only be 
comprehended with reference to the military and logistical context.
The Slovak uprising marked a decisive and conclusive alteration in the nature of 
Anglo-Czechoslovak relations. Although the Foreign Office continued to inform Benes 
and his government that they had not lost interest in Czechoslovak affairs the west’s 
failure to support the Slovak uprising, and the sluggish progress of the western allies 
eastward, meant that the Soviet Union looked increasingly likely to play the leading role 
in the liberation of the county.149 SOE had one final chance to provide the equipment and 
supplies it had long promised to the Czechoslovaks -  during the liberation of Prague in 
May 1945. Unfortunately, as had already occurred in Slovakia, the west would prove 
incapable of matching the military assistance proffered by the Soviet Union.
Before April 1945 Britain and the United States had never seriously contemplated 
the prospect that their forces might actually reach Czechoslovak territory, but with the
l4S Cf. Nemecek, et al (eds), Ceskoslovemko-sovetske vztahy, Vol. 2, pp320-321.
149 FO 371 38946 C l6611/1347/12 Eden to Nichols, 27 November 1944.
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rapid advance of their forces across France and Germany early in the year this became a 
possibility, especially as the United States Third Army, under the command of General 
George S. Patton, was on the verge of crossing Czechoslovakia’s western borders by 
mid-April.150 The arrival of United States forces on Czechoslovak territory necessitated 
the resolution of a number of political problems that then arose. A Czechoslovak liaison 
team was despatched to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force’s (SHAEF) 
forward headquarters where they began the task of synchronising policy between these 
forces and the relevant Czechoslovak authorities.151 This development came at much the 
same time that Czechoslovak military authorities in London requested that its Armoured 
Brigade, which had been stationed outside Dunkirk since late 1944, now be employed on 
active operations in order to provide a counter-balance to the influence of the 
Czechoslovak troops fighting with the Red Army, ideally in Germany or on liberated 
Czechoslovak territory. Ripka passed on this request to the British government on 18 
April 1945, but this was denied.153
On 1 May uprisings against the German occupation began in Moravia, organised 
by local national committees, and these revolts spread westward in advance of Soviet 
forces until they reached Prague on 5 May.154 It was these events that briefly re-opened 
the possibility that the Third Army might well be ordered to liberate the last German 
occupied capital in Central Europe.155 These uprisings revived the possibility that the 
SOE would be expected to send supplies to assist them. Moreover, pleas soon emanated
130 C.M. Province, Patton’s 3nl Army. A Daily Combat Diary, New York, 1992, pp247-258.
151 FO 371 47086 N 4701/207/12 from SHAEF forward HQ to Sargent, 27 April 1945.
152 FO 371 47139 N3640/1904/12 Nichols to Eden, 3 April 1945, on talks with General Ingr.
153 FO 371 47139 N4327/1904/12 Nichols to Eden, 18 April 1945, on talks with Ripka.
154 See K. Bartsek, Prazske povstani 1945, Prague, 1961 & M. Mudra, Ceske ndrodni posvstdni v live nit, 
Prague, 1995.
155 FO 371 47086 N4766/207/12 Churchill to Truman, 30 April 1945.
from the Ceslca ndrodni rada (Czech national council), the political body in charge of the 
revolt for military assistance to be sent, be it from the east or the west.156 During the last 
days of the war, therefore, SOE became a crucial nexus between the SCAEF, the British 
and the Czechoslovak authorities and actually provided the first British political 
representative on the ground in Prague after the war.157
This was a somewhat incongruous position as the SOE officer involved, Harold 
Perkins, had close ties with the Poles, had earlier called for the closure of SOE’s Czech 
section and had shown little sympathy for Czechoslovakia’s delicate political position. 
Perkins was with the Third Army in western Bohemia when the uprising started and was 
in contact with a SOE trained Czech officer Captain JaronuT Nechansky, code-named 
Platinum, who was in the capital and kept SHAEF and the Foreign Office informed of the
j  CO ' #
developing situation. In addition, Captain Pavel Hromek, code-named Bauxite, was in 
touch with the Military Representative of the Czech National Council in Moravia.159 It 
was through these contacts that requests for the despatch of supplies and weaponry began 
to reach both SCAEF and SOE.160
SOE had already considered the question of the supply of weaponry to the 
Protectorate and the possibility of supporting any future uprisings back in January 
1945.161 This issue was discussed during the monthly Foreign Office/SOE liaison 
meeting in January 1945, when Gubbins had stressed that what pro-western resistance 
there was in Bohemia would ‘disintegrate unless adequate supplies could be sent to it,
136 Erickson, The Road to Berlin, pp622-640.
157 HS 4/7 & HS 4/51 Perkins’s despatches from Prague to London.
138 FO 371 47086 N5445/07/12 Lieutenant Colonel Boughley, SOE, to Warner, 8 May 1945
159 HS 7 / 108 Keary et al, SOE Country History: Czechoslovakia, pp29-30.
160 HS 4/6 SOE history of the Czech Rising, 17 May 1945 & F.C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, The 
United States in World War II, The European Theatre of Operations, Washington, 1954, pp503-507.
161 See FO 371 47099 N736/259/12 for War Cabinet Office and COS from SOE, 11 January 1945.
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and as the matter stood the available airlift was not sufficient.’162 This question was then 
referred to the COS. They concluded that, although SOE should continue to encourage 
sabotage in the region and supported the sending of at least ten supply flights a month to 
the region, it should be made clear to the Czechoslovak authorities that no supplies would 
be provided for a general rising.163 This was a decision Gubbins reluctantly had to 
accept.164 Thus SOE’s limited ability to send support was recognised as far back as 
January as being of a political, rather than of a military nature. Concern was voiced in the 
Northern Department (re-named after Foreign Office reforms in late 1944) that this 
position was ‘dangerously vague’ and that it was unclear whether the resistance groups in 
the Protectorate were aware that no supplies would be arriving from the west.165
In the event this was exactly what happened when requests from the insurgents in 
Prague were not met with sufficient deliveries of supplies. Hromek was the first to be 
disappointed, as his requests for the delivery of supplies to the insurgents in Moravia 
were not met due to bad weather over Italy, the constantly moving Soviet front line and a 
lack of accurate intelligence on the ground.166 As the situation became more desperate so 
did Hromek’s messages, he radioed (in a rather garbled message) that, ‘That former 
unfortunate Munich, repeat Munich, is repeated from the west,’ on 8 May he added, ‘We 
are hearing from you only excuses as weather or front line. This is our last desperate try.
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106 HS 7 / 108 Keary et al, SOE Country History: Czechoslovakia, pp29-30.
If not successful will be forced to finish with you...’167 After these messages had failed to 
elicit the required response, he did just that and SOE never heard from him again.
SOE did prepare 24 planeloads of equipment and had four parties of agents ready 
to be sent to Prague and RAF did make several drops, but these were infrequent and
ineffectual due to bad weather in Italy and lack of reception committees on the ground.168
Nechansky also forwarded more calls for supplies and aerial support to Perkins, and to 
the Czechoslovak liaison team with SHAEF, but with little effect.169 Eventually on 6 May 
the RAF informed SOE that, ‘they were unable to carry out any operations on the 
following day; no reason was given.’170 The actual reason is not difficult to ascertain - 
Germany surrendered the next day and RAF commanders and crewmen were 
understandably unwilling to risk their lives on active operations now that the war had 
ended.
For a second time in six months SOE had failed to re-supply the resistance in 
Czechoslovakia, this lack of assistance reinforced the belief of many that Czechoslovakia 
had been liberated by the Soviet Union alone and the west had done little to assist 
them.171 Perkins later wrote that, ‘The communists are also making great propaganda out 
of the fact that no help was received from the west.’172 Clearly this was an unsatisfactory 
end to SOE relations with the Czechoslovak exiles and one that may also have 
inadvertently provided the KSC with a significant propaganda victory. For one final time, 
the delicate interaction of political and military considerations had made its effects felt on
167 HS 7 / 108 Keary et al, SOE Country History: Czechoslovakia, pp29-30
168 HS 4/6 SOE history of the Czech Rising, 17 May 1945.
169 FO 371 47086 N5445/07/12 SOE, to Warner, 8 May 1945, FO 371 47159 N5223/5217/12 from BBC 
monitoring of Radio Prague’s calls for help with the uprising & Pogue, The Supreme Command, p504.
170 HS 4/6 SOE history of the Czech Rising, 17 May 1945.
171 HS 4/7 Perkins to Gubbins from Prague 16 May 1945.
172 HS 4/51 SOE to Warner, memorandum of Perkins’s activities in Prague, 16 May 1945.
311
Anglo-Czechoslovak relations. Benes and his government in exile had used military and 
intelligence assets at the beginning of the war in order to secure political recognition, 
while Heydrich’s assassination had pressurised a reluctant Foreign Office to denounce 
the Munich Agreement. But military issues also proved to have negative effects too as the 
Slovak and Prague uprisings amply demonstrated.
When SOE came to assess their relations with the Czechoslovaks during the war, 
which had begun with such high hopes, Heydrich’s assassination was rightly regarded as 
a major coup, but the overall lack of success was categorised in four groups. First, 
direction: SOE never had full control over operations to the Protectorate and liaisons with 
those Czechoslovak officers entrusted with SOE work had always been problematic, most 
of all with Moravec who tended to focus on intelligence gathering rather than sabotage. 
Second, distance and weather. In fact there were only a few days in the year that an 
aircraft could make the journey to the Protectorate under cover of darkness and SOE’s 
work was continually hampered by a chronic lack of aircraft. Third, ‘The over-riding 
claims of Poland,’ a reason that is largely self-explanatory and was amply illustrated by 
SOE’s different approaches to the Warsaw and Slovak uprisings. Finally, the natural 
hesitancy on the part of the COS to give a full and clear directive to the Czechoslovaks, 
due to the failure of Czechoslovak military authorities to give full details of its secret 
army and the fact that by 1944 the COS regarded operations in Czechoslovakia as a 
Soviet commitment.173 Be this as it may by the end of the war it seemed to some people 
in Prague that the west had yet again, as it had done in September 1938 and again in
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March 1939, failed to come to Czechoslovakia’s aid in its hour of need. This was a 
conclusion echoed in SOE’s official history. ‘SOE had done its best: but the whole story, 
from Munich 1938 to the Prague rising of 1945, will serve mainly to teach future 
generations of Czechs that in a crisis little is to be expected from the west.’174
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Conclusion
In many respects British policy towards the Czechoslovak government in 
exile, based in London during the Second World War, was ambiguous, contradictory 
and reactive. This is not to suggest that the British government or the Foreign Office 
were unduly biased against these democratic refugees or uninterested in Central 
European affairs, but rather that the Czechoslovak question came way down the list of 
British wartime priorities. The conduct of the war in Europe and in other theatres, 
domestic and Imperial considerations, relations within the Grand Alliance and with 
other allies and governments in exile (especially with the Free French and the Polish 
governments) all took precedence over issues related to Czechoslovakia. In effect, the 
sheer volume and complexity of Britain’s global interests during this period and 
Winston Churchill’s disinclination to consider long term plans for Europe’s future 
precluded the formulation of a coherent series of policies by the small number of 
officials in the Foreign Office’s Central Department, which also had to deal with 
eleven other countries and contained less than ten staff. As a consequence, British 
policy toward Edvard Benes and his colleagues was hesitant, designed to avoid any 
unwarranted or unforeseen commitments and was largely formed in response to 
policy initiatives instigated by the exiles themselves. Those British policies that did 
emerge, therefore, were all formulated in reaction to Benes’s objectives and goals, 
such as those on the question of political recognition and economic relations, the re­
establishment of a Czechoslovak state, relations with the other exiled governments in 
London, military support for uprisings on occupied territory, tripartite relations with 
the Soviet Union and the proposed transfer of the Sudeten German population.
The incremental nature of British policy toward the Czechoslovak emigres 
was most clearly demonstrated by the slow progress of the recognition question, a
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process that lasted nearly two and half years. The British authorities reluctantly 
recognised a Czechoslovak National Committee in December 1939, then based in 
Paris, but only did so because of the earlier recognition granted by the French 
authorities. The subsequent recognition of a Provisional Czechoslovak government in 
London in July 1940 was only agreed to because of the perilous military situation 
Britain then faced. These were factors that the Central Department accepted even 
though such enhanced political recognition went against its own advice on this issue. 
The final phase of the recognition process that ended in July 1941 was again 
motivated by external influences, this time by the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union and Moscow’s swift and unreserved recognition of Benes’s government. 
During all three stages of this process, therefore, the British authorities were reluctant 
to grant increased political recognition to Benes and his colleagues, but were impelled 
to do so by the course of events, Benes’s political sophistication and his relentless 
determination to prevail. Benes’s resolve was again demonstrated by the dramatic 
reversal of British policy on the Sudeten German question and on his government’s 
relations with the Soviet Union in 1942 and 1943.
From the beginning of the war onwards British attitudes towards the 
Czechoslovak emigres were quite explicit, even if the resulting policy was not; they 
were designed to extract the greatest possible levels of cooperation from the 
Czechoslovak emigres on military, intelligence, economic and industrial matters 
while proffering the minimum level of support for Benes’s political agenda. While 
this position was solely motivated by British self-interest and the wish to avoid any 
long term commitments in Central Europe that might prove impossible to implement, 
it was one that complicated bi-lateral relations. The roots of this approach lay in the 
fact that Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist in March 1939 and there was little
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enthusiasm within the Foreign Office to see this ‘indefensible mosaic5 resurrected. 
Moreover, there was very little the British authorities could actually do to alter this 
situation, nor did they want to antagonise those states that had benefited from 
Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment, such as Poland and Hungary. Consequently, the 
Foreign Office accepted this situation and gave little consideration to issues related to 
the former Czechoslovakia until the outbreak of war in September 1939. By way of 
contrast Benes and his colleagues created an ‘action abroad’ in the United States that 
summer, which was dedicated to the annulment of the Munich Agreement and the 
reestablishment of the Czechoslovak state. This difference in approach proved crucial, 
as from the outset of relations the Czechoslovak exiles had a clearly defined set of 
political objectives, while the British authorities had none. This gave Benes and his 
colleagues a distinct advantage in all subsequent negotiations, as they had explicit 
goals they wished to achieve and using the political, military and intelligence assets at 
their disposal they were repeatedly able to ‘short circuit’ British decision making to 
their advantage, as they demonstrated during the recognition process. They 
demonstrated this ability once again in the summer of 1942 when, in the wake of the 
assassination of Reinhard Heydrich in Prague — an operation assisted by Britain’s 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) -  Benes was able to secure his most cherished 
objective in the face of the Central Department’s strenuous objections: the 
denunciation of Britain’s adherence to the terms of the Munich Agreement.
But it was the powerlessness of the British authorities unilaterally to influence 
events in Central Europe, as was demonstrated in March 1939 and again in May 1945, 
that exerted the largest influence on bilateral relations. It was Britain’s inability to 
project its power into the region, both in reference to Czechoslovakia and Poland, that 
impelled Benes and his government to regularise and formularise their relations (after
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June 1941) with the one allied power that could, the Soviet Union. Although Benes’s 
desire to pursue a foreign policy based on equality between the western and eastern 
allies was understood by the Central Department it was viewed with some suspicion, 
which increased as the Red Army began to advance westward. Indeed, Benes’s 
decision to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1943 was strongly criticised by the 
Foreign Office, not least because of the effect it might have on the Polish government 
in exile, and they repeatedly tried to delay it until Anthony Eden reserved this policy 
at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in October. Yet from the 
Czechoslovak perspective they had little choice but to deal with the Soviet authorities, 
especially given the Polish government’s deteriorating relations with Moscow, and 
the Soviets’ willingness to agree to the post-war recreation of a Czechoslovak state. 
This position was further reinforced by Britain’s refusal to re-supply the Slovak 
Uprising in the autumn of 1944 on the grounds that Czechoslovakia now lay in the 
Soviet zone of military operations.
A further consequence of the British position was that throughout the war the 
Foreign Office maintained a series of reservations regarding its recognition of Benes 
and his government. These were on the ‘juridical continuity’ of the Czechoslovak 
state, a refusal to acknowledge or commit itself to the restoration of any particular 
frontiers in Europe and restrictions on the exiled government’s jurisdiction over the 
Sudeten German emigres in Britain. As a result, unlike the Soviet Union, the Foreign 
Office never officially agreed to the recreation of the Czechoslovak state which was 
Benes’s ultimate objective and it was only in March 1945 that the War Cabinet finally 
agreed that the Czechoslovak government could ‘excise full political authority’ within 
the area bounded by the frontiers of 31 December 1937, at least until the anticipated 
post-war peace conference. This was a largely symbolic gesture, however, as by this
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time the vast majority of Czechoslovak territory was under Soviet control. While 
Britain’s refusal to acknowledge any frontiers in Europe had little effect on those 
allied counties west of the Rhine this policy had quite different consequences for the 
Czechoslovak and Polish governments in exile.
It was in an attempt to address this issue and mutual concerns over security 
that both governments entered into discussions, in late 1939, regarding the possible 
creation of a joint federation after the war. This policy was enthusiastically welcomed 
and supported by the Foreign Office, as it was believed that large federations in 
Central and South-eastern Europe would provide an excellent cordon sanitaire against 
any future threat of German or Soviet expansion. Yet while these federative ideas 
seemed appealing in 1939 and 1940, it was later apparent that the Poles difficult 
relationship with the Soviet Union meant that Moscow would be unable to accept its 
creation. In the event it did not and these British-sponsored plans failed, although 
responsibility for this failure should be equally apportioned amongst all the relevant 
parties. The other problem that faced the British and Czechoslovak authorities was the 
question of the Sudeten German population, who had been the impetus for the Munich 
Agreement in 1938. The Central Department was at first favourably disposed toward 
those Social Democratic Sudeten Germans that had escaped to Britain and they 
protected and assisted them financially, not least Wenzel Jaksch, and encouraged 
Benes to incorporate them into the exiled government. But this support declined as the 
government in exile’s political position strengthened after 1941, and Jaksch’s plans 
for an autonomous Sudeten German region were replaced by proposals for the 
wholesale removal of the German population from Czechoslovakia after the war.
The evolution of these transfers plans and British acceptance of this principle 
provides a unique example of the formation of a joint Anglo-Czechoslovak policy.
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This was because the first concrete proposals for extensive population transfers 
emerged from the Foreign Office’s own Foreign Press and Research Bureau (FPRB) 
in May 1940, which produced a detailed memorandum on this subject in response to 
one of Benes’s speeches. As plans for Central European federations stagnated so both 
the British and Czechoslovak authorities looked for alternative solutions to increase 
security and stability in the region and the transfer of ‘troublesome’ minorities 
became an increasingly attractive, yet controversial, solution. Thus in the wake of 
Pleydrich’s assassination and the denunciation of the Munich Agreement the British 
authorities agreed to the ‘principle of transfers’ in July 1942. The subsequent 
development of these plans by the government in exile and the Foreign Office 
demonstrated that the British authorities were in fact considering far more radical and 
widespread proposals than were the emigres. The eventual acceptance of the 
Czechoslovak government’s proposals by the European Advisory Commission (EAC) 
and later by the members of the Grand Alliance at the Potsdam Conference in August 
1945 resulted in the implementation of these plans after the war. This was an 
unprecedented development for whereas the British government had been willing to 
appease Germany over the Sudeten German question in 1938 so as to avoid war, six 
years later they had completed a dramatic volte-face on this issue.
It is interesting to note that the very last British policy initiative on the 
Czechoslovak question, developed in late April and early May 1945, emanated from 
the highest levels of government and was designed to encourage the United States to 
order its forces to liberate Prague before the Soviet Army. Yet this belated attempt to 
forge a credible western presence in the Czechoslovak capital failed, it had come too 
late and, as had so often been the case, could not be implemented by the British 
authorities themselves. To paraphrase the conclusion of SOE’s own history of its
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relations with the Czechoslovak exiles it could be said that - the British authorities 
had done their best: but the whole story, from Munich 1938 to the Prague rising of 
1945, would serve mainly to teach future generations of Czechs that in a crisis little 
was to be expected from the west.1
The British authorities were consistently cautious in their dealings with Benes 
and his government during the war for one simple reason; no one could predict, with 
any degree of certainty, what the outcome of the war with Nazi Germany and her axis 
allies might be. Consequently, British attitudes on the Czechoslovak question were 
designed to keep open the widest possible number of policy options, so as to be able 
to react and respond to a number of possible post-war scenarios and thus avoid 
untenable commitments. Moreover, after the creation of the Grand Alliance in 1942 
and the growing political and military predominance of the United States and the 
Soviet Union the Foreign Office was increasingly unable unilaterally to commit itself 
to any policy in Central Europe without prior reference to its principle allies. The 
British authorities, therefore, had little choice but to maintain a reserved and cautious 
attitude toward the Czechoslovak government in exile, while warning them not to 
become too reliant on the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Army’s physical 
presence on Czechoslovak territory from early 1944 onwards meant that Benes had 
little alternative but to seek some form of accommodation with Moscow. As the war 
in Europe came to an end in early 1945 the Foreign Office became increasingly 
concerned about Czechoslovakia’s international position, but as had already been 
demonstrated in Poland, there was very little that the British authorities could do to 
influence events. Thus, although the Czechoslovak government in exile had been
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based in Britain for nearly six years it returned to a liberated Prague via Moscow, and 
Czechoslovakia’s future political orientation would not be influenced by the decisions 
made by London.
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